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Russia and Japan: play off!

THROUGH THE SLOT OF NARROW EYES

Moscow

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In the Far East, the interests of many peoples and powers have long been tied into a tight knot...

Russia, Japan, China, Korea, the USA and Western countries... The interconnection of their destinies, the "Far Eastern" "tangle" of problems in the world history of the 19th century is the topic of a new study by Sergei Kremlev (Sergey Brezkun), author of the books "Russia and Germany: pit!", "Russia and Germany: together or apart?" etc. Particular attention in the book is paid to the relations between Russia and Japan, the initial history of which goes back to the time of Catherine the Great...

The ideologue of Victorian Britain, Homer Lee, believed that the day when Germany, Russia and Japan will unite, it will be, it will be the day of the death of the Anglo-Saxon hegemony.

Yes, we can and should be friends with Japan. However, at the end of its history, tsarist Russia was at war with Japan. Why? Is it not because the enemies of Russia quarreled with the Russians with the Japanese in the East just as they quarreled with us with the Germans in the West? They quarreled, mortally afraid of their common union ...

A story about the movement of Russians to the Amur, about the "Heavenly" Chinese Empire and the ancient people of Koryo, about medieval Japan of the Shogun Tokugawa and Japan of the Meiji era, about the intrigues of Count "Polu-Sakhalinsky" Witte and the role of the United States in the Russian-Japanese conflict, and

also about many other things in the new book by Sergei Kremlev.

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With gratitude to Zhenya Galina for all the evenings and weekends given over to work on this book

From the author

Dear reader!

For quite a long time, I have been devoting a lot of effort to researching relations between Russia and Germany over a long historical period. The result was, in particular, four books on the topics "Russia and Germany: play off!", "Russia and Germany: together or apart?", "Russia and Germany: the path to the pact" and "The Kremlin visit of the Fuhrer (Visit of fate)". .. Two more are planned - within the framework of the "Kremlin visit of the Fuhrer" project...

And my work convinces me more and more that, both in the past and in the very possible future, our most constructive partner in the outside world is Germany. The strategic union of the two peoples makes the world hegemony of the Anglo-Saxon West impossible. The absence of this alliance contributes to the growth of the arrogant claims of the world Empire of Evil - the United States.

Today it is becoming more and more clear that our simple-hearted and, alas, often smeared in social idiocy, Russia is the eternal bearer of the idea of World Good, the Power of Good.

Germany, for all its far from justified past ambitions, is the bearer of an active spirit that managed to create a great national power not on the bones of colonial slaves, not with the financial and political support of supranational forces of the Masonic persuasion, but at the expense of enormous daily intellectual and industrial activity.

the Germans themselves...

The combination of the Russian principles of Goodness and the German principles of Active Diligence to this day has a huge potential for global

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values. A German who had been in Russia during the war said in the 1940s to my wife's father: "If we could combine a German man and a Russian woman, then it would be communism" ... A deep and promising thought, if we mean the combination of the best qualities of the two peoples in the name of both their common prosperity and the common prosperity of the peoples of the planet.

However, in a possible international equation that describes the conditions for a stable and just world, there is one more member - Japan. Japan has also achieved phenomenal success already in its initial development since the end of the 60s of the century before last, and also, like the Germans, due to the efforts of its own people.

At the same time, Russia, as it could in the past and in the future, can become a connecting link between the potential leader of Europe - Germany and the potential leader of Asia - Japan. (Let me note parenthetically that China and India, given their systemic role, will be the most important complementary components of such an alliance.)

That is why the evil forces in the world have thwarted and are diligently trying to thwart possible alliances between Russia and its natural strategic partners,

The first place among which in the Far East is occupied by Japan.

It was Japan, after its forcible "opening" by the United States in the second half of the 19th century, that objectively could have supplemented Russia in the East, just as it could have happened with Germany in the West.

To prevent this from happening, Russia and Japan were pitted according to approximately the same scheme as was done with Russia and Germany, moreover, the same forces and with the help of the same figures in Russia (especially Witte should be noted here).

Even more promising and beneficial for the whole world would be, I repeat, a strong alliance between Russia, Germany and Japan, the potential of which, in my opinion, has not yet been lost!

We do not know Japan very well - it is the most interesting and original phenomenon of world history and world civilization. But the events that shaped it, the history of Korea and China related to it, are

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not a roadside of the world development of mankind, but one of its main routes, which ran parallel to the European one and in some ways led its builders further than their pale-faced brothers in mind ...

And the author would very much like that after reading this book the reader began to better understand the past of our eastern neighbors, and themselves, and ...

... And our great, still not completely found itself Russia ... Russia from the Baltic islands of Ezel and Dago to the Kuril Islands, from the polar ice plains to the snowy highlands of the Pamirs ...

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Foreword

AS the author has already informed the reader, he devoted a lot of effort to clarifying the very obvious, but carefully obscured for decades, fact that both bloody Russian-German conflicts in the 20th century were not due to some objective historical, geopolitical, political or ideological factors, but were the result of a lot of work heterogeneous forces to play off the first Russian and German empires, and then -

the nationalist Third Reich and the Soviet Union that overcame Trotskyism...

The mechanism of this bleeding in a systemic sense turned out to be surprisingly similar.

However, I was simply discouraged when, while researching the "Far Eastern" history of Russia, I realized that not only with Germany, we Russians were pitted on an equal footing, as they say, but also with the Japanese we were arranged for a "divorce" on the same in fact, the scheme, as with the Germans.

And this was done for the same purposes as in Europe, and in the interests of the same forces and even, in many respects, the same figures.

First of all, here it is necessary to point out - finally - to Count "Polu-Sakhalinsky" Witte ... I already had to write that this rascal with a thin voice, who quarreled with the Germans, while maintaining a reputation among historians as a Germanophile, cut the Chinese-East with a "saber" railway long-term Russian-Japanese relations.

At the same time, a host (or rather, a pack?) of historians and then exposes him in the eyes of posterity, a "peacemaker" who ensured Russia's peace with Japan.

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Professor Anatoly Arkadyevich Koshkin gave his interesting book "The Japanese Front of Marshal Stalin" the subtitle "The shadow of Tsushima is a century long" ... However, not Tsushima, not Mukden, not the Russo-Japanese War became the reasons

centuries of alienation of Russians and Japanese. Tsushima turned out to be only a logical outcome of the Russian Far Eastern policy, which since the end of the 19th century was rolled along the rails (in the truest sense of the word) of the railway lines to Northern and Southern Manchuria.

And it was Witte who laid the rails there - both steel and political. And he paved in the interests of that Golden Elite of the world, whose headquarters firmly became the United States.

As for Japan...

Looking at old facts and circumstances in a new way, I was struck by the absolute originality of her historical path. And, only peering into it, I realized what a serious, unique and instructive phenomenon - the Japanese factor in the life of mankind.

I looked at many things in a new way in the history of China, Korea, and even Russia ... My new "Far Eastern" interest - growing and growing - gradually turned into a separate book.

The one you, dear reader, are now holding in your hands.

A book about the Russians, the Chinese and the Japanese, the pressure of the Yankees and the Russian fate...

HERE, in the preface, I cannot fail to mention two interesting and non-standard studies of the problem, written by a professional (and hereditary) Japaneseist, Doctor of Historical Sciences Vasily Elinarkhovich Molodyakov ... Youth and enthusiasm are present not only in his surname, but also in his works, and he himself is very young - he is not even forty.

Earlier I already came across his interesting articles about Prince Konoe, and I got acquainted with his new books with interest and pleasure. One of them was published in 2004 under the title "Failed

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the axis Berlin-Moscow-Tokyo. The second, released in 2005, is called Russia and Japan: Beyond the Barriers.

Both of these works are valuable both for their concept and factual material. It is not possible to agree with everything there, but the main idea is completely shared by me ... Yes, Russia could become the core of a strong, natural tripartite alliance of three powers. At the same time, Japan would play the role of one of the global footholds of a new, just world order.

Russia's OUTPUT to the Amur and Primorye created problems for Russia in its relations not with Japan, but with the Chinese Celestial Empire. However, even before the Nerchinsk peace treaty, concluded by Russia with China back in pre-Petrine times - in 1689 - and much later than this period, the conflict never acquired scale, and after 1689 it was never stained with blood ...

However, even before the Nerchinsk Treaty, skirmishes between the Siberian Cossacks and the Manchu detachments did not carry the character of a full-fledged war ... And all the expansions of Russian lands to the Amur and the Pacific Ocean took place, although with the opposition of China, but peacefully.

Russo-Japanese relations could have developed just as peacefully - although also not without problems - a solid foundation for which the Russian patriots tried to lay already in Catherine's time!

I spoke in detail about the long-standing "Japanese" project of Professor Laxman in the book "Russian America: Open and Sell!", And here I will dwell on it, as well as on the embassy of Chamberlain Rezanov, in the preface ... a kind of epigraph to the whole situation around Russia and Japan ... A situation that even before its formation was negatively affected by anti-Russian and anti-Japanese forces ...

NOT THE FIRST, but our most famous attempt to establish direct and

friendly relations with Japan falls on the period of the first Russian round-the-world expedition of captains Kru

zenshtern and Lisiansky ... Chamberlain Nikolai Petrovich Rezanov was appointed Ambassador Extraordinary ...

However, Rezanov's Japanese embassy failed. The Land of the Rising Sun then very strictly limited any contacts with the outside world - which will be discussed in detail later.

Even before the departure of the Kruzenshtern expedition, the Minister of Commerce Rumyantsev submitted to the Tsar on February 20, 1803 a memorandum "On bargaining with Japan", where he wrote:

"It is known that since the time of the terrible persecution of Christians in Japan and the expulsion of the Portuguese from it, only the Batavians (Dutch. - CK) have had this bargain in their hands for about two hundred years. Nature itself, placing Russia adjacent to Japan and bringing both empires together by sea, gives us an advantage over all trading powers and convenience in trade, for which our merchants, it seems, only expect a single approval from the government.

Having outlined all the benefits of trade with Japan, Rumyantsev proposed:

"On this subject, would it not be pleasing to Your Imperial Majesty with the ships now departing for America to appoint a certain family to the Japanese court of the embassy and, using a person with abilities to carry out this important enterprise ... instruct him to make the Japanese court decently correct about the dignity of the Russian Empire suggestion ... and to establish friendly relations between the two empires for the future ... "

In August, Krusenstern's Nadezhda with Rezanov on board and Lisiansky's Neva set sail. At the Sandwich (Hawaiian) Islands, they parted temporarily, and on September 26 (Russian style), 1804, the Nadezhda arrived in Nagasaki, where she was met with extreme precautions. Together with the Japanese there were also the Dutch - outwardly loyal to the Russians, but hardly pleased with their appearance ...

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And, most likely, it was they who inspired the subsequent development events. They could play a dirty trick here, however, and secret English agents.

The next day, the governor of Nagasaki sent gifts of poultry, rice, and fresh fish. On the whole, a regime of captivity was established. Only on December 17, Rezanov was settled in the town of Megesaki in a house that looked like a prison.

Two months later, on February 19, Russian style, 1805, the ambassador was informed that the Japanese emperor was sending his "commissar" to him. A month later, it became known that Emperor Rezanov would not honor an audience, and on the morning of March 20, his envoy finally arrived from the capital. Negotiations began on March 23 (April 3), 1805, and ended quickly and deplorably. The Russian ambassador was presented with letters forbidding Russian ships to ever land on the shores of Japan.

April 18 "Nadezhda" left these shores and went to sea ...

Then Rezanov visited Russian America, in California he fell in love with the daughter of the commandant of the Spanish fortress of San Francisco, Maria de la Concepción d'Arguello, was engaged to her, and soon, forced to urgently leave for St. Petersburg, fell ill on his way back to the Russian capital and on March 1, 1807 died in Krasnoyarsk. His death was unexpected and ... very beneficial to the enemies of Russia.

Accident?

Maybe...

However, in the history of the initial Russo-Japanese contacts, there are two more than interesting fates that also ended in strange deaths ...

It's about father and son Laxman.

A native of Finland, Eric (Kirill) Laxman-father, after studying at the university in Abo, moved to St. Petersburg at the age of 25. In 1770 he was elected an academician "in economics and chemistry", in 1780

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permanently moved to Siberia, visiting the capital on short trips and enjoying well-deserved respect in the metropolitan scientific world.

In 1791, the Japanese Kodai was wrecked off the Russian coast and, together with his companion was brought to Irkutsk, from where they were sent to the court.

The Japanese are escorted to the capital by Laxman, and there he invites Catherine to take advantage of the opportunity to send the victims home and establish relations with Japan. The proposal was accepted, and its author was entrusted with the development of instructions for the expedition. And Eric's second son, Captain Adam Erikovich Laxman, was ordered to go with the Japanese on this unprecedented trip.

On September 13 (Old Style), 1792, on the anniversary of Catherine's signing of the decree on the "Japanese" expedition, Adam went to sea on the galliot "Saint Catherine". In fact, the embassy was a political act, but formally, Adam Laksman brought to Japan letters from just something from the Irkutsk Governor-General, gifts from his own name and gifts from his father to three Japanese scientists.

October 9, 1792 "Catherine" entered the harbor of Nemuro on the northern coast of the island of Hokkaido, but only on April 29, 1793, a Japanese embassy of two hundred (!) People arrived in Nemuro with a response from the emperor. Laxman was asked to deliver two of his wards to the southernmost port of Hokkaido - Matsumae on a Japanese ship.

Laxman nonetheless took the Ekaterina to Hakodate, a port a hundred kilometers northwest of Matsumae. In Hakodate, the authorities received him extremely kindly, but completely isolated him from any contact with residents.

As a result of more than difficult negotiations, Laksman obtained permission for one Russian ship to dock once a year in the port of Nagasaki. As the reader later becomes more familiar with Japanese history, he will realize that Adam's success was virtually unbelievable.

Upon his return, Laxman was called with his father to Petersburg, received the rank of captain and was intended for a new expedition, which was supposed to be equipped in 1795. The scientific part of the order

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went to Eric Laxman, and the trading one went to Grigory Shelikhov, the famous founder of Russian America...

But the expedition did not take place. Shelikhov died suddenly in Irkutsk on July 20, 1795, Laxman on January 5, 1796 on his way back to Siberia. And also suddenly, overnight ... Moreover, both were in excellent health, and their summers were not exactly advanced.

Shortly after the death of his father, young Adam Laxman also died.

And now, in the last three deaths, there is every reason to assume the hand of the ubiquitous and eternally spoiling Russia of the "Englishwoman" ... So it is not surprising that twenty years after the success (alas, unfixed) of Adam Laxman - a man without a serious position and supreme powers, a chamberlain - and Ambassador Extraordinary Rezanov was already expecting a complete collapse of his mission.

Why? After all, Rezanov represented Russia at the highest official level!

He was a dignitary, an emergency minister! In order not to irritate the Japanese, who do not tolerate Christians, Rezanov even ordered to temporarily remove pectoral crosses - especially for sailors who walked with an open chest. Nevertheless, he did not even achieve confirmation of what a modest army lieutenant had achieved from the Japanese before him ...

Why?

Is it not because, if Rezanov succeeded, Russia could be the first of the world powers to peacefully interrupt the self-isolation of Japan, which the United States will rudely interrupt only half a century later?

The failures of the first Russian embassies to Japan became, as it were, a prologue to the constant failures of our "Japanese" policy, first in the 19th, and then in the 20th century. While the US and Western countries were actively building up their influence in Japan, Russia allowed the West and its internal agents in Russia to actively confront Japan. The systemic peak of the situation was the Russo-Japanese War...

The "Chinese" policy of the tsarist government was no more clever ... And - "Korean"...

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However, even today the Russian-Chinese border runs along the Amur... And huge China begins on its right bank. And in Primorye, the sentries of the Motherland are still guarding a narrow strip of our border with People's Korea ...

In relations with these two of our continental Far Eastern neighbors, as well as in relations with Japan, Russia at the turn of the century before last and the last century missed very tempting opportunities ... The reader will soon find out about all this and many other things for himself.

And I hope that new knowledge will give impetus to a new understanding of the old, however still unresolved issues.

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And one more warning...

At the end of 1919, Vasily Alekseevich Maklakov, a landowner, a member of the Central Committee of the Cadets Party and the ambassador of the Provisional Government in Paris (by that time representing already white Russia in the "capital of the world"), reported to General Anton Ivanovich Denikin: "According to Churchill, I can assure you - about which he promised to telegraph you personally, that they (that is, the British. - S.K.) continue and will continue to send you weapons. They ask you not to be embarrassed that the blockade on Russia is being lifted. This is actually a very difficult question..."

The "difficult question" for the Whites was that in England they began to slowly come to the conclusion that the orientation towards Denikinism and the Whites was hopeless. at all. And some of the British elite - and here Anton Ivanovich's mustaches drooped completely - even thought about recognizing the Bolsheviks.

There were, however, in England directly opposite sentiments, as Denikin was informed by the famous cadet professor Pavel Nikolaevich Milyukov. The essence of these Anglo-Saxon sentiments was formulated by him without circumlocution: to allow Germany, which had just suffered a defeat in the First World War, to partially restore its military power and "to allow Germany and Japan to do away with Bolshevism, providing them with serious economic benefits in Russia."

This is how they expected to "unite" the destinies of the three world powers on the banks of the Thames. The same, no doubt, wanted on the shores of the Washington Potomac. And here it is not only the fact of the existence of such sentiments that is interesting, but also the fact that even then there were forces in the world that saw a possible

interdependence of relations between Russians, Germans and Japanese and feared that

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that this mutual dependence will develop along the paths of peace, not war.

So, the Anglo-Saxons assumed that the fates of Russians and Germans could cross again. At the same time, as Anton Ivanovich himself later reported: "These assumptions found a very sympathetic response on the banks of the Spree, far, however, from the optimistic aspirations of the British. Quite indicative in this respect was the appearance in 1918 of a popular book by the German professor W. Daya, who preached "a new tripartite alliance of the 20th century—Germany, Russia, and Japan."

DEAR my reader! A smart German professor looked at the problem very sensibly! And it turns out that in Germany at that time there were many of his no less far-sighted like-minded people who understood well that it was vital for the Germans to ensure such a state of affairs when the interests of Germany, Russia and Japan would be united into something interconnected not by strife, but by alliance!

So in 1919, not only the specter of communism roamed Europe, but also another, albeit more ephemeral, but also a terrible specter for the Anglo-Saxons and French... The specter of the Russian-German union.

Here is how another European correspondent of General Denikin, Count Vladimir Nikolaevich Kokovtsov, wrote about this in his letter dated September 17, 1919: "Here a painful thought begins to break through, no matter how the terrible prospect of mutual rapprochement of Germany, Russia, Japan might one day arise and Italy..."

Truly, our enemies often see Russian advantage better than we see it ourselves. And when they see it, they make every effort to ensure that this benefit does not become obvious to us ...

And here is something to think about! After all, the anti-Russian forces themselves at the beginning XX century united in their political nightmares

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into a friendly alliance are those three countries that in the 20th century twice found themselves in a pairwise military conflict with each other.

I have already said a lot about the significance of a possible strategic partnership between Russia and Germany in three books covering the period from the end of the 19th century to the beginning of the German-Polish war of 1939, which in a matter of days grew into a European war.

Such a partnership would be a truly terrible reality for the enemies of Russia, because it would destroy all their plans to establish the world domination of America - the new residence of the Golden Capital.

With Germany, everything becomes clear quickly enough - you just need to peer into our common history with her carefully and carefully.

Well, what about Japan? And, by the way, with China? Also, the problem is not small!

Yes, and the long Pacific history of Russian-American relations does not interfere with pulling out more often by the ear and into the sun. Moreover, there is enough of it in the Far East ...

In THIS book, dear reader, we have to learn a lot and understand a lot... I will explain something here myself, something, I hope, will become information for the reader's own reflections and conclusions.

The "Japanese" aspect here will be only one of several, but I would like to say something about it additionally and separately. After all, even in those days when Japan was a completely closed country for the outside world (we have yet to tell about this), in 1851 Lord Palmerston was already afraid of a possible "bundle" "Central Europe (essentially Germany. — S.K.) - Russia - East Asia

(Where, two decades later, Japan began to rapidly progress. - S.K.).

That is, our enemies have long been afraid of an alliance not only of Germany and Russia, but also the union of Russia and Japan.

And the famous German geopolitician Karl Haushofer understood this.

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In 1940 (!) he wrote the book "The Continental Block (Central Europe, Eurasia, Japan)". It was published in Munich in 1941 (!!)

It is far from possible to agree with everything in this book, but there are many interesting ideas that are still promising to this day. However, it is not even Haushofer himself that I would like to quote now, but the passage in his book which speaks of an assessment of a possible alliance of the three powers by a clear enemy of these powers.

"From the heyday of the Victorian world empire," Haushofer reported, "is the warning voice of another imperialist, Homer Lee, author of the famous book on Anglo-Saxon world affairs. In this book, regarding the alleged rise of the British world empire, one can read that the day when Germany, Russia and Japan are united will be the day that determines the fate of the English-speaking world power, the death of the gods."

So, the clever Anglo-Saxons understood the danger for themselves of such a triple union back when Japan was very, very weak.

But there is, let me remind you once again, in the Far East both China and Korea, and across the Pacific Ocean - America ... And there is Europe, which is far from indifferent to the problems of the Far East ...

And all this existed and exists not separately, but intertwined and interacting. So, dear reader, it does not hurt us to take a closer look at

take a closer look at our long-standing Far Eastern and Pacific affairs.

This part of the all-Russian life took place and is taking place "far from Moscow", but it is also a part of our life.

The Far East - although it is distant, however - is "ours".
Is not it?

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Chapter 1

Erofey Pavlovich, Count Muravyov and the Heavenly Empire

SO, we start...

The author and the reader have a lot ahead: a story about the history of self-isolation, and then about the dramatic development of Japan, about the no less dramatic decrepitude of the ancient Chinese empire by the beginning of the 20th century ... And something else ...

The fate of Captain Nevelsky and Count Muravyov-Amursky, the plans of American Jewish bankers and the cunning, vile machinations of Count Witte, foreign intervention in the Civil War and the drama of Admiral Kolchak...

All this is ahead of us ...

Until then...

In the meantime, let's turn to geographical maps ...

TO better understand the political map of the world, it is sometimes necessary reflect on the physical map of the native planet.

So let's look at the top right of these two cards and compare...

Here is Soviet Eastern Siberia and the Far East, painted light red. Across the Bering Strait - grayish Alaska, the former Russian land ... From it to Russia stretch the grayish, "state" color Aleutian Islands - also former Russians ...

And here is gray-purple Mongolia, surrounded by Russia and China, and here is and China itself is yellow.

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And there, somewhere quite to the east, a little green Korea separates the Yellow and Japan Seas...

Korea and China are separated by land, by the way, the Yalu and Tumen rivers ... We are talking about them remember.

The border between Russia and China from Kazakhstan and - through Mongolia - to the Chinese city of Manchuria, located near the Chinese lake Dalaynor, although winding, stretches more or less smoothly.

On the other hand, from Manchuria to Vladivostok, the border juts out into the depths of Russia so clearly that one really wants to straighten this protrusion somehow. But, from the geopolitical point of view, taking into account the naturalness of the borders, it cannot be straightened in any way!

Mountains don't.

And rivers...

The Greater Khingan ridge "bulges out" the border towards Russia, and it also determines the course of the border rivers: at first, the Argun, and after the connection of the Argun and Shilka with the Amur-father, the Amur itself.

At Khabarovsk, the Amur turns seven hundred kilometers steeply to the north, to the Tatar Strait between the Seas of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan.

There, the Amur is already squeezed out by the Sikhote-Alin ridge, so memorable to the Russian reader on the wanderings of Arsenyev and his faithful companion, gold Dersu Uzala.

And the same ridge turns to the Amur is the last major border river - the Ussuri.

The Sungachi flows into the Ussuri, flowing again from the Arseniev Lake Khanka.

And there it's already close to Posyet Bay and - at the very narrow border with Korea - a small lake Hassan.

In the 1930s, the Chinese territory of this protrusion of the border was occupied by Japan. The Japanese were then in Manchuria, where in the area of the Dalaynor and Buir-Nur lakes, a short (only 233 kilometers) Khalkhin-Gol river flows.

The river is small, but famous. Although we are talking about this, with the permission of the respected reader, we'll talk later...

First, let's fast forward to the first third of the 17th century ...

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OF COURSE, both in time it is far away, and in place such a journey is not close. However, having undertaken it, we learn that in 1638 the Cossack ataman Maxim Perflyev was sent from Yeniseisk at the head of a detachment of 36 people in search of convenient ways to the Amur.

Much later, the Governor-General of Eastern Siberia, Count Nikolai Nikolaevich Muravyov, rightly believed that Siberia was owned by the one who controlled the left bank and the mouth of the Amur.

I would only add to this formula the right bank of the Ussuri, because between the almost one hundred and eighty-degree solution formed by the Lower Amur and the Ussuri lies that Primorye, which finally leads the Russian lands to the Great, Eastern, Pacific Ocean.

We will still remember about Nikolai Nikolaevich and his associates, about Nevelsky and Zavoiko, about Russian sailors and soldiers, but we must also say a good word about their long-standing predecessors.

For example, the old Russian governors did not always slurp cabbage soup with bast shoes. And they did not disagree with their later colleague in assessing the importance of the Amur for Russia. That is why active Russian people were sent to its shores.

For what?

The simple answer is for a new yasak (tribute), for the conquest of new "yasak" peoples... But this is not only a simple answer, but also the wrong answer... Not only in Russian fairy tales, but also in Russian life of that time, the heroes followed to distant lands, to a distant kingdom, because it was to their liking, because a Russian person - if he is really a Russian person - is accustomed to a wide step and a wide swing ...

Moreover, they went not so much with weapons in their hands (although they had to hold weapons in their hands), but with the ability to treat a foreign people with respect, which is characteristic of Russians. We are not angels, but national arrogance is not in the Russian national character (I am not talking about the caricature of him - the "racist" character).

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A convenient way at that time was the water way. Perfiliev walked on the water, although it was necessary to cross with heavy portages.

The ataman, however, did not reach Amur. The "written head" Vasily Poyarkov, sent already from Yakutsk, reached him.

Although Poyarkov could not gain a foothold on the Amur shores.

And in the spring of 1649, the year after the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 in Europe, which fixed the fragmentation of Germany for centuries, the expedition of Yerofei Pavlovich Khabarov began the journey from Ilmsk to the river, called the "sea" by the natives.

There is a station Erofei Pavlovich on the Trans-Baikal Railway. So this is - in honor of him, Khabarov. I don't know how anyone, but it seems to me that if Khabarov himself had to answer the question: what is more pleasant for him - a big city that bears his last name, or a small station of his name and patronymic, then he would give primacy to this station. It's very cool someone came up with it!

And what a shame! After all, we know how, my dear reader, we know how to sometimes respect ourselves and our best people. Respect sincerely and intelligently ... But, alas, we know how and want this by no means always ...

Two and a half centuries after the Khabarovsk epic, Anton Pavlovich Chekhov traveled through Eastern Siberia and the Far East, then writing a series of essays "From Siberia" and "Sakhalin Island" ...

There were also the following observations:

"It is interesting that on Sakhalin they give names to villages in honor of Siberian governors, prison guards and even paramedics, but they completely forget about researchers like Nevelskoy, sailor Korsakov (hydrograph Voin Andreevich Rimsky-Korsakov. - S.K.), Boshnyak, *Polyakov* and many others, whose memory, I believe, deserves more respect and attention than any caretaker of Durbin, who was killed for cruelty.

Fair...

But let's go back to the time of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich (whose son, Pyotr Alekseevich, we will still have a reason to talk about) ...

In June 1652, the Yenisei governor sent to establish the Russian authorities in Transbaikalia a hundred Cossacks with a centurion Pet

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rum Ivanovich Beketov. Beketov crossed Baikal, went to Shilka, at the mouth of the Nercha River he set up a fortress-fortress Nerchinsk and went further - to the Amur.

He wandered for more than three years and for the first time traced the entire Amur, from the confluence Shilka and Argun to the mouth (and this is almost three thousand kilometers!) And back ...

In the fifties of the 17th century, the Cossacks of Ivan Ivanovich Kamchaty walked along the western coast of the Kamchatka Peninsula (then, however, it was not called that yet).

Historians to this day have not decided: whether he gave his name to the Kamchatka River, and

then the peninsula, or is it just an amazing coincidence. In any case, when the Russian Cossacks first came to these lands, the local land was called Nos, or Lamsky Nose - according to the Lamsky (Okhotsk) Sea, from the Evenki "lam" ("sea"). And the appearance of the name "Kamchatka" (in the beginning - by the river) dates back to the time of Kamchatka's campaigns.

So the roll call of geography and fate is obvious.

At the very end of the century, on the eve of the time of Peter the Great, the Cossack Vladimir Vladimirovich Atlasov passes to Kamchatka by land, thoroughly proceeding from it, and finally consolidates it as a Russian possession.

The white émigré poet Rosenheim has not very perfect, but captivating sincerity lines:

"From century to century, from century to century,

There was a strong Russian man

To the far north and east

Unstoppable like a stream.

With a bad rifle over my shoulder

Or with the same axe,

With a loaf of bread in a purse,

Having bowed to the native land,

From an unsightly life

He went to unknown lands

Through the tundra, rivers and ridges,

Through the rapids and heights,

While in the unknown distance

He didn't come to the ends of the earth

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Where there was nowhere to go

Where across his path

Dressed in storms and mist

A boundless ocean arose...

It is said sincerely ... It's a pity that it didn't occur to the emigrant imbued with monarchical elegiac melancholy that the "immense ocean" did not become an obstacle for strong Russian people, and they left "with a loaf of bread in their purse" for him - to Alaska, to California ... But by the time of Rosenheim, it was embarrassing to remember Russian America in white emigration - it was not the Bolsheviks who sold it, but the tsar.

And one more thing... Just as you can't erase words from a song, so from our history it's not worth throwing away pages that don't color us ...

So, Vladimir Vladimirovich Atlasov lived gloriously, faithfully served Russia and Tsar Peter ... But he died sadly, at the hands of his own ...

In January 1711, a Cossack detachment in Kamchatka rebelled and moved to Nizhnekamchatsk - to get Atlasov ... Vladimir Vladimirovich was cool, and the Cossacks, although the times were already firmly Peter's, still lived in terms of the archery freemen. And, it seems, they were not very eager for the new campaign conceived by Atlasov. Before reaching the place half a verst, they chose the delegates, or rather, the killers. They handed over a fake letter, punishing them with a knife in the back when the ataman starts

read...

Thus ended the life of Atlasov, by the definition of Pushkin - "Kamchatka Yermak."

But even with Yerofey Pavlovich Khabarov, not everything went smoothly. In 1653, an envoy from the tsar arrived in his detachment from Moscow with awards, including those for the ataman. But he removed Khabarov from power, and when Khabarov did not obey, he beat him and took him to Moscow, robbing him along the way.

True, the tsar granted Khabarov to the "children of the boyars" and gave him "feeding"

several villages near Ilimsk. But it was not possible to return to Amur Khabarova.

And torn...

In fairness, I will inform you that in January 1687, my own

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sailors killed the Frenchman Rene Robert Cavelier de La Salle, the first explorer of the Mississippi ...

And the famous Henry Hudson, the English explorer of North America, died in the same year as Atlasov, in the waves of that bay, which was later named after him. Died, landed with his family in a boat rebellious crew.

Cowardice and meanness, alas, are international.

However, I digress, and on the Amur it's already the 19th century, the year 1842 ... And on the initiative of the outstanding Russian German academician Karl Maksimovich von Baer, an expedition of another Russian German, Alexander Fedorovich Midderdorf, who laid the foundations for the annexation of the Amur Territory to Russia, is heading there .

And by 1855, the lower reaches of the Amur were thoroughly explored by Captain Nevelskoy.

HISTORY Gennady Ivanovich Nevelskoy deserves to dwell on it in more detail, telling here also about his boss and patron - Count Nikolai Nikolayevich Muravyov-Amursky.

Coming from an old noble Russian family, Muravyov was born in 1809, fought, was wounded in the Caucasus, received George of the 4th degree for bravery, at thirty-eight years old, with the rank of major general, was appointed Tula governor and one of the first among his colleagues - governors raised the issue of the release of the peasants. And - with the earth.

In 1848, Nicholas the First appointed Muravyov Governor-General of Eastern Siberia to Irkutsk, and that period of his life began, which would bring him the extension of his surname to the prefix "Amursky".

This "geographical" title was fully earned by the count, because he thought about researching the lower reaches of the Amur back in St. Petersburg and there he made acquaintance with the future Amur hero, captain-lieutenant Nevelsky.

At that time it was believed (and this opinion was supported by the author

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tetom of Laperouse and Kruzenshtern) that there is an isthmus between the mainland and Sakhalin (that is, that Sakhalin is a peninsula), and that the mouth of the Amur is blocked by shoals impassable for large ships.

The thirty-nine-year-old Governor-General Muravyov was very worried about the accessibility of the Amur from the sea. And the thirty-four-year-old captain-lieutenant Nevelskoy, appointed in 1847 at his own request as the commander of the Baikal military transport, was eager to clarify this issue.

Anticipating the story that is just ahead of us, I will note that at that time Russian America still existed, and securing for Russia both shores of the Pacific Ocean in this zone was a most important matter.

IN 1848 Nevelskoy's "Baikal" leaves Kronstadt across the Atlantic around Cape Horn to the Pacific Ocean, to Kamchatka - with supplies there from the sea departments.

Muravyov seeks from the chief of the Main Naval Staff, Prince Menshikov (the same one who later commanded the troops in the Crimean War), a special instruction for Nevelskoy: to explore the mouth of the Amur and Sakhalin after the delivery of the cargo.

Having received the instruction, Muravyov sends it to Kamchatka to Nevelsky with the staff captain Mikhail Semenovitch Korsakov (Karsakov), his relative and later his successor as General

governor.

Korsakov did not find Nevelsky, because he - as a "strong Russian man" - at his own peril and risk, had already moved from Petropavlovsk Kamchatsky directly to Sakhalin and to the Amur estuary.

While the "Baikal" was engaged in sounding and cartographic survey of the coast, making discovery after discovery, Muravyov sailed to Kamchatka on the ship "Irtys" and soon left there, everywhere asking about Nevelskoy on the way back.

The rumors were disappointing, but Muravyov stayed in
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fort Ayan on the coast of Okhotsk near the Dzhugdzhur ridge to clarify the situation. He did not know that Nevelskoy, returning to Petropavlovsk, was also going there. But not without reason the dashing captain called one of the bays he discovered the Bay of Happiness.

Happiness accompanied him, and soon Muravyov saw Nevelsky's ship entering the Ayan raid. The joy of the governor was so great that he did not give a damn about etiquette and went to the Baikal on the first boat that came across.

Ah, dear reader! The scene of the meeting of the Anglo-Saxon journalist Stanley with Livingston, found by him in the wilds of Africa, is widely known. However, you and I need to know the scene of the meeting between the Russians Muravyov and Nevelsky.

Here the boat approaches the side of the wearily swaying, battered ship, and the chief commander of the Russian fleet in the waters of the Pacific Ocean rises to the deck along the storm ladder.

Weathered by a semi-circumnavigation, the captain of the Baikal salutes and, instead of greeting according to the statute, impetuously, without even titles to the authorities, reports:

Sakhalin is an island!

- Cupid?

- The mouth of the Amur is accessible to sea vessels, the depth of the strait between the coast and Sakhalin - five fathoms!

- Tired?

"Tired, Your Excellency!"

- Well done! Well done...

Alas, it was only a joyful beginning of a difficult and often sad story.

Muravyov sent Nevelsky and Korsakov to the capital with reports of discoveries, but in the "ruling spheres" the news caused only cruel ...
discontent.

I don't think that it mattered at least some importance that such a dashing and experienced navigator as Baron Ferdinand Petrovich Wrangel (besides -
corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences), earlier
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presented a report to Nikolai, where he stated that the mouth of the Amur was accessible only to shallow-draft boats. Nikolai wrote on this: "I am very sorry, the question of the Amur, as a useless river, should be set aside."

Nevelskoy refuted Wrangel, and even "arbitrarily", but Ferdinand Petrovich was not the right person to be angry about this. No, the main role here was played by the combination of the state stupidity of the highest Petersburg bureaucracy with, perhaps, direct treason. And the first role here was played by Foreign Minister Karl Nesselrode.

If in Griboedov's times the Famusovs were most worried about what "Princess Marya Aleksevna" would say (now, in Putin's time, this legendary princess was replaced by "friend" Bush and other "friends"), then real state and secret advisers had a headache thinking about the possible

displeasure of England, "friendly" China, "friendly" (wow - and then "friendly"!) America...

The fact that Qing imperial China is "friendly" to us as long as we clap our ears on the Amur was not taken into account, and Nevelskoy seemed an unacceptable troublemaker.

Russian activity was not to the liking of those international, or rather - supranational forces, to which such activity confused all their long-term anti-Russian plans since the time of Peter the Great and whose agent in Russia was Nesselrode. Yes, and he is not alone.

Even before the opening of Nevelskoye, the Special Committee, chaired by Nesselrode, with the participation of Minister of War Count Chernyshev, Quartermaster General Berg and other high-ranking bastards, decided to recognize the Amur basin as belonging to China and abandon it forever.

That's how it was, reader!

And then some Nevelskoy ...

N-yes...

Only the arrival of the East Siberian governor himself and his report to Nikolai somehow saved the situation. Nevelskoy came out dry

from the state capital's ink "waters" and safely returned to the waters of the Sea of Okhotsk.

And there, foreign (English and American mostly) ships were already approaching the mouth of the Amur. And Gennady Ivanovich risks again! On his own initiative, he enters the Amur, rises to the Gilyak village of Tyr and announces that the local population will henceforth come under the arm and protection of the Russian emperor.

The exact status of the Amur lands was not then determined by interstate treaties, and the act of the Russian sailor had far from local significance, which I will talk about later.

On August 14, 1850, Nevelskoy, in order to reinforce his word with deeds, founds the first Russian settlement on the banks of the lower Amur - Fort Nikolaevsky Post (now - Nikolaevsk-on-Amur) and raises the Russian flag over it.

By the way, just eight years later, Stepa Makarov, our future great naval commander, Admiral Stepan Osipovich, entered the nautical school opened in Nikolaevskoye ...

Muravyov is delighted with the decisive action of his protégé, and the tsarist Council of Ministers ... And he - clench your teeth and fists, dear reader - he, at the suggestion of Nesselrode, decides ... to bring Nevelsky to a military court as a harmful person and "pushing the Fatherland to imminent danger...

Eh!

And again, everything is decided only by Muravyov's personal audience with Nikolai. The governor and the captain were awarded, and Nikolai summed up: "Where the Russian flag is once raised, it should not be lowered."

Alas, his son will criminally violate this principle by lowering the Russian flag over Russian America ...

But Nevelskoy, with his "criminal" act in the eyes of the St. Petersburg high-ranking bastard, in fact, accomplished a great civic feat. Exactly - a feat, considering that the time of big events and dynamic decisions was just beginning in the Far East.

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NEW times began for Russia, for China...

They were about to start for Japan as well.

And the reason was the activation of the Far Eastern searchlights and appetites

Western Europe and USA. And only the Far East? On the nose of Europe was already the Crimean War.

However, it was only called "Crimean", and its events sometimes unfolded not only on the bastions of Sevastopol, but also in view of the mighty forts of Kronstadt, and the weak fortifications of the De-Kastri coastal post in the Tatar Strait ...

The Kamchatka military governor and commander of the Petropavlovsk port, Major General Vasily Stepanovich Zavoiko (later admiral) in August-September 1854 led the valiant defense of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky from the attack of the Anglo-French squadron of Rear Admiral Depointe and Admiral Price.

It consisted of three frigates: the French "Fort" with 60 guns, the English "President" with 50 and the "Peak" with 46 guns; the French corvette Eurydice with 30 guns, the French brig Obligado with 12 guns and the English steam ship Virago with 6 guns.

In total - 204 "allied" guns against 75 Russian guns 44-cannon frigate "Aurora", 12-gun transport "Dvina" and 19 guns of three coastal batteries.

I had to show heroism, which was not unusual for the Russians.

I, my dear reader, have tried to confine myself further to a brief summary of the defense of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky. But could it be possible to resist and not say about this defense, which is actually unknown to us today, at least what is said below?!

Before the arrival of the "Dvina" (it was she who brought the news of the war), Zavoiko had only 283 people at her disposal. "Dvina" brought another 300, and soon reinforcements of 400 people arrived, led by Captain Alexander Pavlovich Arbuzov (I do not exclude that he was the son of a participant in the first Russian round-the-world trip

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Viy in 1803-1806 Lieutenant Commander Pavel Petrovich Arbuzov). The combatants recruited a little more than 800 people - the Allies suffered their first loss even before the start of hostilities. And it's impossible not to talk about her.

On the morning of August 30, Admiral Price strolled along the deck of the President and, seemingly calmly, discussed with Captain Burrige the disposition adopted on the evening of August 29. The day before, Price personally conducted a reconnaissance of the Russian fortifications and the theater of the upcoming battle on the Virago steamer (under a false, by the way, American flag). And with annoyance he was convinced that the Aurora, which had eluded him from the Peruvian harbor of Callao, and the Dvina, which the Allies had missed in the area of the Sandwich (Hawaiian) Islands, had broken into Petropavlovsk.

After taking a walk with Burrige, Price quickly went into the cabin, in front of the astonished captain, took a pistol from the pistol box, put the muzzle to his heart and pulled the trigger.

Death came instantly. And there was only one explanation - even before the battle (!) Price despaired of taking the city and capturing the Russian ships that he had previously missed. And I decided to make amends for my mistake in this way.

Despointes had to take over command, and the bombardment of the shore began.

Captain Arbuzov quarreled with Zavoiko the day before and, dismissed by him from his post, immediately entered the Aurora as a volunteer under the command of Captain Ivan Nikolayevich Izylmetev.

But an honest common battle is the best means for reconciliation, and a day later Arbuzov returned to his soldiers, gathered them and said:

"Now, friends, I am with you again, and I swear by George, whom I honestly wear fourteen years that I will not disgrace the name of the commander!

The answer to him was "Hurrah!", And Arbuzov finished:

"If you see me as a coward, then stab me with a bayonet, and on the dead - spit!

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New bombardments began. Hundreds of guns thundered, began and attacks were choked.

An indicative detail (we will be able to evaluate it better later - when we are talking about Russian America) ... On September 2 there was a lull - Admiral Price was buried. During the funeral in the Tarya Bay, the Allies met two American sailors from a ship calling at Petropavlovsk. The "neutral" Yankees were chopping wood, but they immediately showed the British a path along which they could quietly carry out a landing. And this treacherous act, the position of the Russians

complicated.

The decisive battle took place on 5 September. The allies only on the shore had approximately a threefold advantage in the assault detachments.

Midshipman Nikolai Fesun, who commanded one of the rifle coastal parties from the Aurora, wrote later: *"There were no limits to the enthusiasm, enthusiasm of everyone; one attacked four. And everyone behaved in such a way that their behavior surpasses praise.*

Therefore, Zavoyko repulsed the assault, and the allies got out of Avacha Bay. However, the danger has not disappeared.

And then the governor decides to evacuate the garrison and residents by sea to the mouth of the Amur and fortify Nikolaevsk there, establishing a connection with De-Kastri (that's when Nevelsky opened a passage from the Sea of Japan to the Sea of Okhotsk).

Soon our forces at the mouth of the Amur already reached two thousand people, and the new batteries of Nikolaevsk reliably covered the entrance to the great river, now completely Russian.

Anglo-French attempt to land at De-Kastri was quickly liquidated, on which their combat activity in the Far East ended.

So if Nevelskoy and Muravyov had delayed shortly before these events, then Russia could have got serious troubles under the Siberian "side", which arose, in fact, out of nothing ...

And one more conclusion can and should be drawn from the Petropavlovsk

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defense... Receiving a worthy rebuff even from small Russian forces, the West immediately drooped and went back in the Far East.

The French member of the "allied" expedition to Petropavlovsk, Edmond de Hailly, admired the skill and diligence of General Zavoyko and Captain Izylmetyev, compared them even with Admiral Nelson, who was well aware of the importance of time for success, and concluded: "How admirable is their ability to use time."

As for the time, it was said right here! Before the battle of Petropavlovsk, Izylmetyev had already encountered an allied squadron in the Peruvian port of Callao. "Aurora", going there, was detained by the allies. Having learned from the side that they were only waiting for an official announcement of the start of the war with Russia in order to capture the Russian frigate, Ivan Izylmetyev, after ten days of waiting (the ability to wait is sometimes also the ability to use time), in a short morning fog, with seven ten-oared boats, silently took the Aurora out of the harbor was like that.

And then he made the transition from Callao to Petropavlovsk in a record short

time is 66 days!

Alas, Russian pioneers knew how to value time and skillfully use it, "strong Russian people", but not the courtiers and their august "bosses" ...

Nevertheless, the decisive actions of the Russian patriots Muraviev, Nevelskoy, Zavoyko and their associates in the Amur region clearly confirmed de Hailly's opinion. They undercut other people's overseas ambitions in the bud and, instead of exacerbating the situation, allowed them to come to peaceful solutions with their Chinese neighbors.

Although not an easy way.

A few years before the start of the Crimean War, Nevelskoy finally received a relative freedom of hands. The Naval Ministry, which had been pulled back by Nikolai, no longer restrained the captain, but, on the contrary, entrusted him with the leadership of the Amur expedition of 1850-1855.

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For all its purely scientific significance, this expedition played first of all an outstanding political, and only then - a geographical role.

However, Nevelsky himself, who had completed his main task, was nevertheless removed from the Far East by St. Petersburg.

The former Decembrist Gavriil Stepanovich Batenkov, in a letter from Tobolsk to a friend in the capital, was perplexed: *"Nevelskoy is a great enthusiast of the Amur case; I don't understand why it was removed."*

Yes, that's why they removed it, because he was an enthusiast of the case, and not his imitation. It is possible, however, that the growing estrangement between Nevelsky and Muravyov also played a role here.

Regrettably, but a fact, and you can't throw it out of history (if it's not in quotation marks), like the words from a song.

Nevelskoy was removed, but Muravyov still remained on the Amur.

More precisely, at one time he was treated abroad, and Mikhail Semenovich Korsakov became the military governor of Transbaikalia. I note that the modern Sakhalin city of Korsakov is not named in his honor, but in honor of the Russian hydrograph Voin Andreevich Rimsky-Korsakov. Even if not tsarist, so Soviet Russia did not forget about this Korsakov ...

The unexpected activity of the Russians on the Amur alarmed the Chinese. Although the state presence of the Heavenly Empire was weakly felt here (China had no time for the development of new lands), Russian-Chinese relations in the Far East were then formally regulated by the Nerchinsk treaty at the end of the 17th century.

century...

Now new conditions arose and new agreements were needed.

Korsakov's negotiations with the Chinese did not go well - not so much, perhaps, his diplomatic failure, how much due to sabotage by the Chinese side.

In 1856, Muravyov returned to the Far East, in 1857 Count Putyatin was sent to help him (we will get to know him later). Putyatin settled in Chinese Tianjin, and also without much success.

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However, soon the internal affairs of the Chinese went from bad to worse. The British and French occupied the southern Chinese port of Canton, penetrated into Tianjin ... The Taiping uprising was spreading in the country. On the nose of the Peking government was the second "opium" war, imposed on him by the Anglo-French. It ended, I must say, deplorably for China ...

However, at that time the Qing regime was not yet aware of the entire loss of its position, therefore, only Russian pressure in the consciousness of being right could be an effective line of behavior with it.

Well, Muravyov had enough pressure.

And on May 28, 1858, three years after the completion of the Amur expedition of Nevelsky, which greatly contributed to the delimitation of the border with China, according to the Aigun Treaty with China, the entire left bank of the Amur and the right bank were assigned to Russia - from the mouth of the Ussuri to the Tatar Strait. Russia secured over a million square miles of rich territory.

On behalf of Russia, the Aigun Treaty was concluded by Nikolai Muravyov, who received the title of Count of Amur for this.

In 1861, Muravyov was also removed from the Far East, although his strength was far from being exhausted (he died in 1881, at the age of seventy-two). Muravyov was replaced again by Korsakov...

In Rus', they like to kick in passing, without really going into the essence of the matter. Sometimes even smart people do it. And even in the governor-general of Nikolai Nikolayevich - in 1860 - the former Decembrist Dmitry Irinarkhovich Zavalishin in a series of articles attacked Muravyov's Amur policy, accusing him of all sins.

I will tell in detail about the young Zavalishin in my place, but here I will report that he was a man. amazing, extraordinary, personally, apparently, absolutely honest. Alas, for all the breadth of many views, he was at the same time a man, somewhat limited and boring. And in his "Memoirs" (republished in 2003), he simply did not have a living and clean place on the appearance of the count

left.

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However, at the same time, his former colleague in a secret society, Mikhail Aleksandrovich Bestuzhev, who knew the state of affairs no worse than Zavalishin, wrote to the accuser: *"No matter how you blame the count, there is a fundamental evil: half-hearted measures and a lack of energy in the highest government" ...*

And here he hit the mark!

Muravyov got it (in some ways - for the cause) and from Herzen. In general, the former exiled Decembrists, who remained in Siberia, assessed Muravyov's works at least positively, and some directly emphasized his outstanding, irreplaceable role in securing the Amur Territory for Russia.

Prince Pyotr Alekseevich Kropotkin, the famous anarchist theorist, but also a scientist and traveler, wrote well about him. At the beginning of 60-1990s, after graduating from the Corps of Pages, he chose an assignment to Siberia, to Korsakov, and here are his impressions of that time:

"In 1862, the highest Siberian administration was much more enlightened and, in general, much better than the administration of any province in European Russia. The post of Governor-General of Eastern Siberia for several years was occupied by a remarkable man, Count N.N. Muravyov, who annexed the Amur Territory. He was very smart, very active, charming as a person and willing to work for the benefit of the region. Like all people of the government school, he was a despot at heart: but Muravyov at the same time adhered to extreme opinions, and a democratic republic would not fully satisfy him (in which he can be fully understood, especially looking at the current "democratic" Russia. - CK). He managed to get rid of almost all the old officials who looked at Siberia as a land where you can rob with impunity, and he surrounded himself for the most part with young honest officers ... "

Kropotkin at the same time talked not only about the benefits, but also about the "harm" in Muravyov's activities: *... the nature of management, the despotism that had become accustomed here, the influence of personalities, etc.*" Therefore, the overall

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their assessment of Muravyov can be considered objective, but the anarchist prince wrote So:

"The entire vast left coast of the Amur and the coast of the Pacific Ocean, up to Peter the Great Bay, were annexed by Count Muravyov almost against the will of the St. Petersburg authorities - in any case, without any significant help from them. When Muravyov conceived a bold plan to take possession of the great river, whose southern position and fruitful banks had beckoned Siberians for two centuries, when he decided, before Japan opened up to Europe, to take a firm position for Russia on the Pacific coast and thus enter into relations with the United States, almost everyone in St. Petersburg took up arms against the Governor-General. The Minister of War had no extra soldiers, the Minister of Finance had no free money. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was especially opposed, always trying to avoid "diplomatic complications". Therefore, Muravyov had to act at his own peril and risk ... In addition, he had to act as soon as possible in order for Western European diplomats to counter a possible protest with a "fait accompli" ...

In the light of my further story, I will immediately notice that Kropotkin, as we see, absolutely did not take into account Russian America (Alaska and the Pacific Islands), which at the time when he appeared in Siberia was still Russian. And, seeing no prospects for Russian America, Kropotkin, of course, was mistaken. Russian America was indeed sold out six years after Muravyov's resignation and five years after Kropotkin's Siberian debut, but this did not happen because objective circumstances were the reason.

Although, as I understand it, Russian activity in Far East Asia has become an additional factor that accelerated the plans of supranational forces to tear away its American possessions from Russia. Having both the Far East and Russian America, Russia - if the Muravyovs and Nevelskys had power in it - could acquire a completely different geopolitical appearance than the one that it actually had by the end of the 19th century.

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Alas, they were not the ones who set the tone for the state life of Russia ... Decembrist Bestuzhev, who reproached the Decembrist Zavalishin for his prejudiced opinion in relation to Muravyov, was convinced more than once, but once again - in January 1859, when through another of his an old Decembrist friend, Baron Vladimir Ivanovich Shteingel, managed to convey his note about the future of Cupid to Alexander II himself.

So what?

But nothing ... Delano - "state", supposedly thoughtful movement of the royal sideburns and supposedly patriotic, but quickly vanished impulse of his brother, Grand Duke Konstantin.

Konstantin even at first thought of going to the Amur himself and on March 9, 1959 he wrote to Muravyov: *"I would sincerely wish to hug you on the banks of the Amur in 1860."*

Well, I would hug you! Who in that could prevent the second person after the emperor in the Russian Empire? And the resonance from such a trip would be enormous, exceptionally beneficial for the Russian cause in the Far East. No wonder Muravyov wrote in his reply that the desire of the Grand Duke to come to the Amur Territory delighted and encouraged him.

And would the count have been pleased and encouraged by such attention from the highest Russian authorities to the Russian Far East?

But no ... In March 1859, Konstantin encouraged Muravyov, but deliberately lied to him, because on January 9 of the same year he melancholy noted in his diary: *"Zhenka is not in a good mood, because Gaurowitz told her about my Amur*

plan".

The grand ducal couple was at that time in Italy, and Konstantin sighed: *"New Year in a foreign land" ...*

So who pushed him there, to this foreign land? What, there was no business in Russia?

But it started spinning: Messina, Syracuse, Constantinople, St. Petersburg, the Kattegat and Skagerrak straits, London, Osborne ... And there already, you look, and September is on the nose, it's cold ...

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And Muravyov went abroad mainly to improve his health ... And therefore, returning on May 30, 1858 after the conclusion of the Aigun Treaty to Blagoveshchensk, he had the full moral and historical right to give an order to the troops, which began like this: "Comrades ! *Congratulations! We have not worked in vain! Cupid became the property of Russia ...* "

When the news was received in Peking about the conclusion of the treaty in Aigun, the affairs of Putyatin in Tianjin were quickly resolved - on June 13, the treaty was signed there too, and it well supported Muravyov's treatise.

Both treaties were immediately ratified by the Chinese Emperor Bogdykhan Yi Zhu.

In 1860, the Beijing Treaty secured the South Ussuri Territory for Russia, and Vladivostok was founded in the same year.

Then, for more than thirty years, the "zone of treaties" moved to Central Asia, to Kazakhstan ... In 1864, the Chuguchak Russian-Chinese protocol determined the general direction of the border in this zone - "following the direction of the mountains, the

pickets.

The wording is vague, but then there were no reliable maps of those places ...

The Livadia Russo-Chinese Treaty of 1879, the Petersburg Treaty of 1881 and a series of protocols all revolved around the Ili region in the mountainous region of Xinjiang.

And only by the beginning of the 90s of the XIX century, Russian-Chinese problems again are displaced (or they are insidiously *displaced there*) to the Far East ...

IN GENERAL, the history of stable interstate relations between Russia and The heavenly empire - China - has more than three centuries.

The signing of the Nerchinsk peace treaty in 1689 can be taken as a starting point here.

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1689 is the last year of the reign of Sofya Alekseevna. That is, pre-Petrine Russia was the first European state to establish treaty relations with China.

Alas, our relations with China from the very beginning of their inception were not easy to build - the "Russian" policy of China was often very insincere, insidious. So, in Sophia's time, China claimed "only" the Transbaikalia.

In the direction of China - to the Russian Nerchinsk - for a long three years the embassy of Fyodor Alekseevich Golovin, an educated clever woman, a future associate of Peter and a future field marshal, went.

The first article in Golovin's instructions instructed: "Insist that the Amur River be written between the Russian and Chinese possessions by the border."

Golovin reached Nerchinsk on August 9, 1689. The great Chinese ambassadors were already standing under the town, and now the outlines of the Russian embassy had grown up nearby - for negotiating congresses. They were put, by the way, by Demyan Mnohohrishny, the former ataman of the Zaporizhian Army.

One detail of the negotiations that began was symbolic, and to remember it

it would be necessary for both the Russians and the Chinese. Three representatives of the Chinese ambassadors came to Golovin to discuss the procedure. The dress, of course, is Chinese, Chinese hats, shaved heads, braids... They also bowed in Chinese, and then... they asked if there was an interpreter who understood... Latin.

Well, the great

plenipotentiary Russian ambassador. And here's what turned out...

Two of the three envoys of the Chinese ambassadors are Jesuit fathers! Spaniard Pereira and French Gerbillon.

And they translated later, at the negotiations, in a very peculiar way ...

Golovin announced that the border should be the Amur to the sea: "Left side to be under the power of the royal majesty, and the right - Bogdykhanov "...

And then the Chinese ambassadors (translated by the Jesuits) discover an amazing acquaintance with ancient European history and

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they say that Amur-de was in the possession of the Bogdykhan from the time of Alexander the Great ...

Golovin calmly responds that "it takes a long time to search for this chronicle, and since the time of Macedonian many lands have been divided under the powers of many states."

Then the Chinese ambassadors (in the Jesuit translation) declare that let the border will reach Baikal, and if something goes wrong, they will bring their "military people" here ...

Golovin again unperturbedly replied that at embassy congresses "it is not customary to threaten war," and if the Chinese want war, then "let them declare it directly."

And these last words of Golovin, as Sergei Mikhailovich Solovyov reports, "ordered to translate into the Mungal language, suspecting the Jesuits that they, translating from Latin into Chinese, add many words of their own"...

Fyodor Alekseevich was clever, and he suspected everything correctly. The Chinese ambassadors - already in the "Mungal" language - assured that they ordered the Jesuits to talk only about the border, and not to threaten with troops.

In Europe, France and Spain have been at enmity for centuries, but here the Spaniard Jesuit and the French Jesuit acted in touching unity, seized by a common sincere feeling of enmity towards Russia (and even towards China) and a desire to quarrel her with China.

The detail, I repeat, is not superfluous in the memory of Russians and Chinese in the 21st century.

By the way, I'll let the reader know that in the course of the negotiation correspondence, the Jesuits, without hesitation, asked Golovin to send them "sables, ermines, black foxes for hats, good wine, chickens, cow butter."

The ambassador sent from the royal treasury "forty sables for 80 rubles, a hundred ermines for 10 rubles, a silver fox for 10 rubles" and from himself - "a silver fox for 15 rubles, forty ermines for 4 rubles, half a pound of cow's butter, 15 chickens, a bucket of wine hot"...

The Jesuits, on the other hand, "gave away" two "preparations" with a knife and

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scissors "at a price of 10 altyns" (thirty kopecks), two engraved portraits of Louis XIV and a "Versailles" book.

The detail is also indicative, and it would also be desirable for Russian people to know and not to be forgotten even in the 21st century.

In Eastern Siberia, the Chinese Bogdykhans paid tribute from the "Mungal" Khan, and did not undertake anything similar to the development of these lands - unlike the Russians. Accordingly, they did not know the geography of these places in the best way ... However, when our embassy provided Russian maps during the negotiations, the Chinese-Manchus, seeing for the first time - just on paper - new expanses, immediately demanded from us the entire territory

east of Lena.

It did not break off... And the Treaty of Nerchinsk recorded, in general, the failure of the attempts of the Manchu Qing dynasty, which had reigned in China since the middle of the 17th century, to conquer - without much military effort - almost all of Eastern Siberia.

This failure was understandable. For example, the behavior of the same Khabarov contrasted sharply with the policy of deliberate terror, raids and massacres carried out by the Manchus on the other side of the Amur, along which the Russian "piece of iron" with the Erofey Pavlovich station would later pass on it.

Of course, everything happened... And, say, during the same Nerchinsk negotiations, the "yasak" Buryats supported not the Russians, but the Chinese, which influenced the results of the negotiations.

However, the life of peoples is measured by the standards of more than one day, and the experience of interethnic communication does not come immediately. But it comes. And as a result of many years of comparisons, the Amur natives were inclined to go, nevertheless, not under the Chinese, but under the Russian sovereign hand.

However, the Nerchinsk Treaty did not become a victory for Russia - according to it, we were forced to leave the Upper and Middle Amur at that time. Legally, these lands were returned to us only by the Aigun treaty.

The Treaty of Nerchinsk demarcated a number of adjacent territories and determined the nature of trade relations between the two countries. Later

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the terms of Russian-Chinese trade were confirmed by the Kyakhta Treaty of 1727.

Even earlier, since 1712, Russia (again, the only foreign state) had a permanent representation in the capital of the Qin Empire in the form of the Russian Spiritual Mission.

An interesting detail: after the Treaty of Kyakhta in 1727, Chinese merchants traded with Russia according to strict "Instructions", which, in particular, said: "*Do not have greed in buying Russian goods and do not show in trade, even if it was an emergency for someone.*"

The summarizing substantiation of this principle is also interesting: "*For the private benefit should not replace the general one.*" Such a thesis in a specific business, and even trade document, and even for those distant times - this, I tell you, is far from an uncommon thing!

And judging by this quote, it can be assumed that national solidarity for the Chinese is far from an incorporeal concept. However, judging by their real history, one can come to the conclusion that the exact opposite is true - very often China was fragmented by the forces of separatism of various kinds.

What conclusion will correspond to the true state of affairs?

Perhaps the one that is based on the multifactorial and ambiguous nature of the Chinese character and the Chinese question and which says: "A lot depends on a lot."

At the same time, looking very far ahead, I will say that the national solidarity of the Japanese is an unequivocally indisputable feature of the island neighbors of the vast Heavenly Empire.

As for China, everything is more complicated here ...

And THIS is what I want to say to my dear reader! In this book, we need to talk about many things so that as a result there is a broad geopolitical picture of the development of life and relations between the main peoples and states of the Far East and the North.

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nay zone of the Pacific Ocean, as well as the countries of the European West in that part, in

which countries were involved in the problems of the Far East ...

That is, Russia and China, Russia and the United States, Russia and Japan, Japan and China, Japan and Korea, Japan and the United States, the United States and China, their bilateral and multilateral ties are the subject of discussion.

We must not forget about England, France, Spain, Germany, and something else about com...

At the same time, the author will sometimes have to deviate from a consistent story in order to try to describe situations that are voluminous in time and space, in their systemic diversity.

So, let's digress for a while from pure history and talk a little about national character...

They say about a person: "If you sow a character, you will reap a destiny."

And the peoples? I think that their historical destinies are determined by the national character not least of all ... After all, the national character is sometimes formed over thousands of years. And, once formed, it turns out to be very stable and difficult to transform even as a result of universal social cataclysms.

True, I will say parenthetically that there are factors that do not overnight change national characters, but quickly *decompose* them and infect the entire world civilization with decay. These factors are Americanized globalization and "Russian" television.

But, noticing this, I will not deviate further here, especially since at the end of the 19th and early 20th centuries, globalization and ORT and NTV were still far away.

So the character of the people...

What is it like among the people, say, the Chinese?

Of course, in a certain sense, the Chinese national character is the concept is rather arbitrary, since China throughout most of its history was very heterogeneous in its different parts.

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Nevertheless, the defining features of the national Chinese character can be singled out and analyzed to the extent that the collective type of the Chinese turned out to be capable of creating a coherent and surviving state in historical troubles.

China had an advanced and seemingly dynamic civilization as early as the time of modern Hellenistic and then Roman civilization. However, Ancient Greece and Rome by the Middle Ages had long since disappeared as subjects of the real world historical process, and China, according to an academic source, "is huge in its territory, had a large population and was famous for its high culture of agriculture, the art of artisans, the works of its scientists and writers.. ."

The same source notes "the development of cities, urban crafts and trade, the widespread use of such major inventions as the compass, gunpowder, printing, a significant expansion of the irrigation network and the introduction of new agricultural crops."

It would seem that these are excellent indicators, and have not been lost for more than a millennium (the above estimate refers to China *in the 10th century AD!*).

The wave of invasions of the nomadic Steppe did not knock China down (as happened with Medieval Russia). The monographs say: "Despite many years of heroic defense, South China was conquered and in 1279 became part of the Mongol Empire, strongly Sinicized and having its capital in Beijing (*my emphasis*. - S.K.). A few decades later, the Mongol yoke in China was overthrown by the forces of a powerful popular uprising.

And a little later, for China, too, everything seemed to be going well ... In

At the beginning of the 15th century, the Chinese diplomat and naval commander Zheng He made seven voyages, visiting Indochina, Malacca, the Malay Islands, Ceylon, India, Arabia, and Africa.

Achievements, needless to say, are impressive. Even against the backdrop of the best European ocean expeditions of the same era.

However...

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However, another three or four centuries pass, and China does not stand any technological comparison with the European West. The same, however, can be said about self-isolated Japan.

And yet, the fates of Japan and China have differed more and more since the second half of the 19th century ... And one of the reasons for the difference in fates is the difference in national characters.

Having touched on this topic here, I will return to it, my dear reader, more than once, because the spiral principle is not an invention of philosophers, but one of the features of a person's social and intellectual life.

As for the Chinese character, shouldn't we recognize as one of its defining features - at least in the past - the inability to adequately evaluate oneself and one's efforts, as well as an amazing combination of pragmatism and adventurism (in the broad sense) in external and internal life?

And these characteristic features of China have been formed over at least the last two millennia of its history.

THIS IS HOW IT WORKS...

Surveying world history, we can single out only two phenomena anomalous development: India and China.

The number of large, stable civilizations over significant historical periods is not so great. With maximum enlargement, it is possible to single out, perhaps, four modern types: Western, Slavic (the bearer of which should be recognized only as Russia, taken as the result of the best civilizational approaches of the Soviet period), Islamic and Eastern (for all their dissimilarity, China, Japan and Korea can be attributed here) .

Remembering the past, we can add a second list to this modern list, namely: ancient Egyptian, Hellenistic-Roman, "Medieval-American" civilizations (defining the states of the Incas, Aztecs and Maya in this way), as well as ancient Indian and ... ancient Chinese.

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Only the last two civilizations from the second list do not belong to the "dead" in their pure form, they have an ancient history, continuity and national continuation in modern times.

But here - despite the external continuity and continuity of civilizational existence for several millennia, neither India nor China realized the potential of such an exceptionally long, unparalleled historical path. This cannot but have well-defined objective justifications.

What?

About something I said, about something I will say more. But the question is complicated, the search for underlying causes may not be successful. Nevertheless, the very fact of the existence of the phenomenon is evident.

We will now set aside India, and not only because it is geographically and politically far from the Far East, but because India, from the middle of the 18th century, increasingly fell under foreign (predominantly British) domination, and by the beginning of the 19th century it had become almost completely into the British colony (Northern Hindustan was conquered by the middle of the XIX

century).

China has always been legally independent. And at a time when Western civilization (and with the beginning of Peter's reforms, Russia too) was developing rapidly, China had no other serious obstacles to its own development, except for internal obstacles. Therefore, China can be singled out as a special phenomenon of the civilizational history of mankind.

In order to become one of the leaders of the world, China had the opportunity much larger than, for example, little Holland.

But he didn't.

Why?

Perhaps some historical and psychological key is found, so to speak, in the syndrome of the Great Wall of China... Here is what the Soviet intelligence officer, Bulgarian Ivan Vinarov, once wrote: *"8 Manchuria and beyond, the train went along the Great Wall of China. This building was striking in its scale. This wall is 5 to 10 meters high and 5 to 8 meters wide, more than 4 thousand*

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kilometers, built on separate sites in the 4th-3rd centuries. BC e., towering over the valleys and mountains. ... Colossal human labor was invested in this pointless construction from a military point of view ... Never - neither at the beginning of construction, nor after its completion - the Great Wall of China was able to stop the invasion of enemies ... "

Vinarov is not an expert historian, but his assessment is interesting. The first sections of the Great Wall of China were actually created in the 4th-3rd centuries BC. e., but the real danger from the nomadic Steppe arose after almost one and a half thousand years. Prior to this, nomadic waves did not have the strength to significantly spread first to the east (to China), and then to the west (to Rus').

The Great Wall of China did not prove to be a barrier to the wild Steppe. Everything was decided by the national resistance of the Chinese - as in Rus'. That is, China seemed to know how to resist ...

However, with the resistance of the Chinese to external pressure, everything is also not simple. Reading descriptions of the actions of the allied Anglo-French expeditionary force during the "opium" war of 1856-1860, I was amazed at the unbelievably easy successes of the Europeans.

Due to the mere superiority in armament, they could not be like that, especially since the "home" theater of operations allowed the Chinese both night and ambush tactics, and they had artillery - some kind of no.

And the expeditionary corps entered Beijing like a steel knife in a softened oil. And this despite the fact that episodically the Chinese quite showed resilience.

But, damn it, did they really not know how to fight, having for a lot centuries before the "opium" wars of such a military theorist as Sun Tzu?

After all, in China they looked down on the Europeans - as uncivilized individuals, "barbarians" (whom the allies, by the way, in Beijing, recommended themselves). And therefore, the Chinese, it seems, should not have experienced panic fear of them. At the beginning of the last, third "opium" war, September 6, 1860, they

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Emperor Yi Zhu issued a decree stating: "These treacherous savages (Anglo-French. - S.K.) dared to move their unbridled soldiers to Tongzhou and announce their intention to force us to give them an audience. Any further indulgence on our part..." and so on...

And here it is! Shortly after these formidable declarations, the thirty-thousandth Manchurian cavalry is dispersed by the "savages" almost without effort ... The Chinese infantry does not protect the artillery batteries ... The Chinese batteries are aimlessly

they hit with a constant flight, but they do not fire at close range, etc. As a result, with a huge numerical superiority, with knowledge of the terrain - catastrophic losses and defeat ...

So, maybe the point is that China in the past is the ability for a gigantic concentration of efforts with often minimal, inadequate results?

Perhaps so...

And what about the Russian national character and Russian historical destiny?

In a dispute with the same China in the 19th century, we - without any special efforts, without a break and a war - were able to defend our natural national interests with the maximum result (because the Russian border along the Amur and Ussuri is a natural border).

More than once we defended and expanded our lands and natural boundaries, and in elsewhere on the planet in the 19th century...

But in all?

And HERE, my dear reader, we need to raise our eyes from the shores of the Yellow and Sea of Japan for at least a couple of minutes and translate it to both sides of the Bering Strait ...

That is, to draw our attention to Eastern Siberia and those lands and islands that the whole world once called "Russian America" ...

I wrote a book about the history of its foundation, development and inglorious sale. "Russian America: open and sell!"...

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And there I wrote that already after Alaska, the Aleuts, the Pribilof Islands, St. Matthew and St. Lawrence were sold to the Yankees for a pittance in 1867, the newspaper of the publisher of Otechestvennyye Zapiski Andrei Alexandrovich Kraevsky "Voice" even after a few days after receiving a message from Washington, in the issue of March 23 (April 4, New Style), she called him "an incredible rumor" and "a cruel joke on the gullibility of society."

In its April 6 issue, Golos wrote:

"The trouble is the beginning: today rumors are selling the Nikolaev railway, tomorrow - Russian American colonies; Who can guarantee that tomorrow the same rumors will not start selling the Crimea, the Transcaucasus, the Ostsee provinces? There will be no business for hunters ... What a huge mistake and imprudence was the sale of our Ross colony on the coast of gold-bearing California; Is it permissible to repeat such a mistake now? And is it really the feeling of popular pride that deserves so little attention that it could be sacrificed for some 5-6 million dollars? Should foreigners really use the labors of Shelikhov, Baranov, Khlebnikov and other selfless people for Russia and collect their fruits for their own benefit? No, we resolutely refuse to believe these ridiculous rumors.

However, both Russian America itself and our potentially brilliant Eastern prospects were sold and betrayed by Emperor Alexander II, his brother Grand Duke Constantine and their inner circle...

The will of a few high-seated bastards - that's the whole Russian Pacific and Far Eastern "geopolitics" of the second half of the 19th century...

And even the expansion of our lands towards the Pacific Ocean on the Asian mainland could not correct the bleak situation...

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Chapter 2

Opium smoke, Queen Ming and "devils from beyond the East Sea"...

YES, OUR Amur successes changed little in the general negative assessment of the situation, if only because these successes were the result not so much of a meaningful and decisive state line, but rather the result of a personal initiative supported (let's give him his due) by Emperor Nicholas the First. Here it is enough to recall the words of Prince Kropotkin about Count Muravyov-Amursky.

The sons of Nicholas - Emperor Alexander and Grand Duke Konstantin - "surrendered" Russian America, and did not show much interest in the Russian Far East.

Count Muravyov-Amursky, however, did not consider the sale of Russian American possessions a catastrophe - in the hope that after the St. Petersburg abandonment of Alaska and the Aleuts, the Far East would flourish. However, the patriots of Russia counted on this in vain.

Alexander the Third was no more interested in these possessions ... I will give the floor here to the person involved in the problem and familiar with it through personal fate - Leonid Mikhailovich Starokadomsky, doctor of polar expeditions on the Taimyr and Vaigach in 1910-1915 and author of Five Voyages in the Arctic Ocean. Here is what he reports:

"The situation was especially alarming at the very edge of the Russian land - in Chukotka and Kamchatka. Here, foreign, mainly American, predatory merchants rampaged uncontrollably.

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Back in the middle of the last century, American St. John's wort penetrated the waters of the Bering and Chukchi Seas. They mercilessly exterminated whales, walruses, fur seals, started a predatory barter trade with the Chukchi and Eskimos. After the purchase of Alaska from Russia, this new American colony became the base for smuggling trade with the Russian Far East (Eh! - S.K.). There was no such meanness that enterprising foreigners would not use to rob the indigenous population. They soldered the Chukchi and Kamchadals, traded precious furs for trinkets, sold junk goods, raided the rookeries of a sea animal, took women away from the camps (one can imagine that they illegally, "smuggled" worked in Russian America in the first half of the 19th century! - C .TO). Taking advantage of the defenselessness of the distant Russian outskirts, American firms began to organize on the Chukchi coast, and even in the tundra, their trading posts, turning a few Russian merchants into their agents. At the same time, acting through figureheads, the Alaskan syndicates managed to obtain a monopoly on the exploitation of the mountain wealth of Chukotka. Crowds of avenues-gold diggers and all sorts of rabble lovers of easy money poured in here. In essence, Chukotka and other Far Eastern outskirts were on the verge of complete capture by foreign predators and rejection from Russia ... "

That is, even by the end of the 19th century, the Far East was something alien to tsarist autocratic Russia. This was subtly caught by the instinct of the observant and humane writer Anton Pavlovich Chekhov, who, in his essay "Sakhalin Island", dating back to 1890, admitted:

"While I was sailing along the Amur, I had the feeling that I was not in Russia, but somewhere in Patagonia or Texas; not to mention the original, non-Russian nature, it always seemed to me that the way of our Russian life is completely alien to the indigenous Amur people (and by that time there were enough of them at the age of thirty years already. - S.K), that

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Pushkin and Gogol are incomprehensible and useless here, our history is boring and we,

visitors from Russia, we seem to be foreigners ... If you want to make an Amur citizen bored and yawn, then talk to him about politics, about the Russian government, about Russian art ... "

What's the matter?

I think a lot here came from a feeling of abandonment, from indifference to Russian Far East of the highest Russian power.

And this indifference produced - whatever one may say - indifference to Far East public opinion in the European part of Russia.

It was this indifference of Russia to the Amur Territory that already gave rise to a response indifference of a significant part of the Amur people to Russia.

Despite the fears of Golos Kraevsky in 1867, if the tsar, following Russian America, decided to sell, say, the Crimea, or the Caucasus, or even Courland, not to mention the St. weapon! Such a king would simply be overthrown by the guards under the applause of the public. And even Pobedonostsev would not have found words for condemnation and objections.

It was allowed to spit on the Russian Far East... And there was no particular interest in it in Russia, and therefore, I repeat, it became possible, and the response that Chekhov described was strengthened.

But Anton Pavlovich was already observing the consequences, and ten and a half years before his trip, the situation was only taking shape ...

And a stupid, non-state, short-sighted situation was FORMED. And this despite the fact that the Far Eastern factor in the all-Russian prospective geopolitical potential could be very significant. We could and were obliged to secure Sakhalin and the Kuriles for ourselves, and within the framework of the idea of an ice-free fleet base to help Vladivostok, to gain a foothold in Korea. The latter was not only desirable, but also reasonable and possible, as will become clear from what follows...

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Yes, at least after the loss of Russian America it was possible to shake things up and not lose control over the development of the situation in the Far East. Of course, for this it was necessary to invest appropriate funds in distant lands.

After all, even after the Crimean War, in the seventies and eighties of the century before last, in the northeast of the Pacific Ocean, Russia still had no serious rivals in military and political terms.

China was weakening more and more, more and more submitting to the will of foreigners. This did not mean that Russia had to allow itself in China the same as the West. But it was necessary to clearly point out to the Chinese the difference in the behavior of the West and Russia towards them!

For example, Manchuria protrudes very seductively into the territory of Russia, and, looking at the map, one involuntarily wants to straighten this ledge. But these lands lay beyond the Amur, and their inclusion within the borders of Russia would be an even more stupid civilizational action than the inclusion of purely Polish lands in Russia -

Slavic only externally.

In the zone of the Far East of Russia bordering on China, by the end of the 19th century, the Russia that we already had should have been enough. And it is not the example of foreigners who humiliate and exploit China that should inspire us here.

These foreigners themselves - the Anglo-Saxons and the French - strengthened in China primarily economically, because seriously - by European standards - they did not need military force in the Far East at that time to ensure their influence. Yes, and then they could not send them to that zone. "Wars" of the French and British with China in the framework of the "opium" policy at the turn of the 50-60s

were conducted by small forces and were, according to the apt definition of the historian R. Svetlov, "police wars" of a limited scale.

In the first chapter I wrote about the unbelievably easy successes of the Anglo-French Expeditionary Force during the Chinese War of 1856-1860. So, they may have been implausible in the full sense.

this word.

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The losses of the Europeans, recorded by historians according to allied relations, turned out to be very small. But was everything so easy in practice, and was the fate of China decided without a fight? It is always and everywhere easier for the interventionists to blame losses on "General Zima", on "General Zhara", on "Marshal Tif", than on the stubbornness of the natives. And it's even easier and more profitable to just shut them up.

If the British and French were walking through China only at a walking pace or a parade march, then they would have taken it and passed it from end to end, if only for the purpose of robbery. They were very fond of this occupation and, having entered Beijing in 1860, they put the looting of imperial palaces on a solid commercial basis. They robbed with money and "in kind", then they counted everything, resold it, and then redistributed the profit between officers and soldiers.

However, it was hardly so easy to rob all of China. And it would be even more difficult to occupy it. The West did not seek military occupation of Central and South China. It would not give anything good to Russia in Northern China either.

To threaten China with aggression would be a stupid and unnecessary thing for Russia. But to refer in conversations and negotiations with the Chinese to our fundamental readiness to protect Russian interests by military force not only on the Russian side of the Amur and to behave harshly with them in this matter - it could be. The precedent was set by the West.

And with regard to the British, Yankees and French, one could hint at our fundamental readiness to both strengthen the Chinese militarily and send **our own** expeditionary force to help them.

Germany in the 80s of Russia in the Far East could not be an obstacle - Bismarck's new Germany was only groping for a strong position there ... It needed us rather than was ready to interfere in our intentions that would be reasonable for us.

Japan was just beginning its powerful path to its new destiny,

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flowing, as we will see later, from its past fate much more logically than it might seem at first glance ... After all, not everyone in the Pacific Ocean treated their history and their historical prospects with such profound disregard as the official tsarist Russia... But Japan was still quite weak at that time, both economically and, especially, militarily. At that time, she didn't even have a more or less significant fleet!

Nevertheless, in 1875, Japan, having removed its - unfounded - "claims" for South Sakhalin, received from Russia the Kuril Islands. How can you attribute at least some part of Sakhalin to Japan - I personally can't imagine. Although the southern tip of Sakhalin is separated from the Japanese island of Hokkaido by the narrow La Perouse Strait, Sakhalin is so obviously adjacent to Russia that there is simply nothing to talk about! Alas, for Alexander the Liberator and his brother, the liberation of Russia from its Pacific possessions has become something of a family entertainment.

However, life went on... After the lost Russian America, Russia still had the acquired Amur region. So, one way or another, continental relations with China continued.

Willy-nilly, one could not forget about Japan, and about a small, but it didn't hurt to remember difficult and ancient Korea either ...

The main current problem in the Far East has so far been China, which - albeit not particularly developing - still remained China.

So let's go back a little...

ON THE ONE PART, the imperial Manchu Qing dynasty for more than two hundred years treated Russia in a very arrogant and sometimes - *funny way* inadequate way. Thus, the Manchu rulers of China for a long time ranked Russia among their "vassal" states and communicated with it through their "Tribunal for Vassal Affairs".

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On the other hand, Russia's attitude towards its neighbor has always favored China in comparison with its relations with other world powers. This was already noted by Karl Marx in an 1857 editorial in the New York Daily Tribune:

"Russia has a very special relationship with the Chinese empire. While the English... are deprived of the privilege of direct communication even with the governor of Canton... the Russians have the advantage of keeping an embassy in Peking... Since the Russians did not conduct maritime trade with China, they were never did not interfere with them in the past and do not interfere now; therefore, the antipathy with which the Chinese from time immemorial treated all foreigners who invaded their country from the sea does not apply to Russians ... The Russians conduct their own internal overland trade."

Indeed, by the first third of the 19th century, foreign penetration into China from the sea - primarily by the British and Americans - acquired not only a wide, but also quite ominous character. Opium began to be massively imported into China (in 1839, about 160,000 pounds, that is, about 2,500 tons!).

In the first half of December 1817, among the Chinese merchants trading with the Russians in the Trans-Baikal Kyakhta, a rumor spread (as it later turned out to be false) about the beginning of British military operations against China, about their capture of the open South Chinese port of Canton, and so on ...

In this regard, the Siberian Governor-General Ivan Borisovich Pestel reported to Alexander the First in a report dated February 14 (26), 1818:

"Judging by the long-standing British attempts to seize the Canton trade, which can easily connect with both Indias, realizing that the so-called Yellow Sea, surrounded by the eastern and northern shores of China and the shores of Tataria and Korea, dependent on the Chinese, of which the latter has a lot of gold and silver, have always been an object of temptation for the greedy English trading spirit, I believe that the news sent, although

Not

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reliable, but in some respects more than probable may be ... "

Here Ivan Borisovich turned out to be just a visionary, accurately defining the promising "Chinese" program of Britain, where opium was assigned a very definite and important role for the Chinese people.

One of my acquaintances, a Moscow political scientist, saw in the widespread use of opium smoking among several generations of Chinese almost the main reason that China was not capable of that powerful civilizational breakthrough that Japan made at the end of the 19th century ... Well, the thought is worthy At least attention ... Opium smoke really overshadowed China's many historical perspectives.

The destruction of foreign stocks of opium in Canton was the first

to the first Anglo-Chinese "opium" war of 1839-1842, and then to the second, Anglo-French-Chinese, which lasted from 1856 to 1860. I have already talked about some of its moments.

England was invariably supported by America, just as invariably pressing English "big brother" from its Far Eastern positions.

Already in 1842, after the defeat in the first "opium" war, China signed the first **unequal** (*unlike* treaties with Russia) Treaty of Nanjing with a Western foreign power - England.

In 1844, "under the guise" of the English "opium" victory, France imposes its first treaty on China. It is signed on board a French ship in the bay of Whampoo Island near Canton.

Unlike Japan, China has never imposed a self-isolation regime. However, China's assessments of the outside world were surprisingly inadequate - especially from the moment of the accession of the Qing dynasty in China from 1644 until the end of the 19th century. And even later (!) Chinese political thinkers and historians speak in their writings about "English, American and other barbarians" - as is typical for capital work with the characteristic title "Cho

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uban iu ishimō" ("The beginning and the end of all dealings with the barbarians"), dedicated to the foreign policy activities of the Qing government and covering most of the 19th century.

However, as the years went by in this century, the affairs of the Chinese with the "barbarians" were not no end in sight...

The NANKING treaty opened 5 Chinese ports for English trade, Hong Kong passed into the possession of England, China paid 6 million dollars for the destroyed opium, plus 15 million dollars of indemnity (for comparison, under the Washington Treaty of 1867, Russia ceded Russian America to the United States for only "seven million two hundred thousand dollars in gold coins).

In 1843, England was additionally granted the right of extraterritoriality and a number of customs privileges. Settlements (extraterritorial settlements) began to be created in the largest cities of China, which can be considered as a kind of prototype of modern "free economic zones."

The gist, if anything, was the same: China's ever stronger and more unequal attachment to the West.

In 1844, threatening war, the United States was already forcing China to sign the Wangxiang Treaty, granting privileges even wider than those for England.

In the dispute over Annam (Vietnam), China also lost to France. Accordingly, in 1885 a new unequal treaty was concluded with her.

Moreover, it should be noted that England, France and the United States did not have any special misunderstandings with each other because of China. There were enough fatty pieces for everyone, there was no point in fighting - take as much as you can.

The essence of the "Chinese" policy of Russia is visible from the decree of the emperor of China during the second "opium" war: "The Russians have maintained friendly relations with China for many years, they should be received first of all, with honors, as guests."

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Of course, all this was far from idyllic, but the episode with this decree can be considered significant. Finding itself in a difficult position due to the self-serving imperialist line of the Western powers, China instantly hid arrogance away and assessed friendship with Russia adequately, that is, highly and with understanding.

its vital necessity for China.

But even in difficult years for itself, China did not strive for parity, was not grateful to us, but only tried to use Russia in its own interests - always ready to turn away from Russia at the slightest readiness of the West for handouts. To be fair, Russia has at times received false smiles, while economic and political benefits, and one-sided ones, have gone to the West.

In 1854, the American squadron of Commodore Perry "opened" Japan. Shortly thereafter, Japan's "incomplete" Meiji Restoration Revolution of 1867-1868 began.

There were probably different reasons for this, but after the forcible introduction of China and Japan to Western civilization, the fates of the two great Eastern peoples developed very differently.

China fell into crises.

Japan began to develop rapidly.

At the end of the 19th century, China was defeated in the Sino-Japanese War, provoked by Japan but also desired by China. To understand the essence of China's position, it is enough to quote the decree issued on behalf of the Empress *Dowager* (more precisely, the permanent regent) Ci Xi : *the borders of the state, our tributary (meaning Korea. - CK) ... We had no other choice but to take out the sword and start a punitive campaign.*

Japan was supported by the Anglo-Saxon countries - England and America. Even a purely theoretically possible union of the three Far Eastern powers - China, Japan and Russia - certainly frightened them. It was still too early to pit Japan against Russia, but it was high time against China.

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France and Germany kept to their own interests.

And China then turned to Russia (however, China has never and could not count on any other power as a friendly one, both before this incident and after).

On May 22, 1896, after successful negotiations in Moscow, a secret treaty was signed for a defensive alliance against a possible Japanese attack on China or Russia. As the coming years showed, it did not acquire any real significance, but even in this case the general trend was stated quite expressively.

In relations with China in the second half of the 19th century, Russia, in fact, ensured its natural geopolitical interests, consolidating and strengthening the status of Russian lands bordering China.

The latter was, it must be said, useful - Russian researchers of the gold reserves of the Amur-Primorsky region L. Tove and L. Ivanov estimated the smuggling of gold from Russian territory to Manchuria at the end of the 19th century.

century at the level of 100 pounds (1.6 tons) per year.

Not so little. Moreover, the real figure was probably even more impressive.

The constant Chinese migration to our Ussuri region also became very significant. The migration process turned out to be complex and ambiguous, if only because these places were now attracting hard-working Chinese precisely because of new circumstances - Russian colonization gave them new opportunities, including jobs.

Yet, unlike Western countries and Japan, Russia did not pursue an imperialist policy in China for a long time, and interstate ties were based on mutual trade.

The beginning of a new Russian policy in China (yes, one might say, in the Far East in general) dates exactly -1896.

Then Beijing sent an emergency embassy to Russia for the coronation of Nicholas II. It was held in Moscow, and there the first person of dignity China was Li Hongzhang, Minister of Foreign

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Affairs of Russia, Prince Lobanov-Rostovsky and Finance Minister Witte just signed that Moscow Treaty, where the parties secretly agreed, among other things, on the implementation of Witte's "broadly conceived" plan - a concession for the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway, CER.

About these four letters (or four "cards"?), which cost Russia more than expensive, we will discuss in detail later.

At the turn of the XIX-XX centuries, Russia takes part in the imperialist intervention of eight countries (England, USA, France, Germany, Japan, Austria-Hungary, Italy and Russia) in China in order to eliminate the most powerful nationwide Yihetuan (so-called "Boxing") uprising ...

Its brutal suppression finally turned China into an international semi-colony. Under the so-called Boxer Protocol of September 7, 1901, China, in particular, pledged to pay an indemnity of 450 million liang until 1940, with its increase at the expense of 4% per annum to 982 million liang.

450 million liang is about 600 million Russian rubles of that time. A good amount...

Each foreign embassy received the right to maintain a national military guard with a total number of guards up to 2101 people with 30 guns and 30 machine guns.

As for the "Chinese" policy of Russia after participation in the intervention against China, it is well characterized by Lenin's assessment given in real time: "*The policy of robbery towards China has long been pursued by the bourgeois governments of Europe, and now the Russian autocratic government*".

The Yihetuan movement was not inherently progressive - its ideas generally rejected progress in the European manner. But this movement was just and justified in its main idea: China should belong to the Chinese, and its potential - whether developed or not - should be used for the benefit of the people of China, not the Europeans. And with this idea, to be honest, not

cannot agree.

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Therefore, the anti-boxing intervention is an exceptionally shameful page in the history of Western civilization and Russia. However, for the West, this intervention was the only way to maintain total dominance in China, which was extremely beneficial economically for the West - after all, by that time foreign capital had settled in China with taste.

Although...

Although inconvenience and conflicts were not ruled out. So, the first German company appeared there in 1842, but in 1919, after the defeat of Germany in the First World War, 273 German firms were transferred to other owners.

By the 20s of the 20th century, according to the data of the National Bank of China, the position foreign capital were as follows:

A country	Capital in million \$	Number of registered firms
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France	?	181
Germany	100	319
USA	200	574
Japan	1000	8926
Great Britain	1750	682
tanya		

I think, dear reader, that there is no particular need to comment on this table. Is it possible to add that England and France gradually lost their influence in China, while the other members of the company presented in the table strengthened their influence.

The Germans and Americans acted with the mark and the dollar, while the Japanese reinforced the yen with a bayonet. At the same time, the Yankees not only aggressively infiltrated China, but, showing far-sightedness, looked closely and intelligently at China.

Here is an example from times not very close, but not very old either ... In the early 30s of the 20th century, a financial magnate from Boston Russell Green Fessenden.

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He was instructed to develop for the White House the general directions of US policy in China for the next decade. Even in the 80s of the 20th century, the German publicist Julius Mader, who reported this, emphasized: "To this day, approximately only half of the Fessenden memorandum has been published, the rest has remained behind the tight doors of the offices of senators and managers as auxiliary information."

The 20th century brought China not just some "seasonal" changes in the political weather, but clearly promised a complete change in the political climate. The Manchurian dynasty ran out of steam, China began to eat away the ulcers of separatism. Yes, and social ulcers were irritated more and more.

And even before our October 1917, on October 10, 1911, a revolution began in China. In 1912, Sun Yat-sen's Kuomintang was formed, an active party not only of the national bourgeoisie, but of all Chinese nationalists in general, including those of the left.

UNFORTUNATELY, we Europeans are infected with a certain Eurocentrism. Everything that happened not in Europe or in America is, in our view, a bit of "the wrong system", it is not so "first-rate" in terms of significance for the destinies of the world, in terms of intensity of passions, in terms of fascination, finally ...

Perhaps, however, I am slandering others, turning over with my the heads of the sick and the healthy heads of the readers?

Well, if so, it's your fault. But as for me, it was necessary to "drive" into the history of the "yellow" East, while working on this book, and even visit China myself, in order to understand that the intensity and twist of Eastern historical passions are in no way inferior to European ones.

The "cauldron" of history has long boiled (and is boiling) in China, Japan and Korea violently and continuously ... And it boils all the more violently because political "firewood" into the fire under this only

Asians themselves.

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All this means that in the 1910s, on the eve of the First World War in Europe, the Far East in general and China in particular were also on the eve of major events far from regional significance. Both in China and in the entire Far East, there were processes that in the future changed the face of the world no less significantly than the processes that took place on the spaces on both sides from the English Channel to the Volga and to the Potomac ...

The Manchu Qing dynasty, in fact, has exhausted itself...

"cynicism"? of the empire, which is in the stage of final insanity, the situation was no longer controlled.

However, they themselves did not think so ...

Seven years before the beginning of the new century, China had to pass the test of the war with Japan, and she did not pass this test.

True, China was "helped" then somehow to get out of the situation by Russia, Germany and France, but the defeat in the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1895 was a strategic harbinger of the end of the monarchy. At the turn of the century, China was shaken by that Ihetuan uprising, which was crushed only by the combined efforts of the crowned and "democratic" bastards from all over the world.

However, the experience of interaction between the supreme power of China and the West for suppression of broad popular movements had already been accumulated before that. Already to suppress the Taiping movement, which peaked in the years after the last "opium" war, the Ci Xi regime attracted an "always victorious army" under the command of the Englishman Gordon.

Today, even in Russia, some historians try to present Ci Xi as a smart, far-sighted and subtle politician. And in their image, Ci Xi resembles a certain Chinese analogue of the Russian ruler Sophia - ambitious sister of the future Peter the Great. And, perhaps, there is a certain similarity here - in the complete inability of the Ci Xi regime (as well as the Sophia regime) to prevent the degradation of their own country. And China, a potentially great power, has degraded.

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The ugliness of social processes in it manifested itself in rampages of the Ihetuan. But even before this uprising, several things happened in China - some of them had far-reaching consequences...

So, four years before the uprising, in 1895, Russian Finance Minister Witte (again and again - he!) arranged for China a loan under a Russian guarantee on the Paris money market (read - with the participation of French Jewish bankers) and created the Russian-Chinese Bank.

In 1896, according to the already mentioned agreement with Russia, initiated by the same Witte, China agrees to the construction of one of the sections of the Russian Siberian Railway through its territory in Northern Manchuria - the subsequently famous CER (the decoding of this abbreviation is already known to the reader).

In November 1897, two Catholic missionaries were killed in the province of Shandong - just in the zone where Catholic spiritual missions were under the auspices of Germany ... Berlin had long been looking for a reason for actions of a certain kind, and now there was a reason ... The German squadron entered Jiaozhou Bay and landed troops. In early March 1898, Germany entered into an agreement with China to lease the Jiaozhou area for a period of 99 years. This is how the Reich's stronghold in China, the Qingdao naval base, was created.

Soon, on March 27, 1898, Russia, under a convention with China, received the port of Lushun (Port Arthur) and the port of Dalian (Far) for 25 years. And we will highlight this fact in particular, because we will have to talk a lot about it in the future.

In accordance with Article 4 of the Convention on the leased territory, "all military command of the land and sea forces, as well as the highest civil administration, will be wholly given to the Russian authorities ..."

Port Arthur was declared exclusively a military port with the right use only by Russian and Chinese courts.

Port Dalniy with the exception of one inner bay left for military purposes, was declared by article 6 of the convention "from
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closed to foreign trade" and open access to it was granted to "commercial courts of all nations".

Enlightened Europe, of course, could not simply observe such steps taken by Germany and Russia. And on May 30, 1898, under the guise of a "lease", England captured the port of Weihaiwei in Shandong Province and the Kowloon Peninsula.

A little later, France "leased" Guangzhouwan in the south of China.

Japan, having won an easy military victory over China, is increasingly although not yet very widely, it frolicked all over China, especially "taking a great interest" in Manchuria.

United States in the framework of the "open door policy" (more precisely - *foreign* doors opened by them) took third place in China's trade by the end of the 19th century.

The "open doors" formula first appeared in the instructions of the emergency the Cushing embassy sent to China during President Tyler's time.

Cushing arrived in China, in Macau, on 4 warships on February 24, 1844, and it cannot be said that he did all the work without difficulty. Only July 3 in Wanxia The first US-China treaty was signed.

But he was - at least where! And this despite the fact that the military might of the United States - especially in the Pacific Ocean - then there was no smell. However, five ports were opened for the Yankees, American consuls were appointed in them, US citizens received extraterritorial rights, and what can we say about customs privileges!

The Yankees opened the doors to China not quite in the manner in which the "safe-cracker" opens a bank safe - they were not strong enough for this. But there were enough gold dollars - after all, the Golden Elite stood behind the back of the United States. Since the creation of the United States, it has always provided them with the most favored nation treatment in everything. And so the "Chinese" affairs of the Yankees invariably flourished.

After the series of "leases" mentioned above, Britain became worried and suggested that the Yankees somehow jointly respond to the new situation. But for the time being, the "younger" is a transatlantic "brother," just as it was more than seventy years before in the case of the Doctrine 69

Noah Monroe preferred to put into circulation the single-handed American doctrine of Secretary of State Hay, which is also known as the "open door" doctrine.

The "disinterested" and "highly moral" Yankees don't need dollars - just let them take care of other peoples ... Here, too, the proposal "to maintain an open market in all parts of China for the trade of the whole world" was explained by them by their desire "to carry out administrative reforms urgently needed to preserve the integrity of China." That is what was said in the note prepared for Hay by the special adviser of the State Department -

orientalist, diplomat and, concurrently, scout William Woodville Rockhill.

On September 6, 1899, the note was sent to the governments of England, Germany and Russia, and soon to France, Italy and Japan.

July 3, 1900 - already at the time of the uprising of the "Boxers" - Yihetuan - Hei's second note appeared, calling for adherence to the "principle of equal and fair trade in all parts of the Chinese empire."

What progress, it must be noted! From the "tariffs of the absurd" at the beginning of the 19th century, the States came at the end of this century to the policy of "equal trade". True, the "tariffs of absurdity" did not let strangers into the US market. And the Hay Doctrine was the Yankee's key to foreign markets. But it was a minor detail. Is not it?

Hay's notes spoke of reforms...

And they were really necessary for China - albeit not in Hay's version.

On the VERY eve of the Yihetuan uprising, in 1898, the young Emperor Guangxu ventured to reform. The risk was not that the reforms might turn out to be untimely, but that they were stubbornly opposed by the already mentioned above clique of his aunt, the 63-year-old empress-regent Ci Xi.

Actually, Ci Xi talked about reforms very loudly -

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like Princess Sophia in pre-Petrine Russia. But "it was smooth on paper" ...

The main figure of the short period of the "Hundred Days of Reforms" (from June 11 to September 21) was the leader of the "renewal" movement, the forty-year-old philosopher Kang Yuwei (the author of the treatises "Subtleties in the Teaching of Meng Zi", "Study of Confucius's Ideas on Changing the Social Order", etc.).

During the "Hundred Days" more than 50 decrees were issued: on the encouragement of industry, on the development of agriculture, on the opening of a university, on the construction of railways, on strengthening the army, etc.

Alas! The heroes of any "Hundred Days" are not very lucky, it seems. On September 21, Ci Xi made another (no stranger!) coup, arrested Guangxu, on his behalf issued a decree on the resumption of her regency, terminated with the start of scholarly "reforms", arrested the "reformers", executing six of them.

But Kang Yuwei missed. The author of the treatise "On the Great Unity" managed to escape and became the head of the ... monarchist party abroad. Well, with philosophers - from a great mind - this happens.

Looking ahead, I will say that in 1911 Kang Yuwei resolutely opposed the revolution of Sun Yat-sen and against himself, and in 1917, ten years before his death, he participated in the unsuccessful monarchist coup of the militarist Zhang Xun, who was trying to restore the Manchu emperor to the throne Pu Yi (Japanese did it much later).

The unsuccessful reformers failed primarily, of course, because they philosophized a lot in the manner of the Russian Manilov and acted little. The vulgar betrayal of the commander of the thirty-nine-year-old General Yuan Shikai also played its vile significance - as also often happens - by the vulgar Beiyang (Northern) army.

Not the first (and, alas, not the last in the history of states and peoples), the traitor general was rewarded with the post of governor of Shandong, and after active participation in the suppression of the Yihetuan uprising, he became the governor of the capital province of Zhili.

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In 1908, Ci Xi died, and three years later the Wuchang Uprising began - the prologue of the Chinese Xinhai Revolution.

It began in 1911, the Xinhai year of the old Chinese calendar, hence the name. The last straw was the adoption by the Qing government of an act on ... the nationalization of the railways. In fact, this meant the transfer of railways in the provinces of Sichuan, Huyuei and Guangdong to a foreign consortium.

On October 10, 1911, the soldiers of the 8th sapper battalion in Wuchang rebelled - that's how it went. By the end of the year, the imperial power in the country had completely exhausted itself.

The revolution made, first, the Prime Minister of the Peking government, and then the interim president of China, none other than ... Yuan Shikai. Actually, at first, Sun Yat-sen, who returned from exile, was proclaimed interim president on December 29, 1911. But Yuan Shikai wooed him

relinquishing the presidency in his favor.

Then the general established a military dictatorship, and later even tried to proclaim himself emperor. Both the West and Japan gladly encouraged all this political trickery... And without the blessing of the Chinese bourgeoisie itself (not so weak at that time), all this would hardly have been possible.

Wonderful are thy deeds, Lord, but the deeds of Capital are perhaps even more wonderful...

Yuan Shikai's China could hardly be called China in the full sense of the word, because by that time it, as a single power, was already beginning to disintegrate ... Foreign landing forces landed in Chinese ports.

At the same time, the Kuomintang of Sun Yat-sen became more active (and three years before On his death in 1913, Yuan Shikai outlawed the Kuomintang).

Little by little the militarist generals loosened their belts.

In China, great in its complex potential, another long-term and debilitating turmoil began, which was not diminished by large and small interventions, and above all by Japanese intervention.

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It was also UNQUIETLY in small but ancient Korea. And just in Korea, that knot of mutual Russian-Japanese contradictions began, which then dragged on tighter and tighter ...

The king of Korea, who proclaimed himself emperor at the end of the 19th century after a series of Jesuit instigations, was then a formal vassal of the emperor of China (which was also reminded by the decree of Ci Xi on the eve of the Sino-Japanese war).

In fact, Korea was independent from China. But in the future, things went to dependence on Japan. However, Korea could also become a zone of reasonable Russian influence if we came to Korea on time and meaningfully - almost immediately after we abandoned Russian America.

That is, in the late 60s or at the very beginning of the 70s... Of course, this is not our relationship with the Ci Xi regime. would improve. So what? The Manchu dynasty would not have fought against Russia because of Korea, not only because of its actual extreme weakness, but also because the Japanese in Korea were rightly perceived as occupiers, and the Russians could be perceived as a guarantor of stability.

Naturally, such an option would look even more promising if we **retained** Russian America. Yes, and all this would be - if it were preserved - even more possible! With a smart Russian domestic and foreign policy, there would be enough forces for everything. Waging a European war for the freedom of "brothers", Russia got into billions of foreign debts. Abandoning the idiotic European policy would immediately provide funds for exciting projects in the Far East.

Alas, not for the quasi-Russian "Romanov bar" and ponderous Alexander Thirdly, it was possible and accessible for understanding and implementation.

But **Russia** could well master this!

Eh!

Later, when time was lost, Russia was persistently pushed into Korea by many, including Witte. Although the main direction given to Witte was Manchu.

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His goals were, I will say frankly and in advance, provocative and anti-Russian. The result here could only be the emergence and development of Russian-Japanese friction, which actually happened.

In other words, in the interests of those world anti-Russian forces for whom

Witte in Europe tried to quarrel Russia and Germany, while in Asia he pitted Russia and Japan.

Moreover, what is interesting and in some respects even funny to the point of sadness ... The future famous geopolitician Karl Haushofer, an expert on Japan (in 1908— In 1910, he was the military attaché of Germany there) and the world situation in general, he assessed Witte as a conductor of the pro-German line in Russia, and he highly appreciated his Far Eastern policy.

Count Sergei Yulievich had a knack for acting and pretense - to be sure!

In fact, in the beginning, Korea competed - as we already know a little about this - Japan and China. Korea has long been considered a feudal "fief" of the Heavenly Empire... But in 1875, Japan launched a military sortie there.

Just twenty years ago, Japan was in a state of rigid feudal self-isolation, the regime of which lasted for the third century by the middle of the 19th century.

Only under the naval guns of the squadron of the American Commodore Perry Japan was forced to open the country to the outside world.

Now the Japanese demanded that the Koreans "open" the country by the methods of classical "gunboat diplomacy". In April 1875, three Japanese warships entered the mouth of the Hangang River, where the Korean capital of Seoul stands, for the first time.

In 1876, Japan imposed an unequal trade treaty on Korea, which has already opened the way for treaties with Korea by the United States and the West.

Koreans are a small people, but stubborn, independent, self-respecting. IN 1882, the first anti-Japanese uprising broke out in Korea. Japan retreated.

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In December 1884, a pro-Japanese palace coup took place in Seoul (all this, of course, was done by the Japanese themselves). But everything quickly ended with the fact that the population of the capital attacked the Japanese embassy and burned it down, killing several Japanese.

The pro-Japanese government fled to Japan.

And in Korea, the influence of China intervening in the situation has increased. In the second half of the 1980s, Japan's share of Korean imports fell sharply, while China's share increased.

As for Russia, royal Korea was not averse to go under the arm of Russia (with the rights of almost joining!).

But Russia...

I, dear reader, I confess, I could not believe my eyes when I read that by the time the first Russo-Korean treaty of friendship and trade was signed in Seoul on July 7, 1884, Korea was the only one of the neighboring countries of the East with which Russia had did not maintain any official, including diplomatic, relations.

This is necessary!

It turns out that we "point blank" did not notice just that *neighboring* (that is, having a common border with us) state, **the timely** powerful patronage of which could give our Far Eastern policy phenomenally tempting and long-term prospects!

Alexander the Third paid two million rubles for the adventurous "Tibetan" project (which will be discussed in due course). Nicholas II subsidized the construction of the CER.

But not in Tibet, not in the Chinese Eastern Railway, but in Korea, it was necessary to invest Russian forces and means. Russia could go to Korea - as a strong and friendly neighbor - even when Commodore Perry was just sailing to the shores

Japanese islands, and Muravyov was just promoting our Amur affairs ...

We could go to Korea even before the founding of Vladivostok in 1860, and even after the founding - even more so!

Nevertheless, the Japanese were a little ahead of us in "Korean" affairs.

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whether not for a dozen years, although the Koreans have traditionally not had love and trust in them since time immemorial.

And the Koreans in 1884 - six months after the conclusion of an agreement with us - showed that they are not at all inclined to portray themselves in front of the Japanese as a rabbit in front of a boa constrictor ... Perhaps, this "fresh" Russian-Korean agreement also played its role here.

Wherever Russia was pushed in the Far East by all sorts of Wittes and Romanovs - to Northern Manchuria, to Southern Manchuria ... But not where we had to go ... That is, to Korea.

However, as I said, we had to go to Korea, if we did, then - on time... For example, in 1885, when Seoul, bewildered under the pressure of circumstances and a mass of new "trading partners" and "friends", expressed a desire to accept a direct protectorate of Russia. Direct protectorate! Voluntarily! This, in fact, would be the first step towards the inclusion of neighboring Korea into Russia - on the basis of broad autonomy with Russia's supreme right to protect the borders of its Far Eastern protectorate.

Didn't decide...

But six years earlier, the Russian Minister of War Milyutin (it must be said, a deeply Russian patriot, a reformer of the Russian army, but a man of no great political mind) did not find anything more suitable than to push Russian troops to the border with Germany - to the annoyance and bewilderment of Kaiser Wilhelm.

About the misunderstanding of this and indeed rational thinking is not understood step Wilhelm directly spoke to Miliutin himself.

No more understandable was the construction of railways in the west of Russia - obviously in order to quickly transfer Russian troops, again to the German border ...

And if these roads were to lead to the Russian Far East - in Russian, naturally, territories?

And if these troops were to be gradually transferred along them to the same place, to the Far East, - so, to incite hot heads and to strengthen faith in the power of Russia, sober and cautious heads?

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And what if, after the very first request of the Korean king, they were even brought into Korea and began to gain a firm foothold in Korea? We had with her, albeit a narrow, but a land border.

Moreover, the natural "roades" along the Sino-Korean border were - the Yalu and Tzymyn rivers ... There was something to maneuver troops to protect the borders of the new acquired protectorate.

Instead of such decisions and actions, Romanov's Russia in 1888 hung on itself the chains of the first French loan, with which Witte's Fatherland, along with ex- and New Berdichev bankers, were blessed ("New Berdichev" was called St. Petersburg by former shtetl Jewish usurers who successfully moved to the Russian capital)...

Russia got involved in European quarrels alien to its interests. And the promising situation in Korea was given to Japan.

On April 18, 1885, Japan and China conclude a convention in Tianjin on essentially equal rights in Korea and on the refusal to send troops there. Troops from Korea mutually responded, but could be brought there again. "Equilibrium"

was, of course, unsustainable.

In the same year, 1885, England occupied the port of Hamilton on the tiny Korean islands of Komundo, a hundred kilometers from the mainland.

And Russia...

No, the Russia of Alexander the Third and Pobedonostsev does not remember ... She, dear reader, through the lips of the Russian charge d'affaires in China Ladyzhensky, who met with the governor of the capital's Qing province, Li Hongzhang, concludes in 1886 her Tianjin agreement on **Korea** -

oral. Also mutually pledging not to send any troops into Korea.

For this, China undertook, together with Russia, to achieve ... evacuation from England Hamilton, which soon happened.

It was beneficial for China, because the English Hamilton is the base for British intervention in China outside of China... China could now talk about its support from Russia...

And Russia? What is really beneficial for Russia received?

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Nothing!

Thus, a very appropriate chance and reason was lost for us to enter Korea confidently and strongly. After all, unlike Japan, we, I remind you, had a land border with Korea.

YES AND LEAN us in Korea then had someone. The energetic and domineering Korean queen from the Ming clan was oriented towards Russia and grouped active anti-Japanese forces around her. Yi Ming remained a supporter of Russia to the end, maintained ties with the Russian mission...

The weak-willed and insignificant king Ko Zhong (Lee Zhe Hwan, Yi Hui) was under the influence of China.

In 1894, a peasant uprising began in Korea under the flag of the new religious doctrine "tonghak" ("Eastern teaching"). For help in suppressing it, Seoul turned to both China and Japan.

China is sending 3,000 soldiers to Korea. Japan occupies Seoul.

In connection with the suppression of the Tonghak uprising by the "allied" Japanese troops, Japan again became the master of the situation, arrested the royal family and formed a puppet government of 80-year-old Te Won Gun, the former regent and father of the arrested king. This government canceled Korea's treaty with China and concluded a treaty with Japan. The latter recognized the independence of Korea from the Heavenly Empire.

On July 27, 1894, Te Won Gun declared war on China and immediately hid behind the back of that Japan, which got him for this because of his back.

Japan's defense of the remake Korean "independence" served as the formal pretext for the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. Officially announced on August 1, it actually began on June 25, 1894, when the Japanese warship "Naniva" under the command of Captain Togo (the future admiral and winner of the Battle of Tsushima) sank without warning the English

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steamship "Cushing", chartered by China and transporting Chinese soldiers.

During the war, the Japanese occupied the Korean capital, but then

they couldn't get there.

The anti-Japanese speeches of the Koreans themselves, and the political (alas, not forceful!) Intervention (one would like to say - already "madness") of Russia prevented it.

Now, when in ten years everything here has changed for Russia, not for the better, we suddenly began to wave our fists ... Soviet historian Fyodor Rotshtein

later wrote: "Russia did not agree to the independence of Korea in order to give Japan the opportunity to seize it and block the exit from Vladivostok."

And what else, one wonders, could Russia expect after it "agreed to the independence of Korea"? China was in a state of growing crisis and could not exercise real patronage in Korea. Korea also could not defend itself. And, renouncing the protectorate over Korea, Russia gave it to Japan almost automatically! The question was only in the pace and timing.

However, even then the time for a decisive (that is, inevitably forceful) Russian policy was not completely lost, because on July 6, 1895, on the initiative of Queen Ming, King Ko Chong removed Japanese proteges from the government and appointed ministers of Russian orientation in their place. Japan was denied the right to keep garrisons in the main cities of the country.

Well, albeit belatedly, Russia's energetic actions could have turned the tide of events in its favor. After all, although Japan was rapidly gaining strength, it was still quite weak. In June 1895, there were only 2,000 Japanese troops in the Korean kingdom! The Japanese fleet was then still very inferior to ours - if we take the overall ratio of warships.

But what's the use of this if all our best naval forces were locked up in narrownesses of the Baltic far from the Yellow Sea and deployed to Germany?

But it was possible, it was possible to transfer everything decent and new in a timely manner to the Pacific Ocean... If we do it on time, we don't have to

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it would even be possible to organize in Seoul another - now pro-Russian - coup. It has already been held by the legitimate Korean Queen Min!

But even this, already finally the last reasonable, our chance Russia mediocre missed...

And what a shame and annoyance, dear reader! The young emperor Nicholas II at that time noted on a note to Lobanov-Rostovsky: *"Russia certainly needs a free and open port throughout the year. This port must be on the mainland (southeast Korea)..."*

A very sound idea! Moreover, it was in the southeast, because then the communications from such a port to Vladivostok would not be squeezed by the Korea Strait, in the middle of which, dividing it into the Western and Eastern passages, stood the Japanese islands of Tsushima.

Southwestern, for example, the Korean port of Incheon (Chemulpo) was not bad - at a distance of three hundred miles across the Yellow Sea was the German Qingdao (Kio-Chau). But inside the Yellow Sea, the Russian fleet could easily be locked up in case of war, and communication with Vladivostok was definitely blocked.

It was not for nothing that later, in the First World War, the Japanese captured Qingdao very quickly and without problems, although the squadron of Admiral Spee with the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau left in advance for Oceania.

That's when - at the end of the 19th century - we really began to "hiccup" the sale of Russian America. In the new situation in the Pacific Ocean, an ice-free base of the fleet would really help the state. But the Russia of Alexander the First missed the "Hawaiian" chance, the Russia of Nicholas the First - Fort Ross, and the Russia of Alexander II - and all of Russian America.

Yes, they left a difficult legacy to their successors...

That is, Nicholas was not deprived of sanity, but, firstly, his policy was burdened by the mistakes of his grandfather and great-grandfathers (not to mention the mistakes of his father). And secondly, Nicholas, alas, was also deprived

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smart state will. But then he demonstrated stupid stubbornness more than once.

So this time everything was limited to smart litter with stupid politics.

On September 20, 1895, the Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Korea and Consul General in Seoul, Vladimir Karlovich Weber, sent a dispatch to the Russian Foreign Ministry, at the end of which he wrote:

"It is highly desirable to receive categorical instructions from the imperial ministry as to the extent to which it is possible to support the king. To refuse him or remain inactive in response to the preference and trust expressed towards Russia would seem to me not only undesirable, but even dangerous for our position here."

Emperor Nicholas also made a note on this dispatch: "I share Weber's thought."

Litter everything was limited, alas, and in this case ...

Well, what can I say, my dear reader?!

And on October 8, 1895, the Japanese envoy Yomiura held a review of his forces - policemen, soldiers and hired bandits in the Japanese legation in Seoul "suck".

The Japanese "sushi" had a wealth of experience in pre-election terror and political assassinations in Japan itself, and that day they were on top ... They broke into the royal palace and killed all the women who were there, hoping that in this way they would not miss Ming .

They didn't miss her.

After identifying the corpse of the queen, the "sucks" dragged him into the garden, chopped him into pieces, doused with kerosene and burned.

Eh!

King Ko Jong was in custody, but on March 11, 1896, he fled, took refuge in the building of the Russian mission, and there issued a decree on the dismissal of pro-Japanese ministers and the appointment of ministers - supporters of Russia.

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Alas, there were no Russian battleships capable of supporting this decision of Ko Zhong (after all, a legitimate monarch) with their main caliber ... They lined up in the waters of Kronstadt at the ceremonial imperial reviews ...

It all ended with the fact that on May 14, 1896, Vladimir Karlovich Weber and the Japanese representative Jutaro Komura signed the first Russian-Japanese agreement on Korea - the Memorandum of 1896.

Outwardly peacekeeping, it has become the first real stumbling block in relations between Russia and Japan in the coming new century. Both powers agreed to the presence in Korea "in order to protect" an equal number of soldiers, as well as other things - on trifles.

Less than a month later, in Moscow, the representative of Japan at the coronation of Nicholas II, Aritomo Yamagata, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Prince Alexei Borisovich Lobanov-Rostovsky, signed on June 9 a new protocol on the Korean issue, which provided for joint control of both powers over the budget and foreign loans of Korea, control over the formation of the Korean armed forces and police.

Russian military instructors and financial advisers arrived in Korea. Some of them represented Russian interests, while others were Witte's emissary.

The King appoints K.A. Alekseev.

The Russian-Korean Bank is founded (however, both "Russian" and "Korean" it was only in quotation marks).

And Nikolai wrote to his friend Willy in Berlin:

"As you know, we came to an agreement with Japan over Korea, and we had excellent relations with North America long before that. I really see no reason why the latter would turn against old friends (oh, Mr. Colonel, Mr. Colonel Romanov! -

CK) just for "les beaux yeux" (beautiful eyes) of England."

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By that time, Wilhelm could have answered bluntly that why not, if Russia is ready to turn against the old partner - Germany, only for the sake of "les beaux yeux" of France (and England to boot).

However, Wilhelm, not without cunning, of course, wrote from Berlin:

"The masterful agreement in Korea, by which you managed to calm the feelings of the angry Japanese, I consider a wonderful example of diplomacy and forethought; ... now you are, in fact, the owner of Beijing.

Y-yes, through the mouth of the German Kaiser - yes, drink honey!

In 1897, the 50-year-old baron Roman Karlovich Rosen was appointed Russian envoy to Tokyo. Just for reference, I note that he stayed there for two years, and at the end of 1902 he was again assigned to Tokyo, replacing Alexander Petrovich Izvolsky, and met the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War in Japan.

Rosent on April 13 (25), 1898, and signed our last pre-war agreement with Japan on Korea.

On the Rosen-Nishi protocol (Nishi is the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs) we need to take a closer look...

It was born already in an environment of sharp activation of Russia in foreign and alien lands - after the "lease" of the Port Arthur zone in Chinese South Manchuria by the Romanov empire, after the start of construction of the CER in Chinese North Manchuria, after receiving in 1896 the first "Russian" forest concession on the Yalu and Tumen rivers along the Korean-Chinese border.

Russia, which had missed its chance in Korea when Japan was weak, now, when Japan was already firmly established there, was dragged into Korea by the anti-national clique.

And at the same time, under the agreement of April 13, Russia renounced privileges in Korea and recalled its financial and military instructors.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however, left open the question of the possibility of training in case of complications in the northern part of Korea. But would it arise if in Korea there were not our military instructors, but military units?

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And Japan was not just settling, but was already ousting from Korea even the United States, which in 1882 concluded its own "treaty" with the Korean king.

By the way, in the same period, in March 1898, Japan wanted to obtain from Russia guarantees of complete freedom of its actions in Korea in exchange for recognition of "Russia's special interests in Manchuria." The proposal is not so unreasonable: since we got into Manchuria and, I'll say, looking ahead, intercepted the Liaodong Peninsula with Port Arthur from Japan, then something could be exchanged ...

Although it would be wiser - if we were missing Korea as such - try to neutralize it militarily in exchange for economic freedom for Japan and a military port for Russia in southeast Korea.

Russia, however, refused, fearing ... to spoil relations with America and England.

Indeed, one could say that those whom he wants to punish, God deprives of reason. However, is it possible to deprive someone of what he does not have? And Romanov's Russia had no foreign policy mind for a long time.

And she went, like a ram on a string, to war with Japan.

Witte outwardly distanced himself from such a policy. He blamed everything (I will show this later) on the Minister of Foreign Affairs Muravyov - they say that he influenced the tsar and achieved the fatal lease of Port Arthur.

But general opinions about this Muravyov - "Port Arthur" do not differ: a semi-educated zhuir, a sly, a limited lazy person, a dodgy deceiver and a clever courtier who owes a career to protections.

In short - the ideal version of the ideal "agent of influence." That is, an agent used "in the dark", so that he does not even realize that he is being made an instrument and conductor of someone else's will.

With such a high-society fool of the kings of heaven and earth, Witte, it was not difficult to provide yourself with a cover on the principle "I am not me, and the horse is not mine, and I not a driver."

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The Russo-Japanese War gave an absolute advantage in Korea and the Far East of Japan. And even the USA had to admit it. For nothing, they themselves had views of Korea, and under the American-Korean treaty of 1882, they promised the Koreans to assist in their relations with other countries.

So, they "contributed"! In 1907, US Secretary of War William Howard Taft (a little later he would become US President) officially stated: "The whole world should have confidence in the policy of Japan, which seeks to spread justice and education in a backward people."

Under such advances, Japan led the case to the complete annexation of Korea, which became a fact on August 22, 1910, after the Japanese and Korean "emperors" (both in quotation marks, but for different reasons) signed the corresponding "treaty".

This "agreement" became one of the logical results of the mediocrity of our Far East policy and Russia's defeat in the Far East war.

It said that the "emperor" of Korea (in quotation marks because the "empire" in quotation marks was Korea) "desiring to increase the general welfare of both nations and to preserve peace in the Far East" ceded for all time all rights of sovereignty over his country to the Japanese "emperor" (in quotation marks because - as we will see later - he ruled, but did not manage).

Japan from the same "high motives" "agreed" to this.

Russia and Japan thus received in fact, albeit a short, but common land border.

Many turbulent events swept over Russia, Japan, Korea and China a decade before such a mutually "generous" decision of the two "emperors" ... And the annexation of Korea itself, as it was said, turned out to be only the result of many of these events.

But about this - about the Chinese Eastern Railway and Liaodong, about Port Arthur and the Yalu River, about Witt-"Polu-Sakhalinskiy", Zhamsaran Badmaev and much more about what and about whom - we will have time to talk in detail later.

Now let's talk about Japan...

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Our OFFICIAL relations with Japan were much younger than with China. The embassy of Adam Laxman, successful in Japanese results, but unsuccessful in St.

century.

No assets...

By the middle of this century, having Russian America, in the case of growing

Pacific gain, Russia could move from a stupid point and Japanese affairs. At least try to do it!

Instead, Petersburg to Nesselrode and his ilk conceded the initiative in the Pacific to the Yankees. For eighteen years - from 1834 to 1852 - only 5 Russian ships were sent to the Pacific waters. Later, this surprised some even in tsarist times!

But even Nikolaev Russia, slow to the Far East, saw that it was necessary to enter into official contacts with Japan ... And our first agreement with her - a treatise on trade (the Shimoda Treaty) was concluded in 1855. From the Russian side, it was signed by Count and Vice Admiral Evfimiy Vasilyevich Putyatin.

The year before, Japan had been "opened up" by the United States. And I must say that the gallant US Commodore Perry, whom we will meet later, acted with the methods not so much of a safe-opening specialist - a "safecracker", as of a thug-raider ...

When you take off your head, you don't cry for your hair. After the opening of the Japanese ports of Shimoda in the principality of Tsioshu and Hakodate in the principality of Matsumai for distant States, it was possible to open them (in the amount of already three pieces - Shimoda, Hakodate and Nagasaki) and for a neighbor - Russia.

How you position yourself is how you will stand... Especially in the East. The East is indeed a delicate matter! On February 18, 1855, Nicholas the First died suddenly, and the first treaty with the Japanese Empire was signed on February 7 of the same year by the head of the Far Eastern expedition of 1852-1855 and the head of the diplomatic mission to establish relations with Japan, Admiral Putyatin.

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This was, as we know, already the third, and obviously belated, Russian mission in Japan.

Telexes did not exist then, and Putyatin, presumably, was guided by long-term instructions. And I don't know whether Nikolai himself sanctioned the obligations of the Russian Empire under this treaty or whether Putyatin decided everything "according to the situation", but Russia's obligations from the very beginning looked, my dear reader, strange.

Count Putyatin sailed to the Far East on the frigate "Pallada" (the same one, Goncharov's, on which the great writer sailed as the admiral's secretary). There seemed to be enough time to think. However, he signed such an agreement that, for example, I only shrug my shoulders about him.

True, even the patriotic second edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia defined it as "favorable for Russia." But what was seen there for us "favorable", I personally do not understand.

Evfimiy Vasilyevich Putyatin was a very dashing sailor. Midshipman on the frigate "Cruiser" went around the world with Admiral Lazarev, saw Russian America. Upon his return, he visited the Battle of Navarino ... He quickly rose in ranks: he had not yet "sailed" for four decades in his life, he became rear admiral. But then he went through the diplomatic line, headed a mission to Persia, where, according to sources, "he achieved an obligation not to obstruct Russian trade in the Caspian."

Persia at that time was no longer the power of the legendary Darius and Xerxes, and what such serious obstacles could it put in the Caspian Sea, the homeland of the heroes of Navarin - Admirals Lazarev and Putyatin - I can't understand given...

Putyatin ended his public career, by the way, at the age of fifty-eight (he lived eighty), leaving in 1861 with a scandal in

resignation from the post of Minister of Public Education after causing student unrest.

The admiral stayed as minister for six months, and caused unrest by banning student gatherings, ticket offices and libraries.

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It was this "great diplomat" and "educational reformer" who concluded our first treaty with Japan.

I will draw the reader's attention to the fact that the idea was not bad ... Putyatin moved from Kronstadt to establish relations with the Island Empire on October 7, 1852 - two years before Commodore Perry's actions.

In Japan, his squadron arrived before Perry - in August 1853, she dropped anchor in Nagasaki Bay. Moreover, Putyatin had orders to achieve the opening of the country exclusively by peaceful means.

Commendable!

So, Evfimiy Vasilievich suggested that the Japanese establish trade relations and draw a border between Russian and Japanese possessions to the north of Japan.

Everything was right here - Russia had to somehow determine itself with Japan, because Russia for Japan is not the same as America. And Japan for Russia is not like the USA. Russia and Japan are neighbours. And life itself constantly pushed the two peoples together - either a storm will beat the shipwrecked Japanese to the Russian lands, or industrialists or fishermen will stumble upon each other in the sea.

And the new times were increasingly reducing the already small distances between the Japanese and Russian borders ... So Putyatin's mission was a long-needed and reasonable action.

In principle, it was also reasonable that we did not put pressure on the Japanese with guns. Putyatin peacefully proposed, the Japanese promised to think about it. And the Russian squadron departed back home.

It was all good...

The bad thing was that further on we behaved with Japan in a way that befits a self-respecting state.

First, Putyatin was busy for a long time not with the thought of a treaty with Japan, but with geographical discoveries and research in the Pacific Ocean. His expedition mapped a lot of new Russian names, and not only purely Russian ones - Cape Schlippenbach in the northeastern part of Korea was named after Putyatin's expedition member, Lieutenant Commander A.E. Schlippenbach.

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However, as a result of these — small, in fact — discoveries, Putyatin missed out of sight the necessity of the main discovery - the discovery of Japan for Russia!

Putyatin's expedition entered the Philippines, then moved to the harbor of Khadzhi (Imperial harbor, and now Soviet harbor) on the mainland, Siberian coast of the Tatar Strait.

Commodore Perry at that time came to the Japanese shores for the second time - in February 1854, and on March 31, the first treaty in the modern history of Japan was signed between Japan and a Christian state - an agreement between Japan and the USA.

Putyatin, in the harbor of Khadzhi, moved to the new frigate "Diana" under the command of Lieutenant Commander (future Admiral) Stepan Stepanovich Lesovsky. Lesovsky came from Kronstadt specifically at the disposal of Putyatin. And the geographical and diplomatic mission returned on the "Diana" to Japan - to Shimoda Bay.

After Perry...

I will remind the reader that at one time Fedor Shimelin from the RAC, regarding the discoveries of Lisiansky's Neva, reasonably noted that geographical discoveries are not always consistent with commercial gain. But, as we see, they are also not always consistent with diplomatic benefits.

It's hard for me to understand another thing - why Putyatin didn't take Pallada with him to Japan. He sailed to the Japanese in peace, but an extra frigate in Shimoda Bay would not hurt ... Of course, in those days - the Crimean War was going on - the Russian frigate was also useful in the area of the mouth of the Amur, but ...

We are sometimes very peaceful - when it is not necessary ... And when it is not necessary - as on The Balkans are warlike.

December 11, 1854 "Diana" was killed during an earthquake, and, surrenders me, something happened then with the brains of Yevfimiy Vasilyevich ...

Yes, I can't explain the Shimoda turn of Russian affairs in the Far East in any other way! Tsarist Russia, which at that time owned, among other things, Russian America, behaved with Japan, from

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which at that time even became from Russia for a good century, simply in an idiotic way, immediately starting to give up Russian national interests "on the vine".

Well, in fact ... Let's take this very first Russian-Japanese agreement - Treaty of Shimoda ...

Here are the positions of the parties...

Russia, headed by the new autocrat Alexander II, is a world and after all, in many respects a European developed power.

Japan is no "power" at that moment, technologically lagging behind outside world for ages...

And the Shimoda Treaty fixed the delimitation in the Kuril Islands so that the Russian-Japanese border passed in the Kuril region between the island of Urup and the island of Iturup.

For some reason, Japan received Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and the "changes" around them, although even one, but an honest look at the world map gives away the entire Kuril ridge on the conscience of Russia.

All!

About Sakhalin, which "stuck" to the Russian Primorye, as a fish sticks to a huge whale, and in general there can be no talk, except for Russian possession!

Nevertheless, the new Alexandrovskaya Russia calmly and even gratefully reacted to the fact that the Japanese, then incredibly weak, did not "mercifully" lay claim to Sakhalin. And in the treaty it was written to consider Sakhalin "undivided between Russia and Japan, as it was until now" ...

Eh, if lieutenants Khvostov and Davydov had remained alive and become admirals, and if they had become diplomats, then maybe the Shimoda Treaty would have looked different?

It's easy to be arrogant when they voluntarily put your face under your fist - on, they say, hit!

It was a dashing time for Russia, my dear reader! The authority of Russia was undermined by the results of the Crimean War. Japan, as I understand it, on the eve of its "opening" gradually followed the events in the outside world carefully and knew how to understand them ... Therefore, Putyatin's task was, of course, very difficult. Well here

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the wife had a truly wise statesmanship, coupled with a lofty and convincing patriotism.

It was necessary to prove to the Japanese that the failure of Russia is a temporary phenomenon, but

its potential is a constant factor. It was necessary to bring to Japan albums of photographs about Russia and albums about her history, her industrial products and her books ... And calmly, with dignity to defend the Russian cause, not going to belittle Russia ... Without stopping, if necessary, and calm rigidity tones...

But, regardless of the personal, not very outstanding, qualities of Putyatin, it is unlikely that the official representative of the then Russia could have behaved *like this!* He did not behave himself, and did not bring any albums to Japan.

In addition, all this would have to be carried not on one, not on two frigates, but on a flagship at the head - an impressive squadron of at least three or four ships. With the appropriate honorary gun salute! Of all the guns...

The strength of the spirit of a diplomat is fed by the strength of the spirit of the state that sent him to foreign lands to defend their national interests. Could Putyatin, sent to Japan by the Russia of Nicholas I, be inspired by the Russia of Alexandrov now?

After all, Putyatin signed the Treaty of Shimoda on the eve of those times when the unforgettable son of the unforgettable Nicholas I - Alexander II - The "Liberator", together with his august brother Konstantin, was already planning to "liberate" Russia from Russian America.

In 1867 he freed us from it...

And soon he also "liberated" us from the Kuriles - according to the treatise between Russia and Japan in 1875 (St. Petersburg Treaty).

And for this, Japan "renounced claims" to Sakhalin, which does not belong to it by any right. Back in the time of Rezanov, the natives of Sakhalin, the Ainu, said: "Sakhalin is the land of the Ainu, there is no Japanese land on Sakhalin ..." They did not object to Russian citizenship.

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And what's more shameful! Between the conclusion of the American-Japanese treaty of March 31, 1854 "on peace and friendship" and the conclusion of the Russian-Japanese treaty of February 7, 1855, an Anglo-Japanese convention was concluded. Japan and England signed it in the same Nagasaki where Putyatin was hanging out on October 14, 1854.

So why historians speak well of Putyatin - I don't understand!

It must be said that both in the agreement with the Yankees and in the convention with the British, as one of the two "station" for American ships, where they could "supplement with timber, water, food, coal and other goods ...", and for English ships "for the purpose of repairing and obtaining fresh water, food and all kinds of other necessary items ..." the port of Hakodate on the island of Hokkaido was indicated.

A study of the map shows that Hakodate, a purely inland Japanese port lying on the outskirts of the then international trade routes, was important for the Anglo-Saxons primarily as a possible base of operations against Russia.

And this despite the fact that the fact of Russian-Japanese neighborhood was inevitably confirmed already by our first common treaty, where Article 2 dealt with the borders between Russia and Japan.

Neighborhood is not always good neighborliness, but only good neighborliness is a smart neighborhood. But did we cleverly distinguish ourselves from Japan from the very beginning, and did we cleverly present ourselves to the Japanese?

This is how it happened in Russo-Japanese relations... On the part of Russia — idiocy, shameful for a great people, mixed with the adventures of those in power. On the part of Japan - stupid arrogance, combined with the same adventurism.

Although even from what I have said, the dear reader may to understand that there was an objective basis for our *smart and kind* relations.

We had something to complement each other.

Yes, and there were people who understood this, both in Russia and in Japan.

Moreover, from the very beginning of contractual relations, the "democratic" Anglo-Saxons put themselves in relation to the Japanese in

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allied position, stipulating only their rights in Japan, but not the rights of the Japanese in England and the USA.

But in the 1855 treaty signed by Japan with "totalitarian" Russia, Article 8 read:

"Both the Russian in Japan and the Japanese in Russia are always free and are not subject to any restrictions. The perpetrator of a crime may be arrested, but judged only according to the laws of his country.

Yes, we could well be friends, mutually respecting the legitimate interests of each other. friend.

Chekhov, in his Sakhalin essays, gives many interesting details and states: "Relations between the local administration and the Japanese are excellent, as they should be."

He also writes that after the Russians began to strengthen in South Sakhalin in the second half of the 19th century, Japanese industrialists, who had chosen this zone because of the abundance of fish and the almost free labor of the Ainu, were alarmed ... "The consideration that they could lose good income and gratuitous workers, -

continued Anton Pavlovich, "made them closely follow the Russians, and they were already trying to strengthen their influence on the island in opposition to Russian influence. But ... due to the lack of confidence in their right, this struggle with the Russians was indecisive to the point of ridiculousness, and the Japanese behaved like children. They limited themselves only to spreading gossip among the Ainu about Russians and boasting that they would slaughter all Russians, and as soon as the Russians established a post in some locality, soon a Japanese picket appeared in the same locality, but only on the other side of the river, and , with all their desire to appear scary, the Japanese still remained peaceful and nice people: they sent sturgeons to Russian soldiers, and when they turned to them for a net, they willingly fulfilled the request "...

This was written fifteen years before the Russo-Japanese War, and here Chekhov noticed a very important thing in a trifle - the absence of malice towards the Russians among ordinary Japanese.

Those in power were distinguished by arrogance, but arrogance is a sham character trait. Her eliminates either a hard pressure, or a full dignity, slightly ironic smile.

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Smiling at the Japan of the Japanese and calmly holding the gaze of the Japan of the Samurai, Russia could secure a lasting peace in the Far East!

However, the possible Russo-Japanese friendliness had the same enemies in the Pacific Ocean as we had with the Germans in Europe. The Englishwoman here "shitted" us in the same way, and in the same way she more and more often spoiled not only for her own benefit, but also for the benefit of Uncle Sam ...

And more and more often this Uncle Sam himself spoiled us ...

The peak (or, if you wish, *the trough*) of a stupid situation was the Russo-Japanese War of 1904. But more about her later...

Let's get back to China...

The GREAT October Socialist Revolution turned Russia's relations with China into the plane of "proletarian internationalism." China was seen as a natural great ally in a future world

revolution.

However, the revolutionary democratic processes in China were dominated by anti-imperialist and nationalist rather than class factors.

Nevertheless, the USSR very diligently helped China in its desire to gain independence, as well as in its anti-Japanese struggle. Back in 1924, a Soviet-Chinese agreement was concluded, which annulled all unequal treaties concluded by tsarist Russia, with a refusal (under Article XI

agreement) from the "Russian part of the compensation", that is, the so-called "boxing" indemnity.

We helped the founder of the Kuomintang, Sun Yat-sen, we helped the Chinese Communists, but we also helped the bourgeois nationalist Chiang Kai-shek. He even received a daughter-in-law from us for his son Chiang Ching-kuo - "Masha from Uralmash". In the Urals, the Komsomol member Chiang Ching-kuo worked under the pseudonym of Nikolai Vladimirovich Elizarov.

However - here it is! "Russian" policy and the Kuomintang led by Sun Yat Sen, and later Chiang Kai-shek, and the Communist Party led by

94 with Mao Zedong in relation to the USSR was, frankly, permanently two-faced.

And at best - mercantile and dependent.

Well, let's say the leader of China, Sun Yat-sen. He died in March 1925, that is, when the Soviet Union itself was still just getting out from under the ruins of two wars and intervention.

It was all the more difficult for us in the year 1922 ...

AND...

And so, in the spring of 1922, Sun met with Comintern employee Sergei Dalin and informed him of his persistent desire to involve Soviet Russia in the grandiose railway construction in China.

"To cover China with a network of railroads is my dream," he confessed innocently to Dalin.

Dalin knew that Sun had once been in charge of the Railway Construction Bureau, that he had such dreams for a long time, and that in 1914 he even created a company in Shanghai for this purpose.

So Dalin politely agreed:

"Well, your dream is a beautiful and useful dream.

- And another dream of mine is to connect Canton and Moscow by rail through Turkestan.

The idea is great, but where do you get the money from? Dalin was surprised.

- And you?

- Eh! We ourselves would not mind getting them from someone for *our* railways ...

- Yes, yes, I tried to get support from the West ...

- So how is it?

- Unsuccessful...

Dalin was a Communist, an adviser to the Comintern, and so he offered Sun Yat-sen quite natural advice:

- And you try to carry out at least a tax (not agrarian!) reform in the interests of the middle peasantry, first of all!

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"No, no, it's categorically impossible," the Chinese immediately flared up.

"But that would give you a stable mass base in the countryside.

- No, no, this is not an option ...

Dear reader! For the 1920s, to offer ruined Russia to build in

In China, the railways were not just a project, but more than that - evidence of a complete lack of political realism, combined with primitive narrow national egoism.

And the rejection of broad social reforms led nowhere...

And if I have already begun a story about Sun Yat-sen, then I will tell you something that the "historians of the Central Committee of the CPSU" preferred to keep quiet so that the "textbook gloss" on the face of the "leader of the Chinese revolution" would not crack.

With the outbreak of World War I, Sun turned to Inukai, leader of the influential Japanese bourgeois-landowner party Kokuminto, with a call to enter the war on the side of the Central Powers (that is, against Russia as well) in the name of the liberation of Asia.

He wrote: "Japan is my second homeland, and the leaders of Japan are my teachers... Asia is our home, and Japan and China are twin brothers in this house, who should work closely together and help each other in practice"...

The comparison about the brothers looked somewhat comical (if you look at the territorial size of the "twins"), but the idea was expressed quite definitely.

On the eve of the First World War, Sun once again went to Tokyo, and there such an interlocutor of his as militarist General Katsura was very disposed to the idea of the proposed "fraternization" and even suggested that Sun Yat-sen "brotherly" cede Manchuria to Japan. And for this he promised nothing less than "liberate China from British influence."

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Sun hesitated, felt uncomfortable, but he did not sharply dissociate himself from these "brotherly" ideas...

Years passed...

Not the principled position of a wise leader who understands the vital importance for China of a strong alliance with Russia, but the opportunism that has ingrained itself in the very essence of Sun Yat-sen's policy and Japan's clearly anti-Chinese line made him a "friend" of Russia.

However, to refuse even selfish China and the possibilities of influence in it was not only stupid for Soviet Russia, but also dangerous. Japan was hostile to us, and China was here, although unreliable, but a real factor in distracting Japan.

Moreover, in August 1923, Chiang Kai-shek brought Sun's request to Moscow. Yat-sen about sending Soviet political and military advisers to Canton.

And from September 1923 to July 1927, Mikhail Borodin (Gruzenberg) became the chief political adviser to the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang. Actually - a Trotskyist, but - okay ... Although where there is - "okay"! Trotskyist leftist excesses ended up costing us dearly in China.

Chief military adviser to the revolutionary government of China since 1924 to 1927 was Vasily Konstantinovich Blucher (General Galin).

However, in parallel, I note that from April 1934 to March 1935, the famous German Colonel General Hans von regime, about 60 German military advisers were registered.

He was also a military adviser to Chiang Kai-shek and a Japanese intelligence major from the "Chinese Research Group" Eremichi Suzuki, through whom Chiang in 1927 in Tokyo established contacts with Chief Suzuki himself - the head of military intelligence, General Ivane Matsui.

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Does not interfere with the words of a personnel officer of the Intelligence Directorate

of the General Staff of the Red Army, Bulgarian Ivan Vinarov, to find out the opinion of Blucher, referring to 1926: "Even the military council in Canton, until recently, rejected any idea of military intelligence ... I do not believe that the generals ... are so professionally illiterate. Most of them graduated from military academies abroad... They probably reject the need for Chinese intelligence in order to provide a field of activity for Western intelligence centers.

To this we can only add that Soviet intelligence had to act in China (including from the standpoint of countering Japan) most often

illegally.

One way or another, we were present in China throughout the 20s and 30s, but the sad "Chinese syndrome" of double-dealing accompanied the Russians in China too often...

Alas!

Here is what our aviator Colonel D.A. told in the second half of the 30s upon his return from China. Kudymov: "Soviet volunteers were the first to take to the air, the first to attack, while other pilots - foreign volunteers (in fact, these "volunteers" were well-paid mercenaries. - S.K.) - always came to a "hat *analysis*". However, the Chinese command ... showed increased concern for American and British pilots. They were the last to enter the battle, their vehicles, unlike ours (although the tactical and technical characteristics of Soviet fighters were much better than outdated Western ones. - S.K.) and Chinese, were hiding in special caponiers. The food of the western volunteers was the best."

COLONEL Kudymov and his comrades ended up in China because in 1931 Japan launched a direct aggression against China, starting with the occupation of Manchuria ...

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In January 1932, it was Shanghai's turn, although by the summer of that year the Japanese had to retreat from the Shanghai area. But in general, they were more successful than defeated in China at that time.

And that, perhaps, had its own logic, determined by the difference in the national characters of geographically close, and civilizationally very, perhaps, very different peoples.

China has been in contact with Europeans for several centuries, during which Japan deliberately did not contact the Europeans.

In the middle of the 19th century, Japan was brought out of self-isolation by threatening it with force. In the 80s of the 19th century, the bourgeois reforms of the "Meiji revolution" began (we will pay a lot of attention to them later, dear reader). And they give impetus to the almost instantaneous transformation of Japan into a very dynamic state, rapidly becoming the subject of world politics of the first row.

China, on the other hand, even after its final "opening" by the West, is not progressing according to the "Japanese" type, but is increasingly turning into a semi-colony and an object of imperialist exploitation.

Of course, compared to China, Japan was less attractive to the West. It is very poor in raw materials. (Even in the 1980s, Japan imported 99.7 percent of its oil needs, 100 percent of aluminum, iron ore, and nickel, 95 percent of copper, and 92 percent of gas.)

Japan was "discovered" much later than China, and compared to China, it did not seem to be particularly attractive and quickly paid off as a place for predatory efforts. Whether China matters... After all, it has already been firmly pressed by the West by a series of "opium" wars.

And for this reason alone, it was more profitable for the West to encourage the development of Japan in order to keep it "at its feet" and, if necessary, incite Russia and (or) China. What the West then successfully did.

But, on the other hand, China's raw material wealth was objectively powerful a potential factor in his rapid national progress.

Why didn't the Chinese "spurt" at the turn of the 19th-20th centuries take place - parallel to the Japanese one?

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I will ask this interesting and important question more than once and gradually - not all at once - I will try to give at least a partial answer to it.

Moreover, speaking of the Chinese character, one must bear in mind, perhaps, the fact that the difference in psychology between the relatively small educated layer of the Chinese and the already immense Chinese peasant mass (I would like to say - biomass), most likely, was large in the 19th century. and remains large in the 21st century. And therefore, speaking of the Chinese national character, I here mean that version of it, which is characteristic of the upper part of Chinese society.

Of course, both the patient coolies of the 19th century, and the almost disenfranchised and almost ignorant peasants of the 21st century, standing impassively at the foot of the sparkling Beijing skyscrapers with their old cargo bikes loaded with greenish Chinese tangerines, were thinking and thinking about something ...

They are indifferent only outwardly - a person is not a cow ... But they rarely intervene in the course of history - when it is already unbearable and when there is nothing or almost nothing to lose ... And the current situation is determined, alas, by those in power educated and supported by them.

So here is some information to reflect on the way of thinking of the "tangerine" part of the then Chinese society...

In the early 1960s, feudal Japan had already been "opened" by the West, but was still in almost absolute weakness and confusion. And the government of Iemochi - the penultimate shogun from the Tokugawa house (about this house and much more about which I will start a story in a dozen paragraphs) - turned to China with a proposal to establish official diplomatic relations ...

But what was the "great" Heavenly Empire before the centuries of despised *dong yang xiao guizi* - "pygmy devils from beyond the Eastern Sea"?

"Damn" refused ...

And in 1871, the Heavenly proposal for an alliance against the invasion of the Western powers were already rejected by the "devils", which began the era of the "Meiji reforms".

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And still later, Mutsu Munemitsu, Japanese Foreign Minister during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, wrote: *"We were faced with an amazing spectacle, which was two countries separated only by a narrow strip of water: one showed the results of the perception of Western civilization, the other remained advocate of obsolete practices in East Asia. At one time, the Japanese used to treat China with great reverence. They called it "Heavenly Empire" and "Great Empire"... Now we despise China as a bigoted and ignorant colossus of conservatism."*

Sharp?

Yes.

Fair?

Alas, also...

Perhaps part of the answer is also found in a demonstrative assessment of the psychology of the Chinese compradors (the national bourgeoisie serving the interests of

foreign capital) of the 30s of the XX century and their views on foreigners, made by the famous Soviet expert on China, Mikhail Iosifovich Sladkovsky:

"For all their sophistication and resourcefulness in relations with foreigners ... one cannot fail to note their weakness. Merchants fanatically believed in their "superiority" and "infallibility", they underestimated their counterparties. Dr. Sun Yat-sen noted in this regard: "China itself highly appreciated its own achievements and did not put other states in anything. It became a habit and became considered something completely

natural"...

China has acquired such national properties over the millennia of its history.

Still would! After all, there were at least four of these millennia!

And this is not counting the fact that the history of Homo sapiens in general dates back, among other things, from the fossil "proto-Chinese" - Sinanthropus.

And Japan...

Well, we'll talk about her now.

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Chapter 3

"Race Yamato" and Commodore Perry

THE HISTORY OF ANCIENT JAPAN is far from going back thousands of years as history of China. However, there is no need to go into the very depths here.

However, in order to better understand the course of more or less modern events, it will be useful for us, dear reader, to at least briefly know the course of events that are quite old ...

And, I dare to assure you, knowing about them is not only useful, but also interesting!

The natives of the Japanese islands lived by the sea: catching fish, shellfish, crabs.

Fortunately, there was enough of this goodness in coastal waters, and you can't even count one and a half hundred, or even hundreds of kilometers to the sea from anywhere in Japan.

More civilized colonists from the "Chinese" mainland came to the semi-wild islands, mixed with the natives, pushed them to the north, but in the end also participated in the formation of that people, who would later call themselves the "Yamato race" and become known in the outside world as Japanese .

This process was especially active in the 4th and 5th centuries, and the channel for the penetration of Chinese clans and Chinese culture to the Japanese islands was then Korea, which had already become acquainted with Chinese civilization.

As I understand it, the natives of the Japanese islands were courageous people and accustomed to the elements. Japan is a country of volcanoes, tsunamis, earthquakes...

Japan is the ocean, huge waves, sea expanses and at the same time many small and close to each other

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other islands with a rugged coastline, with convenient bays. That is, nature itself brought up in the islanders both the courage necessary for survival and easily satisfied curiosity.

As for the newcomers from the continent, they must have been less hardened, but on the other hand they were more educated, more refined. As they say, character is born in storms, intellect matures in silence.

The fusion of the persistent character of the natives and continental culture in a single people, which, moreover, is being formed in a very peculiar and rich natural environment, promised to become also very peculiar and promising ...

And even then in Japan, it seems, the importance of knowledge was very high. The very term "siru", applied to the ancient tribal elders and expressing the concept of "govern", literally means "to know". As Professor E. Zhukov wrote in his "History of Japan" in 1939, "the power of the tribal elder was originally based on the fact that he was more knowledgeable, "knowledgeable" than other members of the clan."

For the ancient peoples, this approach was far from universal, because more often they valued the power not of the mind, but of the fist. However, the majority of modern peoples, starting with the Russian people, are not very good at appreciating reason in power either. But this is so, by the way.

At the beginning of the 8th century, Japan passed the first legislative act on education. The establishment of a system of public schools began in the capital and provinces.

State, reader! At the beginning of the 8th century...

In Europe and half a thousand years after this Japanese state act, the attitude towards education was somewhat different. And quite a few even possessive persons were fundamentally *proud* of their illiteracy.

In Japan, such people were not exactly despised ... There were simply no such people in the ruling stratum!

And this, unconventional for the feudal societies of the world, is a circumstance I ask the reader to remember. We will return to him.

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Medieval Japanese society was highly structured. However, such an outstanding leader in the unification of Japan as Oda Nabunaga, born in 1534, was in his youth only a petty feudal lord. That is, the principle "every cricket know your hearth" was not strictly observed -

originality "from below" did not always meet with rejection "from above".

Eight years after the birth of the future formidable commander and administrator, in 1542, a European ship first appeared off the southern coast of Kyushu.

Portuguese...

And sixteen years after this first "discovery" of Japan, twenty-four-year-old Oda, with the help of his associate Toyotomi Hideyoshi and firearms brought by the Portuguese, began a series of his glorious campaigns in Japan.

Oda and his successor Hideyoshi were uncommon and tough natures. Hideyoshi, by the way, also came not from the nobles, but in general from the common people. He started with Oda as a simple combatant - ashigaru (as the infantrymen from among the peasants were called).

However, the dictatorship of Oda Nabunaga did not last long - 14 years. In 1582, events took place that could very well become the basis of the plot of an exciting Hollywood action movie.

In that year, Oda was preparing for a decisive battle with the largest feudal prince Mori. To defeat one of Mori's allies, Prince Teshu, he sent an expeditionary corps of the experienced Hideyoshi to the province of Bitchu.

A little later, Oda sent after Hideyoshi - to help - another of his closest employees and commander - Aketi Mitsuhide.

At first, an ordinary samurai, Aketi enjoyed the absolute trust of Oda, thanks to which he advanced to the military leaders.

And here...

And then Akechi, instead of going to his friend Hideyoshi, suddenly turned back and entered the temporary residence of Oda - the Honnōji temple in Kyoto.

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Of course, Oda was surprised. But how could he think that he would not have to be surprised for a long time. Aketi brutally slaughtered the guards of Oda, and with it - Oda himself and his eldest son.

Historians have never found an explanation for this villainy. But the fact that the hastily returned Hideyoshi temporarily reconciled with Mori, rushed in pursuit of Aketi, overtook him and destroyed him along with the entire detachment - this is what historians tell us.

Nevertheless, it is pleasant to know that the scoundrels were sometimes quickly rewarded according to their deeds. Even centuries ago...

Soon enough, Hideyoshi became the final master of Japan and already almost its ultimate unifier.

He finally enserfed the peasants and introduced a three-estate system: the nobility (samurai), peasants (hyakuse) and townspeople (temin).

Note that there is no clergy here. Detail, for many peoples at that the time is also not very characteristic.

Oda held Buddhist monks and monasteries as mortal enemies. Hideyoshi was more moderate in this matter, approaching the problem in a purely utilitarian way: as long as the monks do not pry into the affairs of the state, let them pray, but poke their heads, then you can and should give them a hat ...

As for material privileges... Why do "God's people" need them?

The name Hideyoshi is legendary in Japan also because he undertook a number of large-scale expeditions - including to Korea ... He wanted to conquer Korea, Formosa-Taiwan, the Philippines and China, moving the capital to the Chinese city of Ningbo.

In reality, it was possible to conquer only Korea for a while, but in this case almost the entire stock of resources and funds accumulated by Japan at that time was depleted. The ardor of foreign policy adventures faded away.

Although, as the recent history of Japan has shown, not forever.

After the death of Hideyoshi in 1598, the "Tokugawa era" began, named after the first of the Tokugawa shoguns, Ieyasu.

It ended only in 1867 during the Meiji Revolution, when the fifteenth and last shogun of the Tokugawa clan, Tokugawa

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Keiki was forced to declare his renunciation and the return of power to the emperor.

And the founder of the shogunate, Tokugawa Ieyasu, became the shogun, that is, the military feudal ruler of Japan (literally, "the great commander, the conqueror of the barbarians") in 1603, forcing the emperor of Japan to give him this title, known in Japan since the 12th century.

According to the Tokugawa law, the emperor was not supposed to "condescend" to any communication with his subjects. And he - under the watchful eye of the shoguns - "did not condescend." The life of the "Kyoto recluse" was diversified only by the "court nobility", whose salary was paid by the same shogun.

This is the kind of imperial "power" that the Japanese have long had, my dear reader.

The richest feudal lord of Japan - the first Tokugawa - was also an outstanding comrade-in-arms of Oda. The Tokugawa controlled a quarter of the country's total rice income. And Hideyoshi recognized the power insofar as he did not touch him.

From 1598 to 1603, Tokugawa was officially considered the guardian of the legal Hideyoshi's heir, Hideyori.

Then he got tired of it, and he (oh, sorry - not him, but the emperor) proclaimed himself (that is, I mean that he was proclaimed by the emperor) shogun.

Yes, the emperor in Japan even then only reigned, but did not rule.

Tokugawa divided the entire population not into three, but into four estates: samurai, peasants, artisans and merchants.

Note that here, too, there is no clergy as a separate class. It can be seen that the companions of Oda, who remained faithful to him, had not only warm hearts in their chests, but also intelligent heads on their shoulders.

And the ruling strata of Japan carried this last (also not frequent for the "top") feature through the centuries - which subsequently served both them and the Japanese people a considerable service.

By 1600, the Japanese had known only Portuguese and Spaniards among Europeans for more than half a century, but on the eve of the new, 17th century,

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Englishman Adams arrives in Japan on a Dutch merchant ship, and the period of Anglo-Dutch trade begins in Japan.

Enraged Catholic Spaniards began intrigues. And they ended with the fact that in 1614 a decree was promulgated on the complete and unconditional prohibition of Christianity, because Catholicism had already taken deep roots in the Land of the Rising Sun. Moreover, the Jesuits are not Buddhist monks for you ... The first shoguns - the rulers of Japan, we must give them their due, understood this in time.

Religious passions were mixed with social passions. In 1637, the Shimabara uprising began on the Shimabara Peninsula, after which the son of Ieyasu Tokugawa, Iemitsu, decided to close Japan to foreigners (except the Chinese and Koreans) and prohibit the Japanese from leaving Japan.

In other words, he decided to completely isolate the country from any foreign influence.

And isolated!

The "imperial" decree stated:

"For the future, as long as the sun illuminates the world, no one dares to land on the shores of Japan, even if he was an envoy, and this law can never be repealed by anyone on pain of death."

One of the motivating reasons here was the determination of the shogun to stop the spread of Christianity, which undermines the foundations of the state system in the interests of forces alien to the Japanese.

In 1640, a special Portuguese mission was sent from Macau to the shogun with gifts. She went to Iemitsu to review the ban. However, the result was unexpected - almost the entire composition of the mission was executed. Only a few people from the embassy retinue were left alive and sent home to Macau to hand over the document, which said that "the Portuguese should no longer think about us, as if we were no longer on

light."

So, dear reader, far from being invented in the 20th century the notorious "Iron Curtain"...

Any Portuguese or Spanish ship coming to the Japanese shores, was subject to immediate destruction, and its

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crew - the death penalty. A Japanese, abandoned in foreign lands by a shipwreck, was forever deprived of the right to return to his homeland.

Of the Europeans, a partial exception was made only for the Dutch. They could trade on the small island of Deshima near the port of Nagasaki. But even there they were in the position of prisoners. This, however, did not bother the Dutch very much - they exported gold and silver from Japan.

In fact, a special excess of these two eternal "equivalents of happiness" in

Japan was not. And is there an extra precious metal somewhere? However, the Japanese were forced to part with it by necessity - instead of gold and silver, they received firearms. And Japan could not pay for it with anything other than the despicable, but by no means despised metal.

However, as the arsenals filled up, and the Japanese masters themselves mastered the production of weapons, trade with Holland also curtailed. At first, the export of gold was limited, and then banned. In 1685, the export rate of silver was reduced to 130 tons and the export of copper was limited.

Two or three Dutch ships a year came to Nagasaki, from 1715 two were allowed to come, and from 1790 only one.

In 1790, the Japanese limited the export of silver to 30 tons.

Since the beginning of the 19th century, the situation has not changed. In a world in which strong powers began an intensified colonization of everything that lay badly (more precisely, was poorly protected!), Japan was still left to its own devices.

The situation, reader, is simply incredible and certainly unique in world history. And personally, I can only explain such a complacent attitude of the greedy West, which is far ahead of Japan technologically, towards Japanese claims to "closedness" only by Japan's extreme raw material poverty. Japan did not go to the outside world, but they did not touch it either.

With the accession of the first Tokugawa shoguns and the expulsion of Europeans on the Japanese islands, the Great Peace came, which benefited them for more than two hundred
fifty years old.

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Many samurai who wore traditional swords on their belts didn't even know how to use them! Japanese society seems to have been encapsulated. Life in it flowed not that sluggishly, but without what athletes call "alertness" ("tightness").

The then peculiar social tone of the Japanese is already evidenced by the fact that for a century and a half - almost until the very "Meiji revolution" - the population of Japan **did not grow** (the case, obviously, is also unique).

According to government censuses, in 1726 the country's population numbered 26.5 million people, in 1750 - in 26 million, in 1804 - 25.5 million and in 1846 - in 27 million.

I do not rule out that the reader will have a question: maybe the Japanese, in their desire to be original, have gone so far that they simply did not show any inclination to the processes that cause population growth?

No, probably not. Not to mention the brilliant erotic engravings of Hokusai, the statistics also testify to the contrary. When life was cheerful, the Japanese were added immediately noticeably.

For example, during the "Meiji Revolution" in 1868, there were 30 million people in Japan (an increase of three million in twenty years). And soon after the "revolution", in 1883, there were already 37.5 million people (seven and a half million in fifteen years).

Further more! In 1925, the Japanese numbered 59.7 million, in 1935 - 69 million, and in 1940 - 73. But then it was already a completely different Japan.

Somewhere the thunders of Poltava and the wars of Frederick the Great, the Great French Revolution and Marengo, the Battle of Trafalgar and Austerlitz, Borodino and the Leipzig "Battle of the Nations" rumbled...

By the will of the European Freemasons the United States of North America was born, and by the labor of the nations a new industrial age was born.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Fourier and Marx thought about the structure of society, and Pierre

Simon Laplace on the structure of the universe.

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Somewhere great events were raging, great discoveries were being made, and Japan kept spying on them through a narrow "Dutch" crack and by periodically sending secret emissaries to China and Europe...

A new life was born in the world. And in Japan, not even children were born.

Actually, I don't want to say that Japan was in a kind of total civilizational hibernation... Let's say, art... After all, if it is art, of course, it reflects the psychological state of society better than any sociological surveys. And even anti-art (the same pop-modern or quasi-realism of Ilya Glazunov) also speaks about the state of minds and souls in society.

a lot.

So, I'm looking at an engraving by Hiroshige Ando from the series "53 Views of Tokaido" ... This is Japan in 1834. But the feeling is as if our contemporary has led us to the cozy street of a modern small town, full of air and light...

The years of the life of the great Utamaro - from 1753 to 1806.

The years of the life of the great Hokusai - from 1760 to 1849...

In the art of Europe of that and later times - all the time academicism or all sorts of *show off*. And much less often - naturalness.

And the engravings of Japanese masters are natural, like the sky and the sea, like birds and herbs, like simple human feelings and like fleeting life itself...

No, Japan did not sip bast shoes, not only because the Japanese did not wear bast shoes and did not cook cabbage soup ... And even in a state of self-isolation, Japan was, in general, a civilizationally prosperous society.

However, psychologically, Japan in the first half of the 19th century was in relation to the outside world something like a dormant tree in winter. There are juices in it, and there is a will to live ... But when you look at it from the outside, the tree looks almost dead. Although, in fact, the time for seething has not yet come for him.

accumulated juices.

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Years passed...

In itself, Japan was still not very interested in the outside world.

However, it was convenient as a base for America on its way to China, to Russia.

America for Japan and began ...

In 1837, the American ship Morrison approached the Japanese coast, was fired upon by coastal batteries in the area of Uraga Bay, and hastily withdrew.

Eight years later, the expedition of Commodore Beedle approached the same bay of Uraga. of two ships and with the powers of the US Congress to negotiate.

After standing in the bay for 10 days, Beadle (this time not fired upon) retired back home. But the "opening" of Japan became a matter of a few years.

On July 8, 1853, Commodore Perry arrives in Edo Bay "on a visit" - at the head of a squadron of 4 warships with a crew of 560 people and with guns pointed pointedly at the coast.

Perry brought to the stunned officials of the shogun:

- a) a letter from President Filmore;
- b) car models;
- c) a bunch of small mechanisms;
- d) offer to take your time with the answer;
- e) a message about what is being removed from the anchor and goes to China, and ...
- f) the second message that he will return to Edo by spring for an answer.

The commodore returned even before the snow had melted, in February 1854. ten ships.

Two thousand crew members.

And the Stars and Stripes flag over each of the ships and over each of the brave Yankees on their decks ...

This is the embassy!

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The result was not slow to tell: six weeks later, the first Japanese-American treaty was signed. America received its first fuel and food "stations" in Japan.

There is a Japanese engraving of those times, where Perry's ship in the waters of Tokyo Bay, obscuring half the horizon, and the Japanese sailing up to it in bright multi-colored boats under Japanese flags, perfectly illustrate the policy of gunboats ripening in the States.

No, it was, nevertheless, the Japanese had both a sense of life and a sense of historicism.

The arrival of US First Consul Townsend Harris almost coincided with the Anglo-French "opium" intervention in China. And as the first "good advice" Harris advised the Japanese not to balk in relations with "civilization". Like, you see how we have to deal with your intractable continental neighbor at your side.

It is possible that this was the only case in US history when the Yankees did their best at that moment not only for themselves, but also for Europe. After all, the Japanese heeded Harris' "advice" and quickly signed a series of absolutely unequal trade agreements with the States, Holland, England, France, and even with Russia. Foreigners in Japan acquired extraterritorial rights and super-favorable customs privileges.

But then America could not take full advantage of the fruits of the efforts of the decisive Perry and Harris - the Civil War of the North and South of 1861-1865, which began in the States, prevented it.

And in the first place in the "development" of the Japanese markets, England is moving forward. However, in the matter of suppressing anti-Western sentiments in Japan, England and its competitors act in concert - in 1864, a combined Anglo-French American-Dutch squadron bombarded Japanese batteries in the Shimonoseki Strait, which had fired on foreign ships.

Accordingly, both the Tokugawa shogunate, already squirming in front of an external force, and the supporters of a new "closure" of Japan were doomed.

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A brief essay on the history of Japan, published in 1939 by Professor Zhukov, describes the situation as follows: "The Japanese intelligentsia - "Raznochintsy" of samurai-bourgeois origin - since the arrival of Europeans in Japan, for the first time on a large scale, faced the bourgeois culture of the West ... Tokugawa narrowness of thought, police regulation, feudal arbitrariness seemed especially intolerable to advanced people from among the young Japanese intelligentsia. In essence, this intelligentsia in a sharp form expressed the aspirations and political claims of the bourgeois class, which was in Japan still in the period of initial formation and self-affirmation.

Here the main thing that provided a turning point in the situation is well captured - the pressure of young, truly national forces who do not want their homeland to become the backyard of the world.

Do you hear, young Russian guys? Yes, and not very young of their mothers and fathers?

Shogun Iemochi Tokugawa died in 1866. The new shogun (as it turned out - and the last) was Keiki, who had previously been regent under Iemochi for four years.

In 1867, in the ancient capital of Japan, Kyoto, Emperor Komei also died. His

son Mutsuhito was then 15 years old, and the new teenage emperor becomes the banner (nothing more, but ...) of the renewal of Japan.

Yes, the feudal shogunate was doomed...

It is also doomed because peasant uprisings began across the country.

And because cities refused to obey the Tokugawa administration. It was supported only by the Tokugawa capital of Edo (future Tokyo), where the "bakufu" was located - the headquarters of the shogun.

The bloc of feudal princes, daimyo, also opposed the shogunate, with the financial support of the richest banking house of Mitsui. The detail is definitely the most important!

The shogunate also interfered with England, which promised moral support for the campaign anti-Shogun forces on Edo.

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The intermediate finish came in November 1867, when Keiki invited all the most prominent daimyo to a meeting in Kyoto, where, in the presence of Mutsuhito, he announced his intention to lay down power. However, in fact, the largest feudal lord, Keiki, who controlled more than half of Japan, was inclined to still fight. Therefore, the shogunate finally "finished" in 1868, after the defeat of Keiki's troops at Fushimi.

The ex-shogun himself was saved by French military sailors (France, as opposed to England, supported Keiki). The French landed at Yokosuka and threatened that if Kiyiaki was killed they would intervene.

The events of two turbulent years - the struggle of the clans of princes with the shogun, peasant unrest and unrest in cities, battles, victories of some and defeats of others in a civil, in fact, war - laid the foundation for turmoil until the second half of the 70s years.

The culmination of the feudal-samurai anti-government resistance became uprising of the samurai from the Satsuma clan in 1877.

The head and heart of the rebellion was Minister of War Saigō Takamori. He openly called for a repeat of Hideyoshi's long-standing campaign against Korea (even though those long-standing campaigns ended in nothing) and gathered around him young unemployed samurai, deprived of the "rice stipend" by the Meiji government and the ancient right to wear two swords.

Saigō's headquarters was a military school in the Satsuma clan's estate, the city of Kagoshima. Seven thousand cadets studied there, in addition to European military science, also the basics of the "samurai worldview."

In 1877, Saigō made his speech. And immediately made a strategic mistake. He laid siege to the large administrative center of the South - Kumamoto. And there was a large garrison of government troops, consisting not of samurai, but of draft soldiers recruited into the army under the new law of 1872 on universal military service. And this siege tied up all of Saigō's actions.

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Napoleon considered the ability to be at the right time in the right place the key to the success of the commander. However, Saigō chose the place clearly poorly. Yes, and time did not work for him - both in the literal and figurative sense of the word.

Saigō had 40,000 men. The total number of government troops, three months after the start of the rebellion, was 60,000 plus volunteers. Therefore, the clash of the two forces turned out to be extremely fierce and bloody (on both sides 60 thousand were killed and 10 thousand were wounded).

But the Meiji government inflicted a defeat on Saigō's troops, and the rebellion was beheaded. And beheaded - literally!

After the collapse at Kumamoto, Saigō fled to Kagoshima. It was now under siege, and the government began bombarding Kagoshima. Saigō was wounded and, not

wishing to surrender, "asked - according to Professor Zhukov - one of his vassals to cut off his head, which he did."

That is, something like a civil war lasted on the Japanese islands for almost 10 years.

But it was the period of 1867-1868 that was called the Meiji Isin (Meiji Restoration), or the Meiji Revolution. The era of each Japanese emperor receives its own name, and the years of Mutsuhito's reign were predetermined as "enlightened rule" - "Meiji".

So it, in general, and left.

Japan's CAPITALIST start was more than impressive. Of course, on the wave of troubles and reforms, everything and everyone floated up ... Here is one of the signs of the era.

After the defeat of Saigo, a group of participants in the rebellion was sent to Tokyo (former Edo) Yokoyama samurai with a petition to the government.

Yokoyama, who himself wrote this petition-pamphlet, handed it to the officials and immediately made himself hara-kiri.

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"Those who are called to help the emperor as his ministers," wrote Yokoyama, "at the top, mislead the imperial court, at the bottom, do not pay attention to hunger ... Large and small officials care about honors and profit ... They are looking for not people for ranks, but ranks for people ... Communication is valued only on the basis of drinking ... The state is in danger ..."

All these accusations were made, in general, at the address. But if everything was just like this and the common people (and not the samurai who lost their state "pensions" and rice) were starving, then there could be no question of any growth, say, in the population.

And in the country, new little Japanese began to appear en masse.

And not only them, but also many other things - new and unusual, but useful and necessary. So Yokoyama's maxims were somewhat reminiscent of criticism of the Bolshevik innovators by failed white nobles. The whites were not wrong in everything, but the future was objectively not theirs, just as in Japan the future was not for the conservative part of the samurai.

In 1872, Japan's first railroad connected Edo, renamed Tokyo, to the port of Yokohama.

In 1873, the beginning of modern Japanese metallurgy was laid. But here the first experience was unsuccessful - after 10 years, the plant near the Kamaishi iron mines in Iwate Prefecture was closed. And only in 1901 the largest state metallurgical plant Yawata began to work successfully.

It all started in 1868... Then, on January 3, the imperial manifesto was issued by the decision "to approve the resignation of the Tokugawa government ... to abolish the power of the shogun ... to restore imperial power."

So, formally, everything took place under the slogan of "restoring the power of the emperor," from where the term "restoration" later came from (which actually means "restoration").

On April 6, 1868, the emperor (by the way, the Japanese do not call him "mikado", but "tenno") Meiji in a solemn atmosphere took an oath, consisting of five points.

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This is what was proclaimed:

"1. A wide deliberative assembly will be created, and all matters of management will be decided according to public opinion.

2. All people, both rulers and ruled, must unanimously consecrate himself entirely to the prosperity of the nation.

3. All military and civil ranks and all the people will be allowed

fulfill their aspirations, according to the ability of each.

· 4. All obsolete customs of the past must be discarded, and the right and justice, as they admit, will be approved everywhere.

5. For a solid foundation of empires will be everywhere in the world

borrow knowledge."

It was, of course, a declaration, but its spirit was not **given** by the authorities, but **caught** by it in the needs of the era! And therefore, these 5 points did not hang in the air and did not collapse - like the dreams of "reformist" philosophers in China. In something - inconsistently, in some ways - decisively, but these principles were clothed in the flesh of real deeds and results precisely because these principles already existed in the minds and hearts of the entire active part of Japanese society.

What is interesting, dear reader! In that truly turbulent and extraordinary era in Japan, no specific powerful national leader emerged. There were, of course, bright and active figures in the Meiji Revolution - it could not be otherwise in any successful political enterprise. But it was a group.

However, the group was both powerful and dynamic. And this group had leaders. Exactly - leaders, not a leader ... Once again, one can be convinced of this by getting acquainted with the assessment of a prominent Chinese educator of the late XIX - early 20th century Huang Zongxian...

He (like the unfortunate Chinese reformers Kang Yuwei, Liang Qichao, Tang Caichang), with obvious admiring envy of Japan and with the hope that such people would appear in China, kept talking

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and wrote of the enormous role played by "two or three great heroes who spearheaded the movement and laid the foundation for the renewal of the nation".

Liang Qichao wrote about "a group of enlightened, advanced thinkers boldly acting in the spirit of the times."

The real inspirer of Japanese reforms was the Historical Necessity. However, the happiness of Japan (and perhaps its peculiarity) was that specific people followed this "leader" ... And, perhaps, few leaders of the world's states before that thought and acted as rationally as it was with leaders of the Meiji Restoration-Revolution.

And now I'll tell you a little about some of them.

Toshimichi Okubo was 35 years old in 1867. Takamasa Kido - 34. Both - samurai. And both played a prominent and enviable role in the Meiji Restoration.

Okuba lived for 46 years (in 1878 he was killed by a reactionary samurai), Kido - and even less - 44 years.

In the first Meiji government, Okuba was the Minister of Finance, and ten years later, already the Minister of the Interior, it was he, along with another member of the Meiji Revolution, the 39-year-old Minister of War, General Yamagata, who suppressed the Saigou rebellion (for which he paid with his life).

Together with Kido, Okuba prepared and carried out administrative reform in Japan.

A supporter of the centralization of power, Kido averaged the purely samurai ambitions of the feudal lords and the impatient young Japanese bourgeoisie. In 1871, he was part of the embassies sent to the United States and Europe in order to achieve a revision of the Ansei treaties, which were unequal for Japan.

The treaties were so named after the official name of the time of the reign of Emperor Komei - the Ansei era ("calm"). The irony of history is that it was during the years of Ansei (1854-1860) that Japan lost its calmness.

As for the contracts, it was, dear reader, a whole bunch papers: the American-Japanese Treaty of 1854 (signed

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San in Yokohama, and additional articles in Shimoda), the American-Japanese Convention of 1857, the American-Japanese Trade Treaty of 1858, the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1855, the Anglo-Japanese Trade Treaty of 1858, the Dutch-Japanese Treaties of 1856 and 1858, Franco-Japanese and Russian-Japanese trade treaties of 1858...

So Kido and his colleagues had enough work, and it was not their fault that nothing came out of the embassies at that time - only in the period from 1894 to 1911, humiliating and unfavorable for Japan treaties were replaced by equal ones.

The head of the constitutional commission, Hirobumi Ito (also a samurai), was 26 years old at the beginning of the Meiji Revolution (when he headed the first Japanese cabinet of ministers of the European model in 1885, he was 44 years old, and when his constitution saw the light - already 47).

Four years before the events of Meiji, twenty-two-year-old Ito went to England to study under the guise of a sailor. He got to London together with the twenty-eight-year-old Inoue Kaoru (later he held many ministerial posts, including the Minister of Foreign Affairs).

Then for this in Japan threatened the death penalty.

Much later, Ito played a big role in the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese alliance treaty, but he became famous as the "Japanese Bismarck". He deserved this nickname doubly - both because he tried to have an "iron chancellor" for a political model, and because he was a supporter of friendly, not hostile, relations between Japan and Russia.

Ito admired Bismarck and - as Professor Zhukov wrote about him - "he himself admitted that of his foreign wanderings, he acquired the greatest experience for borrowing in Germany."

And what? After all, the united Germany of Bismarck then rose powerfully and quickly. Japanese students clearly knew how to choose the right teachers for themselves! This generation of politicians was really in the right place at the right time and in the right place. That is why they were successful.

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Ito, by the way, created a new title of nobility in Japan - instead of the titles of the shogunate. A special qualification commission divided the 500 newly introduced hereditary titles as follows: 12 princes, 24 marquises, 74 counts, 321 viscounts and 69 barons.

Ito himself became a count (later - a marquis) and at various times personally "tried out" almost all the highest posts, successively heading those state institutions that he himself created.

Ito belongs to the comments on the constitution, and one state thesis Ito deserves special attention.

Article 27 of Chapter II of the constitution stated: "The property of every Japanese subject is inviolable. Exemptions necessary in the interests of the public good shall be determined by law."

Ito interpreted this article as follows:

"The right to property is under the authority of the state. Therefore, it must be subject to legal restrictions. It is inviolable, however, and not unlimited. For example, some buildings are forbidden to be built at a certain distance from the frontier line ... and such a prohibition is not subject to appeal; mining of terrestrial minerals is subject to the control of mining laws; the exploitation of forests is subject to special legalizations based on the principles of rational economy; ... this sufficiently shows that the property of private individuals, like themselves, is subordinate to the state ... "

That is, the greatest bourgeois reformer of Japan from the very beginning of the reforms did not consider private property as sacred and made it clear to everyone that, in case of state necessity, the new Japan would milk this "sacred cow" to the extent that it was deemed necessary.

And this principle (which, like any principle, was by no means always observed, but still did not remain only on paper) by no means fettered private initiative - Japan developed rapidly and boldly!

Later, Ito, as Resident General in Korea, did a lot for Japanese annexation of Korea. Appointed in 1909

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Chairman of the Privy Council, he was assassinated in Harbin by a Korean nationalist.

The bullets that killed Ito whistled near the head of Vladimir Nikolayevich Kokovtsov, who came to Harbin specifically to meet with the Japanese.

Ito came to St. Petersburg in November 1901. For Ito himself, it was rather a sincere attempt to establish trusting relations with Russia. Alas, for many in Japan, this was more of a maneuver in the interests of the speedy conclusion of an Anglo-Japanese alliance treaty.

However, Ito belonged to those influential figures about whom Ito's younger colleague, Kikujiro Isshii, wrote later in his Diplomatic Commentaries as follows: agreement with Russia.

AT THE TIME of the "opening up" of Japan, in 1853-1854, all these people were a little over twenty years old. Before their eyes, Japan was changing, and before their eyes they began to humiliate the Motherland. Moreover, repulse by force was impossible. Impossible because Japan did not have the strength and close equal to the strength of a foreign, external, alien ...

My heart urged me to fight for the new Japan with full dedication and dedication.

The mind suggested a method - to master the knowledge and skill of aliens and equal with them in force.

When the future reformers have matured and when the conditions for reforms are ripe, they started to act. And they won!

The heart and mind of those in power! How important it is that the heart ennoble the mind, and the mind thinks correctly and rationally...

Japanese politicians-reformers thought rationally, but walked, in fact, on the edge of a samurai sword. In 1889, the year of the adoption of the Japanese constitution, Minister Mori was assassinated for excessive predilection for European culture, and in ca.

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In October of the same year, Foreign Minister Okuma lost his leg after a bomb was thrown at him.

Closely associated with the growing power of Mitsubishi, Okuma and after that played the first roles in the life of Japan - he was the "premier of the war" in 1914, in 1915 he made the famous "Twenty-one demands" to China.

But Prince Iwakura Tomomi - Meiji Minister of Justice - after unsuccessful attempt on his life, he retired from political activity.

Matsukata Masayoshi of the Satsuma clan also had dealings with Mitsubishi. He was born a little later than his older comrades - in 1840. He met the beginning of the Meiji era at the age of twenty-seven. When Masayoshi was thirty-four, a small Mitsubishi shipping company was founded. But in Japan, at that time, people from small samurai did big things, and small firms, led by energetic people, quickly grew into powerful industrial concerns.

In the new Japan, Masayoshi had to visit both the Minister of Finance, and the Prime Minister, and the Keeper of the Imperial Seal. He was the penultimate of the "genro", and the last was Kimmochi Saionji.

Saionji was nine years younger than Masayoshi. He entered the number of "genro" in 1912, when this specifically Japanese body of supreme management was already in its fifth decade.

"Genro" literally means "the elders of the state". The title and state role of "genro" were not provided for by any legislative acts. The "genro" institute was created during the Meiji perestroika, and in its composition and meaning it was an institution of the utmost oligarchic. Actually, the "genro", formally considered the emperor's advisers, are the leaders and confidants of the four leading feudal clans: Satsuma, Teshu, Tosa and Hizen.

It was these leaders who initiated the overthrow of the shogun (or, in any case, agree with this idea). The first thirty years

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reform regime, this narrow group was - as defined by the first edition of the TSB - "the absolute master of the state."

It is unlikely that this was the case in reality ... The state, the creation of which gave strength, mind, soul, blood, and even the life of a whole generation of Japanese from the samurai environment, had a much broader social base than any oligarchs could provide.

But by the end of the 19th century and later, the composition of the "genro" looked like a list of the highest and by no means wedding statesmen.

Yamagata... Itoh... Inoue... Oyama... Matsukata... Katsura... Saionji... Okuma...

Ito made his way to Europe to study, risking his life. General Taro Katsura in 70-years he studied in Germany on public money.

In 1898, at the age of forty-one, he became Minister of War, a position he held until 1901. And then, having already been appointed prime minister, he turned out to be the inspirer and organizer of the Anglo-Japanese alliance.

(However, I'll note in parentheses, if it weren't for the desire of the "Englishwoman" to spoil, to the best of her ability, and preferably by proxy, Russian Far Eastern affairs, then Katsura would not have succeeded ... Japan was not so much striving for an alliance with England as England she was drawn into such an alliance, fearing that Russia would not make an alliance with Japan. And Russia's Far Eastern activity frightened not only the Britons. After all, such activity complicated Russia's involvement in the European war planned by the Golden Elite.)

Katsura led Japan to war with Russia. Although even here it would be more accurate to say that Russia itself led the Romanovs to the war with Japan, who succumbed to the provocations of all kinds of Witte, ugly, Abaz, Vogak and others (we will meet these "heroes of the era" later).

Aritomo Yamagata was older than Katsura by almost ten years and was the prime minister in at the end of the "age of reform". He was replaced by Itoh, and Itoh was replaced by Katsura.

During the Russo-Japanese War, Yamagata was Chief of the General Staff.

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All these were active and courageous people. And they did not really appreciate the Russia of that Romanov, who called them "tops" and who, as an heir, during his visit to Japan, received from the "top" a saber head.

They looked at Russia with disdain. But did not deserve it, my dear reader, unfortunate managers such as Muravyov (non-Amursky), Witte, Rodzyanka, Biryulyov, Sukhomlinov?

And did the pack of great princes deserve another? The head of the august

surnames?

Think about it, my dear reader! After all, both the leaders of the Genro clan and the elite of Romanov Russia led their states and peoples to Mukden and Tsushima - two key battles of the Russo-Japanese War on land and at sea.

However, they led them to different and different ways!

High-born high society parasites led us to the shame of defeat.

And the figures of the Meiji era led the Japanese to victories and sovereign power.

So can we blame them for this? I do not feel love for them, and I do not feel particularly good feelings. After all, whatever one may say, but almost all of them turned out to be enemies not only and not so much of the Romanovs, but of Russia.

But I respect them only because for all their arrogance and all their politicking (at the end of the "reform century" some cabinets did not last even half a year), these leaders of Japan were really its leaders.

Japan has changed rapidly, meaningfully. And it was already clear that in the new, 20th century, it would have a stormy and great future.

However, there was no clarity about how it would be in relations with the outside world ...

Yes, the future of Japan was uncertain in this respect, if only because its relations with the only world power that could benefit from

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complement Japan in the Far East in the same way that she could complement Germany in the West to her own advantage.

I mean, of course, our Russia.

In Japan, there were influential figures who believed that it was more desirable to resolve the Far Eastern issues in agreement with it. But outside of Japan there were many even more influential figures for whom the Russian-Japanese partnership was just as unacceptable and disastrous as the Russian-German partnership.

There were enough of these in Japan itself. The glory of Hideyoshi, who went on campaigns to Korea, did not give such rest ...

However, so far both Japan and Russia, and we are with you, my dear reader, still not beyond Japan's "age of reform"...

The FIRST constitution of Japan was published on February 11, 1889, and parliamentary elections were soon called.

Among the emerging parties, the names themselves reflected the processes of the era: the Party of the Needy (Comminto), the Constitutional Liberal Party, the Reform and Progress Party, the Imperial Party ...

Political parties in Japan had only just formed then, but politicking had already gained full strength there. Thus, the leader of the Daido Danketsu organization, Goto Shiojiro, who fought against clan governments, on the eve of the elections left the leadership of the opposition and became a member of the government himself. The ministerial leapfrog and the change of short-lived cabinets became popular.

The electoral law established a property qualification in the form of a requirement to pay direct taxes of at least 15 yen per year. As a result, only about 1 percent of the country's population participated in the first elections on July 1, 1890.

The Liberal Party won 130 out of 300 seats in parliament, while the Reform Party won 41 seats. Ito became the chairman of the parliament, and the general (later - Marshal and Chairman of the Privy Council) Arimoto Yamagata formed a minority government.

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Japan built itself at once in all directions, but the most important was, of course, the economy. In 1889 alone, new investment in Japan

amounted to 72 million yen, with 60 million accounted for by industry. This was 10 times more than in 1886.

For Japan, there was no serious external threat, and she began not with heavy, but with light industry, which gave a quick turnaround and good profits. The textile industry developed. Therefore, the structure of the Japanese "proletariat" in the first period turned out to be peculiar. In 1882, out of 50,000 industrial workers, 69% were ... women. Considering that child labor was also widely used, the picture is impressive.

And even in 1895, out of a total of 425,000 workers, there were about 250,000 women.

It was difficult with agriculture. Also in 1889, due to a crop failure, half of the rice consumed by the Japanese had to be imported from abroad. It took 110 man-days to produce rice per acre in Japan. In Texas and Louisiana, the production of the same amount of rice took 2 man-days and one team for a day and a half.

Honest statistics, my dear reader, sometimes captivate more than an adventurous romance ... Well, isn't it impressive that England increased the tonnage of its merchant fleet from 1891 to 1907 by 91 percent, France - by 49, and even Germany and the USA - by 222 and 217, but Japan by 704 (seven hundred and four)!

Of course, in absolute terms (611 thousand register tons by 1907), Japan was 16 times inferior to England, 3.5 times to Germany, and 2 times to the USA. But Japan has almost caught up with France and overtaken Italy!

And the telegraph network! Starting from scratch in the late 1880s, Japan had almost 3,000 kilometers of telegraph lines ten years later, and by 1908, more than 8,000.

Yes, Germany already had 30 thousand kilometers, France - 43 thousand, and America - as many as 93!

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But the same Italy stretched only 2,000 kilometers of telegraph across its territory. In Europe!

In 1892, Japan began to smelt high-quality steel for the first time. according to the Bessemer method, and in 1893 he produced the first domestic steam locomotive.

In 1909, Japan's savings banks had 8 million savers, while England's had 11 million. At the same time, one average Japanese depositor accounted for a contribution of 1 pound 5 shillings and 1 pence, and for an English one almost 15 pounds.

Of course, the wealth of the average Japanese and the average Englishman were incomparable. The levels of labor mechanization and almost all absolute indicators were incomparable. But just as incomparable - but already in favor of Japan - were the rates of progress of Britain and Japan.

And not just Britain...

Prior to this, in the history of the world there was only one example of a large country quickly and completely throwing itself towards a qualitatively new life and a new level of state power ... Petrine Russia so quickly cut through its "window to Europe". But even she did not walk as swiftly as our great reformer tsar would have liked.

But Japan walked. And only again Russia, but already Russia socialist, later challenged Japan's primacy in growth rates ...

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Chapter 4

Japanese Prologue and the "Far East Question"...

BEING "opened" by force, Japan very skillfully and quickly learned to go out into the outside world as a force willingly resorting to violence for purely imperialistic purposes.

At the same time, Japan took full advantage of its racial and geographical proximity to such objects of world imperialist exploitation as China and Korea.

Moreover, in relation to Korea, she behaved almost exactly as she did himself in relation to Japan, the unforgettable Commodore Perry.

Japan was forced into unequal treaties by powers stronger than her. But it was Japan that imposed them on Korea (in addition to those Western powers that, while imposing dictates on Japan, did not forget Korea either).

Feudal and firmly lagging behind even China, Korea lived - as we know - in conditions of formal vassalage of the Korean king from the Chinese emperor. But in 1876, Japan secured from Korea the opening of the important port of Fusan for its trade, and in 1880, also Genzan and Chemulpo (memorable to the Russian people for the feat of the "Varyag").

We also know how Japanese-Korean relations developed further. But it would be useful and appropriate to quote here the following words from Professor Zhukov's "History of Japan": "The impudent behavior of Japan, which unceremoniously violated all agreements, flooded Korea with greedy merchants, rude officers

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all kinds of adventurers who robbed the people and took part in all sorts of internal intrigues at the Korean court, achieving a predominant influence on the weak-willed and corrupt Korean feudal lords -

twice led to open indignation. In 1882 and 1884 the premises of the Japanese legation in Seoul were burned."

The West sent troops to China, Japan - so far only to Korea, acting under with both strength and cunning.

Here's an example for you... I already wrote that "towards the end" of the outgoing 19th century in Korea, the uprising of the tonghaks against the Korean feudal lords began. So, among the leaders of the uprising were direct ... agents of the Japanese General Staff. Japanese officers studied the situation and, if necessary, acted as instructors.

Internal turmoil is the best time for external imperialists. So let's look at the prehistory of the Japanese-Chinese war also from this side ...

So, on June 4, 1894, the genro and the government decided to send troops to Korea.

And on July 16, 1894, Japan and England signed a new trade agreement on a more or less fair basis (this was the precedent for the refusal of a Western power from the Ansei Treaty).

And this additionally provoked a Japanese-Chinese conflict in the near future. After all, it was not for the beautiful eyes of the geisha that England gave up its pre-emptive rights in Japan! This was the price to pay for Japan's readiness for a forceful foreign policy, for its readiness to live not on the ideas of regional peace and stability, but on the ideas of aggression and annexation.

England also enjoyed almost overwhelming influence in China at that time. However, the policy of Golden Capital is always multi-layered, and the British considered it not useful for them to pit Japan against China. Moreover, England then tested the technology of provoking Japan to external aggression - and with success - for the first time, but, alas, not for the last time! Ahead was the Anglo-Saxon pitting of Japan and Russia ...

Japan, however, did not have to be particularly pushed into Korea. The 12,000-strong Japanese expeditionary corps, shadowed by Hideyoshi, will soon occupy Seoul and the most important Korean ports.

And the Japanese government is presenting an ultimatum to China, demanding that from all rights to Korea (there was no question of the right to Korea of the Korean people).

On August 1, 1894, Japan declares war on China and on September 1, the emperor's headquarters (military headquarters) is transferred to Hiroshima.

China, in turn, was incited by Russia, and America was more than dissatisfied with the agility of the Japanese and their appetites that were so clearly revealed (America recognized the right to eat delicious other people's pies at someone else's expense only for itself).

But in reality, no one could stop Japan at that time, and China was defeated, if not in two counts, then in eight months. In vain that in the battle on the Yalu River on September 17, the Chinese Muslim regiments (in China, as in Chekhov's "Greece", there was enough of everything and everyone) lay down to the last soldier.

The slanted-eyed Muslims did not give up their positions, but the Japanese occupied them anyway. After the death of the defenders of these positions ...

Corruption in the Chinese leadership during the time of the regent Ci Xi did not just flourish, but was its integral generic feature. After the first defeats of the Chinese army and navy, the unsinkable dignitary Li Hong-chzhang was removed, although he was later instructed to sign the "peace treaty" with Japan.

By the way, during the negotiations, Li was shot at, and the bullet stuck under right eye, was never extracted.

Seven months after the Battle of Yalu, on April 17, 1895, a preliminary (preliminary) "peace treaty" was signed in the Japanese city of Shimonoseki.

In addition to various concessions and indemnities of 200 million Kupinsky liangs (taels), that is, approximately 300 million rubles, the most significant in this "agreement" was China's refusal to

the ditch of Formosa (Taiwan) and the Pescadores archipelago, as well as from the southern part of the province of Fengtian (Mukden province) - the Liaodong Peninsula (it is also known by the Japanese name "Kwantung", and this name is not so unfamiliar to Russians).

China also "agreed" to Japan's "temporary occupation" of Weihaiwei (actually tip of the Shandong Peninsula).

And here, dear reader, everything turned out in the style of the best classical fables ... Actually, you are already somehow aware of what happened shortly after the Shimonoseki "peace" and as a result of it.

But here we consider the situation again. But first, one piece of advice.

I highly recommend looking closely at the map of Northeast China so that what follows becomes more clear.

And if there is no desire to "crawl" on the map, then read carefully and understand ... Here is the Korean Peninsula. It separates the Yellow Sea, which goes deep into the land, from the Sea of Japan.

The mainland shores of the Yellow Sea are Chinese.

And near China itself, the Yellow Sea forms a vast "pocket" of the Zhili Gulf and the Liaodong Gulf, bounded "from below" (from the south) by the Shandong Peninsula, and "from above" (from the north) by the Liaodong Peninsula, bordering Korea .

The Zhili Gulf (Bohaiwan) is connected to the Yellow Sea by the Zhili Strait (Bohaixia).

The places are strategically tasty (there is not far from the coast to Beijing).

So, in the end, Formosa and Pescadores remained behind Japan.

But less than a week (more precisely, six days have passed) since the signing of the Shimonoseki Treaty, on April 23, the official representatives of Russia, Germany and France in Tokyo handed the Japanese government a "friendly" note with "friendly advice" - "in order to avoid international complications" - not occupy the Liaodong Peninsula.

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And laughter and sin... Hideyoshi's shadow hovered over Japan, but what about the collective "recommendation" of three such "friends"? Moreover, it was backed up by a naval demonstration of a joint Franco-German Russian squadron in Chifu, where the ratification of the peace treaty took place.

Usually they write that Russia started all this, but it is unlikely that Russia was the true author of the idea, especially considering who was the spring of this joint action on the part of Russia (the reader will learn about this later).

What did Russia have to do with it? France and Germany themselves were not interested in a sharp rise in Japan, because this interfered with their own activity in China.

But formally, it was beneficial for everyone to push Russia forward - in order to ensure dissatisfaction with its behavior both from the Japanese "tops" and from the Japanese masses, who were very nationalistic by that time ...

The Japanese in that situation did the only right thing, that is, they gave in ... On May 10, the Emperor of the Land of the Rising Sun published a rescript. The tenno mikado expressed gratitude to the three "friendly powers" for their "useful and friendly advice" and agreed to use it.

As compensation, Japan requested and received an additional 30 million taels. But what the advisers soon received for their "intercession" "in favor" of China ...

Russia - the right to build a railway through Northern Manchuria and lease the tip of the Liaodong Peninsula. The peninsulas, let me remind you, on the border with that Korea, in which Japan was already unfolding with might and main.

Liaodong...

This name speaks a little to the Russian mind and is unusual for the Russian ear ... But on the Liaodong Peninsula, Russia rented Port Arthur.

And now we will not forget this name ...

France received the right to build a road from Tonkin to Guanxi.

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Germany soon annexed, as we know, the area of Jiaozhou Bay from Qingdao on the Shandong Peninsula "on a leasehold basis".

And the region of Weihaiwzia at the tip of the Shandong Peninsula instead of Japan "temporarily" (and for a very long time) was finally occupied by the restless and indispensable Britain.

And also - on the rights of "lease".

The Sino-Japanese war turned out to be a milestone for the Far East. First, as will become clear from what follows, it created the future prerequisites for Russo-Japanese friction and the Russo-Japanese War itself. Here I mean, first of all, the lease of land on Liaodong by Russia ...

Secondly, after the victory over China, Japan turned from a potential semi-colony of the West into a potential rival of those powers that intended to keep Japan "at its feet". However, the true master of the Western powers - the Golden International - nevertheless managed to use Japan to no small extent for its own purposes.

The goal was the same as in the rest of the planet - at first the strengthening, and then the dominance of America as the future residence of this cunning and

insidious International.

The method was also unchanged - discord between those who could thwart the dominance of America and the Golden International.

A strong nationalist Japan was a hindrance to such goals, and a smart nationalist Japan could see its future in partnership with Russia.

In Europe, the Entente and the United States intensively quarreled and pitted Russia and Germany (this was discussed a lot in my book "Russia and Germany: play off!").

In Asia, it was necessary to pit Russia and Japan.

After all, the nightmare of the "continental bloc" with the participation of Germany, Russia and the countries of the Far East already tormented such an outstanding Englishman as Lord Palmerston already in the middle of the century before last! And later - in the heyday of Victorian England -

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a book by the Englishman Homer Lee was published, about the essence of which Karl Haushofer later wrote as follows: "In this book, regarding the imaginary heyday of the British world empire, one can read that the day when Germany, Russia and Japan unite will be the day that determines the fate of the English-speaking world power, the death gods." Do the gods want to die?

The FIRST Great Soviet Encyclopedia contains an extensive article "The Far Eastern Question", written by a member of the main editorial board of the TSB, a member of the collegium of the USSR People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, diplomat and historian Fyodor Aronovich Rotshtein.

Dating back to the end of the 1920s, it is written lively and with literary brilliance. For example, Rothstein describes the story of the "leases" of ports in China as follows: *"6 as a result of all this political quadrille in China, around the same Zhili Gulf, three predators found themselves, who until recently testified to their friendship with China, and now they were sitting opposite each other like panthers, every minute ready to jump."*

True, apart from the fact that it was hardly zoologically correct to call the British lion a panther, Kaiser Wilhelm's assessment seems to me more accurate, who believed that Russia and Germany became "good guards at the entrance to the Zhili Gulf."

Kaiser, however, was also mistaken: the Russian "guard" was kicked out of his "post" in 1904, and the German - ten years later, in 1914 ...

But in general, Rothstein wrote (I say this without irony) a very interesting encyclopedic article, although far from everything there is true in essence.

So, the "Manchurian" plan of Russia (CER, Port Arthur, etc.) Fedor Aronovich clearly in vain certifies as "much more grandiose than penetration into Korea." It was in Korea that Russia laid the foundation for its imminent grandiose collapse in the Far East.

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He is hardly right in his assertion that: *"The first stage in the development of the Far Eastern question was completed in general to the benefit of Russia, which, unlike its rivals, could connect its new acquisitions with its vast empire territorially and thus exert on China's monstrous pressure."*

What there "pressure"! Moreover, "monstrous" ... Li Hongzhang and one of his colleagues had to pay a millionth bribe for the rent of Port Arthur!

But there is no need to argue with this, it is with the introductory thesis of the article, and it

so good that I'll quote it directly:

"The Far Eastern question is essentially the question of the economic and political seizure of China by the imperialist powers in the conditions of their mutual rivalry. As such, it is one of the key issues of the world age of imperialism. Industrialization app. states of America; entering the path of industrialization of Japan, extremely poor in its own resources; taken by tsarist Russia in the early 90s, after the collapse of the Balkan hopes, the course towards Far Eastern expansion (what such a "course" in the undeveloped and uninhabited Russian Far East! Not a "course", but nonsense! -

CK); the colonial aspirations of young imperialist Germany, which had been playing in China since the mid-1990s. a trade and financial role second only to that of England, and finally the huge economic interests of the latter - all these international factors created an extremely complex and contradictory intertwining of interests and desires around China, from which D. V. was born in 1895.

Here everything is defined correctly and - without the "monstrous" "panthers". That is, the way it was... Although it must be clarified that not only China, not only China, was concerned with the Far Eastern issue. It may have concerned Russia and Germany even more than China, because it hit their strategic interests and prospects even more than China's.

At the same time, I would say that this question was not very confusing! Just on In the Far East, everything was quite obvious -

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the goals, means, methods, subjects, and objects of efforts were very transparent here.

And one more thing is bad - Rothstein did not indicate the "specific gravities", or, if we recall the pressure and speak the language of chemistry, the "partial pressures" of different powers in the Far East issue.

But the really monstrous pressure in the Asia-Pacific the region was increasingly provided by the United States ...

TO correctly understand what was happening in the world of Capital at the beginning of the 20th century - on the whole planet in general and in the Far East in particular - one must be aware that the mighty, say, British Empire, over which by that time "the sun had never set", only at first glance acted as it was necessary for her . In reality, everything essential that she did at that time ensured, in the final analysis, the strengthening not of England, but of America.

And the strengthening of America was possible only with the belittling of Germany and Russia and the neutralization of Japan.

After all, the day when Germany, Russia and Japan would unite would become the day that determines the fate of not only (and not so much) Britain, but the other English-speaking power - on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean ...

In Europe, playing off Russia and Germany, England, it would seem, programmed the future defeat of its rival - Germany.

In fact, England (not she alone, of course, but almost all of Europe along with her) later dragged chestnuts from the fire of the First World War for America. The mere fact that England has turned from a world creditor into a debtor of the United States proves this with all evidence.

In yellow Asia, England muddied the waters in the expectation that muddy water would pour on the wheel of the British political mill... But the English line suited the United States as well.

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America was already looking askance at Japan. The American Federation of Labor (AFL) demanded the complete expulsion of the Japanese from the States, although they were not there.

so much.

Uncle Sam's calculation here was clearly the following ...

Regarding Japan: if the Japanese are in conflict with Russia, they will look for support from the States and will not conflict with the States.

Regarding Russia: we are diverting Russian forces to the Far East, and then the Russians will need European allies against Germany, in other words, in France and England.

That is, by pitting Russia against Japan, it was possible to split it off from the ideas of an alliance with Germany.

At the same time, it was important to maintain consistency. At first, it was necessary to draw Russia into the affairs of the Far East, to assure her that in Europe the only way out for her was an alliance with France against Germany, and then, having quarreled between Russia and Japan, it was necessary to make a reverse maneuver and reorient Russia towards Europe.

What a delight, dear reader! Kaiser Wilhelm also pushed Nicholas II to the Far East. It was he who gave the famous order to semaphore Nikolai from the bridge of his Hohenzollern to the Russian Standard: *"The Admiral of the Atlantic Ocean welcomes the Admiral of the Pacific."*

And, unlike the Anglo-Saxons, he expected that Russia, diverted to the Far East, would not go to war with Germany in Europe. After all, he proceeded from the obvious weakness of Japan in comparison with Russia and did not take into account the cunning of the Golden Elite, who had already decided to powerfully support Japan against Russia and give her military strength sufficient for such a confrontation.

Wilhelm wrote to Nikolai: *"Everyone here understands that Russia, obeying the laws of expansion, should strive to go to the sea and have an ice-free harbor for its trade. By virtue of this law, she has the right to claim a strip of land where such harbors are located (Vladivostok, Port Arthur) ... Between the two ports there is a strip of land that, if it falls into the hands of the enemy, can become something like new Dardanelles. You must not allow this*

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tit. These "Dardanelles" (Korea) should not be a threat to your messages and a hindrance to your trade ... Therefore, it is clear to every open-minded person that Korea must be and will be Russian.

It is generally believed that Wilhelm only provoked Nicholas, but this is hardly 100% true. He was being cunning, if only because he did not mention in his letter such an option, in some respects, convenient for Russia to base the fleet as the Chinese Jiaozhou Bay.

The Kaiser looked after this bay for himself, and he got it. But, I repeat, his letter cannot be called a mere provocation.

Firstly, there was the word "Vladivostok", and this port was on inalienable Russian soil, and it was really necessary to strengthen it, without getting into those Korean-Manchurian adventures, which we will talk about later.

Secondly, the prudently, economically pursued Far Eastern line of Russian policy could really provide Russia with a stable position as a great Pacific power. This was a completely real and useful option for Russia in the development of the general situation in the Far East. And after all, Wilhelm could not have assumed in advance the "Tsushima" version of it.

As for Korea, everything was also said correctly. But, alas, it's too late!

It is both funny and sad that the reason was both in the Entente's reasoning and Wilhelm.

For Russia, an active and tough Far Eastern policy was quite reasonable. And at the same time, she had to be primarily protective. Korea could become "Russian", but the time for this was lost. It's a pity, of course, but it is necessary

was to face the truth.

And if it was worth it to conflict with Japan, then, say, heading for the option of Korea as a direct, legal Russian protectorate, with a readiness to defend it by all means. At the same time, it was possible to make claims about the Kuril Islands - a natural outpost of Russia advanced into the ocean.

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Here it was possible to fight if necessary.

It was more than premature for us to get out beyond the limits already acquired in the Far East (that is, to go to the Chinese coast of the Amur and to the south). Yes, not that it is premature - it is simply impractical.

Going to South Manchuria, to Port Arthur, was stupid and criminal. It would have been better to simply cede it to Japan in exchange for the peaceful development of our Primorye.

But if we are to lay claim to influence outside the borders of Russia, then no further than within the boundaries of the Manchurian border zone, along the line of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which "cuts off" the "Amur" arc bordering China.

And the devil's Romanov's Russia, plus the British lion, plus - behind the scenes - the American-Jewish Kuns, Leba and Uncle Sam were already carried to the Yellow Sea, to Port Arthur.

Just next to Japanized Korea.

Dear reader! I have already said and will repeat it not for the last time: in order to pit the legitimate (from the imperialist point of view) interests of Japan and the hopelessly chimerical (from the imperialist point of view) interests of Russia in that situation, Korea was an almost ideal place.

Alas, the international, ever-increasing wing of the British and American Capital had little doubt that *this* Romanov-Wittevian Russia would behave in Asia just as stupidly and anti-nationally as it did in Europe.

After all, this Russia was already very firmly entangled in both international loans, and, in modern terms, internal agents of influence.

And what was the cost of, say, such august "fruit" as General-Admiral Grand Duke Alexei! This carcass, aptly nicknamed "seven pounds of august meat," puffed out: "I don't give a damn about anything!" — and was much more willing to discuss her chef's new way of cooking sterlet than big politics options. At the same time, being sure that the Japs -

It's not a problem.

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Therefore, the Golden Elite could not be afraid that, faced with difficulties in the East, Russia is blocked with Germany in the West.

England *knew* that as long as Russia was ruled by the supposedly Russian St. Petersburg stock exchange, supposedly Russian Witte and Russian crowned fools, this *would not happen!*

In November 1901, official St. Petersburg lavishly welcomed the already famous us Ito, who came to negotiate a ... Russo-Japanese agreement.

Before one of the receptions in honor of Ito, Foreign Minister Count Lamzdorf turned to Count Ignatiev (not a brave young General Staff officer and future general of the Red Army, but his relative, a seventy-year-old veteran of the diplomatic service) with a request:

"Dear Count Nikolai Pavlovich!" Would you mind if they put you next to Ito?

"Yes, why not, but why such an honor?

- My dear, after all, your acquaintance with the Far East is already forty years old,

counting from your first mission to China!

- Yes, - Ignatiev softened, - there was a time ... It was I who mediated then between the Chinese and the French and signed the Beijing Treaty ...

- I remember, I remember ... So, who better than you, an expert on the Far Eastern problems, try to find out from Ito what he really came to us with?

After the reception, one count asked the other:

"So what's the deal here?"

- And that, my dear Vladimir Nikolaevich, so that we can avoid a clash with Japan and try to reach an agreement that is possible for both sides, - Ignatiev answered thoughtfully.

"Ito really thinks so?"

"I can't guarantee my head, but it seems that he is sincere in his desire for peace with us, Vladimir Nikolaevich ...

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In fact, Ito's trip was for some of the Japanese "tops" primarily a tactical move in the game with England. The cunning Japanese hinted at Albion, who loves to let in political fog: they say, either you, gentlemen of the Britons, agree with us, or we will agree with the Russians.

Tactics are tactics, but everything could have turned out differently for Russia and Japan ...

Time after time, the Japanese demanded from us complete freedom for themselves in Korea. Well, what about us? We have a common border with Korea, in fact, it was like a hare lope. And the convenient time for our powerful entry into Korea as a legitimate protectorate, on the basis of the invitation of the Koreans themselves, was missed.

On the other hand, by reaching an agreement with the Japanese, Russia could thwart all the Far Eastern anti-Russian plans, that is, the plans of the Anglo-Saxons to negotiate with Japan at the expense of Russia's interests. Later, after all, it was recognized by everyone that the Anglo-Japanese treaty for many years predetermined the balance of power in the Far East.

So, was it really not worth doing everything to ensure that the balance of forces predetermined the Russo-Japanese agreement?!

But no! Petersburg resisted, wasted time and initiative. And could it be otherwise in St. Petersburg - "New Berdichev"?

Could it be otherwise, if in January 1898 in this "New Berdichev" there was this conversation...

The ubiquitous "genius" of the Russian state machine, Sergei Yulievich Witte, was visited by the new British ambassador, Sir Nicholas O'Connor, who had recently been transferred to St. Petersburg from Beijing.

- Your Excellency, at the request of Lord Salisbury, I would like to ask you a direct question: "Is it possible for Russia and England to work together in China"?

And Witte immediately answered without any hesitation:

- Certainly!

- Oh! the ambassador perked up.

And Witte helpfully continued:

- If England and Russia can agree, their word will be law for the Far East ...

- Certainly! Certainly! - now the ambassador answered in agreement ...

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Why wouldn't he agree? For England, such a position of Russia called back not only in pounds, but simply *in tons of sterling*.

England was from the Far East, God knows where... Russia had *its own* Far East! And at the side of this Russian Far East was located a dynamically developing Japan.

And if Russia could come to an agreement with it, then the Russian-Japanese word could really become a law for the Far East ...

Isn't that why Witte's Petersburg was so inert in dealing with the Japanese?

Romanov's Russia was losing both time, and face, and initiative, and reasonable perspectives.

And on January 30, 1902, the first Anglo-Japanese alliance treaty was concluded in London for 5 years (let us note this figure).

Union, reader!

The "allies" were obliged to remain neutral if one of the parties got involved in a one-on-one war with someone, and to provide military assistance to each other if at least one more state joined the enemy of the warring side.

What did it really mean?

And here's what...

If Japan started a war with Russia, then England "neutrally"

kept quiet.

If China would join Russia (miracles happen in the world), then England would rein it in (that is, it would simply get into it even more with all four raking paws).

Well, if *someone* waged war with England (although who could then wage war with her war?), then what real help could Japan give her at that time?

So the Soviet "Diplomatic Dictionary" was absolutely right when it wrote about this "alliance treaty" that it "was a diplomatic preparation for the war of Japan against Russia."

And in order to start such a war as soon as possible, Japan was issued by England "carte blanche" for a period of only 5 years ... That is, gentlemen

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the samurai were hurried, while giving them generous Anglo-Saxon (together with the USA) loans. Moreover, the loans are targeted for the construction of the latest battleships in the same England.

With its brains already firmly "screwed" in the direction the Golden International needed, Russia behaved - as planned - in an idiotic way.

What would be logical for Russia?

Of course, to be indignant at the double-dealing of England, courting Russia in Europe and spoiling Russia in Asia, as well as the duplicity of France, blocking itself with this England and at the same time assuring Russia of eternal friendship.

Then it would not hurt to demonstrate readiness for a bloc with the Kaiser if the British do not denounce their fresh anti-Russian Far Eastern provocation.

Well, give real advances to the Japanese in Korea ...

Perhaps this alone would be enough for the passions to subside quickly. Especially - if Russia would not climb into adventures in the Far East.

And Russia has not come up with anything smarter than to demonstrate the strength of their allied relations with ... France!

On March 16, 1902, the Russian-French declaration was made public. It said that (reader, please do not fall off your chair) *"the allied governments of Russia and France see in the Anglo-Japanese treaty the desire to ensure the status quo, common peace in the Far East and the independence of China and Korea (I note that the Britons and the Japanese immediately agreed on their "special interests" and there. - CK), open to trade and industry of all nations, which corresponds to the interests of Russia and France.*

This, reader, is not even a good face for a bad game. This mine is just stupid. However, Romanov's Russia did not pull for more.

Eh!

The next "wise" step was the signing on April 8, 1902 of the Russian Chinese convention on Manchuria. And everything revolved there around the CER ...

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Chapter 5

Minister Witte, Britons and tricky profits

AS WE KNOW, CER is the Chinese Eastern Railway. It began to be built in 1898, and in 1903 it was opened to traffic.

Let's go back to the map. Along the Amur arc, Chinese Manchuria juts out into Russia. In order to connect Russian Eastern Siberia with the Russian Far Eastern Territory in the shortest possible way by railroad, it is necessary to run it for two and a half thousand kilometers through the vast semi-desert and sparsely populated area of Manchuria.

Desert, but a stranger! It is tempting to cut the Amur arc in a straight line, but a straight line it goes through the territory of a foreign state.

What kind of idiot would build a strategically important road in this way? Yes, and on the condition that it is allowed to operate it on foreign territory not forever, but only 80 years! Yes, and not 80, but 36 (because a foreign government is allowed to buy the road in 36 years!).

Well, is it possible to find hunters on such conditions?

Eee! What about the Petersburg government? What about Finance Minister Witte? Sergei Yulievich is not an idiot, but a *state* head!

True, there were heads in Russia, and not very, from Witte's point of view, statesmen. They wanted to build a road to the Far East inside Russia along the Amur Bulge, as the part of the Trans

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siba - Transbaikal railway with Erofey Pavlovich station on it.

Here, for example, the commander of the troops and the governor-general of the Amur Territory, General Dukhovskiy ... He fought against the "Manchurian" project as much as he could. The man did not understand the benefits ...

General Dukhovskiy considered the Witte project simply dangerous for Russia and argued that, passing through the borders of China, this line would not firmly connect the Amur Territory with Russia, that the road through Manchuria would be beneficial to the Chinese, not the Russian population.

However, Sergei Yulievich thought broadly (he was not only the Minister of Finance was, but at one time he was in charge of the ways of communication).

He believed that if a road was built through Manchuria, then it would not only be possible to quickly transfer Russian troops along it (on foreign territory - what a plan!), But also to take over railway construction in all of Northern China. And there you look - and to the south ...

Moreover!

Witte believed (find your fingers, reader!) that the CER should have:

- cause a complete revolution in communications between Europe and the Pacific Ocean;
- to divert the goods coming from the West to the Far East through Suez;
- open up Inner China for trade by connecting it railways with CER;
- to give support to the Russian tea industry and expand the import of Russian metal and textile products to China (even though China had cheap Japanese textiles at hand);
- to attract to itself more than half of Chinese exports and, finally,

- to provide Russia with nothing less than "dominion over everything commercial traffic in Pacific waters "...

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The CER, by the way, was mainly a single-track and difficult to operate road. So the "grandness" of Witte's plans simply anticipated the ideas of Ilfo-Petrovsky Ostap Bender regarding the transformation of Vasyukov into New Moscow, and Moscow into Old Vasyuki.

But in the immortal novel of the Great Combinator, simple-hearted provincial chess players listened with enthusiasm, and in St. Petersburg, "New Berdichev", Witte seriously charmed high-ranking statesmen.

Is it just the state ones?

Irony aside, let me remind the reader that this clever bastard was completely created by Jewish "Russian-subjects" railway magnates and St. Petersburg bankers. So he tried not for the Russian army, not for Russia, but for the alleged profits-geshefts of his "informal" bosses.

Geshefts did not burn out - contracts in China were intercepted by the British, Germans, French. But the CER - this eternal pain of ours for decades - Russia received.

The road was built according to the secret Russian-Chinese treaty of 1896 on the union and construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway. The reader remembers that it was signed in Moscow by the aged Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prince Lobanov-Rostovsky (he died a few days after that - on the royal train, on the way to Kiev), the indispensable Witte, and from the Chinese side - Ambassador Extraordinary Li Hong-zhang who came to the coronation of Nicholas II.

Incidentally, the secret of this treaty quickly became an open secret (as in France they called Pulcinella, one of the characters in the Italian comedy of masks dell'arte, who blurted out everything he knew and did not know), or rather - the secret of the French ambassador in Beijing Gerard ...

The text of the treaty became known to Gerard from Li Hong-chang's notebook, "forgotten" by the latter on the table during his "accidental" absence from the room where he received the Frenchman.

Only after the guest copied the text into *his* notebook, polite the owner returned to the room.

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And this agreement (again, do not fall off your chair, reader) also provided for a military Russian-Chinese alliance. That is, two years after the defeat of China by the still very weak Japan, bureaucratic Petersburg seriously took China into account as a real force.

N-yes...

Or did he seriously count on the fact that China, in case of military need turn to Russia?

The Chinese Eastern Railway did not have time to build, when the Yihetuan uprising began in China (according to Western terminology - "boxing").

The rebels attacked the Russian builders and destroyed a significant part of roads (they actually smashed all the railways, not only the CER).

The losses amounted to 71,745,878 rubles out of the total cost of the road of 374,955,598 rubles.

The amount is considerable, so that Witte's bosses profited from the CER quite well and more than once (for the losses, it was not the Ikhetuani who paid, but also the Russian treasury).

After the defeat of the Yihetuan by the forces of the entire imperialist world, the tsarist government sent troops into Northeast China. And soon the Russian-Chinese convention of 1902 was signed. Signed in Beijing - Envoy

Russia in China by Lessar and representatives of the Chinese Foreign Ministry Prince Qing and Wang Wenshao.

That is, on the part of China, it was signed by two middle-class dignitaries. Total
That!

Under this more than strange low-level agreement, Russia was obliged to withdraw the previously introduced troops, and China ...

China, in four articles of this convention, was not obliged, in fact, to anything.

As for the CER, it was soon completed. The main highway ran from the Siberian station of Manchuria to the Far Eastern station of Pogradichnaya, and the southern part of the road branched almost perpendicularly from the main straight at Harbin through Mukden to Dalny and Port Arthur.

Here is an assessment of Port Arthur as a naval base in naval literature: "Port Arthur was poorly equipped as a

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basing the main forces of the fleet in the Far East. The inner raid was cramped and shallow. The narrow exit to the sea allowed large ships to go to sea only during high tides. There were no docks to repair ships."

But on the other hand, he was at the side of Korea, firmly included by Japan in the sphere their interests. Witte chose a "convenient" place for the Russian fleet!

And what audacity! Count Sergei Dmitrievich Sheremetev was very critical of Witte, and he was an influential figure both formally (in 1900 Nikolai appointed him a member of the State Council) and informally. And on June 26, 1900, Witte wrote him a letter in tones of frank licking, where at the same time casts a shadow on the wattle fence:

" There was just something fatal in the death of Count Muravyov (that very rascal Mikhail Alexandrovich, Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1897-1900. - S.K.) . Four years ago, on his advice, supported by General Vannovsky (Minister of War in 1882-1897 . - CK), we treacherously captured Port Arthur and Dunlavan (Far. - CK), contrary to my urgent advice not to take this step. True, Germany gave us an example (however, with our knowledge). Since then, porridge has gone to China ... "

Four phrases. But this is a small masterpiece of provocation!

Witte managed to dump his Port Arthur "merits" on others, and whitewash himself, and denigrate Russia and Germany, and start counting the "Chinese porridge" from the moment of stupid Russian actions there, although Britain brewed porridge in China, flavored with opium, for a long time.

And she is not alone... AND THEREFORE, let's go back to the times "before the Chinese Eastern Railway" in order to better understand the times "after the Chinese Eastern Railway". I have already said that for Russia the option of renting a port from Korea would be justified according to the option that even Nicholas II saw. Or - renting the Jiaozhou Bay area from China to organize the same winter parking of the Pacific squadron. Jiaoch

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Zhou-Qingdao was far from Korea and objectively did not touch Japan. And parking was required, because the Russian fleet was defending in ... Japan in the winter.

And as Yuri Yakovlevich Solovyov, who was the second secretary of the Russian embassy in Beijing in the late 90s of the last century, wrote later: "The habit of spending the winter in Nagasaki became inconvenient for many reasons."

But there was, it turns out, a moment when our navy was based in Japan!

To Japan!

Inosa village on the northwestern side of Nagasaki Bay, our marine

the officers called it the "Russian village" ... This was the place of their traditional recreation and entertainment. It was there that Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich, sorry, lost his innocence.

But Nagasaki was really an "inconvenient" port for the Russian military forces. And, as Solovyov reports, for several years Russia has been looking for a convenient port on the Chinese coast for the wintering of the fleet and has been negotiating on this issue in Beijing. And it was in Jiaozhou, with the consent of the Chinese, that the Russian squadron under the flag of Admiral Tyrtov stayed for several weeks.

There is every reason to believe that if at least half of the efforts that Russia spent in China to get the "South Manchurian", Port Arthur version, she would have spent on the "Jiaozhou" option, we would have a necessary and politically safe parking lot for us in Jiaozhou would have received.

However, while Petersburg "looked after", Berlin took and chopped off.

Actually, even after that, it made sense to offer Germany to rent Jiaozhou jointly ... This, by the way, would also be a good test of the sincerity of the wishes of the "Admiral of the Atlantic Ocean" to the "Admiral of the Pacific ocean."

Russia did not ask Germany for anything, but climbed into the trap of Port Arthur ...

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In due time, I will cite the opinion of US President Theodore Roosevelt, expressed by him to the German Ambassador to America, Sternburg. And then the reader will see that the point of application of Russia's efforts in the Yellow Sea was chosen in St. Petersburg exactly as if it were chosen for us by our worst enemies.

But this scenario was programmed by Witte's plan for

"penetration" of Russia into Manchuria after the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

However, was Witte a friend and son of Russia?

Working on this chapter and unraveling the old and cunningly tied "knots" of history, my dear reader, I was surprised more than once ...

And once again I was surprised when I read Evgeny Viktorovich Tarle's simply apologetic assessments of Witte's behavior. The master of our historical science devoted a whole book to him "Count S.Yu. Witte. Experience characterizing foreign policy.

And there he describes in detail how, after the failure of the Ito mission, poor de Sergey Yulievich "visited Manchuria and Kwantung (that is, the Liaodong Peninsula. - S.K.)" and then tried with all his might to convince Tsar Nicholas of what was needed, they say, "immediately evacuate Manchuria, otherwise Russia is threatened with great disasters."

Disasters really threatened us, but to evacuate Manchuria - meant abandoning Port Arthur and the commercial port of Dalniy.

But Dalniy is the brainchild of... Witte!

Witte, in his memoirs, shamelessly accused the government of not accepting either Ito's proposals or the direct pre-war proposals of the Japanese ambassador Kurino ... They say that these proposals would have been accepted, and "there would have been no war."

Well, okay, Witte put another verbal veil over his politics and distorted the past. But Tarle might have been expected to be less gullible and more sensible.

Of course, tsarism was guilty on all counts, and the august family itself behaved criminally frivolously. Take that

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On the eve of the war, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, in response to a flattering wish that he be appointed commander-in-chief against the Japanese, scornfully

(an eyewitness expression of General Yepanchin) stated that he had no desire to fight with these Japs.

Nevertheless, Witte's responsibility and his role are especially great. It was Witte who, with his practical provocative actions, and not fornicating "peace-loving" speeches, vilely led these great titles and petty princes to the Japanese war. After all, all the serious Far Eastern "pains" of Russia began after the lease of Port Arthur in South Manchuria from China.

As we know, the lease of Port Arthur became possible as a result of the joint intercession of Russia, Germany and France for China after the signing of the preliminary (preliminary) terms of the Shimonoseki Treaty at the end of the Sino-Japanese War.

But which of the three powers initiated this intercession?

It is generally believed that it was Russia. Indeed, the role of Russia was outwardly leading here - the show of force in Chifu was carried out mainly by the Russian Pacific squadron, which was joined by several French and German ships.

And who was the initiator of organizing pressure on Japan personally?

Almost all - even academic - sources point to the Russian Foreign Minister, Prince Lobanov-Rostovsky. But he only presided over the "special meeting" that determined the line of Russia with the participation of the Minister of the Navy Chikhachev, the Minister of War Vannovsky and ...

And one more minister, which I will keep silent about for now.

After Japan's victory over China, the Far East question then occupied many in the world, including Russia. But the essence of it in Russia was not understood by those who simply had to understand it. On February 15, 1895, even before the signing of the Shimonoseki Preliminaries, Chamberlain Mikhail Alexander, envoy to Japan

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Rovich Khitrovo telegraphed from Tokyo: *"I had a long interesting conversation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs ... Mutsu again confirmed to me ... that Japan does not at all want to demand anything that could be contrary to the interests or views of Russia, and for this purpose he will not hesitate to enter into a frank exchange of thoughts with us in order to prevent any misunderstandings."*

Of course, the art of diplomacy is in no small measure the art of sincerely lying. And Mutsu's outpourings had to be analyzed taking into account this peculiarity of the most "confidential" diplomatic conversations... Nevertheless, Khitrovo's telegram was worth serious consideration in the Russian Foreign Ministry.

But don't think...

Prince Lobanov-Rostovsky was a very elderly man in 1895, but a young minister ... And although his hair turned gray just in the diplomatic service, the prince was not a sovereign head, although he blindly believed in his infallibility (just such "figures" easy to manipulate).

Negotiations were going on in Shimonoseki, time was shrinking, but according to the behavior of the Foreign Ministry Russia, its head and the chief of this head (that is, the tsar) did not feel this.

Only two months after the Tokyo conversation between Khitrovo and Mutsu, Vladimir Nikolaevich Lamzdorf (then director of the Chancellery of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) melancholy noted in his diary: *"I do n't think it was beneficial for us to support Japan too much, however, to impose our will on her now is a very delicate matter. It would be right to express our opinion clearly and distinctly in Tokyo even before the conclusion of peace and before our appeal to France and Germany. Ultimately, the Khitrovo telegram ... gave us an excellent opportunity to do this,*

without violating the best relations with Japan.

In fact, Russia did not convince Japan "delicately", face to face. And she began to pull out from the throat of Japan the prey that she had almost swallowed. Could this not violate our "best relations with Japan", if such possible relations were simply torpedoed by such a Russian initiative?

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In Japan, both the "tops" and the people were embittered ...

Lamzdorf noted in his diary on May 1: *"In a telegram from Yokohama, Khitrovo sets out the delicate position of the Japanese government in relation to the Japanese people, greatly agitated because of the concessions made by Japan to the three powers."*

And who pushed Russia to such reckless strategic (exactly!) decisions?

Well, here I go back to April's "special meeting" on China and I will name its last active participant - Minister of Finance Witte.

All the same Witte ...

Capital academic work edited by Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences E.M. Zhukov "International Relations in the Far East (1870-1945)" reports: "Witte especially vigorously defended the need to prevent Japan from entering Manchuria and recommended acting in this direction until the declaration of war."

Until **the war**, reader!

Still would!

And here is what academician Tarle writes: "It was Witte who insisted then (in 1895) that Russia support the "principle of the integrity of the Chinese empire" and ultimatum (that's even how, my dear reader! - S.K.) *demanded* from Japan abandoning the Liaodong Peninsula. Witte insisted on immediate action. Then the Minister of Foreign Affairs Lobanov-Rostovsky attracted Germany and France to the cause, and when all three powers turned to Japan with a demand drawn up in very categorical (that is, in "friendly" - S.K.) *tones*, Japan relented. ..."

Here you go!

Now we can finally understand that Witte provoked Russia into an idiotic reversal of her Far Eastern policy, and the old man Lobanov Rostovsky served him only as a cover figure.

As a cover figure for the "dark forces" of the international Golden

The elite was served by Sergei Yulievich himself.

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So, in a systemic sense, it was not Russia that initiated the tripartite "advice" of Japan not to demand much from a defeated China. The initiative came from supranational forces - in the form of laying the foundation for the future Russian-Japanese conflict.

Witte took over the technical part of the task.

Somewhere and by someone - far from Moscow or St. Petersburg (and not in Berlin, not in Tokyo) - both the Russian-German and the Russian-Japanese bloody strife for the glory of the Golden International were already planned. And the unfaithful son of Russia (what is there, he was born in Russian Tiflis), but the faithful servant of this International, Witte, began multi-way, vile and profitable combinations for the greedy international bastard ...

Having wrested Liaodong and Port Arthur from Japan under the flag of Russia's "hard" line in defense of supposedly China, Witte then "squeezed" the idea of the Chinese Eastern Railway and all the other "ideas" arising from it. And all these "ideas" - all as one - paved the way to war.

Very often, and very many, the opposite has been asserted and is being asserted, but I am sure that it was Sergei Yulievich Witte who sued us for the war with Japan!

Although he is far from alone.

Witte tried to portray himself (after pitting Russia and Japan) as a champion of Russo-Japanese friendship. But let us remember what he answered Lord Salisbury through the British Ambassador O'Connor in 1898 to Salisbury's question about whether joint activities of Russia and England in China were possible?

(Let me remind you in brackets that Manchuria and Kwantung are also China.)

After all, Witte then replied: "If England and Russia can agree, their word will be law for the Far East" ...

Not Japan and Russia, but for some reason - England and Russia ... And where, in this case, is the place of Japan?

And in 1901, the same Witte reproached tsarism for ignoring Japan.

Ugh!

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I just laughed when I read such passages in the book of the venerable Evgeny Viktorovich Tarle about Witte:

"Witte completely repeats the traditional pattern: "a certain retired captain of the cavalry regiment Bezobrazov appeared" (the text in quotation marks in this quote is this is Witte's own text. - S.K.), a person "honest by nature", but according to the opinion of his own wife, "half-crazy" (it would be interesting to know if it was not after refusing to buy another mink coat that the irritated spouse certified her missus? - S.K.) , was presented to the king, then "received influence from his majesty" and, finally, "began to act at his own expense and fear, so to speak" ... "

Bezobrazov is one of the figures of Korean concession adventures, oh which the reader will soon learn in more detail ... And Tarle continues:

"All this is that firmly established historical popular print, which is not able to withstand even the first touch of critical analysis. Why did only such captains and fortune-tellers or Tibetan doctors *always* "have influence" on Emperor Nicholas (*here, reader, I ask you to make a small notch in your memory regarding the "Tibetan doctors", it will come in handy for us soon.* —

S.K.) ... How "a certain retired captain" could overcome Witte without the slightest difficulty, without representing ... any significance - all these questions do not bother Witte at all.

And why should they bother him if Witte himself ugly and "Tibetan doctors" slipped Nikolai?

Wow, dear reader, that's right! Notch on memory about "Tibetan doctors" done?

Very good, I repeat, it will be useful to us soon ...

PORT Far (in Chinese - Dalian, Dalian) we built on the tip Liaodong Peninsula.

This tip was leased by Russia from China in 1898 for a period of 25 years (just something!) For a fee for Japan's collective "friendly advice" to revise the Shimonoseki treaty with China.

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This Dalniy-Dalyan cost us 30 million rubles, but we built it "for my uncle," or rather, for the Japanese. After the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War, Far became the Japanese Dairen for a long time.

Dear reader! In 1896, the future outstanding explorer of Primorye, Vladimir Klavdievich Arseniev, graduated from the St. Petersburg cadet school and was soon assigned to the 3rd West Siberian Battalion,

stationed in Krasnoyarsk.

The path to Krasnoyarsk is not close, but Arsenyev did not see any problems in getting to the place of service, because the railway then went to Krasnoyarsk.

Arriving, Arsenyev appeared to the head of the garrison:

"Your Excellency!" Lieutenant Arseniev! I introduce myself by the occasion of arrival at the place of service in the 3rd West Siberian Battalion!

— Dove! Yes, after all, we have already transferred him to Vladivostok for three years!
—?

— And what is it? Did they really not know about this in St. Petersburg ...

"As you can see, Your Excellency!

"That's it, that's it... Not in the War Department?"

— ??

- Not in the Main Directorate of the General Staff?

— ???

And lieutenant Arseniev set off on a long journey on the chaise...

How long, short, but thousands of miles of Siberian roads or impassability flew by. On the way he came across a soldier's bivouac. On the shoulder straps of the soldiers, the cipher "8 V. - S. B."

— Brothers! Have you met the third Western battalion?

"We are he himself, your honor..."

- ?

So they renamed...

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Arseniev almost fell out of the wagon - he did not believe it. Then it fell out anyway.

and went to the commander of the unit.

As it turned out - a part of his own, acquired three hundred miles from ... Vladivostok.

The battalion stomped on foot for all three years. The personnel was partially changed - soldiers went into reserve, officers changed. It used to be a "shelf" (in the sense - battalion) decreased due to the deaths of servicemen. Sometimes, the "regiment" arrived due to the fact that officer wives gave birth to new future soldiers.

We wintered in the villages, traveled in good weather ...

On foot.

Three years...

My reader! Dear, my dear reader! From Russian Krasnoyarsk through the whole of Russian Siberia and the Russian Khabarovsk Territory to Russian Vladivostok there was no railway across Russian territory.

On the eve of the 20th century...

And all sorts of Wittes and Romanovs dumped huge folk funds on the construction of supposedly Russian roads in the middle of nowhere abroad.

And all these scams were carried out by supposedly Russian "guardians for the Fatherland" in full agreement with each other.

Here is an interesting illustration to this statement ...

But first I'll ask: is the notch in the memory of the "Tibetan doctors" preserved?

Very good. This is where we need it.

So...

In 1893, a 42-year-old baptized Buryat, an expert in Tibetan medicine, a pupil of the Oriental Faculty of St. resign.

He had a rank of a real state adviser - a considerable rank, general

major. And here...

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It was rumored that the All-Russian autocrat Alexander the Third himself was the godfather of our learned Buryat-general. Is it so, not so, but upon his retirement, Badmaev set out to present to the emperor his "Note on the tasks of Russian policy in the Asian East."

But first he presented a separate note to the Minister of Finance Witte. It was marked, by the way, for some reason, not 12, and not 14, but on February 13, 1893.

A sign - as the connoisseur of Masonic devilry (and not without serving the horned father of lies) the writer-defector Grigory Petrovich Klimov says - is not good.

In Badmaev's notes to the tsar and the courtier there was a lot of "high-minded" chatter like: *"Mongolia, Tibet and China constitute the future of Russia in*

in all respects."

It turns out that our great Pomor Mikhail Lomonosov was stupid when he asserted that "Russian power will grow in Siberia and the Northern Ocean and will reach the main European settlements in Asia and America."

Shelikhov and Rezanov were also stupid, fussing about Russian America...

And then twice the "university student" Zhamsaran turned everything over to Mongolia and Tibet.

Tibet, of course, is not an easy thing. A person very respected by me, having visited Lhasa, said: "In the blue eyes of Tibetan children, I saw the ancient origins of human civilization, covered today with poverty and dirt"...

But the Russian people of that time first had to figure out Siberia - so that Russian infantry battalions would not walk on it for years, God knows why and why, but rolled to their destination on a piece of iron.

The Badmaevs and the "Vitti" pushed Russia out of its legal, but still more or less unexplored geopolitical space, to where Russia could not count on anything other than the geshefts of a handful and the losses of the state .

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Actually, Badmaev's note got to the tsar through Witte. And Witte praised her - there is nowhere else to go.

Still would! The note indicated what kind of raspberries awaited the Russians in the event of the construction of a railway through Chinese Manchuria. That is, in which case it was always possible to point out Badmaev as the initiator of the movement to China.

On Witte's "accompaniment" Alexander wrote: *"All this is so new, unusual and fantastic, which is hard to believe in the possibility of success.*

Wrote well, acted badly. Because he paid off a crazy sum of two million rubles in gold for impudent and unpromising (for Russia, and not for Badmaev and Witte's bosses) adventures in Mongolia and Beijing.

Badmaev left and returned to St. Petersburg three years later. Nikolai had already been crowned in Moscow, and - here we must give him his due - he refused new subsidies. But the deed, as we already know, was done. Or rather, it's *done*.

The construction of the CER was decided.

Already after the Japanese destroyers suddenly attacked the Russian squadron in Port Arthur and disabled the battleships "Tsesarevich" and "Retvizan" with the cruiser "Pallada", after the war had already begun, the father of Count Alexei Alekseevich Ignatiev (the future military diplomat and future general of the Red Army) told his son. "It hurts to let you go to such a war."

Dear reader! When I sorted out (at first for myself) all these Far Eastern and cunningly Eastern "knots", I sometimes caught myself thinking: am I reconstructing that era and its main features correctly?

But after I checked myself, for the umpteenth time turning to such an impeccably honest witness as General Ignatiev, I became convinced that I had not made a mistake in anything.

And in confirmation, I'll simply quote the words of Alexei Alekseevich himself: "Father, indignant, said that we have enough business in Russia not to get into adventures in a foreign land. He was indignant at Witte, who squandered millions (more precisely, as we know, thirty

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million. - S.K.) for the construction of the city of Dalny and created the Russian-Chinese Bank with state money (there was such a feeder then. - S.K.), which financed the Far Eastern scams of such dealers as Admiral Abaza, crazy Bezobrazov and their friend Vonlyar- Lyarsky. More than once, even before the war, my father used to say that the undertakings of this company would not bring Russia to good, and that someday, for their thirst for profit, for their forest concessions, which they took on the Yalu, under the very noses of the Japanese, who were already accustomed to consider themselves masters here the whole state will have to pay.

All right! And about Witte, and about Yalu ... And about the turn in our relations with the Japanese.

What the hell was wrong with that Yalu River and the forest concessions on it! Was there a forest of your own, perhaps, not enough?

And yet...

However, everything falls into place if behind this "forest" we look at those "trees of imperialism" that "gardeners" like Theodore Roosevelt then enthusiastically began to plant all over the world (caricatures of that time depicted him in this form).

No, it was not only the gesheftmakher cousins Abaza and Bezobrazov who dealt with the "Vitty". I will say more about these two outstanding instigators of the Russo-Japanese War, but we can immediately state that, in addition to their greed, it was the plans of the Golden International to strategically weaken Russia.

And if you understand this, then the Russo-Japanese War appears in its true light - as just a detail in the global plans of the "Mammon Masons", who saw the danger to themselves of the prospects of the German-Russian-Japanese alliance since the time of Homer Lee. I hope the reader has not forgotten the presentation of his ideas by Karl Haushofer?

The war was a detail, but a very important, principled detail... This was once again confirmed in his analysis of the Russo-Japanese War by the former Minister of War of Russia and the former commander-in-chief in the Far East, Adjutant General Kuropatkin.

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ALEXEY NIKOLAEVITCH was by no means always a shrewd and resolute person. He was, according to testimonies, clearly reliable, and often excessively petty. But he was also an honest man - the best confirmation of this is his biography after 1917. It is so indicative and so humanly noble that, with the permission of the reader and without any connection with the main theme of my story, I will tell about this deeply Russian person in more detail.

And he himself deserves that we know him better, and I just want to at least briefly acquaint the reader with his fate.

Although ... Although, can it be argued that the story of such Russian people as Alexei Nikolayevich will be redundant today in the narrative-reflection about the fate of Russia?

So, General of Infantry, Adjutant General Kuropatkin...

To take on the supreme military role, he, in fact, was not worth it. But he is for them

did not take. It turned out that they were imposed on him, but he did not have enough determination to refuse.

The sins of the lost Russo-Japanese War were attributed to him almost completely. Almost everyone blamed him, even his entourage. But for me personally, Kuropatkin was largely justified immediately after I read one place in the memoirs of General (then, however, the captain) Ignatiev. In the Russian-Japanese he was at one time Kuropatkin's adjutant, then he asked to go into service.

War is over.

The aristocrat Count Ignatiev went to St. Petersburg (arriving at the front headquarters first, he had the right to be the first to leave).

Upon learning of his departure, Kuropatkin invited the captain to dinner, and then they moved to the saloon car, where a conversation took place, which I quote in full from Ignatiev's words ...

- Well, dear Ignatiev, who, in your opinion, is to blame the most?

"Well, Your Excellency, you commanded us, you, of course, and remain guilty.

"What do you think I'm especially guilty of?"

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- Yes, first of all, that few people were persecuted ...

- Who are you referring to? Name the names.

- Yes, those top generals whom you yourself did not trust. Well, for example, the commander of the seventeenth corps, Baron Bilderling, the commander of the first army corps, Baron Meyendorff, and others.

And then, reader, Ignatiev's chief stood up, calmly opened the safe and gave the captain the following telegram to read:

"Your proposals on the renewal of the senior command staff, and in particular on the replacement of Baron Bilderling with General such and such, Baron Meyendorff with General such and such, etc. etc. the sovereign-emperor finds excessive.

Minister of the Court

Baron Fredericks.

And a minute of heavy silence hung in the passenger compartment ...

Under such conditions, both Kuropatkin and Russia were doomed to defeat.

Russia revolted, but Kuropatkin remained silent. Well, the general, who wore not only 16 military orders on his chest, but also a retinue cipher on shoulder straps, was not a revolutionary.

During the First World War, he formed a reserve grenadier corps. Later, not having time to take command of the 5th Army, he was appointed commander of the Northern Front, and even later - Governor-General of Turkestan.

In April 1917, at the request of the Tashkent Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, he was arrested and sent to Petrograd. In May, he was released and left for the family estate of Sheshurino, Kholm'sky district, Pskov province (now the Toropetsky district of the Tver region).

The messenger of the white movement, calling under the white banners, advised to stop the futile war against his people.

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The French ambassador, who offered him, a Chevalier of the Legion of Honor for participation in the French expedition to the Sahara, to go to France, also refused.

He wrote memoirs, published later in the Red Archive, taught at a secondary school opened by the Soviet government in the village of Lebedev and in

the NATO Agricultural School founded by him. In 1918 he organized a folk museum in Kholm and became its scientific adviser.

The Soviet government retained his house and a rich library for life. Not all, it turns out, are former adjutant generals of the emperor of the Cheka

put it against the wall.

Aleksey Nikolayevich died on the night of January 16, 1925, a little before reaching the age of 77.

Blessed memory to him and our respect ...

SO, Kuropatkin wrote: *"There is an opinion that if we in the Far East were limited only to the passage of the northern highway through Manchuria, there would be no war with Japan. That only the occupation of Port Arthur, Mukden, and especially activities in Korea served as a pretext for war ... At the same time, the opinion is expressed that we would build a railway in our possessions along the river. Amur, there would not even be a thought to occupy the southern part of Mukden and Kwangtung (that is, Liaodong. - S.K.)."*

Kuropatkin, on the other hand, was convinced that *"if we had limited ourselves only to this enterprise (CER. - S.K.), Japan would not have started a war with Russia because of Northern Manchuria."*

That is, the laying of the CER in Manchuria was at least criminal stupidity.

But its South Manchurian branch Harbin - Port Arthur and all the Liaodong-Korean scams of Witte and Abaza were certainly a direct state crime. Count Ignatiev, who traveled along the CER from Harbin to the front during the Russo-Japanese War, wrote about

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branch Harbin - Port Arthur: *"This highway played a decisive role in the whole unfortunate war."*

Yeah...

But the unfortunate war was not for everyone.

Here is one more, perhaps the last detail in this story from the history of the CER.

As the same A.N. Kuropatkin, the assumptions of the Minister of Finance (that is, Witte) that the construction of a road through Manchuria would cost 15 million rubles cheaper than through Russian possessions did not materialize.

Kuropatkin stated: *"At the cost of building the Manchurian the road is the most expensive of all railway enterprises in Russia."*

But could there be any doubt about a different outcome, if Sergei Yulievich Witte put his purest (in white gloves) hands to the CER?

But the way, due to the CER, was reduced only by some (according to those spaces) 500 miles!

On this story about the "great project" could, dear reader, and finish. But I also forgot to say that for the right to this ill-fated concession, harmful to Russia, Witte forfeited the already known Li Hongzhang a million-dollar bribe.

The Russian language is great... However, one can appreciate such deeds only by going far beyond the limits of the Russian (not "new Russian") lexical norm.

ALMOST on the eve of the war, in August 1903, Vasily Vasilyevich Vereshchagin went to Japan through Vladivostok. Our brilliant artist was drawn to the Land of the Rising Sun for a long time ... A man of great energy himself, he wanted to understand what explains such a powerful leap - in just three decades - from a recently feudal country to modern capitalism.

The train went to Vladivostok for a week... Samara, Ufa, Yekaterinburg, Tyumen, Omsk, Irkutsk and beyond Chita down to the CER.

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Here is Vladivostok - the end of the road on Russian soil. Trouble for Japan dinner in honor of the artist on the flagship cruiser Rossiya...

And worrisome talk...

A two-day passage on the boat "Aikoku-maru", and Vereshchagin - in Japanese Tsurug, from where he again travels by train via Kyoto to Tokyo.

Foreign country, unusual customs...

Small (especially for the bearish Vasily Vasilyevich) cars, miniature washrooms, first class - just something covered with carpets

shops.

Outside the window are yellowing rice fields, looking like an Oriental carpet at a fast pace...

The carriages are smoky, cigarette butts are lying around.

One of the passengers in a European dress, in front of everyone, undressed to a loincloth, dried himself with a towel and sat down to read a newspaper. Women in gray silk kimonos with bright belts, alas, did not differ in such immediacy.

On the streets of cities - countless copies of the German artist Lenbach - portrait of Bismarck. Unlike the original - with a cigar in his mouth. Tobacco factory advertisement.

Threats against Russia in the press...

Vereshchagin had been in Japan for three months, but the shipping company suddenly announced the last flight to Vladivostok, and had to urgently leave.

It was November 1903.

After the outbreak of the war, Vereshchagin, recalling newspaper anti-Russian threats, wrote: *"All this would be funny if it weren't so sad, because Japan is a beautiful country with a talented, hardworking people full of artistic talent and understanding. Japan can be considered a well-organized state: it has good communication lines. High rural culture, universal literacy, a lot of taste and elegance in handicraft production."*

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AND NOW this country has started a war with Russia ...

General Kuropatkin later stated that the war with Japan arose "unexpectedly for Russia, contrary to the intentions of the Russian sovereign, contrary to the interests of our Motherland."

I hope, dear reader, we already know enough to understand that if it was unexpected, it was only for the tsar and those of his generals who were not very smart, but relatively honest.

The disparity in pre-war assessments was great ... The military agent (as the Russian military apache was then called) in Japan, Colonel Vannovsky was surprisingly passive, for which he was dismissed in the summer of 1902.

Upon his return to Russia, he wrote in a report: *"It will take tens, perhaps hundreds of years, until the Japanese army acquires the moral foundations on which the structure of any European army is based, and it will begin to compete on an equal footing with at least one of the most weak European powers."*

When Vannovsky was still in Japan, his reports and telegrams from the Russian envoy to Tokyo Izvolsky about Japan's readiness for war reported "diametrically opposed information." And this - according to the memoirs of Count Ignatiev - was loudly indignant at Colonel (later - General of the Cavalry) Gurko-Romeiko from the General Staff.

It turned out that Russia did not really know: was Japan preparing for war? But was Russia itself preparing for the war, or not?

Personally, I have little doubt that tsarism - as something integral, albeit stupid, but nationally colored - really did not prepare for an aggressive war. It could only bring harm to Russia.

But the enemies of Russia have been preparing this war they need for more than one year and have prepared well. Actually, even the discrepancy in the reports was, perhaps, not so accidental.

The inert Colonel Vannovsky was a military agent from the spring of 1900 to the summer of 1902. Then he was replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Konstantinovich Samoilov of the General Staff. And Samoilov's reports were realistic, that is, disturbing.

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However, if Vannovsky carelessly underestimated Japanese strength, Samoilov seriously overestimated it (this was reflected later, when he, as part of the Russian delegation at peace negotiations, even supported the payment of indemnities, because he looked at our prospects too panickingly).

Until the beginning of 1903, the Russian envoy to Tokyo was Alexander Petrovich Izvolsky. A year before the war, he was replaced by Baron Rosen, who in 1899 was replaced by the same Izvolsky.

The year before the war is the year before the war. As a rule, a country that has decided to start a war already *knows* that this year will be pre-war *for it*. And the role of the diplomatic representative of the country - the future victim of aggression - in preventing aggression, in eliminating political conditions for it can hardly be significant.

The situation is different in those years when aggression is only being planned, pondered, but not yet decided.

And it was Izvolsky who represented Russia in Japan during the most decisive years of Russian-Japanese relations.

How did he think and act then?

He himself answered this question as follows: *"I was a resolute opponent of the firm policy that was adopted by Russia in relation to Japan and was inspired by an irresponsible camarilla that had a great influence on the emperor ... I strongly recommended taking a conciliatory position towards Japan and conclude an agreement with that country on matters relating to Manchuria and Korea. My efforts in this direction resulted in the arrival in Europe of such a worthy statesman as Marquis Ito, with the aim of promoting rapprochement between Russia and Japan. This mission, had it succeeded, would have been capable of changing the whole course of events and would have ruled out the possibility of war, but the cold reception given to the Japanese representatives in St. Petersburg, and the slow responses given to them by the Russian government, unfortunately, determined the complete failure of this enterprise. The far-sighted representative of Japan considered it necessary to hasten the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese alliance."*

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Well, perhaps Izvolsky really stood up for the Russian-Japanese rapprochement, but he was a very ambivalent figure.

And even in the above passage, he distorted something. Outwardly, Ito was greeted warmly, another thing is that they really hesitated with answers ... And it was not only because of the slowness of the Russians that our rapprochement with Japan broke down.

Izvolsky presents himself, of course, as an ardent Russian patriot and writes: *"Confident that the policy adopted by the emperor under the influence of Bezobrazov,*

Admiral Abaza and Alekseev, inevitably had to lead to war, and not wanting to be a mere toy in this matter, I asked permission to return to Europe (ambassador to Copenhagen. - S.K.) ".

Well, first of all, you took up the tug of a difficult envoy, so pull to the last, use every opportunity to prevent a war that is harmful to the Fatherland, and do not run away from your post.

Patriots don't do that.

Secondly, Alexander Petrovich was going to leave for a long time ... I would like to emphasize my opinion that is different from the "leading" one, and I would have left immediately after Ito's "cold reception".

Attack...

And the reasons for moving Izvolsky from Tokyo to Copenhagen were very perhaps other than those that Alexander Petrovich told us about.

And that's why...

In the spring of 1902 in Athens, where Rosen was envoy after Tokyo, Roman Romanovich, through no fault of his own (but due to the frivolity of the Greek queen), had an unpleasant purely protocol incident, and he left Greece as a sign of discontent, transferring control of the Russian mission to a chargé d'affaires.

Nikolai then noted on Rosen's explanatory note: *"Rosen must be reassured."* And his return to Tokyo was considered the best way out.

And Izvolsky went to Copenhagen to work on a future European anti-German war ... And contributed to this on

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significance mother of Nicholas, Dowager Empress Maria Feodorovna - Born Princess Marie-Dagmara of Denmark, daughter of King Christian IX.

She could not stand Germany, but "with great benevolence" she treated Izvolsky and his wife (nee Tol, daughter of the Russian envoy in Copenhagen), who grew up in front of the future empress.

By the way, Roman Romanovich Rosen turned out to be at his best in Tokyo in the sense that he *was not* mistaken about the essence of what was happening ...

I will give the opinion of such an interesting memoirist as Yuri Yakovlevich Solovyov, who assessed Rosen as one of the outstanding diplomats, but misunderstood under the tsarist regime: "With his clear and quite real attitude to the issues of our foreign policy, he invariably saw further than her Petersburg leaders. But, probably, that is why they never agreed with him, and gave him his due only when it was too late ... So, for example, just before the Russo-Japanese War, Rosen telegraphed from

Tokyo, that, in his opinion, the course of action that was adopted by St. Petersburg in relation to Japan will inevitably lead to war, and if so, then it is necessary to hastily complete the fortifications of Port Arthur and increase our military forces in Manchuria. .

This is Rosen...

And here is the answer to him, written by the right hand of Minister of Foreign Affairs Lamzdorf, Director of the Asian Department of Hartwig: *"Do not lose sight of the fact that Manchuria is not within your sphere of competence."*

Remember, reader, this name is Hartwig...

We will return to him.

Rosen was precise and patriotic on another occasion before the First World War. As a member of the Council of State at that time, in a special note he far-sightedly warned of the dangers of our break with Germany.

Exposing himself in the question of the Russo-Japanese conflict

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almost a pacifist, after the Russo-Japanese War, Izvolsky managed to become

(more precisely, they "managed to become him") at the head of the Russian Foreign Ministry.

Academician Mikhail Nikolaevich Pokrovsky wrote about him like this: "In May 1906, after the resignation of Lamzdorf, straight from an insignificant post in Copenhagen, he was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs ... He handed over to England a number of significant positions of Russian imperialism, receiving nothing in return except the privilege to fight together with her against Germany.

Izvolsky really did a lot of work to draw Russia after the "Manchurian catastrophe" into the adventure of the First World War on the side of the Entente. Back in 1904, he discussed the prospects for this "cordial agreement" with the English King Edward VII, and it was he who, on August 31, 1907, concluded that Russian-English agreement, which, through the Anglo-French "cordial" agreement, Russia to the Entente and tied.

He consolidated these efforts later, already at the post of Russian ambassador in Paris... No wonder Jean Jaurès, who was killed on the eve of the First World War by a French chauvinist, is credited with the demonstrative words "Enfin cette canaille d'Izvolsky a sa guerre" ("Finally, this scoundrel Izvolsky achieved his war after all").

It was also said that when the war broke out, Izvolsky himself loudly proclaimed: "This is my war!"

The war in Europe was prepared, of course, not by Alexander Petrovich, but also by his role was quite definite.

That is, in Europe, Izvolsky was not afraid of a war that was dangerous for Russia. But on In the Far East, he allegedly fought for peace with all his might.

Strange, isn't it?

And wasn't this "half" "pacifist" actually among those who prepared not only the First World War, but also the first major regional war of the 20th century - Russia's war in Asia?

I do not undertake to answer in the affirmative, but I will quote the words of Yuri Yakovlevich Solovyov, who knew Izvolsky well: "Besspor

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but that Izvolsky, who walked all his life in debt, as if in silk, was sometimes in great dependence on unknown international forces.

All his life, Izvolsky overshadowed himself with an Orthodox cross, and after his death it turned out that he did not know when he became a secret Lutheran and carefully concealed this ...

It is unlikely that this was all that Alexander Petrovich hid during his lifetime.

An interesting touch to his portrait is added by the testimony of Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich, who in the summer of 1914 passed through Paris after the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia.

All of Paris was then agitated by the trial of Madame Caillaux, the wife of a famous French politician, who shot Gaston Calmette, editor-in-chief of Le Figaro, for publishing materials compromising her husband. And the Grand Duke did not believe his ears, hearing how "honorable statesmen and responsible diplomats, forming lively groups, argued with fervor" about whether "she" would be justified.

Who is "she"? the Grand Duke asked, "you probably mean Austria, which, hopefully, will agree to submit its misunderstanding with Serbia to the Hague Arbitration Tribunal?"

Everyone thought he was joking because the "she" on everyone's lips was Henrietta Caillaux.

So, when Alexander Mikhailovich went to the embassy to Izvolsky, he surprised:

"Why, your Imperial Highness, hurry back to Petersburg? It's off season..."

But the possibility of war cannot be ruled out, can it?

- War? The ambassador waved his hand. No, there will be no war. These are just rumors that disturb Europe from time to time. Austria will allow itself a few more threats. Petersburg is worried. Wilhelm will deliver a warlike speech. And all this will be forgotten in two weeks...

Here is such a detail to the already strange portrait of Izvolsky.

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Yes, and Nikolai Genrikhovich Hartwig was a figure not very clear. On the eve of the Russo-Japanese War, he actually sabotaged attempts to somehow straighten out Russia's position in the Far East, either through preventive military or political measures.

On the other hand, as Russian envoy to Serbia on the eve of the First World War, Baron Hartwig actually actively prepared the "Balkan" fuse of the world war ... He, in particular, was an ardent supporter of the general union of the Balkan countries - allegedly against Turkey ... But what was Turkey then even compared to these Balkan "powers"?

No, objectively, such initiatives of Russia looked like unfriendly to Austria-Hungary, and therefore to Germany (I wrote about how stupid and unprofitable for us this was in my book "Russia and Germany: play off!").

Academician Tarle, however, believed that in the affairs of the Balkan Union, Hartwig was "only a tool" - now in the hands of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sazonov (a figure, politically also not that transparent).

So, all his life, it turns out, Nikolai Genrikhovich was someone's tool ...

That's just - whose?

He ended strangely ... Already after the assassination of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in the Bosnian Sarajevo in the summer of 1914, for some reason he ended up at a dinner with the Austrian envoy in Belgrade, Baron Vladimir Gizi, and, having dined, he died the same evening. Allegedly - from heart failure, which he really suffered from. Although his daughter immediately stated that her father was simply removed.

Hartwig was buried in Belgrade with the greatest honors, a street was named after him ... And his elevation to the symbol of Russian-Serbian friendship automatically made him in that situation a banner of anti-Austrian sentiments.

And after all, for some reason, Petersburg agreed to the scandalous (and how else can you say it?) The funeral of a Russian diplomat in a foreign capital

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tse ... Although objectively such an action heated up the political atmosphere and this also led to war ...

Hartwig was somehow connected with Witte. And Witte himself did not hesitate to publicly admit that after the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria in 1909, he recommended Hartwig to Izvolsky as a replacement for Izvolsky as Minister of Foreign Affairs (Izvolsky allegedly intended to leave the ministers then).

It is not entirely clear with the "discordance" in the reports of Izvolsky and Vannovsky from the capital of Japan ...

If Vannovsky reported on the weakness of the Japanese army, then "in diametrically opposite" - according to Gurko - thinking Izvolsky had to report on Japanese military power.

However, he does not take credit for this himself. And where would he get such information from? And if the Foreign Ministry advised Rosen not to poke his nose into neighboring Korea, then Izvolsky's attempts to poke his nose into someone else's "eparchy" of the military department would hardly have been encouraged there.

Whose position did Gurko publicly resent - Izvolsky or Vannovsky? And for what?

And who was Vasily Iosifovich Gurko-Romeiko himself? The son of a field marshal and a fairly typical general himself, he had the peculiarity that he was also a Freemason (like Izvolsky, as the son of Izvolsky). So it is not known: maybe Gurko-Romeiko was indignant and sincere, or maybe he was covering for "brother" Izvolsky.

And there were already enough of such "brother rabbits" in St. Petersburg then.

For example, in 1903, Colonel (since 1912 - Major General) of the General Staff Mikhail Alekseevich Adabash visited Japan and brought important data on the reserves of the Japanese army, which Vannovsky did not even mention. But the report of Adabash (he, by the way, after the Great October Revolution was in the corps of the General Staff of the Red Army) generals Zhilinsky and Sakharov (figures again not flawless) for some reason put "under the cloth" ...

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Colonel Samoilov, by the way, did not report on the reserve troops either. And they tripled the size of the Japanese army!

No, dear reader! It is no coincidence that the Russian-Japanese "happened" a war in which "unknown international forces" were so interested.

It's not very accidental.

Having said a lot about this already, I will say more about this later ...

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Chapter 6

The hills of Manchuria and swamps of the concession

The WAR began with a Japanese attack on the Port Arthur squadron. Even academic sources usually emphasize - "without declaring war." But

it's not exactly like that...

First, already in December 1903, Japan presented Russia with an ultimatum note. Its essence boiled down, in fact, to the fact that Japan sought from Russia the recognition of such rights in Korea that would make Japan a complete mistress in this region.

Whether this ultimatum was at least objectively substantiated to some extent will become clearer to us after we - a little later - get acquainted with the note on the Manchurian question by General Kuropatkin. He presented her to the Tsar in October 1903.

Having not received an answer to its note, on February 6, 1904, Japan breaks off diplomatic relations with us, and on the same day the Japanese fleet leaves for combat positions in the Yellow Sea.

Actually, after the ultimatum, everyone related to defense and Russia's foreign policy should have been "ears on top".

Especially in Port Arthur!

Especially - at the naval in Port Arthur ...

The rupture (!) of relations and the exit of the Japanese squadron of Admiral Togo into the ocean should have been immediately regarded there as a signal of combat alarm. So what kind of "declaration of war" is there ... After all, the Japanese attacked Port Arthur only two days after the break in relations!

And formally, war was declared on February 10.

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Regarding the "unexpected suddenness", there is another piquant circumstance ... Four years before Port Arthur, in January 1900, it was in the style of the Japanese that Admiral

Virenius.

With the same, in general, the result that was actually achieved by the Japanese, Virenius finished the game. Later, it was even suggested that the secret plans for this game came to the Japanese, who

and took advantage.

N-yes...

Already in post-revolutionary emigration, General Nikolai Alekseevich Yepanchin, a high-ranking and close to the court, recalled: *"A war began, which no one in Russia sympathized with, which the masses of the people did not understand at all, and our army understood this war even less."*

So after all, it should be noted that the smart, educated strata of Russian society here also could not understand anything, or rather, they could not see something rational for Russia.

Interestingly, the assessment of the monarchist general strikingly coincides with the assessments of the Bolshevik Lenin, and it can be directly inserted into the text of Lenin's articles of that period.

And here is what Ariadna Tyrkova-Williams, a prominent member of the Cadet Party, wrote: *"Public opinion was against the Japanese war. The war was attributed to the machinations of a small gang of courtiers interested in forest concessions on the Yalu... Admiral Abaza, close to Nicholas II, and several other courtiers were considered the main culprits of the whole adventure."*

The siege of Port Arthur, during which 112 thousand Japanese and 27 thousand Russians died ... Heroic death during the defense of the second fort of General Kondratenko - the favorite of the soldiers and the soul of defense on land ... The mediocre surrender of this sea fortress by the mediocre Stessel ...

The death of Admiral Makarov and Vasily Vereshchagin on the battleship "Petrovsk" ... The feat of the "Varyag" and "Korean" at Chemulpo and the campaign of the 2nd Port Arthur squadron of Admiral Zinovy Rozhdestvensky, which ended in the Tsushima Strait ...

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The battles near Mukden, the retreat from the Liaodong (already preparing to become the Kwantung) Peninsula and the waltz "On the Hills of Manchuria"...

All this was in that war.

However, I am not writing her story and am simply reminding the reader of what he is talking about. and he himself is unlikely to have forgotten, but it is impossible not to recall something even in a few words.

At the very beginning of the war, in February 1904, in a leaflet of the Central Committee of the RSDLP "To the Russian Proletariat," Lenin wrote: *"All the forces of the people are subjected to the greatest tension, for a serious struggle has begun. A struggle against a people of 50,000,000, which is superbly armed, superbly prepared for war, and who is fighting for what they see as the urgently necessary conditions for free national development. It will be a struggle between a despotic and backward government and a politically free and culturally rapidly progressing people."*

I would like to draw your attention to Lenin's assessment of Japan's goals - the struggle for "urgently necessary ... conditions for free national development." Understanding the situation was also reflected in the reservation - "in his (that is, the Japanese people. - S.K.) eyes."

In its active phase, this struggle lasted a year.

On February 25, 1905, the Japanese inflicted a decisive defeat on us on land - in South Manchuria near Mukden. The army withdrew to positions in the Siping (Syngai) area, and the "Syngai" sitting began.

At this point, the period of active operations on land ended, because the Russian troops dug in well, and the Japanese did not have the strength for a decisive offensive.

On May 28, 1905, the theoretical possibility of a Russian victory at sea sank in the waves of the Tsushima Strait together with the squadron of Rozhdestvensky.

After that, it remained to lick their wounds and look for ways to peace. And - both sides.

The war cost Japan 2 billion yen and Russia 4.5 billion rubles.

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For Russia, these financial losses amounted to half of the then public debt. Was lost and almost the entire Baltic Fleet - the most powerful and modern.

And what did 2 billion yen mean to Japan?

On the eve of the war, Japan's total budget expenditure was 250 million yen. The national debt was 540 million yen. Here also consider!

As for the loss of life, my dear reader, the data differ seriously, and I will cite them from various sources to show you how dangerous it is to blindly trust any one of them without tedious rechecking.

According to the "History of Japan" by E. Zhukov, the loss of the Japanese killed and 700 thousand people were wounded.

The second edition of the TSB states that "the Russian army and navy were defeated, suffering huge losses." And everything.

In the latest edition of 2004, the monograph by Vyacheslav and Larisa Shatsillo "The Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905" reports that Russia lost about 270 thousand people, including 50 thousand killed, and Japan's irretrievable losses were even greater - over 86 thousand killed.

More - it seems to me - you can believe the "History of Military Losses" by Boris Uralnis, who reports that Russian losses on land amounted to 177,490 people (25,331 killed and 6,127 died of wounds), and Japanese - 232,237 (47,387 killed and 11 425 died of wounds).

Actually, regarding Japanese losses, Uralnis, as I understand it, was guided by *the official* data of the chief medical inspector of the Japanese army, Dr. Kipke. And, most likely, the Japanese lost even more manpower! That is, in terms of Japanese losses, the 2004 monograph seems to be close to the truth.

So, according to General Kuropatkin, the total losses of the Japanese killed, wounded and sick amounted to 554,885 people. In Tokyo alone, 60,624 people were buried in an honorary cemetery and, in addition, 74,545 died from wounds and diseases.

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But Russian losses seem to be exaggerated by the 2004 monograph - in full accordance with the general tendency of "Russian" historians to portray Russians as incompetent.

The sea took the lives of 6,299 Russian sailors and about 2,000 Japanese.

One way or another, but the irretrievable losses of the Japanese in battles on land are no less than twice as many as the Russians.

If we take into account the fact that the soldiers were given to Japan harder than us, and the fact that the population of Japan was three times smaller than ours, then the systemic losses of the Japanese in manpower turned out to be monstrous, exorbitant compared to ours.

And for this reason, the victory of Japan could have been problematic if not for the vile "mediation" of America (for some reason, we write about the alleged "Russophilism" of the United States, which was afraid of the strengthening of Japan and its requests to moderate -

de) and the foulness of the Russian elite, who stubbornly resisted before the war and quickly agreed to everything after it ended.

By the way, regarding the "Russophilism" of the United States... Already when the war began, the main official "Russophile" of America, President Theodore Roosevelt, confidentially told the German ambassador in Washington, Sternburg, the following:

- It is in our interests that the war between Russia and Japan should drag on until both states achieve the maximum possible exhaustion of each other, that the territories where their interests collide continue to serve the same goals after the conclusion of peace, and that the boundaries of their spheres of influence intersect in the same way as before the war ...

That's it - simple, clear, vile.

And how can one not recall another American (and also the president) Harry Truman, who in 1941 advised real history to help the Russians if the Germans win, and help the Germans if the Russians win, and so on until the last German kills the last Russian...

Churchill Jr. spoke in the same vein at the time.

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We are still simple in Russia, my dear reader!

Moreover, war is not bad for everyone. After all, who loses, and who gains ...

True, the Yankees did not always succeed in provocations. Thus, on February 1 (14), 1904, the Philadelphia newspaper North American Newspaper reprinted a telegram to Leo Tolstoy: "Do you sympathize with Russia, Japan, or anyone else?"

Tolstoy replied in a short letter:

"I am neither for the Russian nor for the Japanese government, but for the deceived working people of both countries, forced to fight against their well-being, conscience and religion."

On that "freedom of speech" ended - such an answer by the Yankees was not to be published from hand.

And here's something else about the Russians and the Anglo-Saxons "loving" them...

Serious construction of the Japanese navy began in 1895 - Japan built the fleet for indemnity under the Shimonoseki Treaty, which amounted to 230 million liang (about 300 million rubles). In total, Japan spent 773 million yen on the army and navy from 1896 to 1903, while more than 30% of the military budget went to the needs of the fleet.

However, the process of building up Japanese naval power was sharply accelerated by a huge US loan and British assistance. Most of the new Japanese ships were built in the shipyards of the latter. And the benefit here was double and even triple.

Here is a list of only new Japanese battleships of the early 20th century of "English" origin:

- squadron battleship "Mikasa". The builder is Armstrong in Elswick. Laid down on 01/24/1899, launched on 11/08/1900, completed on 03/01/1902;

- squadron battleship "Asahi". Construction company - J. Brown" in Clydebank. Laid down on 08/01/1898, launched on 03/13/1899, completed on 07/31/1900;

- Squadron battleship Shikishima. The builder is Thames Iron Work in Blackull. Laid down on 03/29/1897, launched on 11/01/1898, completed on 01/26/1900;

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- Squadron battleship "Fuji". The builder is Thames Iron Work in Blackull. Laid down on 08/01/1894, launched on 03/31/1896,

Completed on 08/17/1897.

The British also built the armored cruisers Izumo, Iwate, Asama, Tokiwa, Chiyoda, armored cruisers Naniwa, Takachiho, Izumi.

Americans - armored cruisers "Kasagi" and "Chitose".

The benefit here was, I repeat, triple ...

Borrowed amounts contributed to the strengthening of the Anglo-Saxon influence on Japan.

They, turned into armored ships, oriented Japan against Russia.

And, finally, they returned to the Anglo-Saxons, since from these sums with they paid for the ships launched.

But there was also a purely geopolitical moment! After all, Russia was also turned head-on in the direction of Manchuria and Korea so that it would later collide with Japan with this forehead.

And if it wasn't? What if our "Korean" and "Chinese" policies in the late 19th and early 20th centuries were realistic? By that time, Russia had created a very powerful fleet. If she reoriented herself from the Anglo-French to Germany, then almost the entire combat strength of the fleet could be transferred to the Pacific Ocean. Actually, with the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, this was done, but with an alliance with Germany, the fleet could be transferred to the Far East in advance. And - not for confrontation with the Japanese, but for a weighty proposal to the Japanese to enter into alliance relations with us.

Historians, however, believe (and not without reason) that, on the contrary, one of the reasons for the accelerated construction of the fleet by Japan was Russia's plans to increase its squadron in the Pacific Ocean. But the same action can lead to opposite results depending on how it is perceived.

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And what if Russia, instead of a line of discord with Japan, took a course towards an active alliance with her? What if Japan, too, looked at the situation with sober eyes and understood the desirability of peace and an alliance with Russia? Moreover, many influential figures in Japan looked at the possible prospects in this way.

Instead of adventures outside the borders of Russia, we had to prove to Japan in word and deed that the mighty Pacific Fleet was not a threat to Japan, but a factor in stabilizing the situation in the Far East and a guarantor of the peaceful development of Russian Transbaikalia and Primorye. That Russia needs peace, but the threat to the world is the Anglo-Saxons, who objectively threaten the Japanese islands because of their unwillingness to see Japan economically independent and strong. After all, the war meant for the rapidly developing Japan the emergence of a number of financial and economic problems and objectively led to new foreign loans (as it actually happened). And foreign loans for purposes are not constructive, but destructive; military loans mean internal troubles, internal instability.

Conclusion: Russia and Japan need peace and joint economic efforts - including in China. And plus to it - and the military union.

After all, then the combined fleets of the two new allies would provide such an alliance with absolute power in the Pacific Ocean with strong year-round bases for the Russian fleet!

The Anglo-Saxons were preparing a fleet for the Japanese against Russia, but it could also be that their creation would have turned against them!

And peace in the Baltic would allow Wilhelm to join the Russian-Japanese Pacific company as the third! Moreover, the Germans have already formed considerable Pacific island possessions.

And such a mighty trio could do everything!

Among other things, it could require a radical revision of the Pacific situation that could become the key to the global situation!

Russia under the new conditions would be able to demand the return of Alaska and northern Pacific islands. Could it be like this

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to demand the division of the Hawaiian Islands between the USA, Russia, Japan and Germany.

Germany and Japan, having acquired a solid Russian rear, would have the opportunity for unhindered, unlimited economic expansion in China and throughout the Asia-Pacific region. And thank God! After all, Russia would also have a strong rear for the peaceful development of Eastern Siberia and the Far East ...

And **again** our Russian America!

And there one could think about strengthening the Russian economic activity in the Pacific.

And there it would be possible to include China as a junior partner in the general alliance. And there it would be possible to ensure the independence of India from the British crown.

Is it only India...

And only from the British!

These are the prospects that the Roosevelts, the Churchills, the Schiffs with Coons and lobs and the entire financial Golden International with its agents like Witte.

The Pacific peace and the alliance between Russia and Japan were just as deadly unacceptable for them as the European alliance between Russia and Germany.

Therefore, real events went according to the scenario just the opposite ...

LET'S LOOK, dear reader, at the chronology of Russian-Japanese relations before the war more carefully.

Even during his first visit to St. Petersburg in 1901, Ito, in exchange for Russia's withdrawal from Korea and giving it to Japan, offered Russia Northern Manchuria (the CER zone) and even complete freedom of hands in China.

In the latter, he, most likely, was cunning, although ... Although such a turn would mean the inevitable conflict between Russia and England and the United States, which would suit Japan.

In 1901, such Japanese loyalty could be attributed to

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account of their desire to play the "Russian card" on the eve of an alliance with England. However, at the end of July 1903, Japan again invited Russia to discuss the problems of the Far East. The Anglo-Japanese alliance has already been concluded and it would hardly be correct to assume in this proposal just a game.

Most likely, Japan really wanted to somehow negotiate with Russia. After all, the potentials of Russia and Japan then differed very much in favor of Russia. Russian battleships and cruisers did not yet rest at the bottom of the Sea of Japan, but smoked from chimneys in Port Arthur, in Kronstadt, in Vladivostok.

Of course, Japan then already had a powerful and modern fleet built at Western shipyards (the near future already showed that it had an overwhelming advantage over the Russian fleet, but this was far from obvious before Tsushima).

Of course, the Japanese army was also not bad at that time. Before the defeat of the French in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1871, she had French instructors, but after the defeat of France at Sedan, the Japanese preferred German instructors, and they organized the Japanese army along the German model. And he was really good!

Yes, and students of the Japanese were talented.

The German army is traditionally strong with reservists, and this feature was transferred to the Japanese army - by the beginning of the 20th century it was quite well equipped and

trained, although far from being as numerous as the Russian.

And already one hugeness of the Russian army in comparison with the Japanese, of course, frightened the Japanese. These fears were all the more great, and justified, because the Japanese could not be completely confident in their own training. After all, the Japanese army of the new time was not seriously tested by anyone or anything.

Yes, Japan then had a victory over China in its assets. However it was scary to threaten Russia with such an asset.

So a lot depended on a lot...

On August 12, 1903, the Japanese ambassador handed over to the Russian Foreign Ministry Japanese draft agreement.

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Article 1 contained the obligations of the parties to respect the independence and territorial integrity of China and Korea and uphold the principle of equality of all nations in commercial and industrial terms.

Article 2 provided for Russia's recognition of the predominance of Japanese interests in Korea and the recognition by the Japanese of Russia's "special railway construction" interests in Manchuria.

Article 3 gave Japan the right to continue the railways built in Korea to South Manchuria until it was connected to the CER and Shenghai-Yingkou line (this was a branch from the southern part of the CER to Beijing).

As you can see, the Japanese project did not require us to abandon Port Arthur, but blocked our activity in Korea and Manchuria, allowing Japan to enter there widely. But it was only a project "to talk." And the "conversation" went so that the Russian "counter" project of October 5 blocked activity in Korea and Manchuria already in Japan.

Was there any reason, dear reader?

After all, we shouldn't have poked our noses at foreign shores at all - if you think about the needs of Russia, and not ... about the benefits of all the gunzburgs there (why I mentioned them, it will become clear in due time).

But since the Chinese Eastern Railway and its branch to Port Arthur existed, since Port Arthur and Dalny had already been built, was it worth risking them by going into direct conflict with Japan?

We went where it was stupid to go. But - poked. Straight to the point about this to the Japanese, it was also possible to tell them directly that we do not want to leave Liaodong, but we do not want to fight Japan either, therefore we are ready to accept the Japanese project as a basis.

For the base...

But - accept!

And everything could have ended differently, but ...

But, on the one hand, Petersburg hesitated, did not concede and behaved, in fact, anti-nationally. Let us recall the opinion of Count Ignatiev Sr. on this matter...

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High-ranking General Nikolai Alekseevich Yevanchin agreed with him then, declaring that in resolving our, in his words, "misunderstandings" with Japan, the issue was far from acute, and that "with a prudent attitude to the matter, we, of course, could have avoided the impending war."

Alas, Petersburg in the Far East in general and in "Korean" affairs in particular, he never behaved intelligently.

So, in 1897, on the advice of Tsarist Russia (I would like to know in whose particular head this operetta idea was born), the Korean king declared himself emperor in order to become de "on an equal footing" with the emperors of China and

Japan.

On this occasion, I recall an anecdote about the "Zaporozhets", which has a glass inscribed "I'm still growing! So I'm a Mercedes..."

On the other hand, fearing that the Russians and the Japanese would come to an agreement, the United States egged Japan on. On the same day, October 8, 1903, the United States and Japan conclude trade agreements with China. And in October, England and the United States "advise" China not to be very friendly with Russia.

In December 1903, Japan, as we know, sends a stern note to Russia, which does not provide for a definite deadline for a response (a symptom that is not good, yes ...).

And then the American government officially assures Japan that in the event of war, American policy will be benevolent towards Japan (already during the war, President Theodore Roosevelt publicly stated: "I will be extremely pleased with the victory of Japan, because Japan is playing our game").

On January 9, 1904, Wilhelm writes from the New Palace to Tsarskoye Selo:

"My dearest Nicky! ... God grant that everything goes smoothly and that the Japanese listen to the voice of reason, despite the fierce efforts of the vile press of a certain country. It seems that she decided (it would be more accurate to write "they decided", referring to both England and the USA. - CK) to pour money into the bottomless well of Japanese mobilization without end.

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On the same day, he also gives Nikolai a telegram (a signal to the "Admiral of the Pacific"), where he warns of the provocations of the Anglo-Saxons and the activity of the Japanese. The telegram ended with:

"If you manage to force Japan not to break the peace, then by doing so you will win a bloodless but significant victory."

Even before receiving these messages, on January 8, 1904, Nikolai sends Wilhelm from Tsarskoye Selo secret telegram:

"I very much hope that I will be able to come to an agreement with Japan, whose latest proposals have been made in a moderate and conciliatory tone. All alarming news about preparations for war in the Far East comes from some source, in whose interests it is to maintain this excitement ... "

On January 15, 1904, the Japanese envoy to France, Ichiro Motono, attended a court ball in the Winter Palace. And, as General Yepanchin later recalled, they looked at him as a spy, and even a traitor.

The same court trash that gave rise to Abaz and ugly, why then she expected from Motono that he would stand for the interests of Russia, and not Japan.

They were judged according to themselves, to know ... This "Russian" elite at all times cared for the needs of other people's "uncles" and cares more than the needs of native aspens. And Motono represented Japan in Paris, and, of course, he cared only for her interests.

Can we blame him for this?

At the beginning of 1904, at the special invitation of the emperor, US Secretary of War Taft appeared in Japan with Roosevelt's promise to help Japan if France and Germany were involved in the Russo-Japanese clash on the side of Russia.

And Japan decides.

Although the Russian reply to the December note leaves for Tokyo on February 3, and Japan knows about it, the Japanese Foreign Ministry instructs the envoy in St. Petersburg on February 6 to demand his passports and break off diplomatic relations with us.

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The Russian answer was delayed by telegraph in Nagasaki and delivered to the Russian envoy Rosen only on February 7th. And everything was already riding, rolling, swimming... And riding, rolling and swimming towards the war that had almost begun.

The policy of St. Petersburg - as we see - led to this war no less objectively than the growing ambitions of Japan. Petersburg just played along with them. But they were stimulated not only by Japanese samurai chauvinism, but also by American imperialism.

Without these three components - racial stupidity, Japanese impudence and American meanness - it is unlikely that the Russo-Japanese enmity would have arisen at all.

And only with the combined action of these components did it become a fact. However, historians more often emphasize the instigating role of the "Admiral of the Atlantic" Kaiser Wilhelm.

But he was rather loyal to us - unlike the Japanese extremists, US bankers and the "New Berditch" elite.

However, it is necessary to mention one more, non-national, or rather —. supranational, the factor is the greed and self-interest of the Golden International.

Without realizing it, Alexey Nikolaevich actually said this Kuropatkin in his memo to the Tsar in October 1903.

He brilliantly described the situation and analyzed it, and only did not point out those evil anti-Russian and anti-Japanese forces that made it impossible for the rational development of Russia's policy and did everything to make this policy weaken Russia.

Kuropatkin wrote that Russia could wait if its Manchurian line were preserved, but he did not understand *why* this disastrous line was so stubbornly and consistently maintained for many years.

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Nevertheless, the time has come, dear reader, for us, with excerpts from this see notes...

"Without coming into contact with the border of Korea," its author wrote, "without occupying the area between the railway and the Korean border with our garrisons, we will really convince the Japanese that we have no intention, following Manchuria, to take possession of Korea. Then the Japanese will probably limit themselves to the development of their activities in Korea without the occupation of the country by troops. Then Japan will not start a significant increase in its forces and will not drag us into the difficult need to constantly strengthen its troops in the Far East and, even without a war, bear the heavy burden of an armed peace.

With the accession to the Russian possessions and South Manchuria, all the questions that now worry the two nations and make them fear a close armed conflict will become even more acute. Our temporary occupation by garrisons... of the points in the strip between the railroad and the Korean border... will turn into a permanent one. Our attention to... Korea will increase even more.

At the same time, the Japanese are getting new confirmation of their suspicions that Russia wants to seize Korea as well. It is almost certain that our occupation of South Manchuria will lead to the occupation of South Korea by the Japanese. Further dark".

It's dark, but General Kuropatkin himself very correctly clarified it: *"Japan will be forced to quickly strengthen its armed forces. In response, we will increase our troops in the Far East. **And now, between the two peoples, it would seem, called to a peaceful life, because of certain parts of Korea that do not have any serious significance for Russia, a struggle will begin even in peacetime to the detriment of the interests of the indigenous Russian population (the emphasis here is mine** , for how can these words not be singled out! - CK). This peacetime struggle ... will constantly threaten to turn into a heavy deadly struggle, which not only can stop the calm development of our eastern outskirts for a long time, but can also affect the slowdown in the growth of all of Russia.*

This is how General Kuropatkin thought and wrote...

However, there were many hunters to prove that he thought and acted in the exact opposite way. And so I repeat: it is very dangerous to trust in historical research to any one side.

We, dear reader, have just read the official note of Kuropatkin himself. And here is what - in the most brazen way - Count Witte wrote about the position of Alexei Nikolayevich:

"He was at first one of the main culprits of the measures that led us to war. Contrary to the tendencies of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Count Lamzdorf and mine, he kept urging the sovereign to a policy of capturing and neglecting the interests of China and Japan... All this is documented in my manuscript "On the Origin of the Japanese War..."

Witte really scribbled a mighty work in two volumes of 769 typewritten pages, but - even without being familiar with it - I will suggest that historians are unlikely to act wisely if they study it not for the purpose of studying the public physiognomy of Count "Polu-Sakhalinsky", but with the intention of discovering the historical truth.

But who to believe?

Partridges or Witte?

Well, let's try to figure this out...

First, one should take into account that before the war, a note by three authors was submitted to the tsar about the danger of continuing the Far Eastern policy adopted by Russia. Its authors were Finance Minister Witte (obviously preparing a political "alibi" for himself ahead of time), Foreign Minister Lamzdorf (obviously inspired by the cunning sage Witte) and ...

And - War Minister Kuropatkin.

Alexei Nikolaevich joined such a "duumvirate", of course, out of the simplicity of his soul, rooting for Russia ...

And it is unlikely that he understood at the same time that, allowing Witte to make himself "co-author", he automatically issues Witte a certificate of innocent

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the latter in the Russian "Far Eastern" political idiocy of the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

But even Witte, not wanting it, of course, gave us grounds to doubt the sincerity of his judgment about Kuropatkin. After all, the unity of the official views of Kuropatkin and Witte at a time of crisis is recorded in their joint and official document, which Witte could not forget ... But here he "forgot".

Secondly, in order to judge Witte and Kuropatkin, let's try to invite an *objective* witness of those events, the participants of which were two statesmen, that is, a witness "from outside".

And such an interesting testimony was left to us - already in post-revolutionary emigration - by Kuropatkin's "reverse namesake", General Nikolai Alekseevich Yepanchin, who reported this: "In the summer of 1903, General Kuropatkin visited Japan. And there were rumors in society that he got the impression from Japan that it would be easy for us to defeat the Japanese.

On December 3, 1903, General Kuropatkin invited me to breakfast ... Twelve people were invited, and ... when it came to Japan, Kuropatkin began to talk about the difficulties that we would encounter in the event of a war with Japan, that the Japanese were well prepared and that we must do everything possible to avoid war.

"It's more profitable for us," Kuropatkin said, "to give the South to the Japanese Chinese railroad and even Port Arthur rather than risk war."

We were all struck by such a decisive opinion, which completely contradicted what was then said in society, namely, that General Kuropatkin thought that it was easy for us to defeat the Japanese ... "

So, one wonders, is it not at the suggestion of all sorts of "witt" and their "informal" bosses spread these false, discrediting Kuropatkin rumors?

In any case, as we see, Witte's dirty printed insinuations against Kuropatkin go very well with the dirty "she"

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tray" in relation to Alexei Nikolaevich in the "Petersburg-New Berdichevsky" salons.

And Witte once again looks here as an outstanding "agent of influence", blackening true patriots in order to look like a devout patriot himself, dressed in white robes.

It can also be added that Yepanchin's recollection "from memory" is fully consistent with the text of Kuropatkin's note dated November 25, 1903, where it was said: "Shouldn't we give back to *China Kwantung with Port Arthur and the Far East, give the southern branch of the East China Railway, but in return to receive from China the rights to Northern Manchuria and, in addition, up to 250 million rubles in return for the costs incurred by us for the railway and Port Arthur ...*

We will get rid of the need to fight Japan over Korea and China over Mukden.

We will have the opportunity to restore friendly relations with both China as well as Japan.

We will bring peace to the affairs not only of Russia, but of the whole world."

Witte had already removed himself from the Ministry of Finance, having resigned in alleged "protest" and received the "representative" post of chairman of the committee of ministers.

Having read Kuropatkin's note, he even agreed with it, saying, that a year ago he would have been against it, but now he sees no other way out.

There was no contradiction here!

A year ago, such a powerful breakthrough in the web of Far Eastern affairs could have thwart all the plans of the Golden International to pit Russia and Japan against each other.

Now, on the eve of the war, it was possible - for, I repeat, an "alibi" - to agree with Kuropatkin's sound thoughts ...

As one of my comrades used to say: "Democracy is when you can say anything, because you can't change anything."

Yes, that "yes", then "yes".

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BELOW I will tell you something else about "patriots" like Witte, about what they did in the framework of Witte's policy and ...

And, in fact, together with Witte.

Kuropatkin did not yet see any particular trouble in including Northern Manchuria in the sphere of Russian interests. Although he himself and the military department headed by him looked at such activity without enthusiasm, rightly believing that we have something to do and something to protect inside the Russian borders.

But with regard to South Manchuria, Alexei Nikolaevich was is, as we already know, more than skeptical.

Still would!

Because of what, gentlemen of the jury, did all the fuss flare up?

And here's why...

In 1896, the Korean government issued the Vladivostok merchant Yu.I. Briner a concession for the right to cut state-owned Korean forests along the Yalu and

Tumyn... The names of these rivers vary in different sources, but everywhere we are talking about one and the same...

The concession area in the Yalu (Yalujiang, Amnokkan) and Tumen (Tumen-ula, Tumynjiang, Tumangan) basins occupied an 800-kilometer border zone along the Chinese-Korean border from the West Korean Gulf of the Yellow Sea to a tiny section of the Russian-Korean border on the Sea of Japan.

Briner did not develop a concession, but proposed this business to Adolf Yulievich Rotshtein, director of the St. Petersburg International Bank, one of the founders of the Russian-Chinese Bank and the CER Society, the founder of the Russian-Korean Bank, a member of the boards of the CER Society, the Russian-Chinese Bank, the Russian-Korean Bank, the Russian Gold Mining Society ("Zolotorossa"), the head of the Manchurian Mining Society, and to all this, also ... Rothschild's son-in-law.

That's it...

But that's not all! Saying "Rothstein", one could immediately mean, dear reader, none other than ... Sergei

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Yulyevich Witte (this is the same Witte who later stigmatized "the irresponsible Korean concession adventure of Petersburg court circles"). After all, Rothstein was both a friend and an employee of Witte.

Rothstein allegedly wanted to carry out an operation on the foreign market and create a special syndicate... But it can be assumed that the Golden International saw in this concession not so much possible financial as political strategic benefits... After all, the Korean concession match could be used to incite Russian-Japanese passions.

And the operation was temporarily transferred to the reserve.

What is interesting is that many authors who wrote about this concession fatal for Russia do not even mention the "Rothstein period", immediately calling this concession "bezobrazovskaya"!

Alexander Mikhailovich Bezobrazov was drawn into this business, of course, up to his ears - as, in the beginning, and his august namesake Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich, the chief administrator of merchant shipping and ports ... Witte even called the Grand Duke in print a great intriguer and a bad person. And there were (for Witte) their reasons.

However, the envious and raking aristocrats in this political (more precisely, by the way, geopolitical) anti-Russian sabotage were used, most likely, in the dark ... The same Alexander Mikhailovich naively asserted much later that Russian diplomats were guilty of Far Eastern adventures. *"Absolutely unaware of the military strength of the Empire of the Rising Sun, Russian diplomats,"* he believed, *"sitting at the tables of their St. Petersburg offices, dreamed of the exploits of Hastings (a former employee of the East India Company and the first Governor General of India. - CK) and Clive (conqueror and first governor of Bengal in 1757-1760. —*

S.K.). Their plan was to make Manchuria for Russia what India was for Great Britain. Under pressure from these diplomats, our government ... decided ... to build the Siberian Railway directly through Manchuria ... "

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But which of the diplomats could "pressure", even if it was on the unfortunate in the thought processes of Nikolai? Who are the colorless and lack of initiative State Secretary Shishkin, Count Muravyov, Count Lamzdorf? Fullness! They pressed on, but they didn't!

The personality of Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich - a memoirist to the reader,

I hope it is memorable... So, in his memoirs, he writes about the Korean concession in great detail. Still, his role in this case was, after all, not much more plausible than the role of the ugly and "witt" ... And he wanted to justify himself. He, obviously, and therefore denigrated Kuropatkin no worse than Witte and exposed the Minister of War as a "blind man", "an eccentric idiot", a "madman", who allegedly believed that "the Japanese army is not a serious threat to us", that it is "the product of an ardent British imagination

agents."

But Alexander Mikhailovich seems to me among the most august company of Romanov, nevertheless, not the most bad person. Although, of course, not seven spans in the forehead. And he, having described the beginning of the concession adventures, which were presented to him as a "gold mine", further reports that the fuss that had begun in Manchuria alerted him. I can believe! Moreover, in 1902, the Grand Duke, who had previously been "in the most friendly relations" with Witte (Alexander Mikhailovich himself), completely interrupted these relations.

One of the reasons was the appointment of the Grand Duke as the head of the Main Directorate of Merchant Shipping with the rights of a minister. Since earlier Witte also had trading ports, the capital's wits immediately declared that "Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich removed the ports from Witte!"...

And friendship immediately went apart ... But it was, of course, not a matter of witticisms ... The new august minister objectively interfered with Witte. In particular, he prevented him from pursuing a policy of playing off Russia and Japan, outwardly ostensibly resisting it.

The Grand Duke interfered with the "vitty" in another way, proposing to Tsar Nicholas to create a state society for the exploitation of the oil fields in Baku and rightly believing that the state 195

Military oil revenues will provide funds for a broad program of commercial shipbuilding.

The government itself rose up against the idea. And the tone was set, of course, by the former "friend" of the Grand Duke.

"I was accused," Alexander Mikhailovich recalled, "of wanting to draw the imperial government into speculation (yes! - S.K.). They said about me that I was a "socialist", "destroyer of foundations", "enemy of the sacred (yes! - CK) the prerogative of a private entrepreneur", etc."

Witte's style is very recognizable in these expressions.

It ended with the fact that the oil-bearing lands were sold for a pittance to enterprising ... Armenians. *"The one who knows the pre-war value of the enterprises of the "Armenian trust" in Baku,"* the Grand Duke ends his story, *"will understand what enormous sums have been lost for the Russian State Treasury irretrievably."*

And the adventure of the Korean concession was successfully developing further ... On the initiative of Witte (again Witte!) Rothstein created the Russian-Korean Bank. And its very first major share is supposed to be the acquisition of Briner's concession.

But even here they decided, it seems, to wait.

Bank shut down...

A source, in relation to Witte, apologetic, tells us: "Meanwhile, a group of businessmen (N.G. Matyunin, V.M. Vonlyarlyarsky, AM Bezobrazov and others). They masked their true goals with "patriotic" motives: the desire to restore Russia's influence in Korea and oppose the "Russian principle" to Witte's "international method" in the Far East...

So, Witte had something to do with it, and - it seems - nothing to do with it ... It turns out, it's not him, but the owner of a very rare court title of "State Secretary of His Majesty" "half-crazy" Bezobrazov with Vonlyarlyarsky through Count Vorontsov -Dashkov seduced the king with their projectors.

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And seduced.

Nikolai ordered the "cabinet" (that is, from his "personal" sums) money, secretly from Witte (?!), to outbid the "Briner concession" in the name of N.I. Neporozhnev, who was responsible for performances for the highest awards.

I do not believe that the "affair" was a secret for Witte. Witte then concentrated almost all state administration in the Ministry of Finance, creating departments of other ministries there: communications, military, maritime, public education, internal affairs, agriculture, foreign affairs ... He actually commanded the corps of the border guards and security guards of the CER, had his commercial and diplomatic representatives in different parts of China and Korea ...

That is, he had unlimited trust, but here they were hiding from him with some kind of private concession. In addition, Witte had such agents that you can't really hide ...

Yes, in fact, in 1899, the "patriotic" Matyunin, "dismissed" from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, turned to him for funds in order to re-register the concession in his own name (of course, only formally).

Witte allegedly stubborn - but not because of the adventurousness of the idea, but in his desire to conduct business through the Russian-Chinese Bank.

And Bezobrazov allegedly became stubborn because of the unacceptability of participation in the "case" of "international banking elements".

In fact, Russian finance was already in many cases "Russian" in name only. But Witte's brainchild, the Russian-Chinese Bank, although, like any Witte's brainchild, was an undertaking with a double and even triple bottom, it was still in essence a state-owned bank created to finance the construction of the CER.

And the "patriotic" "protests" of the buffoon, who had neither honor nor conscience, nor the feelings of the Motherland, looked either buffoonish, or vile.

But rather - vilely buffoonish ...

Moreover, in the end the money went exactly what

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rez Russian-Chinese Bank, transformed into the Russian-Asiatic Bank.

Nevertheless, academician Tarle for some reason claimed that "Witte's stubborn struggle against Bezobrazov and his friends lasted in 1899, 1900, 1901, 1902

years."

(Actually, I'll note in parentheses, although Evgeny Viktorovich Tarle became a Soviet academician, in his youth as a Privatdozent he was a member of the constitutional-democratic, "Cadet" party, that is, in fact, a bourgeois liberal. First love is not forgotten, and the Cadets, if they did not like Witte, at least admired his "scale." It is this admiration that Tarle seems to have carried through all the Russian upheavals and revolutions.)

Let us return, however, to concession matters...

In 1899, the concession, now either Neporozhnev or Matyunin, was re-registered in the name of the former Russian Charge d'Affaires in Korea and director of the Nevsky Shipbuilding Plant, Albert. I note that this

the tactical turn in the fate of the concession is missed by many authors.

And soon Rear Admiral Abaza, as well as circles, are woven into the "case" associated with circles, both courtly and, one might say, feigned.

In 1902, among the founders of the planned Bezobrazov enterprises in Korea, a "Korean genius—as his sycophants called him—appears. Timber Association" Gabriel (Gavriil) Gunzburg, son of the famous Horace Gunzburg, lord of the gold mining Lena, international banker and baron.

How did the supporters of a purely "Russian principle" and opponents of "international banking elements", history is silent.

Finally, in May 1903, a "Fellowship in Faith" was formed (I would like know - which one?) for the exploitation of concessions on the Yalu River.

Meanwhile, as the volume of the 20th first TSB reports: "In fact, there are forests there was not - they had long been cut down by the Japanese.

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It is not surprising - since the "Briner" period of the concession it's been seven years!

For the sake of accuracy, I cannot keep silent, however, about the enthusiastic assessment of the prospects for the concession by the head of the target expedition to North Korea, engineer Mikhailovsky. He telegraphed to St. Petersburg at the end of 1898: *"I saw a lot of wealth in Manchuria. Wonderful forests of larch and cedar, a lot of gold, silver, red copper, iron, coal."*

But for clarity, let me tell you that all this in impenetrable virgin (judging from the words of Mikhailovsky himself) wooded and mountainous places, the brave engineer discovered and examined in ... 94 days, during which he allegedly "explored" all of North Korea ...

Perhaps such a "report" on the "expedition" could be written without leaving St. Petersburg ...

Whether there were "wealths" there or not, but one thing was undoubtedly present - the concession zone extended along the entire Korean-Chinese border! It actually blocked Japan's road from Korea to South Manchuria and back, because in the concession zone (that is, along the entire border between Korea and China!) Russia had the right to keep troops to guard the concession.

So the passions around the Yalu finally and irrevocably shaped both the political Russian-Japanese (more precisely, St. Petersburg-Japanese) conflict, and the direct Russian-Japanese military clash ...

In July 1903, the question arose of creating a governorship in the Far East with the governor's stay in Port Arthur, 1,200 miles from our main naval base, Vladivostok.

As friends (I almost wrote - in "accomplices"), Abaza and Bezobrazov had a brilliant Guards Lancer, Colonel Vogak, who had long been in the Far East, who at the end of the 19th century was a military agent (apache) at the same time (!) In China and Japan, but who spent most of his time not in Beijing or Tokyo, but in international adventure-soaked Shanghai.

On July 30, 1903, Vogak had a half-hour (!) audience with the tsar. And the next day, a decree appeared on the appointment of an experienced mo

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ryak (at the age of forty, commanding the cruiser "Africa", made a trip around the world), but mediocre and ambitious Admiral Alekseev, the illegitimate son of Alexander II from an Armenian woman, the governor of the Far East.

The 60-year-old Alekseev, ruling from Port Arthur (the whole company of the Yalujiang concessionaires was on the best terms with him), obeyed the Amur governor-general and the military governor of the Primorsky region, envoys in China, Japan and Korea. And he was instructed to unite diplomatic relations with "adjacent regions."

"Indignant" Witte resigned. More precisely, having done everything, he

entrusted and assigned, temporarily stepped aside,

But back in May 1903, Witte declared to Nikolai that he was "not in disagreement with the head of the "military" party, Bezobrazov, on the merits of the matter." The last fact, dear reader, was then known to a few people, and later it was not advertised.

It took me some time, dear reader, to figure out all these Jesuit political "mines" planted by Witte and his behind-the-scenes "puppeteers" under the whole possible and real future of peaceful relations between Russia and Japan.

But - figured it out.

Here it is, this "escalation ladder"!

CER...

Liaodong-Kwantong...

Port Arthur...

Yalu...

All this is not just a stepping stone to a regional war, but to ensuring a sharply negative geopolitical future for Russia in the Far East and in the Pacific zone in general.

So the essence was, as I believe, not in the forests as such - cut down there or not cut down ... And it was not in vain, obviously, that this concession was "bought out" and "outbidden" by someone ten times and deftly slipped under the raking noses of the noble Petersburg rascals.

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And was it all about calm on the distant Russian frontiers? They were beckoned with a ruble, and they chased him...

And in order to better understand the vileness and rot of this supposedly Russian elite of those years in *that* Russia, let's try, dear reader, to see behind this "cut down forest" some high-ranking "trees" that grew safely under the canopy of the august goodwill of as many as three Russian monarchs.

Here is the state controller, chairman Department of State Economy of the State Council and Minister of Finance under Alexander the Second and Chairman of the Finance Committee under Alexander the Third, Alexander Ageevich Abaza - the uncle of Alexei Mikhailovich Abaza - the same, "Korean" ...

The uncle was favored by the grandfather and father of Nicholas II, and the nephew was already Nicholas himself. In 1903-1905, the younger Abaza was a comrade of the head of the Main Directorate of Merchant Shipping and the manager of the affairs of the Special Committee of the Far East (and even a relative of Bezobrazov).

And I'll give a portrait of my uncle given to Witte: "He is a man with great common sense, a great player (Witte himself writes that he would not sacrifice a single evening of a card game for the implementation of this or that liberal measure. - S.K.) , very lazy, completed a course at the university, but then studied little ... "

However, maybe Sergei Yulievich simply did not like Alexander Ageevich? I don't know, I didn't hold a candle.

But here is what such an excitingly informative and at the same time academic source as the monograph of B.V. Ananyich, *Banking Houses in Russia. 1860-1914* ("Science", Leningrad branch, 1991).

Abaza-uncle was the largest landowner in the southwestern region, closely associated with the Odessa banking house of Rafalovich (he called him "my banker"). But in 1890, Abaza, knowing - as Ananyich writes - "about the top secret exchange operation of the Ministry of Finance (preparation of the introduction

gold money circulation based on the devaluation of the credit ruble. —

S.K.), re

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he wanted to use it for his own enrichment and ... involved Rafalovich in this game.

Rafalovich was not privy to the secret. Playing for the fall of the ruble on the encrypted telegraphic instructions of Abaza from St. Petersburg, he suffered losses (in half with Abaza) for 1,600,000 rubles.

After falling into a panic, of course, Rafalovich rushed to Abaza for clarification, but he simply ordered him to continue selling (that is, selling credit rubles and buying gold).

Rafalovich, on the other hand, began to sell for Abaza, and to buy for himself, already playing on his own to increase the ruble.

But the rate kept falling, and ...

And Abaza, having won back losses, still earned 900 thousand rubles, and Rafalovich went bankrupt.

Only the realization that I am already deviating from the topic (or maybe not very much?), Keeps me, dear reader, from a detailed story about how later the entire financial and bureaucratic world of St. Petersburg - "New Berdichev" saved the reckless from Odessa (three most submissive reports of the Minister of Finance Vyshnegradsky on the bankruptcy of the house of Rafalovich in the highest name; the formation of a special syndicate of banks to help him; the allocation of millions of sums, etc.).

But what an uncle! He (according to, among other things, Witte) spoke of Kuropatkin as follows: "A general with the soul of a staff clerk."

Well, Kuropatkin was sometimes really petty to the point of a joke, but... But was Abaza, that petty scoundrel with big connections, and Witte, a big scoundrel, to judge him, a military general?!

The admiral-nephew was completely a match for his uncle.

And such a bureaucratic-landlord-banking riffraff then ruled the ball in the Russian Far East. Yes, and if only on it ...

And it was in this dirty environment that such a renegade as Witte could seize his political chances.

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BUT DAMN them, my dear reader!

And should we return to the Tokyo Rosen-Nishi Protocol of 1898 in order to clarify *something* ? Then Japan, in exchange for a free hand for itself in Korea, offered Russia the recognition of our interests in Manchuria.

So, the Russian government did not agree to this, since the implementation of such a proposal would allegedly complicate Russia's relations with Great Britain and the United States.

So what?

Wouldn't this complicate Japan's relations with England and the USA? Japanese America was then very courted!

But it's just the Americans - after all sorts of, excuse me, "Vitti" made the Russian-Japanese rapprochement impossible - they gave Japan a huge loan for the construction of the fleet that put an end to the Russian fleet in the Tsushima Strait.

And the British built this fleet for the Japanese!

By the beginning of the 20th century, Russia's true interests in the Far East (as well as in the West and in the South) lay *within its* own borders. And all we needed from our neighbors was peace on the borders.

Russia could not have a continental war with England and the USA. So

what was there to fear "complications with them"?

Respect yourself, be friends with Germany and spit on all the "complications".

Japan is another matter...

Its interests objectively spread outward due to the poverty of raw materials. And here she necessarily ran into the external activity of the Anglo-Saxons. But it was then so beyond Japan's power to wage a naval war with them that the Japanese could not even think about it (let alone build any specific plans in this direction).

Therefore, a powerful fleet as an instrument of a real war at the turn of XIX and XX
For centuries, Japan could only think against Russia, whose naval conditions in the Pacific Ocean were then obviously losing. We haven't had Russian America for a long time...

On the other hand, while neutralizing the tendency to worsen relations with
Russia's new Japanese fleet, built on the ang

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Lo-Saxon money could be used by Japan as a force factor for such a bolder and wider external expansion that would run counter to Anglo-Saxon interests, but without a direct military conflict with England and the USA.

Understanding and skillfully using all this, Russia could have had a fundamentally different situation in the Far East. Instead of allowing itself to be provoked into conflicts with Japan for the sake of the Golden International, Russia could itself quarrel Japan with the Anglo-Saxons by the very fact of mutual and real loyalty to each other of our two countries.

There would be no Rosen-Nisi protocol of 1898 (more precisely, if it were, then -
in the Japanese edition), would Russia have agreed in 1901 to Ito's proposals -
there would not have been, you see, the Anglo-Japanese treaty of 1902, there would have been no
American loans with an anti-Russian orientation.

So no, according to the protocol of 1898, Russia forced Japan to confirm the complete independence
(ha!) of Korea and refuse (at least on paper) from interfering in its internal affairs.

Although Russia itself cut off all hopes for peace with Japan with the concession along the Yalu -
for nothing that, according to the protocol, it pledged "not to impede the development of commercial and
industrial ties between Japan and Korea."

Foreign affairs were then formally led by such figures as "State Secretary of His Majesty" Nikolai
Shishkin (from August 1896 to January 1, 1897) and Count Mikhail Muravyov from Muravyov-Vilensky
(from January 1, 1897 to June 8, 1900 of the year).

Shishkin, a career diplomat, was generally a passing figure, and Muravyov, who was a little familiar
to us, excited the world with the ideas of a disarmament conference and paid attention to the Near and
Middle East, leaving the Far East at the mercy of Witte and the bezobrazovtsy ... On the whole, enough
has been said about his figure.

In fact, everything essential revolved around Witte. And what is Witte, I also said more than once
or twice, starting with my first book about the First World War, "Russia and Germany: play off!".

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So it is not the Yalu concessions that explain the fact that Russia was so persistently pushed into
Korea. It was pushed there because Korea was not just a convenient, but, perhaps, the only significant
zone of the birth of the conflict. At that time, it was only because of Korea that it was possible to push
Russia and Japan bloodily,

bayonet to bayonet.

And the initial claims of Witte's "Russia" to Port Arthur foreshadowed the Yalujiang "firewood" into
the fire of the future Russo-Japanese War.

And I already spoke about this when I described the "friendly" tripartite action of Russia, Germany and France to put pressure on Japan in order to revise the preliminary terms of the Shimonoseki Treaty of 1895 following the results of the Sino-Japanese war. That is, the action, the initiative of which is often attributed to Prince Lobanov-Rostovsky, but to which Witte inspired Russia.

I think that now the reader no longer looks inexplicable lease of the Liaodong Peninsula by Russia, in the neighborhood of Korea.

Witte knew what he was doing.

THE MONEY that was pumped into Port Arthur and Dalniy, if it were invested in the development of Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky - would ensure our maritime trade much more reliably than rented Chinese ports far away from Russia.

And the southern branch from the Chinese Eastern Railway (since we built the Chinese Eastern Railway!) for the transportation of Russian goods to ports in China could also be laid, say, to the already existing non-freezing Chinese port of Qinhuangdao on the mainland coast of the same Liaodong Gulf, but at a greater distance from Korea.

However, *someone* (not even Witte, of course, but through Witte) chose to rent the Liaodong "tip" for Russia according to the "Gavrila Princip principle" (for nothing that Gavrila himself, whose shot at the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand triggered the First World War, at that time not yet out of diapers).

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Minister Witte and Buryat General Badmaev presented the project of the CER as the core of Russia's future influence in Manchuria, but in fact Russian capitalists (there were such people in Russia!) feared that (I quote a serious monograph): "The completion of the construction of the CER will be used by American capital not only to consolidate their trading positions in the Far East, but also to penetrate into Siberia.

And what is said is very true!

After all, Port Arthur and especially the commercial port of Dalniy, combined with the Port Arthur-Harbin branch and further from Chinese Harbin to the left - to Russian Siberia and to the right - to the Russian Far East - this is an almost ideal channel to Russia for American capital and goods.

So for whom did Far Witte build?

And one can only be surprised that in such a solid work as "International Relations in the Far East (1870-1945)", we are told the following: November 1902 for the next soundings. - S.K.) was essentially a program of an aggressive adventurist course. The pursuit of this course and the struggle against the "triumvirate" of ministers - foreign affairs, military and finance, headed by Witte, who were inclined to slow down the dangerous development of expansion in the Far East - were made easier for the "bezobrazovskaya gang" by unreality ... "etc.

Truly, from some minds - only grief!

In reality, Minister Lamzdorf was prone to passivity (let us recall, for example, the answers to Rosen by his "right hand" Hartwig).

Minister Kuropatkin was prone to simplicity.

But Minister Witte ...

To draw a conclusion about what Witte was inclined to, I leave it to myself to the reader.

Moreover, I do not rule out that he himself is the joint report, which Lamzdorf and Kuropatkin signed with him, and

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composed (scientific minds noted that he headed the "triumvirate").

Why not?

Yes, Witte retired on the eve of the war in August 1903, allegedly protesting against the aggravation of relations with Japan. But it was a classic move like "the Moor has done his job, the Moor wants to leave."

Witte acted in the same way in European affairs: at first he pretended to be almost a Germanophile, in fact he prepared the mutual cooling of Russia and Germany, and then, when the war was already on the nose, he called for caution.

So if you carefully get acquainted with his biography against the background of his contemporary era, then the true appearance of the "Count Polusakhalinsky"

becomes quite clear.

The conclusions of the author of the 1928 monograph "Russia in Manchuria (1892-1906)" B. Romanov regarding "the well-known independence of Nicholas II in determining the course ... of foreign policy on the eve of the Russo-Japanese War" are also amusing.

What kind of "independence" is there in the presence of the "Korean genius of the Timber Association" on Yalu Gabriel-Gabriel Gunzburg and his dad Horace?

What kind of "independence" is there when those who conceived this war are all their own the plans were brilliantly implemented and Russia was dragged into it!

The WAR between Japan and Russia was financed by many (both openly and behind the scenes). But most often the role of the banking house Kuhn, Loeb & C0 (Kuhn, Loeb & Co.) is emphasized.

Here - everything is for sure, and we will see it now ...

Poorly wise Russian nationalists keep saying that these coons and lebs (in fact, this banking house was headed by Jacob Schiff) financed the Russian revolution of 1905, which would not have started without them ...

But this is nonsense!

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This is how Yakov Vasilyevich Glinka, a sworn Duma apparatchik and by no means a revolutionary, began his recollections of 11 years of work in the Duma: *"Our defeat in the war with Japan in 1904, the death of a squadron, the loss of Port all the rottenness of our state apparatus. A murmur began, the workers responded with strikes, the peasants with unrest, accompanied by fires in the landowners' estates ... "*

So the revolution was programmed by the entire foreign and domestic policy of tsarism.

But the fact that the internal ferment in Russia was beneficial to the West and that it could support certain revolutionary forces financially is beyond doubt. But to support not to ensure their victory, but for greater confusion.

Financial "aid" (help in quotation marks, because it smelled like financial bondage in the long term) to ensure victory was provided by the Schiff clan to the autocracy. After all, it was precisely in the form of suppressing the revolution that the tsar and his entourage went to those urgent new enslaving external loans that Witte organized for them. And it was precisely to suppress the revolution that these loans were urgently given.

So a kind of partial coincidence of the direction of actions (but not their motives and goals!) of the worker-peasant masses "from below" and the financial Jewish circles "from above" cannot be ruled out ... Could the Kuns-Schiffs "under the Russian turmoil" something Trotsky—bronsteins and throw up ... But this did not change the purely national character of the indignation of the Russian masses.

Jacob (Jacob) Schiff explained the financing of the Japanese by the fact that he thus "combats the policy of anti-Semitism in the Russian Empire"...

And this, of course, is also nothing more than words, like the statements of unfortunate historians about

that Schiff-de refused to participate in the Anglo-French dollar loan to the Russian government, which was beneficial for him, again "because of hostility towards the Russian government."

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No, the Schiffs only leave to stay.

The first Japanese military loan was opened in the USA in April 1904... Russian Ambassador Artur Pavlovich Cassini reported to Count Lamzdorf from Washington: "*As Your Excellency knows, the Japanese loan issued in New York is half of the loan, which was taken over by the English syndicate, which includes Hongkong and Shanghai Banking*

Corporation and Parr's Bank & Ltd. Of the total amount of 50 million dollars, 25 are issued in London, while others are commissioned to issue in America ... by the banking house of Kuhn, Loeb & Co., which, as far as I have been able to learn, is assisted in this enterprise by another New York house of Schiff. Both of these banks are in the hands of the Jews and belong to the category of solid institutions.

Cassini rightly remarked that the \$25 million in itself, "due to the enormous military costs" of Japan, is a sum "comparatively

insignificant"...

But they were provided to Japan by a formally neutral country, whose leadership assured Russia of "benevolent" neutrality.

Japan presented its customs revenues as guarantees and borrowed dollars at 6 percent per annum, which, as Cassini noted, "even a third-rate European power would hardly agree to." Let us remember this circumstance and this opinion, reader!

Knowing them, we will also know that from a certain moment, Japan, with every extra day of warfare, more and more turned its victory into a Pyrrhic one (in ancient times there was such a Pyrrhus - the Hellenistic king of Epirus, who could hardly catch his breath after his victory over the Romans at Ausculum).

In November 1904, a second Japanese loan was opened for \$60 million. And this despite the fact that the military successes of Japan have already begun America worry.

In Russia, the United States feared more strategically. Therefore, Artur Pavlovich Cassini had golden speeches, and Japan had golden loans.

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And the second loan was not the last... And Schiff alone borrowed Japan a total of 180 million dollars. This amount was already far from only

symbolic.

America remained America, which the Russian envoy documented in his next report to St. Petersburg: "*The federal government, although it always loudly proclaims the Monroe Doctrine (let me remind you that the declarative essence of this doctrine, memorable to us, proclaimed by President Monroe in 1823, could be expressed by the formula "Europe -*

Europe, and America-America. - CK), but seeks to apply its principles only in its own favor. While not allowing anyone to interfere in everything that concerns the American mainland, it simultaneously ... shows a desire to interfere in issues relating exclusively to Europe and Asia.

These words were fully confirmed immediately after the end of the war. actions between Russia and Japan ...

The WAR between Russia and Japan ended, as you know, with the Portsmouth Peace Treaty, signed in the American city of Portsmouth on the part of Japan by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Komura Zetaro, but on the part of Russia - for some reason, Sergei Yulievich Witte.

Sergei Yulievich was a master of all (and all - unclean) hands. But he never served in the diplomatic department. So why did he go to Portsmouth?

But more on that and more later. And I just want to pay attention reader for an amusing chronology.

The Treaty of Portsmouth was signed on September 5, 1905. And a month and a half before that, in July 1905, US Secretary of War Taft once again came to Japan as the personal representative of President Roosevelt.

On July 27, he met with Japanese Prime Minister General Katsura. On the same day, they signed a secret memorandum following the conversation, declassified only in 1924.

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Both interlocutors were colorful personalities, and, having taken documentary sources to help me, I can well imagine *how* they could talk to each other in the politically hot summer in Tokyo in 1905 ...

Forty-eight-year-old William Howard Taft, son of Alphonso Taft the US envoy to Russia during the time of Alexander III, was, like his father, a lawyer-politician, and by no means a military man. But his character was not hereditarily soft, like his father, like his great-grandfather Aaron Taft ... The son of William Howard, by the way, was no softer than his father and in 1947 became a co-author of the famous Taft-Hartley anti-union law.

Count-General Katsura was, in fact, a protege of Marshal Yamagata, and in this capacity - an ardent militarist. He was also a supporter of orientation towards the Anglo-Saxons. They made acquaintance with Taft a long time ago, and therefore the general did not stand on ceremony, but immediately declared:

- Don't you think, our dear guest, that the time has come for a direct union between Japan and the leading force of the world - the Anglo-Saxon titans, that is - your country and Britain?

— Direct? Taft asked searchingly.

Katsura realized that he had overdone the "stick", and "worked" back:

- Well, if not direct, not official, then at least actual ... -

the Japanese paused and repeated in English: - Alliance in practice ...

Taft was silent, and Katsura saw fit to add:

- It will be useful for maintaining peace in the Far East ...

Taft remained silent as before, and Katsura added:

- I can assure you, Mr. Minister, that Japan will not attempt to seize the Philippine Islands.

And here Taft reacted, shifting in his chair and briefly throwing:

- Was it ever discussed? And then Katsura fell silent.

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And there was something, because the moment, dear reader, has come quite delicate...

I will explain this now.

On December 10, 1898, under a peace treaty between the United States and Spain - after the Spanish-American War - the Philippine Islands were transferred to the United States. However, back in September, the island Revolutionary Congress proclaimed the Philippine Republic, with which the "stronghold of democracy and republicanism" did not agree and sent troops across the Pacific Ocean.

The Yankees set up their "democratic" "protectorate" in the Philippines brutally (in such a way that both Mark Twain and Leo Tolstoy protested against it) and by April 1901 they achieved their goal, simultaneously removing the local puppets of the popular General Lun with the hands of the local puppets. And on July 1, 1902, the US Congress passed the Philippine Colonial Status Act.

Taft was directly involved in all this, because from 1900 he was at the head of the 2nd Philippine Commission, formed to administer the islands, and in July 1901 he became the first civilian governor of the Philippines.

Katsura knew all this, of course... And Taft knew that Katsura knew this.

But they both knew geography...

Delicious, almost equatorial islands were separated from Japan by almost two thousand kilometers. The distance is considerable ... But the Philippines are incredibly distant from the USA. The ocean line between Manila in the Philippines and Honolulu in Hawaii is 9,000 kilometers, and from Honolulu to San Francisco is another 3900...

In total, the Philippines was seven times closer to Japan.

I don't know how many times there - seven or not seven - Japanese politicians, admirals and generals measured distances on maps, but they opened their mouths wide in the Philippines. However, in comparison with the "tit" - Korea, lying at the side, the islands were not even a "crane". Not to fight because of them with America, all the more so by going into conflict with Russia.

America was not, of course, inclined to indulge Japan in her quiet

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oceanic expansion, but the Yankees could not repel Japan either. The United States needed Japan for reasons that I have already mentioned more than once, although the anti-Russian reason remained the main one.

And so the conversations between Taft and Katsura ended with the recognition by Japan American rights to the Philippines, and America - Japanese rights to Korea.

Thus, on July 27, 1905, the first anti-Russian prologue to the Peace of Portsmouth ended.

The day before, a Russian delegation headed by Witte had sailed from Cherbourg to New York, to a peace conference.

And on August 12, 1905 (already during the Russian-Japanese negotiations), foggy Albion took over the anti-Russian baton. On this day, the Anglo-Japanese alliance treaty was renewed and extended in London. Formally, here Japan supported England on the issue of India, and England confirmed the legitimacy of Japan's claims to all the same Korea ...

But what was, dear reader, Japan even before India, and could the Japanese then seriously claim the Philippines?

No, in both America's Tokyo and Britain's London, the main goal was to cheer Japan up before her peace talks with Russia. Moreover, long before the summer of 1905, back in January, an Anglo-American agreement was reached on facilitating the transfer of Port Arthur and the Liaodong Peninsula to Japan. And Japan knew about it, of course.

According to the plan of the Golden International, the Japanese were to behave brazenly and assertively with Russia. And they, supported by both "Atlantic" powers, behaved arrogantly and assertively.

And when they sobered up a little, they were immediately frankly incited.

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Chapter 7

Russian unrest, the shame of Portsmouth and Sakhalin-Karafuto ...

PORTSMUT is a city and a major naval base in the northeastern United States in the state of New Hampshire. In fact, there are three Portsmouths in the USA alone (except for New Hampshire - still in the states of Virginia and Oregon), not counting the "original" Portsmouth - in England.

How did the Russian and Japanese delegates end up in this seaside town? And why exactly in an American town?

I think the reader can answer the second question himself. As for the first question, we need to dwell on it and on the situation around Portsmouth in particular.

Of course, America was extremely interested in strengthening its control over the affairs of the Far East. Japan not only did not interfere with this, but even wanted something like that at that moment. Let and hold together the proud samurai heart...

And how could it be otherwise, if on April 5, 1905, Cassini reported from Washington to St. Petersburg to Lamzdorf about another Japanese loan to the USA. And this telegram is so interesting that I will quote it extensively.

"Dear sir, Count Vladimir Nikolaevich," wrote Cassini. — By a secret telegram dated March 17, I notified the Imperial Ministry of the tremendous success of the latest Japanese loan of 150 million dollars, placed, as Your Excellency knows, equally in England and the United States.

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A group of New York bankers led by the Jewish house of Kuhn, Loeb & Co. , who undertook the issuance of 75 million, spared no effort to attract the local public to the widest possible participation in the subscription ... The result exceeded the wildest expectations of the Japanese and their friends , and the subscription in the United States alone reached 500 million dollars, that is, almost a billion rubles ...

If the foreign credit of the state can serve as a denominator of its material prosperity, then there is no doubt that the conclusion of the last loan constitutes a new major success for Japan ... The predictions of some political circles that the war started by Japan will inevitably lead to its economic exhaustion in the near future and that the financial question constitutes the Achilles' heel of the Mikado dominions, unfortunately, did not materialize in practice.

It is unlikely that Artur Pavlovich, by the predictions of "certain political circles," had in mind the assessment of Lenin, who later noted that "Japan had the opportunity to plunder the eastern, Asian countries, but it cannot have any independent financial and military power without the support of another country." But it was not only the Bolsheviks in Russia who saw that Japan, as a large independent entity, was only a matter of the future. Both "left" and "right" smart people understood that if it was a matter of strength, then it was not the strength of Japan, but the strength of the hatred of the Anglo-Saxons and all sorts of coons and lobs for Russia ...

Alas, Cassini himself did not understand that in reality Japan could not withstand a long military tension, and Anglo-Saxon-Jewish loans could only provide her with an opportunity for a peace favorable to Japan.

And as soon as the Kuhn-Schiff dollars were given to Japan, its representatives on May 31, 1905 turned to Roosevelt with a request to invite both warring parties to negotiations.

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A week before this address, Roosevelt publicly ranted about "useful to the interests of other powers mutual extermination of two nations."

And then all of a sudden, the nation on which America still staked, confidentially reports that it no longer has the strength to fight ... Loans are loans, but they will have to be repaid, and Japan's public debt has already increased catastrophically. At the same time, loans were made by Japan against its future government revenues.

It could have been embarrassing, and Tsushima is financial (but already for Japan)

would then have crossed out all the benefits from Tsushima sea.

What was left for America? The only thing that is completely characteristic of her: posing as a peacemaker, politically actively intervene in the conflict.

And so it all happened - on June 9, Roosevelt officially turned to Nicholas. His message was conveyed to Lamzdorf by the US envoy in St. Petersburg, George von Langerke Meyer.

I will not quote Roosevelt's note - there is too much base hypocrisy and outright hypocrisy in it. Roosevelt, in particular, assured the tsar that if, they say, he responded positively to America's "peacekeeping" call to stop "in the interests of all mankind" the "terrifying, unfortunate conflict", then the president undertakes to obtain agreement to the negotiations of the Japanese government.

That's how it was done in Washington, my dear reader! The Japanese pleaded plead for peace, and the Yankees pretended that they would persuade them ...

Artur Pavlovich Cassini was a hereditary diplomat and came from an old Italian family. Grandfather Cassini began the Russian service in 1790. So the grandson had enough experience, but there was no desire to lick the Roosevelts and the Schiffs. He, while still envoy to China from 1893-1898, opposed the Yankees' railroad plans.

Perhaps that is why Cassini was soon recalled, and appointed in his place familiar to us Baron Roman Romanovich Rosen. And at 13

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July (the thirteenth - either by chance or out of love for this number of the Mason president) Roosevelt appointed an audience for Rosen to receive his credentials.

Witte, by the way, also sailed from Cherbourg on July 13 (but according to the old style adopted then in Russia) ... Oh, these fun with the "devil's dozen" so revered by *someone* !

Roosevelt then lived in a summer dacha, and he received the new ambassador modestly the atmosphere of the reception, but "with cordial cordiality", as Rosen himself reported.

All right! As they say, nothing costs us so cheap and nothing is valued others as dear as our courtesy.

"Your Excellency, on the highest commission, I have the honor to convey to you the sovereign-emperor's bow and present you with confirmation of my powers," Rosen said the first phrase, holding out the letters to Roosevelt ...

- Oh yeah! I am flattered and touched ... And I see my role in one thing: the world, the world and the world! I sincerely sympathize with Russia ...

Rosen kept quiet, and Roosevelt, with his usual eloquence and exaltation, continued:

- I confess to you, Baron, honestly, that at first my sympathies were on the side of Japan. However, not Russia, but Japan, is our main rival in terms of trade and industry, and the strengthening of Japan is not in our interests ... And it is not in our interests to allow Russia to be completely pushed back from the Pacific Ocean ...

"But it's just impossible for anyone," Rosen couldn't help it.

- Yes? But it seemed to me that with your hopeless position in the theater of events, you are threatened with the loss of not only Sakhalin, but also all the Pacific possessions, "Roosevelt declared with the air of a simpleton.

Even the Japanese at that moment spoke about Sakhalin more like this - "for a request" ... And the "friendly" Roosevelt from the very first meeting with Rosen was already impudently and provocatively "pressing" on us and the zones

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supervised (in the interests of the Japanese, of course) our readiness for political resistance ...

The line of vile provocation (especially in terms of the "Sakhalin" issue) Roosevelt withstood, I must say, to the end.

He had the audacity to cite as an example the Treaty of Prut between Russia and Turkey (this is when Peter was tightly surrounded by the Janissaries in 1711 and he was really threatened with capture) and the Treaty of Paris in 1856, which ended the Crimean War.

Starting with Rosen, Roosevelt blackmailed Nikolai all the time while the Russians and Japanese were negotiating for peace. He wrote to the tsar that "the continuation of the war means the loss not only of Sakhalin, but also of Eastern Siberia."

Although what there Siberia! The Japanese were glad to chop off at least Port Arthur and Dalny and remove us from Korea.

They would have tried to poke their noses on **the left** bank of the Amur, near Vladivostok!

Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Baikal - this is not a strange and incomprehensible Mukden or the Yalu and Tumyn rivers ... Then the "Russian bear" would rear up to its full height! Under the Chinese Port Arthur, alien to the Russian heart, defended by Russian soldiers, the Japanese lost 110 thousand people killed and wounded (this is with a total strength of the active army by the end of the war of 442 thousand people).

How many sons would the Japanese mothers have not counted near Vladivostok?

Roosevelt's bony soul could not understand this, but the tsar considered himself a Russian and, as such, could have been better aware of what I said above. Alas, Nikolay listened not to Russia, but to advisers like Roosevelt and Witte ...

Interestingly! In the above-mentioned monograph by Vyacheslav and Larisa Shatsillo "The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905", published on the 100th anniversary of the start of the war, it is also stated that the Japanese de already "directly threatened the mouth of the Amur River, Kamchatka, Vladivostok, Primorye, Sakhalin Island" and in general the entire "huge Russian coast of the Seas of Japan, Okhotsk and Bering Seas"...

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Now that's a threat, that's a threat! This is the scope, so the scope ...

The authors of the monograph stated that "in the event that the enemy landed troops on this coast with its gigantic length, then bringing up forces sufficient to repulse, with the impassability of these places, turned out to be a matter of almost impossible."

It is not clear, however, where the landed troops, given the off-road conditions mentioned, would move from the coastal strip and to conquer what - the impassable, walled taiga or the Sikhote-Alin ridge?

And where did the half ... - yes, where is the "semi ..." - from the utterly exhausted Japan would take on this material and human reserves, not to mention financial reserves?

Moreover, the most overwhelming advantage at sea is not yet the decisive factor in a land war.

Let us return, however, from the beginning of the 21st century to the beginning of the 20th century...

Rosen knew that the United States often openly accused Roosevelt of undesirable for America and careless intervention in the conflict in the interests of exclusively Japan and England ... It must be assumed that Rosen and Roosevelt knew about such awareness.

And so he repeated over and over again to Rosen:

- I am a friend of Russia, but here is England ... According to my information, England is very interested in the fact that the upcoming peace negotiations are not crowned with success ...

Rosen's information convinced him of the opposite, and he simply kept silent, and Roosevelt "moved" to another "horse", which he also "spurred" over and over again in a conversation with Rosen:

"I assure you, Baron, that Japan has been very reluctant to negotiate peace with you...

However, it was not without reason that Roman Romanovich represented the interests of Russia in the Land of the Rising Sun for a long time and, in response to such speeches, only shrugged shoulders.

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In his report to Lamzdorf, he wrote: *"The president's statement, it seems to me, cannot correspond to reality for the following reason.*

The only, but very significant, weak side of the situation in which Japan now finds itself is that, despite all the victories won over us at sea and on land, Japan does not have any means that would enable her to force Russia to conclude peace and to the payment of military indemnity, if Russia would prefer to evade this and decide to continue at least passive resistance.

Dear reader! Rosen hit here, as they say, to the point! Well, what could Japan do if we just said: "A world without annexations and indemnities"?

What could she do?

Japan no longer had the strength to go to war directly on our territories (and even on the CER zone).

Landing troops on Sakhalin? Well, theoretically it was possible - our sea power rested at the bottom of the Tsushima Strait. The mediocre head of the Naval Ministry, Admiral Birilev, openly declared that Japan was the master of the waters of the Far East.

The Japanese landed on Sakhalin (they called it Karafuto) and landed. But they were internally ready to evacuate their "forces" at any moment.

Japan could not keep the entire fleet of Admiral Togo off the coast of Sakhalin! And the very first severe winter (and all winters there are severe), the very first strong ice would give us - with our determination - a decisive advantage here too ... The owner of the waters is not yet the owner of the ice ...

Moreover, as a result of the war, Japan already became the mistress of Korea and the Liaodong Peninsula of China. And this is a sign

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It began that Russia would have to give up Port Arthur, and Dalny, and the southern communications we had laid.

By the way, Japan also took advantage of another Russian booty, which academic sources do not report, as a rule, so unanimously that I will tell the reader about it.

The CER was just being designed, and in St. Petersburg its nimble "builders and organizers" were already busy about the fact that the "CER Society" had the right to also maintain ... an ocean shipping company. The handwriting in this undertaking was clearly "Witte's", although formally it had nothing to do with it.

On June 12, 1898, by the highest order of Nicholas, this right was granted to the Society. The CER was just beginning to be built, and already in the same 1898, the first three steamships were purchased in England. And by the Russo-Japanese War, the "CER fleet" consisted of 22 large and small ships, among which were such as the cargo-passenger "Mongolia" and "Manchuria", which cost a million rubles each each.

And almost all of this wealth went to Japan for nothing. Something was then just captured, something - raised from the bottom after being flooded by us.

So Japan, even without Sakhalin, without indemnities from Russia and other things, received very large compensation from the war with us - already due to the return to her

Russian ports, cities, communications and merchant ships.

Yes, and warships - too.

Roman Romanovich Rosen was right, three times right, but... But at the upcoming negotiations with Japan, he was only the second delegate.

And the first one...

On the identity of the first, Rosen reported to Roosevelt on the same day, July 13:

- I am glad to inform you, Mr. President, that the night before I received a telegram from St. Petersburg, in which it is reported that the Sovereign Emperor appointed Secretary of State Witte as the first representative of Russia to conduct peace negotiations ...

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- Ooo! Roosevelt couldn't contain his feelings. "This is really good news! In entrusting the leadership of such an important matter to such an outstanding statesman, who enjoys worldwide respect, I see the best guarantee of a successful outcome of the upcoming negotiations!

Roosevelt frankly rubbed his hands and, catching Rosen's surprised look, hastily explained:

"I don't know about you, baron, I'm already hungry and I can't wait to be invited to a family breakfast ...

And then a black messenger of the President's wife floated into the room to majestically proclaim: "Dinner is served"...

So, Roosevelt, having learned about the appointment of Witte, rubbed his hands.

And he is not alone.

But the Minister of Finance, Vladimir Nikolaevich Kokovtsov, who knows Witte as flaky, met this news differently ...

Count Kokovtsov was a patriot of Russia without quotation marks and big words, and he was a direct person. And to his colleague, Count Lamzdorf, he expressed his opinion about Witte's mission, without hesitation: "It is very unfortunate that the Chairman of the Committee of Ministers is appointed to this place, because this means that peace will be concluded, because Sergei Yulievich will agree to all conditions."

But Sergei Yulievich was not so simple!

While still sailing on the ocean steamer "Kaiser Wilhelm the Great" (he chose it as a mockery, or what?) Witte gave an "ultra-patriotic" interview to the St. Petersburg correspondent of the London "Daily Telegraph" E. Dillon. This representative of the second oldest profession was clearly a multi-stationer, since he had previously worked in Russia as a professor of comparative linguistics at Kharkov University, and in England he had a reputation as a master of delicate diplomatic soundings.

Of course, this, let's face it, the English spy was not in vain circling next to Witte ...

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Having set foot on the soil of the States, Sergei Yulievich continued to diligently play the "patriotic" vanka and began with categorical statements to Roosevelt about the fact that "great Russia will never agree to any conditions whatsoever, offending honor."

Then, having crowed what was supposed to be for future historians, he ended up by the fact that in an incomplete (*incomplete*, reader!) month he "surrendered" not only what it was no longer possible to defend, but also what it was impossible to give away - if you remember the honor and soberly assess the capabilities of the Japanese.

Why did the parties come to Portsmouth?

Russia's losses in the war amounted to four and a half billion rubles - half of the public debt.

Fifteen CER!

Kuropatkin complained that Russia did not have enough funds for the full development of the Far East, and therefore, they say, it is of great importance to us and not
It has.

So here they are, these tools! They burned with powder smoke, seeped into a foreign land with Russian blood ...

But Japan did not grow stronger every day of the war, but weakened and got into debt. Actually, it was *the first* major military clash of the 20th century. The first in the world! Moreover, a clash that has all the features of a modern war.

Not only Japan and Russia had no experience in waging (including financing!) *Such* a war. Nobody had it at all - not in any country and in any financial group. Therefore, the prolongation of the conflict and the foreign loans hastily picked up by the Japanese, hastily issued by the Euro-Anglo-Saxon bankers, threatened to blow up the entire financial world system to hell.

At the same time, such a crisis would have affected Russia least of all (Witte had not yet managed to securely lasso it with external loans).

We could well take our time and end the war with dignity. And they completed it with the Witte peace.

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What did he contain?

And here's what...

Russia recognized Japan's predominant interests in Korea and pledged no longer interfere in Japanese-Korean relations.

Yielded to Japan - "with the consent" of China (after 4 months given to them) - lease of Port Arthur and Dalny with the entire surrounding territory, property, with the South Manchurian Railway from Changchun (Kuanchenzi) station to Port Arthur, with all coal mines belonging to this road or being developed to supply it.

Paid compensation of \$ 20 million to cover the costs of maintaining Russian prisoners of war in Japan.

Gave Japan part of Sakhalin south of the 50th parallel with all adjacent islands.

Undertook to conclude with Japan a convention on fishing in the Russian territorial waters of the Sea of Japan, the Sea of Okhotsk and the Bering Sea for a period of 12 years.

The convention signed on July 28, 1907 in St. Petersburg was so beneficial for Japan, that it was called a hidden indemnity.

And for all this, Witte received from tsarist Russia not contempt, but glorification.

At one time, Talleyrand managed to protect the legitimate interests of France in an absolutely losing situation for France. Witte could not (?) defend the interests of Russia in a situation that was by no means a losing one. And it is unlikely that anyone other than Witte could "proport embarrass" them so mediocrely ...

Well, yes ... In all the bureaucratic Petersburg they did not find a better candidate for the first delegate-plenipotentiary than Witte. And why would the same second delegate, Baron Rosen, be bad? Witte assessed him as follows: "This is a good, noble man, with a mediocre mind of a logical Baltic German, who is very behind the state of affairs in Russia, hesitating about the issue of peace until he got acquainted with the stories of Colonel Samoilov and Captain Rusin."

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I hope the reader is not so familiar with Roman Romanovich Rosen now, so as not to see how vile Witte was in his assessment of his

Colleagues.

Rosen had a good grasp of the state of affairs. Thinking precisely sensibly and logically, he therefore hesitated on the question of whether it was necessary to hasten and yield, having all objective grounds for caution and intransigence. And only the panic, in fact, mood of Samoilov and the skepticism of the former naval agent in Japan, Captain 2nd Rank Rusin, somehow shook Rosen's position.

However, Witte did not let him open his mouth during the negotiations. But he himself handed out autographs and interviews left and right. He earned cheap momentary success with the general public and the press, instead of showing with one restrained majestic look (and the devil did not offend him with dimensions) that Russia, they say, had enough gunpowder in the powder flasks.

Perhaps it would be appropriate here to quote a few words about the US press, taken from the report of our envoy to the US A.P. Cassini on June 3 of the last pre-war year of 1903: *"About 3 million Jews live here, and almost all the press, like in Europe, is in their hands."* And just before the war, on January 11, 1904, Cassini reported: *"Public opinion here is rather favorable to Japan thanks to the incessant insinuations of the Anglo-Jewish press."*

Witte could not fail to understand that there could be no question of any sincere and long-term benevolence of the American press towards Russia, if only because the "Anglo-Jewish" press was vitally interested in Japan ripping off Russia as soon as possible and how it is forbidden...

After all, Japan was the debtor of Schiff and the company, in whose hands the US press was! The outward friendliness of Schiff's hacks to Witte was point to point similar to the praises of Krylov's Crow of Krylov's Fox.

The American newspapermen had already opened their mouths in advance on the fees from Schiff, paid from interest on Japanese loans, which Japan intended to repay from Russian indemnity. And Witte

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something was ready to come out of his tailcoat, just to please this newspaper rati.

Ugh!

But it's necessary! Even the Soviet historiography of Witte did not expose and certify him as a truly outstanding statesman, but not a figure, but **a criminal!**

What can we say about the "Russian" historiography... The same "anniversary duet" of Vyacheslav and Larisa Shatsillo believes that Witte managed to "achieve the maximum possible" in Portsmouth. And they also admire his "very sharp and sharp remarks" during the negotiations. So, for example, here's what...

Komura advised Witte to make an indemnity sacrifice "to save more important interests.

"If Japanese troops came to Moscow," Witte reacted idiotically, "then we would consider it natural to raise the question of indemnity ...

Having expressed a stupid and humiliating assumption for Russia, Witte, of course, "set himself up", and Komura calmly remarked:

- In this case, there would be no negotiations, and we would simply dictate the terms of peace.

Sergei Yulievich, like a schoolboy showing off in front of the maid, continued instead of talking in essence to ornate:

"History says otherwise. Napoleon was in Moscow, but he did not dictate peace conditions to us ...

But instead of provoking these picks, Witte should have simply pointed out the financial impossibility for Japan to continue the war, the buildup of our forces in Manchuria and serious material benefits, and

so obtained by Japan.

Witte - together with all sorts of Abazas, Gunzburgs, Badmaevs - in the interests of the Golden International, first of all, actively created the political and material foundations of the future Russo-Japanese conflict.

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Witte pushed through the ideas of the Chinese Eastern Railway, its southern branch, "Zheltorossiya" on Liaodong etc.

Then, when these efforts were about ready to bear fruit in the form of war, Witte suddenly became in opposition to Russian active policy in Manchuria and Korea and even resigned.

Apparently protesting...

The war is over, Russia has lost it. It's time for peace talks.

And who should be authorized to do so?

And as someone - Sergei Yulievich, of course! He, after all, shrewdly kept us from the war ... He now holds the cards in his hands.

And it is completely forgotten that Witte is one of those who war against Russia and bungled for the glory of the power of the anti-Russian forces.

Speaking of these powers...

Witte was appointed to Portsmouth at the suggestion of ... Alexander Petrovich Izvolsky. Here is how Izvolsky himself writes about his role in this: *"Witte's candidacy was especially undesirable for the emperor, who treated this outstanding statesman unkindly (the tsar's mind was not in abundance, but he sometimes showed a subtle flair. - S.K.) ... Nevertheless, I was so convinced of the greatest importance of the influence of our representative that ... I wrote a letter to Count Lamsdorf, in which I expressed my deep conviction with all the energy that I was capable of, that the only person in Russia (n -yes - CK), who would successfully complete such a difficult task, is Witte.*

My letter was received in St. Petersburg just at the moment when Count Lamsdorf had exhausted all arguments in favor of Witte's candidacy, and, as he himself told me later, it helped to dispel all the emperor's doubts.

Witte went to America, and, as everyone knows, with his outstanding talent, I would say, with genius, he successfully completed the work entrusted to him.

Yes, why does the cuckoo praise the rooster...

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Alexander Petrovich was, let me remind you, a figure who, according to contemporaries, was often "highly dependent on unknown international forces." And he praised Witte in front of Lamzdorf and the tsar, presumably, for a reason.

And Witte went to Portsmouth. I went to hand over half of Sakhalin to Japan (although Sakhalin is not Liaodong), to hand over the fish riches of the Far East. Surrender the dignity of Russia.

It was as if Japan, having fought to the point of dying, received little from Russia even without Sakhalin. Let me remind you once again: we left South Manchuria, agreed in the future to the actual annexation of Korea, to a humiliating fish convention, handed over on a silver platter the powerful sea fortress of Port Arthur with all personal belongings, the port and city of Dalniy, the Changchun-Port Arthur branch ...

So no, they also have Sakhalin with some shisha!

And Witte is a count for this ... Well, at least there were sharp-tongued Russian people and - in addition to the royal favor - they gave Witte the nickname of Count "Polu-Sakhalin".

And after all, with Sakhalin, dear reader, it turned out to be generally criminally idiocy ... We know little about this, but we need to know.

And here's what to know...

The Japanese began negotiations with a very large request. All their demands were ardently supported - "in order to achieve peace as soon as possible" - "ardent friend of Russia" Roosevelt. He convinced Nikolai that Sakhalin was already irrevocably Japanese. The Russian delegation resisted. And the negotiations were mainly around the problem of Sakhalin and indemnities (Korea was already put an end to).

On August 26, the first Japanese delegate Komura telegraphed to Tokyo that the Russian delegation categorically refused to pay indemnity and threatened to break off the negotiations.

Komura's telegram in Tokyo was dated August 27 because of the time difference. A meeting of the government and the "genro" was immediately convened. It dragged on until late at night and decided not to insist on indemnity.

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On August 28, in the presence of the emperor, a joint meeting of the "genro", the government and the high military command is held. And this meeting, my dear reader, decided to make peace, refusing two demands: the concession of Sakhalin and indemnity!

I repeat: Japan from these requirements from-ka-zy-va-las!
Including from Sakhalin!

Even before the start of peace negotiations, Japan occupied the South Sakhalin! But of course, there could be no talk of any significant forces there ...

And here the Japanese suddenly (oh, the eternal "suddenly"!) find out that the tsar, in a conversation with the American ambassador Meyer, was inclined to cede South Sakhalin to Japan, but sharply rejected the very idea of contribution.

Enlightened the Japanese, of course, Roosevelt. And Prime Minister Katsura immediately sent an additional instruction to Portsmouth - to demand the cession of South Sakhalin.

Witte "surrendered", not daring to object to the sovereign... But, as we will see now, such a reaction from the tsar was to a large extent programmed by him himself.

Of course, Nikolai did not shine with his mind, although keeping his mouth shut is mind large does not seem to be required. But there are two points...

Yes, the tsar foolishly betrayed the most important state secret, but he nevertheless betrayed it not to the enemy, but to the ambassador of a "friendly" mediating power.

And then this secret became known to the Japanese. Through these very "friends" of ours.

And here's another point...

Witte informed the tsar about the atmosphere at the negotiations. And his telegrams to St. Petersburg were unambiguously such that they pushed Nicholas to very broad concessions. Witte, in fact, provoked the king against them.

August 21, 1905 - just on the eve of the ill-fated audience of Nicholas Meyer-Witte telegraphed to the Foreign Ministry: *"The facts*

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stronger than any arguments and considerations, meanwhile, the fact that Sakhalin is in the hands of the Japanese and we do not have the means to take it away, so if we want the blame for the ineffectiveness of the conference to fall solely on Japan, then we cannot reject both the concession of Sakhalin and the return of military spending "

On the steamer sailing to the States, Witte, in his interview with Dillon (by the way, for the first time in the history of the world press, it was transmitted to England by radiotelegraph) stated that his task was only to find out the intentions of the Japanese and strictly follow the instructions from St. showing.

Before Witte's departure, Nikolai clearly told him: "I want the negotiations to come to a peaceful solution, but I cannot allow a single penny of indemnity, not a cession of one inch of land."

Witte from the States, motivating his recommendations with better knowledge of the current situation, persuaded the tsar to pay indemnities, and unreasonably whipped up passions, exaggerating in a way that was beneficial to the USA, Japan and the anti-Russian Golden International.

In fact, pro-Japanese pressure on Tsar Witte began on the way to Portsmouth, when he met with the banker Mendelssohn in Berlin. The German Jew Mendelssohn was close to the Kaiser, and Witte transmitted through the banker a request to Wilhelm to influence the Tsar in favor of expanding possible concessions.

In Portsmouth, he only continued this line.

Unbalanced by Witte's telegrams, the tsar blurted out at the wrong time about Sakhalin, because the main thing that he cared about was to insist on the refusal of indemnity, the mere thought of which was extremely humiliating and unbearable for him.

No wonder Roosevelt was so happy about the appointment of Sergei Yulievich, although in the end he was not completely satisfied with him. Already after the conclusion of peace, Roosevelt wrote in a letter dated September 9: *"Japan, returning Northern Sakhalin to Russia, made much more concessions than it should have. I am sure that I would have achieved the transfer of Northern Sakhalin to Japan."*

What can I say - a bastard, a scoundrel and an insolent one at the same time!

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Dear reader! The author is not inclined to apply the norms of ordinary morality in relation to those public figures behind whom their states stand. In foreign policy, it is necessary to recognize the primacy not of honesty, but of state expediency.

But after all, Roosevelt behaved in relation to Russia both dishonestly, and duplicitously, and short-sightedly. He, in fact, encouraged Japan to take a promising aggressive course towards the United States itself.

And was it an expedient policy for the US?

Although...

Although it was precisely such a development of future world events that not only suited the Golden International, but was also directly planned by it. For the people of America, a future war with Japan was not required. And for the Golden Elite, growing fat in wars?

After all, another Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, deliberately framed his largest naval base in Hawaii, Pearl Harbor, in 1941 under a Japanese attack. Framed to drag America into the world war.

So ordinary Americans needed peace, and the Roosevelts and their fellow lodges and clans needed a war, including in the Pacific, that is, a US war with Japan.

And for this it was necessary to support the arrogant Japanese ambitions, fueled by the "victory" over the Russians, and to provide a material basis for the development of such ambitions in the future.

Here is the background of Roosevelt's efforts during the conclusion of the Portsmouth contracts.

And for such "peacemaking" an energetic scoundrel Yankee in 1906 received ... the Nobel Peace Prize.

N-yes...

A lot has already been said about what happened in Portsmouth. However, it seems to the author useful both for himself and for the reader to once again look at these events in their chronological sequence, already more or less enlightened.

with a look.

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After all, repetition is the mother of not only learning and memorization, but also understanding!

August 9, 1905 in the resort (he also had such a "face") town

Portsmouth on the Atlantic coast of the United States opened a peaceful Russian-Japanese conference.

The first day is procedural. The official languages adopted for the Russian delegation were "normative diplomatic" French at that time, for the Japanese delegation - English.

On the second day, the Japanese hand us the text of their peace terms. That's what they are contained...

First: Russia's refusal to be active in Korea and the recognition of Japan's rights to Korea.

Second: the complete evacuation of Manchuria by Russia with the obligation of Japan to return it to China.

Third: Japan's right to interfere in the affairs of the "returned" provinces.

Fourth: mutual rejection of obstacles to the measures of "other nations" (read - USA) on the "commercial and industrial development" (that is, colonization) of Manchuria.

Fifth: the cession of Sakhalin to Japan.

Sixth: the cession of lease rights to Port Arthur and Dalny and, in general, to all leased territory on the Liaodong Peninsula.

Seventh: Russia's refusal from the southern branch of the CER from Harbin to Port Arthur (by that time the Japanese had occupied the territory of South Manchuria along Syngai, that is, almost along the border of Changchun station, located approximately in the middle of the southern branch).

Eighth: Russia can use the northern line of the CER to Vladivostok only for non-military purposes.

Ninth: Russia reimburses Japan for the costs of the war, that is, pays an indemnity.

Tenth: Russia gives Japan all its ships interned in neutral ports.

Eleventh: Russia limits its naval forces in the waters of the Far East.

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Twelfth. Russia grants without reciprocity to Japanese subjects the right to fish along the coast of Russian possessions in the Seas of Japan, Okhotsk and Bering.

At first, the Japanese wanted to put forward **the thirteenth** condition - disarmament Vladivostok. But they immediately abandoned it.

In theaters, extras, in order to portray the rumble of general chatter, say in an undertone: "What to say when there is nothing to say?"

And I personally have nothing to say about these conditions either. Anyway within the framework of censorship lexical norms.

And now, on August 12, Witte provisionally accepts points 1, 2, 3.4, 6, 7, 8 and 12.

The only thing the Russian delegation did not agree with on these points was the abandonment of the entire southern branch of the CER. Witte was ready to give it away for the part actually occupied by the Japanese, that is, for Changchun (it remained so later).

Actually, on the third day of the negotiations, Witte "surrendered" everything except Sakhalin.

Do not take credit for his disagreement with paragraphs 9,10 and 11!

And this despite the fact that he himself reported to St. Petersburg on August 18: "*Japan is more*

all he needs is money, and the government is probably afraid of being liable for loans made against the security of various state properties.

Already from this statement it followed that Japan actually waged war not in state, although the supreme power hides this from the general public.

If only we could "rubber" and pull for some time. On the Sybin positions, the Russian soldiers sat firmly. However, already on August 15, Witte confirms our preliminary consent to points 1.2, 3.4, 6, 7, 8 and 12.

I note that, agreeing to the special fishing rights of Japanese subjects, he did not even try to give these rights the character of reciprocity. Although he simply had to demand that Russian fishermen be provided with similar fishing opportunities in Japanese waters. Even if it's just for the purpose of delaying negotiations.

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On August 18, the Japanese "conceded" on the arrogant 10th and 11th points with condition for Russia to fulfill the 5th and 9th points - Sakhalin and indemnity.

In fact, the Japanese desperately needed money, and they were ready to give up Sakhalin - after all, this meant the resumption of active hostilities.

And in such an actually advantageous situation, Witte, as we know, on August 21 offers the tsar to agree to the loss of Sakhalin and to the "return of military expenses."

On August 22, an order came from St. Petersburg to terminate the negotiations. in view of hopelessness, bring them to a satisfactory state.

And on the 22nd, Roosevelt put pressure on Nicholas. It was on the 22nd that he wrote to the tsar that "the continuation of the war means the loss not only of Sakhalin, but also of Eastern Siberia" ...

On August 24, Nikolai inadvertently confides with US Ambassador Meyer...

And on August 25...

And on August 25, my dear reader, Yakov Schiff sent a letter to the Japanese ambassador in Washington, Takahira, in which he wrote: *"If the war continues, Russia will be able to use its huge gold reserves. On the other hand, I am afraid that the money markets of America, England and Germany (remembering Mendelssohn's conversation with Witte in Berlin, I was especially touched by this "... and Germany" - S.K.) will not be inclined to continue to finance Japan in any way significant amount."*

It wasn't even a punch on Japan's nose, it was a knockout. Indeed, why should the Schiffs allow Japan to rip off from Russia the money that the Schiffs, Mendelssohns and Rothschilds themselves were going to rip off from her through the already planned loans to Witte for the "suppression of the revolution"?

Wouldn't it have been better **not to let** Japan solve its debt problems for account of Russian indemnity and keep Japan "on a short leash" longer?

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"Clever" Witte should have understood this even in a dream - it was so elementary for a more or less competent financier. And yet - I did not "understand".

Although he understood everything, understood everything, the bastard!

But Japan understood this ultimatum (and how else to regard such a letter?) Schiff, or rather, the entire financial elite of the world, understood.

That is why the Japanese delegate Komura on August 26 sent a panicked telegram in Tokyo that the Russian delegation was threatening to break off the negotiations. And that is why the conference of the emperor, the "genro" and the high military command on August 27-28 authorized the signing of peace and the rejection of the demand for Sakhalin and indemnity.

Actually, in the instructions to the Japanese authorized Sakhalin and not listed among the requirements, absolutely mandatory.

But the idea of a completely Japanese Sakhalin was the leading one for Roosevelt. After all, such an option would be an eternal reason for discord between Russia and Japan and an eternal temptation for Japan to grab something else from Russia, in addition to Sakhalin ...

However, Roosevelt did not "break off" here, and on August 29 all disagreements were closed.

By September 5, the experts finished with the editorial revisions of the text contracts.

EVERYTHING took less than a month.

For comparison, let me tell you that peace negotiations between Soviet Russia, which was really in a desperate situation, and Germany in Brest Litovsk began on December 22, 1917 and continued until February 10, 1918 (when Trotsky thwarted them).

Witte, on the other hand, did everything in more than twenty days, having received from the "American" press the title of "king of all diplomats".

And it may very well be that this "king" was applauded from the coffin by Baron Stekl ... After all, he also concocted anti-Russian affairs, without particularly delaying them.

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Years passed ... On March 1, 1919, the former corps commander on the Northern Front and the future head of the military ministry at Kolchak, Baron Alexei Budberg, was driving through South Manchuria, heading to Tokyo ...

Here is what he later wrote about this trip: *"We passed Antung, a former Korean village, and now a solid city with stone houses, factories and factories. It is sad to think that we have laid the foundation for this too; we were the first to awaken desert Manchuria, introduced culture into it, invested many millions of Russian money, lost hundreds of thousands of Russian people, and in the end made it a source of great blessings and income, but not for ourselves; Japan has profited, gained a lot and is preparing to acquire even more China, while we, out of historical habit, have got ourselves only grief, losses and a position with a broken trough ... "*

Actually, it was a kind of epitaph for the Far Eastern policy of tsarism, the foundations of which were laid by Witte and which he also buried in the American resort town of Portsmouth.

And the final touch to the history of the Portsmouth world ... It is interesting in itself itself, and also somewhat better illuminates the issue.

Even before the signing of the peace, a member of the council of the Grand Orient of France Masonic lodge, Laferre, sent a telegram to Roosevelt: *"The Grand Orient of France has the honor to address you with the warmest congratulations for the outstanding service just rendered to mankind. Freemasonry is happy to see the triumph, thanks to one of its most famous sons, the principles of peace and brotherhood."*

And again, before the signing of peace - September 4, 1905 - US Assistant Secretary of State Francis Butler Loomis, on behalf of Roosevelt, expressed in a response letter gratitude for the "gracious telegram sent on behalf of the Freemasons of France in connection with the President's efforts in favor of achieving peace in the Far East".

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The telegram and letter were published in December 1905 in the closed Masonic journal L'Acacia (Masons gave the acacia a mystical meaning as a tree that miraculously grew on the grave of Hiram, the architect of the Solomon Temple in Jerusalem).

And in 1906, "brother" Roosevelt received from a committee of five people,

elected by the Norwegian Storting, their "Nobel Prize", which, according to the will of Alfred Bernhard Nobel, was awarded "to those who will make a significant contribution to the rallying of peoples, the destruction of slavery, the reduction in the number of existing armies and the promotion of a peace agreement."

And what?

"Peace" agreement the American president really contributed, so what's there ...

The "King" of "all diplomats" had to be content with the nickname "Count Polusakhalinsky".

OF COURSE, tsarist Russia was not up to Sakhalin at that time - the revolutionary movement was growing in the country, and it was necessary to quickly get rid of external problems at any cost (including the price of new onerous loans and neglect of national interests) in order to crush internal problems with punitive expeditions.

At one time, they wanted to hand over Sakhalin to a concession or even sell it to smart American businessmen or the US federal government (Alaska was not enough!) For a penny sum of 90 million rubles ...

And this is instead of wide-ranging reforms, not bullets, to calm Russia down and resolutely refuse Japan where it should have been refused - on the issue of Sakhalin, first of all.

By the end of the inglorious war, we were not so exhausted. On the contrary - with a smart (oh, again - smart!) line of behavior, we could threaten Japan. She exhausted her reserves, but we brought them to Manchuria. They appeared there - already "after

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fight" - and machine guns in trenches, and champagne in officers' fanzas.

Y-yes, and again - y-yes, my dear reader ... And how is it with them, with the shadow "masters of the world", everything turns out so cleverly! I have already honestly confessed to you that if you start to deal with all this, you will not understand it right away!

But when I realized that not only Russia and Germany in Europe, but also Russia and Japan in Asia were quarreled and pitted out of the blue, in fact, on **about the same technology**; When I realized this, I just stupidly looked at myself in the mirror ...

And I caught myself on the fact that involuntarily - with an eternal national gesture - I scratch the back of my head, or, as they say in Ukraine, "I smell the rear"...

Surprisingly, entire academic institutions in the USSR and "Rossiyanin" in the hundred years that have passed since the war have not revealed this. I know only one outside-the-box thinking (in fact, a really thinking person always thinks outside the box) professional historian, Vasily Elinarkhovich Molodyakov, the author of the excellent monograph "Failed Axis: Berlin-Moscow-Tokyo", also published in 2004, who looks at the problem sensibly and professionally (mainly, however, in its later production in the 20-30s).

What about monographs like the "jubilee" written by Shatsillo? Well, with an abundance of facts, it is enough to put accents in the wrong places, not to take into account seemingly small nuances ... And the conclusions turn out to be doubtful, and the assessments are biased. And sometimes in a sad and funny way.

So in the book of Vyacheslav and Larisa Shatsillo "The Russo-Japanese War. 1904—1905" shows a portrait of a polished captain of the 2nd rank in full dress. Near - explanation: "Grand Duke Kirill, who died in the explosion of Petropavlovsk ...

But Kirill, unlike Admiral Makarov and the artist Vereshchagin - did not die (then in the fleet they hinted that a certain substance does not sink).

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And how do I know about it? Yes, at least from the book of Vyacheslav and Larisa Shatsillo "The Russo-Japanese War. 1904-1905", where on page 220 you can read the following: "After one and a half to two minutes ... "Petropavlovsk" disappeared under water ... Sailors on boats from the "Poltava", "Askold", "Gaydamak" and squadron destroyers were rescued from the water by 80 people, including the commander of the battleship captain 1st rank N.M. Yakovlev, captain of the 2nd rank of the Grand Duke Kirill Vladimirovich ... "

Y-yes... That's how the authors want to add at least a little "heroic" gloss to the portrait of the august scoundrel... At least - on a good quality glossy paper sheet of photo illustration.

However, one way or another, the war took place, and Russia lost it, and Japan won.

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Chapter 8

Why Japan won and something else...

WHY did Japan win?

We have already spoken about the significance for the fate of the country of the national character of its people. So let's get back to the question of the national character of the Japanese once again... And to begin with, let's remember how Japan has treated education for centuries.

Already in the middle of the 17th century, a network of temple schools was developed in Japan, where children of artisans, wealthy peasants and ... poor samurai were taught literacy, numeracy and manual labor. Wealthy samurai were also formed, but at their own expense.

That is, the traditions **of mass** education and the taste for it arose in Japan a very long time ago. But the flourishing began only after the Meiji Revolution, when in 1872 a school reform was carried out and a law was passed on compulsory universal education with a single centralized system.

The principle "Not a single person without education, not a single village without a school!" was not simply proclaimed, but widely introduced into the life of the Japanese **masses** ! And this was not the stunted system of parochial schools in Russia, introduced since 1884, not to mention the fact that universal education became compulsory in Russia only under Soviet rule.

In 1872, the Japanese school charter outlined three types of schools: primary, secondary and higher (among them - male and female, general education and professional, "dead end" and preparing for further education).

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In the 1980s, Sony co-founder Akio Morita wrote that interest in education arose during the Tokugawa era and that even uneducated parents—peasants and merchants—understood the importance of education for their children. If a school was nearby and the child was capable, they sent him to study. And the same Morita reports that the density of schools in Japan at the end of the 20th century is about the same as in the days of Tokugawa and Meiji. I don't know for sure, but I think that this is an absolutely unprecedented fact in the history of the world.

And this was, I emphasize again and again, the policy of the state! Not proletarian, not popular, but feudal, samurai, bourgeois! Blessed is the country, however, whose "tops" have on their shoulders not overheated hari or stupidly lean physiognomies, but intelligent heads.

So, speaking of Japan, we can talk about the age-old traditions of public education. But in China - according to the competent testimony of Sun Yat-sen - even at the end of the 19th century, "maintaining the ignorance of the masses was

the constant concern of the Chinese government." Politics, as mathematicians say, is "exactly the opposite."

Tsarist Russia here, if it has left Qing China, is not very far away.

In post-reform Japan, they openly followed the example of Germany. Fragmented into "kingdoms" and "electors" by the Peace of Westphalia in 1848, the German Empire entered the political arena of modern history as a united power of the German people under the thunder of victory over the French at Sedan. And this victory - to use the aptly winged expression - was ensured not only by the German non-commissioned officer, but also by the German village teacher ...

Now the history of the rise of the nation by the power of the clever policy of the "tops" in relation to the mass education of the "bottom" was refracted and repeated in a peculiar way in the Japanese island state.

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Gunsmith General Fedorov (I will refer to him later) was surprised, observing the mores of the Japanese army. He wrote: *"I looked with envy at the ease that was in the relationship between a Japanese soldier and an officer in moments of rest. I did not notice any downtroddenness or intimidation, which always slipped in the tsarist army, not only in relation to the soldier to the officer, but even the lower command staff to the higher one."*

In the last third of the 19th century, Japan rose from "deaf agrarian isolation" in the last third of the 19th century to the position of the largest military and industrial power in Asia in the lifetime of just one generation.

Why?

Is it because the future breakthrough of Japan was - oddly enough - founded at the beginning of the Tokugawa era? Then, when the shoguns played an active and positive role in the life of the country.

Creating a united Japan, polishing their national character, the Japanese people (and, let's give them their due, their feudal leaders) enriched this character with a mass craving for knowledge and respect for knowledge. Our wonderful and underestimated writer-democrat Gleb Ivanovich Uspensky in "The Morals of Rasteryaeva Street" has a four-page story "The Book" about the unfortunate boy Alifan, who was imbued with a passion for the book and, together with its hero, the navigator Captain Cook, "drowned in the quagmire of Rasteryaev's ignorance", "criticized to smithereens ... even by dogs."

"Why are your hands itching: everything for the book and for the book? She doesn't touch you, after all, Rasteryaev's townsfolk warned and taught the "lost ones". — You catch on to trouble ... there Alifan read and read, and you look - and he will die like a dog ..."

In Japan, this plot is unlikely to have ever been possible anywhere.

Here is another sketch from nature, made by the hand of a great writer... Chekhov, whom I have mentioned more than once, wrote about the Japanese consul on Sakhalin and his secretary as follows: "Outside the house they go in European dress, they speak Russian very well; being in

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consulate, I often found them reading Russian or French books; they have a bookcase full of books. They are European-educated people, refined, polite, delicate and hospitable. For the local officials, the Japanese consulate is a good, warm corner where you can forget about prison, hard labor and official squabbles and, therefore, relax.

But what the hell, one wonders, prevented Russian officials, living on their own, native, Russian land, from arranging **their own** warm corner, with their own "cupboards" of books, and not empty bottles?

There were two Japanese, and they had a lot of books. Russian officials could pool together an entire library, instead of painting the "bullet" to the point of stupidity or pouring themselves with alcohol. But, alas...

And China? After all, there existed an ancient and continuous civilization created by a huge power ... Well, China was huge only externally, but in its history the periods of centralization were much shorter than the periods of fragmentation that replaced them every now and then. By the beginning of the 20th century, even the Chinese language reflected the centuries-old feudal fragmentation of China into a number of destinies. As volume 32 of the first edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia reported: "The Chinese language is divided into a number of dialects ... These dialects differ so much from each other phonetically, vocabulary and partly grammatically that they do not allow mutual understanding and from this point of view they deserve rather names of individual language groups.

The same encyclopedia in volume 65 reports the following about the Japanese language: united linguistically...", and further: "Over the 11-century existence, the Japanese written language has, of course, experienced a number of changes ... but all the time it retained its main characteristic: it was the language of the state unification of Japan."

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And this is quite logical. After all, Japan began firmly enough centralized already under Oda and did not deviate from this line.

China (remember Dr. Sun Yat-sen) "had a very high regard for its own achievements and did not put other states in anything.

And Japan, with the beginning of the Meiji era, proclaimed through the mouth of the emperor (recall the Meiji oath of 5 points) that knowledge would be borrowed everywhere in the world to firmly build the foundations of the empire.

And these were not beautiful words, but a long-term program. World achievements in science and technology were thoroughly studied, books of practical importance were translated and distributed. Scientists from America, England, Germany, Holland, France, Switzerland, Russia and from any other country were invited to work in Japan if it was useful and

Maybe.

At the same time, many young Japanese went to study abroad. Universities were opened in Japan itself (the first was in 1877 in Tokyo). In 1879, the Japanese Academy of Sciences was established in Tokyo and soon a number of research institutions were organized. Their far from complete list speaks for itself: the Central Meteorological Observatory, the Tokyo Astronomical Observatory, the Military Topographic Department, the Department of Hydrography of the Navy, the Institute of Infectious Diseases, the Geological Department, the Electrical Laboratory, the Railway Department, the Institute of Fisheries, the Agronomic Experimental Station, experimental stations for horticulture and forestry.

In total, 72 such institutions were created. Yes, plus 70 scientific associations in specialties. And all this - with the active interest of the state.

In Russia, such an approach of the authorities to science became possible only under the conditions of Stalin's USSR.

It is also characteristic that the activities of the institutes being created were immediately aimed not only at the development of scientific knowledge, but also at its practical application for the development of production.

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Without comment, I will quote General Kuropatkin's impressions of his pre-war trip to Japan: *"I saw a beautiful country with a large, hard-working population. Lively activity reigned everywhere. The cheerful mood of the population, its love for the motherland, faith in the future bribed ... In all schools of the country, military exercises occupied a prominent place, and children and young men were engaged in them with enthusiasm ... "*

Major of the Prussian service Bronsard von Schellendorf, seconded as an observer to the Japanese army during the Russo-Japanese War, wrote that the discipline and nerves of the Japanese were iron.

And Kuropatkin concluded: *"But the main thing that served to the success of the Japanese troops was their high morale, readiness for all sacrifices to achieve victory and the perseverance with which all the ranks of the army, from the soldier to the commander-in-chief, achieved victory ... Do not be the whole army is patriotically disposed, if the army did not feel the unanimous support of the whole nation, if the army in all its ranks did not realize the great importance of the struggle, the efforts would not have been effective ... "*

OF COURSE, Japan also had other features that allowed her to win wars and progress not just quickly, but unprecedentedly quickly and impressive.

For example, from the very beginning, state entrepreneurship was developed there more than in any other country. And the state was extremely loyal to industrial and financial private capital. And capital thought nationally, because it had, in fact, the same feudal-samurai origin as the state itself. That orgy of surrender of national interests and perspectives, which began under Gorbachev, developed under Yeltsin and rages under Putin, in Japan was not only impossible, but absolutely unthinkable. The most treacherous and selfish politician would not even dare to think about such a thing!

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The state planted industry and created state-owned "exemplary enterprises", and then often transferred them to new capitalists (quite often - former feudal lords). So arose, by the way, the power of the houses of Mitsui and Mitsubishi. And these large zaibatsu concerns - Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumimoto, Yasuda - controlled the country's economy. But, for example, in ferrous metallurgy, 73 percent of pig iron smelting and 84 percent of rolled products were provided by the state-owned Yavata plant.

The Meiji state initially encouraged the establishment of banks (this is how the yen was pulled out of the "stocking" of the average Japanese), but quickly compressed the banking network to a minimum size and created "leading" banks - the Yokohama Currency Bank in 1880 and the Japan State Bank in 1882.

Japanese industry was built with Japanese money, but with European samples and with the help of European (American, of course, too) engineers.

And where did the money come from, reader? After all, as has been said more than once, Japan is poor in raw materials. But on the other hand, as already mentioned, Japan had a smart and hard-working people, and not so stupid ruling classes. Especially since the Meiji period. And therefore, all methods of obtaining finance were used. So, already in the very first years after the Meiji Revolution, the central government introduced new taxes: on vodka and tobacco (and the Japanese are eager to drink and smoke). Exchange and stamp duties (as once in Russia - by Peter!) were introduced, as well as mountain taxes.

Foreign loans were not forgotten either. However, unlike Tsarist Russia, these were loans to finance the scientific and technological revolution, and not to

suppression of the social revolution.

Since 1873, the annual compilation and (note, reader!) *Publication* of the state budget began.

Tea, silk, rice - this, of course, was exported by the Japanese in increasing numbers. quantities immediately after the "opening" of the country. But now the peasantry, by hook or by crook, was being particularly urged to

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concentration of efforts on two high-commodity industries - rice cultivation and sericulture. And pushed.

A profitable cotton industry developed rapidly in Japan. The first mechanized cotton-spinning factory for 6 thousand spindles was opened in 1868 near Kagoshima (the residence, by the way, of the rebellious Satsuma clan).

However, the main money was given, of course, by the harsh exploitation of the masses. Already during the First World War, our famous gunsmith, "twice" general (of both the tsarist and the Soviet army), Vladimir Grigoryevich Fedorov, ironically, went to Japan to get rifles for the Russian army. And he was surprised at the cheapness of the Japanese Arisaka rifle ... It seems that it, made of imported metal, should have cost more than Russian, and

was cheaper.

Fedorov soon realized that the secret was in the exceptional cheapness of the labor of the Japanese worker. He was paid 30-40 percent less than a Russian, who was also not spoiled by particularly high wages.

Once Fedorov went into a huge Mitsui store for fabric and talked with the seller, who knew Russian well.

The Japanese boasted that local fabrics are made from imported Indian cotton, and are cheaper than in India.

— How does it happen? — Vladimir Grigoryevich was innocently surprised.

"It's very simple," replied the seller, "in Japan, life is extremely cheap, and our workers can get paid less...

"For me then, the reasons for the terrible poverty and destitution of the workers on the outskirts of Japanese cities became quite understandable," Fedorov wrote. - The cramped crooked streets, crumbling dirty houses were striking in their squalor. Even the air was different there: numerous garbage emitted a stupefying stench.

So let's not, dear reader, be simpletons, now and then repeating: "But they have ..." The "Japanese miracle" was also fed by the special patience of the Japanese masses ... And not even patience, but that

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fatalism worked out from time immemorial, which can arise and develop only in the national character of the people, subconsciously every day ready for an unexpected typhoon, earthquake, tsunami.

Yes, natural disasters also shaped the character of the Japanese. And they were shaped in such a way that they became more inclined to painstaking work and social patience than to revolutionary social protest.

I do not call on the Russian masses to look for an example to follow in this. Our national characters, and the history of the two peoples, and the whole complex of conditions that determine the life of society are very different. I am simply analyzing the reasons for Japan's success and stressing that this success would probably not have been possible without a sufficiently high coincidence between the national tasks and the national character of the Japanese.

This is also why the average rate of profit in Meiji Japan did not fall below 20-30%, and often amounted to 50 and even 100%! It remained just as high in the 20th century... And it was not the usurious profit of the parasite, but

profits squeezed out of the sweat of the Japanese workers and peasants. But it was used by the ruling strata of Japan wisely - for the development of commodity production, for the export of capital and the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves.

Let us recall the unfortunate Chinese reformer Kang Yuwei, who, together with his comrades, was easily "knocked down" by the regent Ci Xi ... In his "Study of the Reforms in Japan during the Meiji Period", he lamented: only 1/10 of the population of China ... And yet, as a result of timely political reforms, small Japan was able to defeat and destroy the army of huge China ... "

Kang Yuwei saw the "secret" in the fact that Japan-de introduced the division of the "three rights" following the Western model: legislative, executive and judicial power. Paper reformers always see the causes in the structure of the bureaucratic institutions of society, and not in the social atmosphere.

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But in general, the opinion of Kang Yuwei is nonsense! First, before Japan, the private-property world gave only one example of a sharp state breakthrough - Kaiser's Germany after its unification in the early 70s of the XIX century. century. However, Germany was an imperial monarchy with a high level of centralization of power.

Most importantly, power is like the freshness of sturgeon in Mikhail Bulgakov's novel... Either it exists (like power, say, "genro"), or it doesn't. And for those in power there are no "three rights", but only the right of power. Another thing is that if the rulers use such their right only in the name of asserting total mass lawlessness, then ...

Then, recalling the "Conversation of Legs and Head" by our glorious partisan poet Denis Davydov, the "lower classes" can one day "top" and say: "If you have the right to manage, then we have the right to stumble. And we can sometimes, stumbling - how to be - Your Majesty on a stone to crush.

No, the Japanese "secrets" had a different origin - the realism of the "top" in relation to the masses. Thus, taking into account the experience of the war with Russia, Japan, along with the Ministry of the Armed Forces and the Great General Staff, created an equal (equal, reader!) Commission for the Defense of the Country (Kyuoiko-Hombu).

Conceived as the "headquarters for education", this commission was supposed (I quote from Karl Haushofer below) "to maintain contact between the mood of the people, public opinion and the departments of the land army, navy, communications, internal affairs" ...

After all, this is not even an analogue of the Soviet DOSAAF or its predecessor of the thirties Osoaviakhim (Society for the Promotion of Defense, Aviation and Chemical Construction)! This is something that has no analogies at all, but something that was of paramount practical importance for building up the power of Japan through the energetic actions of the entire Japanese people!

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There was, however, another amusing moment. At the very beginning of the Meiji Revolution, Japan did not have significant export funds. And its foreign trade developed due to the export of ... precious metals. That is - silver and gold.

"Where does gold come from in resource-poor Japan?" the modern reader may be surprised. But only modern. I was surprised myself at first... what kind of gold did the Japanese pay for guns with the Portuguese in the 16th and 17th centuries?

And the answer here is simple: "Japanese". Because gold (and silver) in Japan

there was then, it turns out, a lot ... In chapter 14, I argued that there was no particular excess of these two eternal "equivalents of happiness" in Japan ... But then, for the convenience of the story, I was a little cunning in front of the reader, and I'm sorry ... No, there were times when Japan was rich in its own gold and silver.

There was also copper in Japan (already in the feudal period, the copper industry provided the main export item). However, copper is just copper, but

gold...

As for information about Japanese gold, I was rescued, as always, by the first Great Soviet Encyclopedia. She informed me, and I inform the reader, that by the beginning of the 1930s the situation was as follows: the powerful gold deposits in the north of Hokkaido along the Esashi River (they were called the "Japanese Klondike") were already depleted, and gold deposits on northeast of Kyushu in the province of Oita.

In the 1920s, both of these regions produced approximately 40% of the production of the Japanese Islands. And the entire annual production - due to the improvement of technology - by the 30s was about 18 tons (of which about 6 tons are Korean deposits).

Japan's gold reserves were then estimated at \$214 million. With the gold content of the then dollar at 1.50463 grams, this was approximately 320 tons of gold. And it was only "official" Japanese gold. But there were also personal (and more than decent) reserves of magnates.

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With an average annual production of, say, 10 tons, a reserve of 320 tons was formed in 32 years ... But gold in Japan was mined for centuries from still undepleted deposits - albeit by primitive methods. And this gold did not leave the country for centuries during the period of self-isolation.

So the inclination towards knowledge is an inclination; smart, socially wealthy behavior of the Japanese "top" (as opposed to the "top" of the Russian) - behavior; taxes - taxes; loans - loans; exploitation - operation and Kyuoiku Hombu - Kyuoiku Hombu ...

But let's not forget the Japanese gold that Japan itself gave to Japan, and

more precisely - its bowels ...

AFTER the Russo-Japanese War, Russia and Japan could no longer count each other as friends. Japan was "friends" with others - with England, with the States, but it would be appropriate to ask these Japanese "friends" the question: "Whom are you friends against?"

The answer was unambiguous - against Russia.

Japan, meanwhile, was growing stronger and more and more considering not Russia, but the United States, as its main potential rival. At the same time, Japan did not really try to protect itself from the "Western" rear at the expense of a smart "Russian" policy. She no longer took Russia seriously. I will emphasize this for those who are inclined to consider the reign of Nicholas II as a kind of flowering of Russia. But the Japanese - from their Far Eastern far -

they didn't see any special promising obstacles to themselves from the Russians ...

Of course, both belligerent views towards America and condescending views towards Russia were the politics of adventurism. And the Japanese, seemingly prudent by nature, behaved here surprisingly recklessly - if we keep in mind the long-term geopolitical prospects.

I think that here they - for all their energy and diligence - were let down by the same feature of the history of the country, which helped them

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get back on your feet quickly. I mean more than two centuries of self-isolation

Japan. Having tightly fenced off from the outside world, the Japanese avoided a semi-colonial fate and retained their originality. The outside world - during the period of isolation from it - they arrogantly regarded as "barbaric".

When this "barbarian" world truly barbarously, under pointed guns, began to "open" Japan, the Japanese elite had the historical instinct and the mind not to boast, but urgently learn from the mighty "barbarians" and adopt from them everything that gave power and strength .

However, latently something samurai arrogance remained!

Japan skillfully and talentedly learned to use the scientific and technological achievements of the West in its internal economic and social life and
politics.

I emphasize - in the inner!
And in the outer?

Alas, in foreign policy - and here I ask the reader to be especially attentive - Japan has not been able to assimilate the principles of constructive external relations and relations in the same creative way. True, for the sake of justice, it must be admitted that there was no one here to learn from her. The foreign policy of the elite in all countries of the world has very rarely been rational from the point of view of the true national interests of these countries. What, however, cannot be said about the political thought of the West (if we take it in all its development from the time of Socrates and Aristotle to Marx).

However, samurai Japan treated other countries in a completely consumerist way, striving either to subjugate or use them, and not to cooperate with them for mutual benefit, and even more so to comprehend the intellectual "studies" of Western politicians-theorists.

The domestic policy of the Japanese elite was often wise and balanced. External - often surprisingly blind.

General Fedorov, known to the reader, after one minor incident, in which the narrowly egoistic secrecy of the Japanese "ally" of Russia in the world war manifested itself, thought bitterly:

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"Never with such an attitude will a Japanese soldier stand next to the soldiers of other nations on a common front."

And the reason for this opinion was ...

Japan was doomed to compete with America for purely geopolitical reasons, but it was a stupid, arrogant chimera for Japan to count on its sole dominance in the Pacific region. Nevertheless, Japan behaved just unrealistically. She deliberately underestimated the "barbarians" whom she had so quickly caught up with, and overestimated herself even more. And at the same time, she did not want to understand that she had only one reasonable ally in the Pacific Ocean for all time - Russia.

Japan defeated Russia, so to speak, inadvertently - not because of its real material superiority, but only because of the idiocy and betrayal of the Russian "tops". Moreover - by virtue of the support of the Schiffs and the Roosevelts.

And I decided that henceforth Russia can be seriously disregarded.

But here are two numbers. Even in 1913, Japan smelted 243,000 *tons* of iron and 255,000 *tons* of steel. And Russia - 4.6 *million* tons of pig iron and 4.9 *million* tons of steel.

Compared to 16.8 million tons of pig iron and 15.7 million tons of steel in Germany, the Russian result did not look amazing, but the difference in weight categories between us and Japan was, nevertheless, more than convincing. Moreover, we smelted our pig iron from our own ores, and not from imported ones, like Japan.

Let's go back to the time of the signing of the Portsmouth Peace ... It would seem that Japan then got everything possible to the maximum and even beyond it. And the conditions of the fishing convention were so overhead and insulting for Russia that the Japanese could moderate their appetites here so as not to have our deservedly sidelong glances in their direction in the future.

But no! When news of peace conditions reached Japan, unrest broke out in Tokyo. The monument to Marquis Ito, erected to him during his lifetime, was destroyed by an angry mob because Ito was a supporter of moderation. Tokyo was declared at war

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position. Over 500 people from the people and the same number of policemen were injured ...

True, Soviet historiography explained this by "the performance of the broad masses, dissatisfied with military hardships, high cost, increased tax oppression," etc. It must be assumed that this was not without these reasons (with the end of the war in Japan, a number of strikes took place), but it is unlikely whether someone would time a social performance precisely on the day of the signing of peace. And what does the monument to Itoh have to do with it?

No, the masses of Japan were, for the most part, very chauvinistic at that time. The head of the Japanese delegation at the talks, Foreign Minister Komura, was forced to resign.

So, unreasonably haughtily, they began to look at their external - even great - neighbors, "little devils from across the sea."

The average Japanese treated the former civilizational mentors, the Chinese, more and more hostilely. And after the First World War - generally as "slaves of the lost state" (a typical curse in relation to the Chinese). The Chinese were contemptuously called "pigtails", referring to their wearing a scythe as a symbol of humility during the Manchu era.

domination.

And it wasn't just official policy. On the contrary, sometimes in relation to the same China, the political leadership of Japan itself was forced to take a more arrogant position than it would like - for fear of irritating Japanese public opinion ...

But there was not only arrogance, but also bitter truth in the words of the Japanese police chief, which he said to the arrested Chinese student (there were several thousand of them in Japan). The Japanese stated:

- Politically, your state is rotten, the financial situation is terrible. The people are dark, the army is mediocre, the Western powers occupy strong positions in your country and hatch insidious plans to swallow you. If not for our support

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ka, the country would long ago have shared the fate of Annam (Vietnam. - S.K.) or India ... "

This is how things developed in Japan at the beginning of the 20th century with one of the great (at least in terms of territory and population) of its neighbors.

As for Russia...

Japan neglected a possible friendship with Russia so much that at the beginning of the First World War, at the first request of England and France, it handed over to them those rifles that had previously been promised to Russia and which the Russian representatives, Generals Hermonius and Fedorov, unsuccessfully expected for several weeks!

OF COURSE, time put something in its place. In the summer of 1907, in St. Petersburg, the parties signed a fishing convention, and two days later, a Russo-Japanese agreement on general political issues.

In its vowel part, the parties pledged to respect the territorial

each other's integrity (here I'm just shrugging my shoulders), and also recognized the independence and integrity of China. In the secret part, the division of Chinese (by the way) Manchuria into Russian (northern) and Japanese (southern) spheres of "special" interests was recorded.

Russia recognized all the rights of Japan in Korea, and for this received the most favored nation treatment in Korea (in simple terms, this meant that the Japanese in Korea did not kick the Russians in the ass).

It would seem that our relations with Japan were getting better. However, everything was more complicated ... To a large extent, such a "thaw" was due to the fact that Russian-Japanese relations were cunningly and self-servingly "improved" by England and France, which in 1904 fell into "cordial agreement", called the "Entente" ...

The Entente plotted against Germany. Contrasting Russia with Germany, she also attacked Russia.

In passing, I note that, with the goal of organizing a pan-European

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ru, beneficial - in the final analysis - only to the United States, the Entente also beat on itself.

But the victorious war for the Entente and the United States against Germany was possible only after attachment to the "cordial consent" of Russia.

And Russia was distracted by the Far East. It was in order to turn it to the west - nose to nose with the Germans, that England put pressure on Japan. And France helped England (the Japanese, who fell into a "financial hole" after the "victory", were just negotiating a large loan with the French).

And the text of a seemingly bilateral agreement (and even with a secret part!) was even before (!) its signing approved (!!) by the British and French (!!!).

Eh, tsarism was not afraid, not afraid of either the Danaans, who brought gifts, or the crafty "friends", who precariously reconciled Russia with the former enemy only in order to set up a new, much more formidable enemy for her.

But it was possible to be friends with Germany, and build up with Japan cooperation, which had a serious geopolitical basis.

HOW IT HAPPENED!

A growing Japan was of no use to the United States, if only because its strengthening blocked America's paths to China. Even that part of the US Golden Elite, which was interested in providing a future opportunity for Japan to wage war with America, then did not strive for the rapid strengthening of Japan.

Russia, which was growing stronger, was not only unprofitable for the United States, but also permanently strategically dangerous. After all, an independent Russia, if it began to pursue a smart foreign policy, could quickly become the basis of an alliance between Germany, Russia and Japan. And then all the plans of the Golden International would come to a natural end.

That is, Japan and Russia had a common enemy even if

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if they peacefully, without threatening anyone, developed their natural civilizational potential.

They would have this enemy even if Russia and Japan themselves were absolutely friendly to all their neighbors.

They had this enemy because he himself considered the two countries as potentially hostile already by virtue of the very fact of their existence independent of the desires of this enemy.

And that enemy was the United States.

So the mutual need to counteract the Asian expansion of the United States objectively led to the idea of one or another unification of the policy of Russia and

Japan.

After the Russo-Japanese War, both Russia and Japan weakened, and this automatically entailed the activation of the Yankees. And so John Pierpont Morgan, the railroad tycoon Harriman and the indispensable (if you need to profit at the expense of Russia or play a dirty trick on her) the banking house of Kuhn, Loeb and Co. proposed a project for laying a global railroad through Alaska and Northeast Siberia.

Less than half a century ago, Russian tsarism abandoned Russian America, and this, in global terms, hiccuped us more and more often. Here and here - the project was brazen, with a claim to communication coverage by Americans of the entire globe. The Trans-Alaska-Siberian Railway, performed by the Yankees, would become one of the elements of the "web" entangling Russia. Moreover, the same company had plans for "reconstruction", and even the purchase of the Russian Siberian Railway ...

Here we recall the attempts of the Russian railway "king" Samuil Polyakov to buy off the Balkan railways with the help of the Russian treasury during the time of Alexander II. Polyakov was driven, of course, by a vulgar desire to swallow a fatty bite, although he covered himself with more than patriotic phraseology. But I remembered this failed project because the Russian Foreign Ministry instantly "hacked" it, frightened by the mere thought: what will Princess Marya Aleksev say ... oh, sorry - Madam Europe?

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But the Yankees didn't give a damn - who was there and what they would say! And here I agree with them in the sense that Russia should not have given a damn about everyone, except ... Except for Russia and those who were ready to respect Russia or, at least, take it seriously be considered.

In 1909, US Secretary of State Philander Chase Knox put forward (more accurately, of course, to say that "they put forward") the idea of "commercial neutralization" of Manchuria, including through the construction of new railways in China.

Knox was an active man, in the same 1909 he negotiated in Paris the sale of a concession to the United States for the construction of the Panama Canal, openly pursued "dollar diplomacy" in Latin America, and an "open door policy" in China. However, he preferred to open "doors" to foreign countries not so much as to break through.

Knox had enough ideas, arrogance and pressure - too.

So, he put forward a plan - as Baron Rosen from Washington informed Izvolsky, who was then already foreign minister, on January 19, 1910 - "acquisition by an international group of financiers of the entire network of Manchurian railways, already existing and still to be built in the future."

Yes, that's really what "Panama" is so "Panama"!

America also offered to establish international control and management on the railways of Manchuria. Let me remind you that in Manchuria at that time there were only the Russian CER and the former Russian (departed by Japan) South Manchurian Railway, YuMZHD (the former southern branch of the CER from Harbin to Port Arthur).

Knox also had a plan to build a new Jinzhou-Qiqihar road by an Anglo-American consortium. In its upper part, such a road would cross the Russian Chinese Eastern Railway a little, and down from the Chinese Eastern Railway it would go along mainland China two hundred kilometers west of the Japanese Southern Railway.

There was also a longer version of the Jinzhou-Aigong railway,

connecting the Liaodong Gulf of China with the Amur and

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running from Jinzhou through Qiqihar in Inner Mongolia to Aigun in Northern Manchuria...

All these options were needed and beneficial for both Russia and Japan no more than the fifth wheel of a cart.

Knox explained everything by concern for the "sovereign rights of China" and the "equal rights" of all powers. However, not even much to the appropriate irony, the Russian Foreign Ministry on January 21, 1910, in its memorandum to the US Embassy regarding the "internationalization" of railways in Manchuria, noted with caustic politeness: "As far as is known, neither China's sovereign rights in Manchuria, nor the policy of" open doors *There is no threat in this area at the moment. Therefore, the imperial government finds it difficult to clarify to itself those reasons, which lie in the present situation in Manchuria, which could cause the urgency of placing on the queue the requests now initiated by the government of the United States.*

The Japanese answered the United States in much the same way, And - almost to the day with Russia! There was nothing surprising here, because in developing their answers, the Russians and the Japanese exchanged confidential views. That is, in the new situation, Japan was not averse to somehow being friends with us, but only against the ambitions of the United States.

And on July 4, 1910, as we remember, another agreement was signed in St. Petersburg. In exchange for Russia's consent to direct annexation of Korea, Japan agreed to Russia's "freedom of action" in Northern Manchuria, Outer Mongolia, and Western China.

It was envisaged to hold consultations on measures to maintain the status quo in Northeast China.

In the secret part of the agreement (there was one), Russia and Japan again pledged not to violate each other's "specific interests" in the areas established by the secret part of the 1907 agreement.

And on November 30, 1908, that is, shortly before this joint Russian-Japanese action, which was the result primarily of the American

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Kansu railway geopolitical turmoil, US Secretary of State Ruth and Japanese Ambassador to the States Kogoro Takahira exchanged notes, and the US-Japanese Ruth-Takahira agreement on maintaining the status quo in the Pacific Ocean became a fact.

Then, by the way, Japan formally assured the United States of its agreement with the "open door" doctrine.

I ask the reader to remember the name of Elihu Root, because, although not soon, it will come up again in my story.

As for the agreement he signed, it must be admitted that in principle there is nothing forbidden in agreements between different countries. However, there was no clear consistency in the behavior of Japan.

And in the behavior of Russia?

I would like to acquaint the reader with an excerpt from the report of the agent of the Ministry of Finance in China, von Goyer (he, by the way, was later Kolchak's last finance minister).

On January 19, 1910, Goyer wrote to Finance Minister Kokovtsov, in particular, this: "*Should we go with Japan or with America? .. If Japan is ready to give us really tangible, effective guarantees of its peacefulness, if it presents us with factual evidence that the benefits, which she gains from approaching us, will not be in the near future*

turned against us, it is more advantageous to ignore the Anglo-Americans and conspire with her; otherwise, it should be borne in mind that, having turned away from the Americans and the British and now acting together with the Japanese in Manchuria, we to a certain extent lose their sympathy in the event of a subsequent break with Japan, which deceived us, and must be prepared for what they will tell us : "Serve you right, they brewed it themselves, and disentangle it yourself!"

Goyer did not predetermine the answer, but only gave information for consideration for the government, gave a competent analysis. And as a government official, I couldn't say directly that a smart government doesn't just expect a potential partner 260

ra some "tangible guarantees", and the very smart policy creates the conditions for the emergence of such guarantees.

Alas, just a state mind at the heights of the state
Russian authorities were not observed ...

Japan and Russia in 1910 jointly abandoned American plans to "neutralize" the railways in Manchuria. But this was not a strategic step, but rather a tactical one ... Although in the same days to which Goyer's note refers - in March 1910, Roman Romanovich Rosen, in a report to Minister Izvolsky, gave an overview of the mood of American society regarding Russia and placed considerable responsibility for "Japan's determination to enter into an open struggle with Russia" on Secretary of State Hay, on Jacob Schiff and on President Roosevelt. ("Mr. Roosevelt," wrote Rosen,

in spite of all his efforts to speak out always in the most friendly sense to us, he undoubtedly did not have sincere sympathy for Russia and the Russian people.")

And here is how the role of the banker Schiff was assessed:

" The personality of Mr. Yakov Schiff, a fanatical hater of Russia, comes to the fore. By his own admission, which we now have in an article in his organ The New York Times, he was the organizer of the financial operation that gave Japan the opportunity to enter into an armed struggle with Russia. He also ... taking advantage of the unlimited influence of Jews on the American press, was the inspiration for that press campaign,

which succeeded in instilling in American public opinion the conviction that great Russia was about to attack little Japan and that Japan, chivalrous and disinterested, was forced to take up arms in order to defend its very existence and, at the same time, the independence of Korea and the inviolability of the Chinese Empire.

About Schiff, Rosen said everything correctly. But, of course, no - even the most fanatical - hatred of a particular individual for Russia could not have so significantly changed the face of the global political situation, if the entire international Golden Clan, in which

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Schiff was only a trusted and active member. Actually, the victory of Japan was to a large extent a victory for the Schiffs, and without their support it could not have take place.

It turned out that for many reasons Japan was doubtful for us as a partner, but the America of the Schiffs, Hays, Knoxes and Roosevelts could not be an acceptable partner for Russia at all - from any point of view. She can't be him, by the way, even now. America is organically incapable of partnership.

By the way, during the Russo-Japanese War (and this, dear reader, very little is known), the American fleet advanced to the route of the probable

movement of Russian ships to the Far East. That is, America was ready if necessary, block that campaign of the Zinovy Rozhdestvensky squadron, which ended with Tsushima even without her intervention.

And then, for the first time in its history, the United States began to develop a plan for a military operation against Russia in order to block Russian cruisers in Vladivostok.

That's even how!

And I don't understand why even academicians kept quiet about this in the USSR at that time, as any C student in elementary school should have known about it.

The role of America (more precisely, Schiff's "America") in shaping the political situation in the Far East at the beginning of the 20th century should be discussed once again...

Well, the fact that the States set Japan against Russia and pushed Russia against Japan is still all right. It's more or less clear...

But it is completely incomprehensible at first glance ...

Making Japan an enemy of Russia and vice versa is a logical divide and rule policy already known to ancient Rome. To this end, the United States, together with England (translated by the Golden Clan in the short term into the category of a junior "partner" of the United States), contributed to the development of Japan's military power.

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But they contributed in a strange way. Anglo-Saxon loans were used to build the Japanese navy, which was built both in the USA and in England ... Meanwhile, Russia is a continental country, and the main knot of possible contradictions between Russia and Japan could only be tied up on land - in Manchuria, in Korea (he got stuck there).

A first-class, powerful and modern navy is extremely expensive at all times. With the money that Japan spent on armadillos, she could create such a land army that really could give Japan a chance to look at both Vladivostok and the left bank of the Amur!

True, a powerful land army could theoretically become for Japan an instrument for capturing China, but in reality Japan's interests lay in Korea and, as a continuation of them, in Chinese Manchuria. And this automatically oriented Japan - with a powerful land army - further north, to the Russian Far East and Eastern Siberia.

That is, the continental priority of the military efforts of its narrow-eyed neighbor across the Pacific Ocean seemed to be beneficial for the United States. And here - the Japanese built up the navy with the help of the Anglo-Saxons. And they built it up so that immediately after the end of the Russo-Japanese War, from 1906, Japan began to be assessed by the American command as the most dangerous enemy.

Indeed, before Tsushima, no one could have imagined that instead of the mutual extermination of the Russian and Japanese fleets conceived by the Golden Elite, the death of the Russian fleet and the powerful strengthening of the Japanese fleet were actually realized. Moreover, the strengthening, including due to Russian ships captured or raised from the bottom and put into operation by the Japanese.

And in the United States in 1907, the development of the first version of the "Orange Plan" began - the first in the history of the United States, a pre-prepared plan for war with a great power. And that power was Japan.

Literally on the eve of the signing of the Root-Takahira Agreement of 1908, the US Great White Fleet visited Japan. I can

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whose combination of sixteen newest battleships, painted white (hence the name), then wandered around the world, demonstrating to this world who is now "Who is who" ("Who is who") on the oceanic world expanses.

The Japanese greeted the white guests outwardly cordially, but unofficially advised them to get out as soon as possible and in good health, if they did not want the squadron to be sunk.

Already, even what kind of tone was taken away in relations with the Yankees by "little sea devils" ...

By the beginning of 1910, the "Orange Plan" was developed as a full-scale plan for the war with the Land of the Rising Sun, and by May 1913 it was finalized and provided for:

- the surrender of the front line of defense in the Philippines;
- retreat to the Midway-Hawaii line with an attempt to hold Guam;
- the subsequent transfer of the fleet from the Atlantic;
- Achieving victory through a counteroffensive and blockade of Japan.

It doesn't fit well in my head. Even then, the States were preparing, as we see, by no means for an easy and instantly victorious war with the Japanese. And at the same time, they strengthened Japan and behaved hypocritically with Russia.

What, in the USA they did not understand what they themselves were creating for themselves in the Pacific Ocean mighty naval enemy?

To develop the military power of Japan as a potential enemy of Russia would be a vile thing for the United States, but it is logical. But to develop Japan's military strength as a potential US enemy?

In fact, I have already spoken about the possible motives for such behavior of the Yankees, and here I will simply repeat: for America of pioneer farmers and dock workers, for America of miners and metallurgists, for America of Mark Twain and Thomas Alva Edison, this really was idiotic nonsense.

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But for the "America" of Jacob Schiff and Bernard Baruch, Dupont and Morgan, the "America" of the Roosevelts and Root, this was just creating the conditions for a future world war in the Pacific Ocean.

Golden "America" was preparing a world war in Europe, creating discord between Germany and Russia. And the same Golden "America" was preparing a world war in Asia for a longer perspective, creating discord between Japan and ... And - America ...

No, the logic of the Golden Clan was all right. That's just very vile and bloody it was, this logic of planning big wars of the 20th century.

Wars, abundant for the masses with tears and blood, and for the Golden International - new power and new gold.

1911 did not bring calm in the Far East. Here is how he describes it such a contemporary of the era as the Cadet leader Pavel Nikolaevich Milyukov:

"In the same year, 1911, a revolution took place in China, and the Manchu dynasty gave way to the republic of President Yuanshi-kai. The sovereign princes of Mongolia felt free from Chinese officials, soldiers and colonists - and declared Mongolia independent. Mongolian deputations appeared in St. Petersburg to ask Russia for support. Russia's interests were directly affected here, and support was provided... The desires of Mongolia were satisfied, but with the preservation of China's nominal sovereignty. Mongolia became autonomous... Thus, in Outer Mongolia, Russia was installed in the role of a patroness... The so-called Inner Mongolia came under the protection of Japan, and the spheres of "special interests" of Russia and Japan in Manchuria and Mongolia were more precisely demarcated.

Milyukov set out everything here, albeit briefly, but quite fully, and it only remains for me to add that the "demarcation" of spheres of influence in Mongolia was recorded in the Russian-Japanese secret convention of 1912, signed in St. Petersburg,

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In 1911, the Anglo-Japanese treaty was also extended ahead of schedule ... The signing took place on June 13 - either by accident or with intent. Superstitious English sailors did not want to sail on the 13th, but for some reason the British diplomats were not afraid to embark on a new "voyage" along the "Japanese waves" ...

However, the union was mutually renewed sluggishly and had rather the goal of reassuring the States in some way. There, the broad masses, dissatisfied with Japanese immigration, were already squinting at Japan with might and main ...

It happened "at the end" of 1911 and another event, the Soviet Historiography, which was also, for some reason, sparingly covered.

In December of this year, the US Congress denounced the treatise between Russia and the US on trade and navigation, signed by Russian Foreign Minister Nesselrode and US envoy to Russia Buchanan in 1832 (!!). Do you remember, reader?

The House of Representatives voted for denunciation by three hundred to one, and the Senate by seventy-two to zero. Unanimity for both chambers is the rarest!

What was the matter here?

And here's what ... As the annual report for the 2nd department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for 1912, written already when everything was over, said, "the official refusal of the government of the United States of America from the trade agreement of 1832 was caused by dissatisfaction with the existing procedure for admitting entry American Jews to Russia (actually, they were mostly Jewish emigrants to the USA from Russia — S.K.)".

On February 14, 1911, when the idea of denunciation only took hold of the broad masses of congressmen at the suggestion of their former colleague Herbert Parsons, Russian Charge d'Affaires in the United States Prince N.A. Kudashev wrote to St. Petersburg: *"Satisfaction will be given to a handful of Jews and some of their friends, but will it be in accordance with the inevitable irritation that will be caused in Russia by the denunciation of the treatise, which has been in force for about 80 years, on the basis of the stated motives."*

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So, in America they began to inflate the "passport conflict". In fact, Kudashev, for example, believed that "the backwardness of some provisions of our passport system" harms "our moral charm abroad," and there is little sense in restrictions.

So it must have been. But why break the treaties? And so old too! Moreover, this gap hit the economic interests of the United States more than it hit us.

Our ambassador to the United States, Yuri Petrovich Bakhmetev, was by no means always at his best, but I read his report to the Foreign Ministry of January 2, 1912 on the mood in the States after the denunciation with great pleasure in places and I will now cite some of the most expressive passages.

Bakhmetev, one feels, wrote in a cheerful state of mind, and there was reason to have fun - Russia did not always succeed (or rather, almost never succeeded) to tinker the Yankees with their muzzle (sorry) on the table or there "face" on the "table" ...

And he wrote to Minister Sazonov these words:

"Dear Sir Sergei Dmitrievich! The validity of the old saying "You cannot eat your cake and have it too" (You can't eat your cake and have it whole. -S.K.) has never been justified so instructively as in the present case: Americans hastily swallowed the cake and now look with bewilderment at empty plate, wondering why a fresh, even tastier piece has not yet appeared on it ... They all imagined what it cost in one fell swoop

get rid of the old treatise in order to immediately, automatically, replace it with a new one, concluded according to their own desires, without at all taking into account the other side of the issue, i.e. legal rights of Russia ... And, in my opinion, the longer we keep the Americans le bec

dans l'eau ("beak in the water"), the more convenient and calmer the issue will be resolved ... "

This is the psychology that would suit Russian diplomacy in any era and in relation to any country that reacted unkindly to us.

So, the States broke the long-standing treaty, and a new treaty was not signed even by the end of 1914. Trade relations, however,

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somehow developed even without it... After all, a hot time has come for traders and capitalists of the whole world - to forge gold, while it was still hot from the heat of the battles of the outbreak of the World War.

Two years before, the 27th President of the United States, William Howard Taft, called for replacing "bullets with dollars" in American expansion.

But it was just a beautiful phrase - dollars replaced bullets when there was no need for bullets, and when such a need arose, Uncle Sam instead of dollars from his wallet took out cartridges from his pouch.

The principles of "triangular" trade were not forgotten in the new version. But now the United States built the "trade triangle" differently: "bullets - dollars - bullets."

The outside world received bullets from the USA without return.
Dollars returned to the USA.

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Chapter 9

World War, Far Eastern "tangle" and Admiral Kolchak

Japan entered World War I with hesitation, but joined the side of the Entente against Germany. Tempted by the opportunity to expand its influence in China at the expense of German possessions. November 7, 1914 Japan occupies the German "leased" territory in China - Jiaozhou (Kiao-Chao) on the Shandong Peninsula in China with a naval base in Qingdao.

This immediately provided Japan with advantages in China for the future and destroyed the "Chinese" plans of the Germans.

The creator of the Qingdao base, Admiral Tirpitz, wrote in his memoirs:

"It was necessary, by investing a small amount of capital, to awaken to life values that the Chinese did not suspect existed, and to show, even in a small way, what Germany is capable of."

The calculation was not bad, but, as the same Tirpitz admitted: *"We had everything, there was only no policy that would allow us to consolidate this German test for a long time. The development of Qingdao was possible only if good relations with Japan were maintained."*

Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Ivan Stepanovich Isakov, commenting on this idea of Tirpitz, ironically about it and claims that Tirpitz did not understand: "it is the development of Qingdao that excludes in the future "friendship" with the Japanese imperialists." But Isakov wrote this already after a fragment of a German bomb had deprived him of one leg, that is, after the Great Patriotic War.

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war, which did not contribute to the sober view of the Soviet person on the essence of Russian-German relations, as well as on the potential role of Germany in

the world.

In fact, the option desired by Tirpitz was by no means excluded, but in the case of a German-Japanese-Russian Far Eastern agreement and alliance. And the very fact of such thoughts and a smart German speaks volumes.

"Admiral of the Atlantic Ocean" Wilhelm wanted to see Nikolai "Admiral of the Pacific." But Nicholas could have been him without a conflict with Japan, but simply having a powerful fleet in the Pacific Ocean, strengthening it at the expense of the Baltic Fleet already in the very first years of the 20th century. The Rozhdestvensky squadron anchored in the Golden Horn Bay of Vladivostok in 1901, plus smart diplomacy - and not only that there might not have been a Russo-Japanese war, but there might not have been an Anglo-Japanese alliance either.

Of course, such a strike force as four squadron battleships of the Borodino type (Borodino, Emperor Alexander III, Eagle and Prince Suvorov) was completed only by the middle of 1904, but also due to the available by 1901 year of the combat strength of the Baltic Fleet, and the naval forces of the Black Sea, it was possible to make the Pacific Fleet not only quantitatively, but also qualitatively different! Especially if you do not spend money on Port Arthur and Far.

But the Pacific bloc between Russia and Germany was possible with their European agreement, and Russia at that time was already looking for a "cordial agreement" with the British and French.

One way or another, with the beginning of the war between the Russians and the Germans, the Japanese blocked the Qingdao fortress and, after a short hostilities, with their sevenfold numerical superiority, took it. Their losses were, according to the British allies, 36 men killed and 181 wounded.

The case of the German Qingdao once again showed that the idea with the Russian Port Arthur was rotten from the very beginning, especially in a situation where there was discord between Germany and Russia, not an alliance.

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The Japanese operation in Qingdao was almost the only example of Japanese combat activity in that war. Nevertheless, Japan soon seized enviable ocean bases - the Mariana and Caroline Islands, bought back by Germany from Spain, as well as the German Marshall Islands.

Yes, the First World War turned out to be very beneficial for Japan and helped her to strengthen herself a lot. Here Japan, one might say, was lucky, because she was not involved in organizing this war.

All the more or less major powers of the world were then engaged in the European war, and Japan at that time conquered - where without shots, and where already with shots - the Asian markets. During the war years, the profits of Japanese enterprises doubled or tripled. The number of metallurgical plants in Japan has increased from 22 to 300, the number of shipyards - from 6 to 57! The number of industrial workers quadrupled. There are one and a half million of them in Japan -

almost as many as in Russia, with its three times the population.

And during the war years, Japan became the third naval power after England and the United States.

Japan bought from Europe and America, but it mostly sold to Asia. It was the same with capital: Japan borrowed from the "whites" and borrowed "colored".

The quality of Japanese goods back then was remarkably poor. Wealthy Japanese preferred European (including Russian) or American things. But during the First World War, the sale at inflated prices of a mass of Japanese goods, with the rapid growth of Japanese shipping, ensured in 1915-1918 a colossal (expression from the first TSB) influx of currency.

And he was still a lot - three billion yen. Two thirds of it Japan

used for the import of gold and the formation of foreign exchange reserves abroad, and a third - for the export of capital, and for 272 million yen, the Japanese bought Japanese valuables from foreigners.

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It is interesting to look at the Table of Japanese Exports (in millions of yen) before World War I, to its end and ten years later.

Product groups	1913	1918	1928
Silk	199.4	432.0	742.6
Tea	10.1	23.1	11.8
Grain	7.4	107.7	37.8
Minerals, metals, chemicals	82.0	237.7	91.7
Textile haberdashery	191.0	647.9	654.2
Paper, ceramics, matches	27.4	101.2	84.8
Hardware and cars	10.0	159.3	51.0

This table does not include exports to the Japanese colonies and is therefore particularly expressive. It can be seen that for Japan, the distant world war was really not a stepmother, but a mother. The United States, Europe and Russia themselves needed raw materials, metals, chemicals and metal products, and Japan supplied all this to them, but primarily to Asia, during the war.

The war is over - exports have also dropped sharply, with the exception of textiles. But textiles have already been traditionally Japanese export "horse" ...

What the first TSB wrote about also had its significance: "The late arrival of foreign capital in Japan and its weak introduction into the country after the Civil War were important conditions that allowed Japanese capitalism to develop and take an independent place under the sun."

Everything here, of course, is also true.

But - I will say already - that's how it is, however, if Japanese capitalism had not put Japan above all else from the very beginning, and not profit in its pure form, then Japan would have received not national capitalism, but comprador capitalism - as in China ... And yet - I didn't get it! And this is also one of those features of Japan, which op

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was divided by the features of the national character of its people and its history.

I, dear reader, do not admire the Japanese - it is enough that they have shown themselves to be great masters of admiring themselves (the clever Japanese writer Nitobe even put national conceit among the shortcomings of the national character in the first place). However, the inability to neglect the interests of Japan, combined with the ability to neglect the interests of everyone else, is still better than our Russian inability to put our own interests above (or at least not below) someone else's ...

So, in the World War, the Japanese army did not actually participate, but they rattled their weapons, as they say, with might and main. True, not in the direction of formal enemies, but threatening China, like Japan, which took the side of the Entente. In other words, an ally.

Yes exactly!

When it became clear that the war in Europe would not end soon and the white race would be drawn into it for a long time, Japan immediately pressed China sharply. heavenly

the empire, which had become a chaotic decentralized "republic", did not have much strength to resist, and on January 18, 1915, Japan presented its famous "21 demands" to Chinese President Yuan Shih-kai.

I don't know to what extent this number of them was due to the gambling addictions of the Japanese elite, but politically this set of requirements was a clear overkill.

Behind the super-expansionist demands, which, if met, would have given Japan complete political, economic, and military control of China, was the powerful Kokuryudan, the secret Black Dragon Society. And the Japanese ultimatum (you can't call these demands anything else) provided:

- ensuring "special rights" of Japan in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia;
 - an increase in the terms of the lease of the Kwantung region with Port Arthur and Dalian (Far), with the South Manchurian and Shenyang-Andong railways from 25 to 99 years;
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- legalization of the capture of Qingdao and the Shandong Peninsula;
 - transfer of German coal concessions to Japan;
 - the transfer to it of all rights and privileges previously granted to German citizens in Shandong;
 - transfer under joint management of the Khaniepinsky coal and metallurgical plant;
 - granting extensive railway concessions in the Yangtze basin (it was a straight and especially painful pin in the side of Uncle Sam);
 - granting the right to build a new railway from Chifu in Shandong;
- Japan's exclusive right to lease Chinese ports, islands and territories;
- unimpeded admission of Japanese military reconnaissance on Chinese territory;
 - the right of Japan to appoint under the Chinese government Japanese political, financial, economic and military advisers;
 - such control over the police departments of the most important points in China, in which the leadership of the police would consist exclusively of Japanese;

- the purchase from Japan of at least 50% of weapons imported by China from abroad.

Secret negotiations were held in Beijing for four months. China tried to somehow save face, but on April 27, 1915, after minor changes, the demands were again handed over to the Chinese government with an ultimatum, and on May 9, China accepted them and signed a secret treaty with Japan.

China accepted the ultimatum on the recommendation of the United States and Britain, given, of course, reluctantly heart.

England was bogged down in battles on the European continent and in the European seas. Even before the war, she even had to pull her armored squadron from the Far East, leaving only cruisers there.

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America was gradually preparing for that decisive period of the war when it will have to "personally" enter into it.

It was not up to China, especially since, although Japan took some practical steps to implement the requirements, soon after the end of the war, the very same States prevented her from doing so.

However, Japan's position has already strengthened - one way or another. It showed up and

in the fact that even Uncle Sam had to reckon with her and at the Paris Peace Conference, held in 1919 in Versailles, to transfer German rights to the Shandong province not to China (of which this formally leased province was a part), but to Japan.

Both CHINA and Japan were represented at Versailles by an equal number of delegates - five each. The Chinese delegation was led by Foreign Minister Liu Chen Xiang, while the Japanese delegation was led by a Genro member and twice Premier Saionji.

The Chinese sought the return of their own territory and argued that the Shandong Peninsula, on which 30 million Chinese live (that is, in number - half the population of then Japan), is the original Chinese territory, and even the birthplace of Confucius. This was the purest truth, but Saionji and his colleagues stubbornly insisted that Shandong had been "recaptured" from Germany - now defeated, and they will not give up "their own".

The Japanese stressed the "sacrifices" they had made in the name of "common victory". (In parentheses, I will inform the reader that Japan lost 300 (three hundred!) Soldiers and officers during the entire war (although there is data that increases this figure to a "whole" thousand.)

The "white" Entente objected to its "yellow" ally, although it objected, and resisted, but not always got her way.

Success always intoxicates the Japanese like wine - they themselves admit this and confirmed this in a peculiar way at Versailles ... Then US Secretary of State Lansing asked one of the Japanese representatives at the conference, Baron Makino:

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- Mr. Makino, I ask you to somehow soften the "Shandong" blow for China!

- That is?

- Well, you could come up with some kind of formal friendly statement.

- What?

"Actually," Lansing held out his hand to.
a sheet of paper - we jointly sketched a project here ...

Makino looked at Lansing impassively and was silent, and Lansing continued his persuade:

"It's even better if you see Liu Chen-hsiang additionally. Makino shrugged, and Lansing explained:

"Such a move would be met with the greatest approval everywhere and would raise the prestige of Japan!"

- Everywhere?

- Yes! And above all - in China, where otherwise bitter disappointment and indignation can result in violent resistance to you all over the country!

- Countrywide? repeated Makino contemptuously. - Is it China?
is something united as a state?

—?!

— No, Mr. Lansing, I listened to you very attentively and appreciate your your sincere efforts, but...

- But?

"But I can't take such an action and I'll tell you right away why ...
Why? Lansing couldn't resist.

"Because I'm afraid of the indignation..." here Makino pressed his voice, "Japanese public opinion.

It must be said that this behavior of Makino was programmed by the States themselves.

A year and a half before this "Versailles incident", November 2, 1917, the same

Robert Lansing traded with former foreign minister

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Japan's Foreign Affairs Council, the head of the Japanese special mission in Washington, Kikujiro Ishii, with notes where the United States and Japan mutually determined their policy in China. Recognizing Japan's "special interests" in China at a time when Japan had already annexed Shandong and the Qingdao base, America actually agreed to this Japanese takeover. Japan, on the other hand, reaffirmed its agreement with the "open door" policy.

The little incident around the Lansing-Ishii agreement illustrated well the entire US-Japanese-Chinese intrigue.

The publication of the agreement was scheduled for November 7th. But already on November 4, without the knowledge of the United States, Japan handed over the texts of the notes to the Chinese Foreign Ministry. China immediately declared that it does not recognize any agreement concluded regarding China by other countries.

But what did the protests of China mean then and a little later - in Versailles? And Shandong remained with Japan.

(What's interesting, I'll note in brackets!) The states eventually refused to sign the Treaty of Versailles, motivating this step by their disagreement with the transfer of Shandong to the Japanese.

"Well, what can I say?!" - I have to repeat the author for the umpteenth time ...

LANSING and Ishii exchanged notes after October 1917, and this great Russian October was not least the cause of mutual American-Japanese complacency. Russia, America, Japan and China were once again entangled in a contradictory "Far Eastern" tangle...

Japan and America could not but "be friends" together against China, although the limits of such "friendship" could not but be limited. As Baron Budberg wrote from Tokyo in 1918: "Japan's whole task is to keep China in disorder and try to break it up into component and warring parts."

At that time, *such* China suited the United States as well.

But, as Budberg noted again: "A healthy and powerful China is the end of Japan as an industrial and military power."

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And in this sense, *such a* China would also not be so bad for America. After all, such a China would save her from a Japanese competitor. True, a healthy and powerful China would itself become a competitor to the United States. The American-Japanese-Chinese intrigue was therefore variant, ambiguous.

But with Russia (and even more so with Soviet Russia), everything was simple and unambiguous. A healthy and powerful Russia was not needed by America from any side.

Japan or...

Far-sighted Japan needed, of course, a strong Russia... And far-sighted people, and simply loyal to Russia, were in Japan during the First World War. In the history of this war there is one little-known (of course, a great many of them) and exciting detail. A small detachment of the Japanese Red Cross operated on the Russian-German front. Yes, that's right - a Red Cross detachment from Buddhist and Shinto Japan. But in this case, from Orthodox Japan...

Here they are in front of me in the old photograph - seven touchingly concentrated Japanese sisters of mercy, and behind them - five Japanese medical officers in Russian-style tunics and a tall Japanese priest in an Orthodox cassock and with a Russian pectoral cross. This picture, these faces, these looks cut me to the core.

Ordinary people are always more humane than the elite... Even outwardly beautiful faces

Blood aristocrats of all nationalities abhor me like a dead gloss on the "faces" of wax mannequins - they have no life and struggle ...

But for some reason, even looking at the seemingly open and smiling faces of ordinary Anglo-Saxons or French, I do not often feel a sense of spiritual kinship and unity with them ... But how often I felt it, looking at the faces of the Germans - even dressed in uniform of the Wehrmacht... Even in it! Even with these young guys who came out of the hell of the Battle of Kursk, I want to be friends, not hostile! Even with them... Because they have sincerity...

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And these Japanese guys in Russian uniforms... Their faces... Their expressions look damn Russian! Of course, these are the Japanese, they are really friendly and spiritually close to us, the Orthodox Japanese ... Of course, their
A little...

But they were!

However, they did not determine the situation and relations between Japan and Russia. And Japan, drunk during the World War with its huge success, "paid for" by three hundred dead (what it was for the Japanese accustomed to earthquakes and typhoons!) Was also sure (although it would be more accurate to say that it was self-confident) that a *strong* Russia she needs it too.

And so - looking back at each other with distrust - Japan and the Yankees were inclined, if not to "be friends" against Russia together, then at least somehow demonstrate to each other their mutual readiness for possible future compromises on Russian territory.

In 1916, however, the situation was still different, and on July 3, 1916, the last agreement between tsarist Russia and Japan was signed in Petrograd (formerly St. Petersburg). And - at the initiative of Japan!

True, this was not without a cunning Japanese game, because in May 1916 the Japanese government informed Russia that Germany had supposedly offered Japan to conclude a separate peace with it. Petrograd trembled. Although he could have figured out how much Germany needs peace with Japan and how it can affect the position of Germany? And under what conditions could such a peace be concluded, taking into account the fact that Japan had already taken advantage of German possessions in Asia and was counting on even more in the future. Indeed, in the summer of 1916, the Japanese demanded that England conclude a secret agreement on the preservation of the former German islands in the Pacific Ocean north of the equator.

On February 16, 1917, England gave such guarantees to Japan. And then they were confirmed by other countries of the Entente (the United States was not officially notified).

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Japan deftly bluffed, taking advantage of the difficult position of the Anglo-French on the German front. Moreover, she was bluffing, because, without risking anything in a purely military sense, she was then firmly politically connected precisely with the Entente.

The point here was that, despite the formidable tone of the "21 Demands" and China's outward obedience to them, Japan in China was continually pressed by the Yankees. And Japan's alliance with the Entente somehow smoothed it all out, at least partially.

In 1916, the US made a number of loans to China and received several railroad concessions. And Japan suddenly "remembered" that the waters of the Pacific Ocean wash the shores not only of the great power of America, but also of another great power, at least geographically opposite to America, but much closer to Japan. That is, they remembered Russia ...

Of course, the Japanese wouldn't be Japanese if they didn't start with pressure here as well. Tsarism needed the supply of Japanese weapons, and the Japanese negotiators insisted on new fishing concessions in the territorial waters of Russia,

on the transfer to the Japanese authorities of the entire southern part of the branch from the CER to Liaodong and other "little things" ...

However, the initiative of a certain political "alliance" came from the Japanese. Russia, on the other hand, could see for itself the benefits of a bloc with the United States against the pressure of Japan. In any case, she could scare Japan with such a prospect with much more reason than Japan Russia - "Germanic" world.

Nevertheless, the Japanese in St. Petersburg, which became Petrograd with the outbreak of the war, "go ahead."

By treaty with Russia, Japan also hid from England. And Russia only provided itself with Japanese military supplies, but simply believed that for the sake of this "the game is worth the candle." Therefore, the Russo-Japanese Treaty of 1916 took place. Neither the Japanese nor the Russian side then knew that this was their last agreement, because Russian tsarism had a little more than six months of historical time left.

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And already a year after the Petrograd negotiations, in the summer of 1917, Japan began to accumulate troops in North Korea and North Manchuria and concentrate military supplies in strategic border points with Russia. Already taking full advantage of the Chinese turmoil, the Japanese now intended to warm their hands on the All-Russian turmoil.

(I will note in brackets that she succeeded in many ways.)

SO, to whom war is a stepmother, and to whom is a mother...

For the Land of the Rising Sun, the First World War became both a breadwinner, a "good rich aunt", and a "cash cow" ... And we already know how Japan's capital and its influence in Asia grew during this war. But how did prices for rice, textiles, and coal rise by 1917?

Well, I answer - forty percent.

At the same time, wages increased by ten.

In 1918, a wave of "rice riots" swept through the Japanese islands. On 10 million people rebelled in two-thirds of the country.

The strike movement in the cities was, however, relatively weak. The number of strikers in 1916 was only 8,413. In 1917, it increased several times, but the absolute figure was not impressive - 57,309 people.

By 1919, the growth was insignificant - 63,137 people, and in 1920 even a decline was revealed - 36,317 people.

In 1920, a natural post-war reaction began. In the economy of the country, which only profited from the war, there was a crisis. But the cost of industrial products fell by only 20 percent, and although in June 1921 there was an unprecedented strike of 35,000 Japanese shipbuilders, although securities on the stock exchange fell by half and a banking panic broke out in 1922, on the whole Japan was not shocked.

Here, perhaps, the property of the Japanese was affected, about which the Japanese scientist and government adviser Naito Torajiro

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said that Japan always reacted to even the most insignificant challenge from the outside as a single integral organism.

It wasn't a phrase. Therefore, even the poor Japanese (not to mention the wealthy) reacted to *significant* internal challenges to Japan's stability in such a way that this, on the whole, suited the highest authorities.

ON MARCH 4, 1918, Baron Budberg arrived in Tokyo for the post of Russian military agent (which he never took). He was supposed to replace Major General Viktor, who knew Japan and the Far East well.

Alexandrovich Yakhontov.

On the same day, after talking with an old acquaintance Yakhontov, Budberg wrote: *"According to Yakhontov, Japanese intervention in our Siberian affairs is apparently inevitable, but it is unlikely to go further than Transbaikalia; the greatest difficulty so far is the sharp protest of America, which does not agree to such a Japanese action."*

On March 7, a new entry appeared in the baron's diary: *"According to Yakhontov, the Japanese are very cunning and even more greedy; now they are full of desires, how it would be more profitable to use our misfortunes and extract from this the greatest benefit for their country; this benefit is drawn in the easy capture of the entire Russian Far East and laying its paw on the natural resources of this region (mountain and fish) that are extremely necessary for them. So far, Japan is holding back and squinting towards America, its irreconcilable rival in everything related to exploitative experiments in the Asian continent."*

However, the very next day, Budberg noted: *"The newspapers report that three days ago America gave its consent to Japan's intervention in the Russian Far East."*

As early as January 12, 1918, the battleship Iwami entered the port of Vladivostok "in order to protect Japanese subjects". Two days later, the cruiser Asahi and the British cruiser Suffolk joined him.

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Around the same time, the Japanese began to support the "ataman" Semenov - a person with more claims - within the limits, however, of what is permitted.

On April 4, during an attack on the Vladivostok branch of the Japanese trading office "Isido", two Japanese employees were killed. The reason (it was created, of course, by the Japanese themselves) appeared. And on April 5, the squadron of Rear Admiral Kato landed its first landing of the Marine Corps, thereby starting the Far Eastern intervention of the Entente.

At first, however, the Japanese simply watched the development of local events and did not interfere much in them. According to some reports, the Japanese at one time even returned the landing force to the ships - allegedly because of dissatisfaction with such a step inside Japan. The first is not excluded, because it was calmer on the ships, and it was possible to go ashore again at any moment. The second is doubtful. In Japan even ordinary Japanese were by no means pacifists and internationalists. For the most part, they traditionally viewed the interventionist actions of the authorities favorably for Japan.

Moreover, the Japanese presence in Russia could be described in one word - robbery. Or rather, two: polite robbery. And there was more to come...

Moreover, the first of the interventionists to come to Russia, the Japanese were the last to leave: on October 25, 1922 - from Vladivostok and only on May 15, 1925 - from the Russian, Soviet part of Sakhalin. They, unlike the United States and the Entente, showed the utmost tenacity. At first, from the borders of the RSFSR, then from the territory of the "buffer" of the Far Eastern Republic, and, finally, after December 1922, the Japanese were literally squeezed out of the territory of the USSR.

The American "Siberian Expedition" began with the dispatch to Vladivostok in March 1918 of the cruiser Brooklyn. However, the Yankees did not land *their* marines until June 29th. On this day, under the cover of Japanese troops, an uprising of the White Czechs rose. Stretching from the Volga region to the Golden Horn Bay of Vladivostok, the troops of the Czechoslovak Corps became the fuse of the great Russians.

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civil war over a vast territory. And after the city

completely controlled jointly by the Japanese and Czechs, the Americans appeared there.

On July 17, the State Department releases the memorandum. His style was already quite characteristic of that America, which in Europe ended the First World War by proxy and successfully laid the foundation for the conquest of Europeans by the hands of Europeans, and in Asia was forced to reckon with Japan's categorical unwillingness to be Uncle Sam's servant.

The memorandum reported that America had a negative attitude towards intervention in Russia, but was forced in the name of fulfilling its allied duty

help the Czechs.

This memorandum had an interesting background. On March 11, 1918 (while Baron Budberg was still filling out the Tokyo pages of his diary), US President Wilson sent a message to the Fourth Extraordinary All-Russian Congress of Soviets.

I will quote it in full:

Taking advantage of the Congress of Soviets, I would like, on behalf of the people of the United States, to express sincere sympathy to the Russian people, especially now that Germany has thrown its armed forces into the depths of the country in order to prevent the struggle for freedom and destroy all its gains and, instead of the will of the Russian people, to carry out German intentions.

Although the Government of the United States is, regrettably, not at present in a position to give Russia the direct and active support it would like to give, I would like to assure the Russian people, through this Congress, that the Government of the United States will use every opportunity to secure Russia's full sovereignty. and complete independence in its internal affairs and the full restoration of its great role in the life of Europe and modern humanity.

The people of the United States wholeheartedly sympathize with the Russian people in their striving to free themselves forever from autocracy and become the arbiter of their own destiny.

For all that, America captured by April 1918 four

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steamships of the Russian shipping company Dobroflot: Simferopol, Nizhny Novgorod, Tula and Chisinau (they were never given to us).

And Wilson's "gray eminence" - "colonel" House in the same days developed a program of US policy on the "Russian question", where the first points were: "1. Recognition of provisional governments that have been created or are expected to be created in various regions of Russia. 2. Providing assistance to these governments and through these governments.

And on August 16, 1918, the 27th and 31st regiments of the US Army landed in Vladivostok - a total of 3 thousand people. They came from Manila.

Four days before this - the Yankees had just set off - on August 12, the Japanese landed the 12th Infantry Division in Vladivostok. And this is 16 thousand Human.

On August 18, its commander, General Otani, a member of the Supreme Military Council of Japan, was appointed commander-in-chief of all allied forces in the Far East.

On September 3, additional American forces arrived - 5 thousand people from the 8th Infantry Division under the command of Major General W.S. Greys.

As early as July 8, America and Japan agreed on joint anti-Soviet military operations and on approximate equality of forces in Primorye and Siberia. However, in terms of the number of troops, both sides violated this agreement so simultaneously that the true severity of the situation here is fully revealed. not without reason

Budberg wrote at the beginning of March 1918: *"Local (Tokyo. —CK) newspapers are discussing the question of Japan's action to establish order in the Far East ... Japan is waiting for America to speak out on this issue, vigilantly and jealously following Japan's every step especially on the Asian mainland.*

Almost simultaneously, political steps were taken - the Japanese officially announced the sending of troops to Vladivostok on August 2, and the States - on the 3rd.

Appointed commander on September 14, Grevs settled in

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Vladivostok with its headquarters of the American Siberian Expeditionary Force. Formally subordinate to Otani, he stayed there until April 1 (I'm not kidding!) 1920.

From the sea, Grevs was supported by the US Pacific Fleet under the command of Admiral Knight. The cruisers Brooklyn, Sacramento, Vir, Albany, New Orleans were moored in Vladivostok...

By November 1918, the Japanese increased the number of their troops in Russia to 73 thousand and gradually occupied our Primorye. The Americans followed slowly behind them. They avoided active hostilities and for the entire time of the Siberian expedition lost 170 (one hundred and seventy) people. 36 (thirty-six) Yankees were killed, and 134 died from wounds and diseases. Another 52 (fifty two) people were injured.

By the way, the Americans did not "fight" more actively in the North of Russia, where the first battalion of marines was landed in Murmansk on May 24, 1918 from the cruiser "Olympia". In total, in the North, by the beginning of January 1919, almost 6 thousand Americans had accumulated as part of the North Russian Expeditionary Force (700 of them were railway engineers - the Yankees took control of the roads right away!).

They just accumulated, because they were inclined to fight, and not *to be present*, in the north no more than in the east. Although in the north they had to fight a little (there, the Americans killed 144 people in battles and 100 people died of disease and as a result of accidents, 305 were injured).

It turned out that many Americans were in the garrison of the city of Shenkursk. However, at the end of January 1919, Shenkursk was taken by the red troops of the former Major General of the General Staff Samoilov. Together with the White Guards-Aborigines then went to parts of the expeditionary corps.

The effect was deafening: an order came from Washington forbidding the Yankees to be placed in the front line, and in June 1919 their evacuation began in general ...

America's main calculation was then already on Kolchak, whose troops were marching from Siberia to Samara. And before that, January 9, 1919

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2009, a Japanese-American agreement was signed in Tokyo to establish joint control over Russian railways, including the Chinese Eastern Railway.

The general control over Siberia and the Far East was then in the hands of ...

And really - in whose hands was he then? American? Japanese? White Guards?

It is unlikely that anyone could give an unambiguous answer to this question then ...

The United States had 9,000 troops there, and Japan ten times as many...

But everything, my dear reader, was not so obvious ... After all, at one time the United States had at its disposal in eastern Russia such a very serious and promising factor as Admiral Kolchak.

THE NAME OF KOLCHAK is widely known, but for me there was always a lot of incomprehensible things in his post-revolutionary counter-revolutionary rise. While working on this book, I peered into it already in detail, and

many obscure things have been cleared up. Kolchak began to look, although more understandable, but also more gloomy, more sinister and unsightly character in Russian political history.

And just in the story with Kolchak one can see not just disloyalty to Russia, but a special *sophistication and echelonism* of the anti-Russian policy of the Golden Elite of the West and the USA.

Sophistication, which the "historians of the Central Committee of the CPSU" managed not to consider for many decades. The Russian defrocked "historians", such as Valery Krasnov, who did not disdain vulgar plagiarism from the Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, almost hit the admiral's apologetics. There is no time for thoughtful analysis ...

Although "Kolchakiada" is a fertile field for analysis, already because all other leaders of the white movement in their postrevolutionary

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revolutionary actions and in his "white" career are quite clear. Kolchak, I repeat, seems to be a figure not only with a double, but, perhaps, with a triple bottom.

And why I think so, the reader, I hope, will become clear from acquaintance with the following story about Admiral Kolchak and his time. This story will not divert us from the topic, because Kolchak's quasi-"odyssey" intertwines many significant and poorly lit collisions of the Far Eastern efforts of Japan, the West and the United States both in relation to each other and in relation to Russia.

And all this is especially interesting in the part of the USA ...

Naval officer Alexander Vasilyevich Kolchak became famous already at a young age thanks to participation in the expedition of the polar explorer Baron Toll. The Imperial Russian Geographical Society then awarded him its highest award - a large gold Konstantinovsky medal. And through the maritime department, he received the Order of Vladimir ...

After participating in the Russo-Japanese War and Japanese captivity, Kolchak was appointed to the Main Naval Headquarters, and later became the first commander of the new Vaigach icebreaking transport, but did not go into the polar voyage - he was returned to the General Staff for the position of department head. As the latter, he laid, among other things, the foundations of a ambitious program for the construction of superdreadnoughts (battleships) of the Izmail type.

I must say that this grandiose program in terms of material and financial costs was basically rather wrecking - due to the stupid distortion in the construction of the Russian fleet on the eve of close serious events. The Ishmaels, having squandered huge (and "fallen") funds on them, built, but never completed the construction. And the Russian army on the fronts of the world war was sorely lacking in either field artillery or shells for it ...

Kolchak also labored at that time in the State Duma as a naval expert. That is, the allegedly "apolitical" officer was in fact well received as his own in the new body of the bourgeois

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noah Russian policy. But after that he preferred to keep quiet about it ...

I did not find any documentary evidence of certain connections between Kolchak and the military industrialists. However, I can assume something ... Unlike the generally capitalist industrial elite of the Russian Empire, the shipbuilders associated with the maritime department belonged mainly to the "state" nation, that is, they were Russians, and in this sense they were sufficiently nationalists, but by no means monarchists. On the other hand, they also had good connections with foreign ship manufacturers, the leading of which were the Anglo-Saxons. And in this sense

Russian businessmen were quite typical cosmopolitan capitalists.

I think that Kolchak - already by virtue of his involvement in promising shipbuilding programs - could not help but have serious acquaintances in this environment. Another thing is that he did not advertise them then, and only later - and even more so ...

I note that nine years later - already during the Civil War - Kolchak, who seemed to know well about the program for creating superdreadnoughts, spoke for some reason about a series of ships not of the Izmail type, but of the Kinburn type. "Kinburn" in the series was, however, not the lead. A trifle, but strange.

And such strange inconsistencies, large and small, in the life of Kolchak - spare at least.

He really came to the fore during the First World War as a capable and energetic naval officer-miner. Although it should be noted that the future admiral served directly on combat destroyers for a total of just over a year!

During the siege of Port Arthur, he, who had *absolutely* no mine experience before, for some time commanded the destroyer "Angry". And, as some sources report and as he said - again, already during the Civil War - he himself, on the mine "bank" exposed by "Angry", was blown up by the Japanese cruiser "Takasago" (one source loyal to the admiral calls him "the latest Japanese cruiser Takasago").

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There really was such a cruiser in the Japanese fleet, although it can hardly be called the newest. Built in 1897, she was not so young among Japanese small (light) cruisers. It was launched in 1897, and the Tsushima-class cruisers and the Otava cruiser were considered the newest in this class.

The cruiser "Takasago" died on a mine bank near Port Arthur on November 30, 1904. Possibly, Kolchak also put it up, but the mine bank is a pre-planned business, and the commander of the "Angry" was only required to carefully carry out a plan and combat order not developed by him. Of course, in reality, this "only" was far from a simple matter, but it fit perfectly into the framework of routine combat work.

Kolchak appeared in Port Arthur on March 18. Acting was appointed. artillery officer on the Amur mine layer, on April 21 he became the commander of the Angry, and in May he was admitted to the hospital for two months with pneumonia. He did not participate in the naval battle on July 28 - he was ordered to remain in Port Arthur. On November 2, Kolchak was appointed commander of a coastal battery, but soon articular rheumatism again put him in the hospital, from where he was already taken to captivity.

It is unlikely that Kolchak made a serious contribution to the training of the crew of the ship entrusted to him. Yes, "Angry" (already without Kolchak) fought well, broke through during the surrender of Port Arthur to Chifu ... And Takasago was blown up on the bank he put up ...

But this is hardly proof of the high "mine" level of his short-lived commander. Obviously, therefore, in one, very "monarchically" oriented, naval reference book of the early 90s of the XX century, an extensive and very benevolent article about Kolchak about the Japanese cruisers blown up by his mines, which is very benevolent to the admiral, remains completely silent and only sparingly reports that "under the direction of (? - S.K.) A.V. Kolchak, minefields were placed on the approaches to the Russian base "...

Also weird...

Kolchak was just a destroyer commander, and besides, I repeat, he had no past mine experience. Even if he had

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some ingenious innovative approaches to mine productions, not mediocre

the Port Arthur naval authorities would allow the young officer to lead (!) The mine defense of the main base. All he could do was, as I said, carry out someone else's order within the competence of an ordinary commander

destroyer.

By the way, Kolchak's "Japanese" awards are not impressive either: "ensign's dream" - "cranberry" Anna of the 4th degree, a "golden" saber and, after captivity, Stanislav of the 2nd degree ... To understand the value of the Polish-born three-degree order St. Stanislav, you need to know that he was among the Russian orders after Anna in seniority, that is, he was one of the most insignificant (especially in the lower degrees) awards ...

For the "newest" Japanese cruiser (if he really would be on Kolchak's track record) - more than a little. For example, even the last officer of the Varyag received the 4th degree for the battle at Chemulpo Georgy. (Kolchak also received it during the First World War, but already in decent ranks - not so much, presumably, for a personal feat, but for status, for leading a tactical landing operation).

By the beginning of the 1910s, Admiral Essen became Kolchak's patron. The commander of the Baltic Fleet, he was considered a talented miner. But Essen also did not have serious combat personal experience in this part. Another thing is that, in general, Russian sailors were able to lay mines.

From 1912 to 1913, Kolchak commanded the destroyer Ussuriets on the Baltic Fleet, and then, with the rank of captain of the 1st rank, he began to command the destroyer "Border Guard".

Strange again... These ships were usually commanded by lieutenants (very rarely by captains of the 2nd rank). Everything was explained by the fact that Kolchak was taken by Essen as a flag captain, and the "Border Guard" played the role of Essen's messenger ship. That is, he did not carry out military service.

Kolchak began to fight in the same Baltic. In January 1915, he led the successful 4th Danzig minefield operation.

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to her. Those who admire Kolchak usually do not notice the number of this operation, and he tells us that before Kolchak, only near Danzig, three major Russian minelayings were made, carried out without Kolchak's leadership.

And not these mine positions were the main ones. The central (but by no means the only) mine position was placed before the start of the First World War and at its beginning. Moreover, at this position alone, 3285 mines were dumped into the waters of the Baltic Sea. The distance between them was about fifty meters. Just!

So the command of the Baltic Fleet (the same Essen and its flag officer) was taken here, perhaps by skill, but rather by numbers.

To put such a gap of mines in the conditions of small and evil Baltic pitching was, of course, a matter of great art and a great feat. However, this was a feat of the biggest hard workers of the war - destroyer teams and their commanders, who spent several months in Port Arthur and Kolchak.

As for the commanders of these commanders, then - not being a professional - I will nevertheless make the assumption that the Russian admirals, including Kolchak, did not possess some *unique* secret of organizing mine positions.

Knowing a trade is a valuable and rare quality. However, knowledge of the craft only part of the talent, and the part that is not developed in a year or in three. Kolchak may have had a mine talent ... But knowledge of the craft ...

And, perhaps, in the mine business, the admiral should rather be considered as a talented adventurer (even though he even wrote theoretical works on the mine business).

June 28, 1916 Kolchak was appointed commander of the Black Sea Fleet. There, he seemed to be a skillful organizer of a mine war, although ... Although the main mine productions (one Bosphorus has more than two thousand mines!) Were conceived and prepared under his predecessor, Vice Admiral Eberhard.

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Andrei Gustavovich Eberhard was a natural sailor, sailed a lot, knew staff work well, and in 1911, at the age of fifty-five, he became commander of the naval forces (since 1914 - fleet) of the Black Sea. He ensured a good level of combat readiness for the fleet, he knew the theater of naval operations perfectly, and I think he was respected in the navy. The later famous writer Konstantin Paustovsky ended up in the military Sevastopol in the spring of 1916, and his description of a fleeting acquaintance with young Chernomorsk officers contains brief but convincing evidence in this regard.

Before the war, Eberhard and his staff developed two versions of the fleet's operational plan for combat operations. It was reasonable to envisage both the case when the initiative would be in the hands of the enemy, and the case when the activity would be ours. But the Main Naval Staff rejected both options, and Eberhard had to lead his entire combat life as a commander in the conditions of tied hands. Suffice it to say that Eberhard had no right, without the permission of the high command, to go far out to sea and even conduct reconnaissance in the southern part of the theater of naval operations off the coast of Turkey (they say, there is no need to "tease the Turks"). Although under these conditions, under the leadership of Andrei Gustavovich, the Russian squadron twice seriously patted the newest German battleship Goeben, which sailed formally under the Turkish flag and was renamed Sultan Selim on this occasion.

In order to complete a brief portrait of the one who had to give way to Kolchak, I'll say that Eberhard, who retired on December 13, 1917, remained in Petrograd, was arrested by the Cheka in 1918, but was soon released on April 19, 1919., in the sixty-fourth year life, but died in Petrograd.

A descendant of Russian Germans, on Russian soil...

Alas, the current "Russian" "historians" did not say a particularly kind word about him. Perhaps just because, unlike Kolchak, he served the Motherland honestly and did not step in the way of the new Russia. They write about Kolchak as a super-combat admiral. However, I

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I doubt the validity of such an assessment, if only because the people and sailors forgive a lot for the combat admiral.

But they did not forgive Kolchak.

Looking at his portraits, one can, of course, assume great will and energy. However, as the future showed, the admiral did not show them in the loudest and most decisive period of his life. But a really strong character really manifests itself precisely in the most difficult circumstances - unless, of course, he has in his hands the opportunity to influence

on them.

In Civil, in Siberia, Kolchak had it! And didn't use it.

So far, however, he is still on the Black Sea in 1916 ... There was no serious naval war there (as, by the way, in the Baltic, where the very weak German naval forces were not much stronger than on the Black Sea).

This is all to the fact that by world (not by Russian) standards, Kolchak could hardly be considered a kind of genius in mine warfare, landing operations, and anti-submarine warfare. He had experience, but not one that would put him forward among the Allied naval officers to prominent positions of outstanding

expert.

And I ask the reader to remember this conclusion of mine.

After the revolution, Kolchak did not get along with the sailors and on June 6

In 1917, by the decision of the Sevastopol Council, he was dismissed from his post. His current biographers portray this conflict in tones that are flattering for Kolchak. And emigrant historians in the sixties of the last century in the journal "Military Story" painted a touching (completely, however, refuted by the story of the admiral himself) story about a dagger (in some versions, a saber) thrown into the sea, which the ashamed-de sailors allegedly got from the bottom of the sea and returned to the owner, recognizing his power and greatness ... I, however, more trust not the historical, but the everyday fact that many mutts on the Ship Side in Sevastopol had the sonorous nickname Kolchak in the early 20s.

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Yes, in fact, if you get acquainted with the description of events by Kolchak himself, it is clear that he rather took advantage of a convenient occasion and refused to command the fleet himself or provoked his "removal" from his post (for a regular officer, in fact, unauthorized, since "dismissing" only top management could).

True, his biographers also refer to a direct order from the Provisional Government to surrender the fleet and depart for St. Petersburg. But in fact (as the admiral testified during the investigation), Kerensky simply agreed to the resignation of Kolchak, which he took without asking anyone, arbitrarily.

If you know his subsequent life, then we can assume that Kolchak's departure from the fleet was part of a plan cleverly and secretly conceived by *many* inside and outside of Russia to turn the country, which had been stirred up by the revolution, towards a military-bourgeois dictatorship.

Kolchak was needed in the center of events, in St. Petersburg. He went to the center. Unless, of course, he was secretly summoned there.

And he didn't go himself (soon I'll tell you with whom). And how and with whom he left for the capital only strengthens the suspicions about the admiral.

The reader who has read about Kolchak may assume that the author's imagination has gone wild, but I'm not just inventing it out of nowhere here. The very next strange detail in the admiral's biography gives grounds for the assumption that his resignation and moving to the capital were precisely planned - both by him and his well-wishers in the capital.

It is believed that Kolchak was appointed commander of the Black Sea Fleet instead of Admiral Eberhard because Eberhard de could not paralyze the "daring actions of the German ships." Although the fleet under the command of Eberhard fought not so badly and, by the way, in early March 1916 successfully landed troops on the Anatolian coast of Turkey. But these were operations in cooperation with the army and in its support.

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The purely maritime "passivity" of Eberhard was explained by the fact that the Supreme High Command - I remind you - deprived him of the right to distant exits to the sea. For some reason, Kolchak immediately received such a right and went under the Bosphorus - to do there those new mine productions that Eberhard conceived, but could not carry out because of his hands tied from above.

Kolchak himself explained his appointment by the fact that, they say, at the Headquarters they believed that he would be better than anyone else to be able to carry out the Bosphorus landing operation, scheduled for the spring of 1917. Why did the Baltic Kolchak suddenly have such a reputation - it is not clear. By that time, the most serious landings had been made on the Black Measure - just at Eberhard.

In his memoirs, former naval minister Grigorovich attributes the initiative to appoint Kolchak to himself. "I saw," Grigorovich reported, "that the Sovereign was not very pleased with such a request of mine, but, to my surprise, he

easily agreed...

Of course, Grigorovich Kolchak knew earlier from the Main Naval Staff, but the minister was well acquainted with the top of the Cadets, who in 1916 were already preparing a coup d'état with might and main. And the capital's military-industrial circles, associated with the Cadets, could not help but know Kolchak on the program for the construction of "Izmail" ... So the admiral's candidacy could also be given to the minister suggest.

But where does Nikolai's compliance come from?

And here on the pages of this story appears the brave figure of the colonel of the Intelligence Service, Samuel Hoare (the former head of the secret guard of the tsar, Alexander Spiridovich, calls him "Hoar"). Even then Hoare was a member of the House of Commons, later became Minister of Foreign Affairs and left a significant mark on English politics. And at the beginning of 1916, he arrived in St. Petersburg at the head of a British military intelligence mission with special powers, both official and - not very ...

The British ambassador Buchanan listened to Hoare.

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The choir (who had mastered the Russian language well) was well received in the Military Industrial Committee (VPK) - the "headquarters" of business "Russian" people.

The choir was also good with the Cadets, with the Anglophile Milyukov.

And, by the way, Choir was a fellow student in Cambridge of Prince Felix Yusupov - one of Rasputin's assassins.

He assessed the situation very soberly and understood that the autocracy itself was leading itself to collapse. But also to the State Duma, as a "constitutional" replacement the king, he did not really believe.

The chorus believed in determined people, but such determined people who would also be quite gentlemen in the sense that they would also be Anglophiles. For what kind of a gentleman is he who does not love the mistress of the seas and the homeland of gentlemanliness, Britain?

By the way, speaking of British intelligence officers in Russia in 1917, one should note such a little-known fact as the involvement in the events of the famous English writer William Somerset Maugham, author of *The Burden of Human Passions* ... After the outbreak of the First World War, Maugham worked in intelligence, spent a year in Switzerland, and then he was sent to Russia on a secret anti-Bolshevik mission. And already in 1938, in the book "Summing up", he admitted: *"I do not ask me to believe that if I had been sent to Russia six months earlier, I might have had a chance to succeed. Three months after my arrival in Petrograd, thunder struck, and all my plans went to pieces."*

I don't know about Somerset Maugham, but Samuel Hoare had an influence on Buchanan. Buchanan, on the other hand, was firmly attached to Nicholas. And now - as Hor-Hoar himself later admitted - it was he, together with the British ambassador, who put pressure on the emperor, insisting on the appointment of Kolchak as commander of the Black Sea Fleet. For some reason, not a single biographer of Kolchak wrote about this, but this fact is simply revealing! Why did Khor so persistently (at the highest level!) take it into his head to ensure a quick career for some ordinary Russian admiral? He didn't even know him personally!

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And, of course, Kolchak was recommended to Khor by his "military-industrial" friends. In any case, I personally see no other explanation (if not

suggest direct recruitment of the admiral).

But these friends, it seems, in advance - even before the February Revolution they were preparing - considered the admiral as one of the figures of a possible future bourgeois dictatorship.

After February 1917, their interest in Kolchak could only increase. Even though they were wrong...

TO prove this, dear reader, perhaps it is here that I will introduce you to several characteristics of Kolchak, given by people who knew him well and - most importantly - knew him in a businesslike way.

These characteristics are given by such different people (and at such different times), but at the same time they are so similar that they convincingly prove the fallacy of the calculations of those who in one way or another "bet" on Kolchak as a political figure.

Despite the fact that Kolchak certainly made a strong impression on the civilian cadet "shtafik". He looked like a strong-willed person, and could anyone think otherwise given his harsh polar past?

But was he really like that? Here is what Kolchak's colleague A.A. wrote in his report to the Minister of the Sea. Sakovich: *"Kolchak is too impressionable and nervous, because he does not know human psychology at all. His absent-mindedness, frivolity and completely indecent state of nerves provide the richest material for all kinds of anecdotes. A person like him cannot have a beneficial effect on the general course of events, because his activity is sporadic, very rarely justified and almost always extremely unpleasant for everyone."*

Alexander Konstantinovich Clifton, who headed the Russian Printing Bureau at Kolchak in Siberia, a prominent cadet, newspaper editor, already knew Kolchak as the "Supreme Ruler", and this is how he certifies him: "To me, like others, it seemed that in the person of Kolchak we have

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an honest national leader and patriot around whom the democratic elements are grouped. We saw that this government had no program, that it had no power, that it could not be strong... But then it was not yet clear that we did not have the dictator Kolchak, but had a toy in the hands of a number of atamans, with one side, and on the other hand - Headquarters and military ... Nothing was created here, but that bouquet of cruelties and horrors developed, which is a sign of impotence."

Kolchak's Minister of War, Baron Budberg, naturally said a lot of flattering things about Kolchak. But he said about him like this: *"He is spoiled by success and very sensitive to failures and troubles ... Always deceived and deceived, overwhelmed by a thirst for personal work, completely ignorant of the situation and unable to understand it ... "*

Budberg considered his "Supreme" a neurasthenic and a man without a will of his own.

Kolchak's General Sakharov, on the contrary, writes about a strong-willed character, but immediately illustrates his assessment with the following words: *"Alexander Vasilyevich ... was very quick-tempered. Moods quickly changed under the pressure of minor events and the first news, the amplitude of fluctuations from full hope to its decline passed easily and quickly "-*

Yes, the will here can be seen downright "iron", there is nothing to say! Especially if you remember that we are talking about a professional military man, and even a sailor.

Leonid Ivanovich Shumilovsky before becoming Kolchak's minister

labor, lived for forty-three years, graduated from the Faculty of History and Philology of St. Petersburg University, taught at the Barnaul Women's Gymnasium, was a member of the Central Committee of the Menshevik Party ... *as a strong personality, he will be able to contain the military environment and protect the state from those shocks that inevitably threatened from the right ... Popularity in democratic countries - America, England (I note that if she was, then not because of the merits of the admiral, but because*

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his advertising by those who counted on him. —CK), the ability to put myself in a military environment... and forced me to vote for him... I then came to the conclusion that he is a bad Supreme Ruler. But I considered him irreproachably an honest man..."

As for honesty, that's how to say it. Kolchak, of course, was not a thief. But it's not good for him to dissemble more than once and in a big way. And he knew how to act. And, it seems, he played talentedly and was so fond of his game that he made others believe in himself and others.

But for the time being...

AT THE TIME, when Kolchak was on the Black Sea, and Tsar Nicholas was on the throne, an inter-allied conference began in Petrograd in January 1917. There were Englishmen, Frenchmen, Italians... There were - where to go? — and Russians.

Colonel Horus called the conference "Noah's Ark." He believed: "Neither the people, nor the government, nor the emperor wanted the arrival of the allied mission ... this large company of politicians, military men and experts ... This was an importunity in the hour of trials of their Motherland ... "

Of course, it was also importunity. Still would! After all, Russia was on the eve of that February revolution, which was prepared not by the sailor Zheleznyak and the Bolshevik Leninists, but by the industrialists and the Cadets.

No matter how you look, the allies arrived at the wrong time...

However, who cares ... Because, if we leave aside the French and Italians, who are losing their importance and weight, then it must be said that the British pursued quite definite goals in St. Petersburg and were sure that they had come to Russia just right ...

The fact is that the English delegation was headed by Lord Alfred Milner, and this is how the Irish politician Gynell assessed the essence of his mission: "Our leaders ... sent Lord Milner to Petrograd to prepare a revolution that destroyed the autocracy in the ally country." Ginnell was still in anger at the brutal reprisal of the London leaders with the unfortunate (after all, the milners did not support him

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lived, but suppressed) by the Irish National Revolt. Therefore, he was quite frank, and we are simply obliged to believe him here.

But if that was the case, then Hoare, Buchanan, the Cadets, Milner, Milyukov, the military-industrial complex, and many others were parts of the same political mosaic. And it looks like Kolchak was "built into" this mosaic. And even before the February Revolution.

Kolchak was associated with the Cadet Duma, with the industrialists ... And it was hardly a matter of chance that Kolchak supported the "Kerenshchina" from its first days as commander of the fleet, and at the end of May 1917, as sources say, he himself — met in Odessa with A.F. Kerensky personally.

I do not rule out that the two Alexanders really got to know each other then, just as I do not exclude the possibility that they only *renewed* their pre-revolutionary acquaintance. There were enough places in St. Petersburg-Petrograd where they could be introduced ... One way or another

otherwise, but on the return passage to Sevastopol, having Alexander Fedorovich Kerensky on board the flagship destroyer, Alexander Vasilyevich Kolchak spent the whole night in conversation with him.

What they talked about there, Kolchak told us sparingly (and Kerensky generally kept silent), but it was as if they argued a lot about the essence of discipline. And Kerensky could not fail to remember the tough position of the admiral. However, if he had forgotten about Kolchak, there would have been someone to tell him - the same Samuel Hoare.

The fast days and nights of the first revolutionary summer flew by... And in the white nights, the future white "Supreme Ruler", who had arrived there from the Black Sea, wandered around St. Petersburg.

And on June 17, 1917, the former associate of Baron Toll, the former commander of the Black Sea Fleet, the legal husband of Sofya Feodorovna Kolchak - Vice Admiral Kolchak wrote a letter to his beloved woman Anna Timireva ...

Also married, Timireva was the daughter of a famous Russian pianist and conductor Vasily Safonov and met Kolcha

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com in early 1915. And now it was to her that the admiral wrote: *"So, I found myself in a position close to a condottiere who offered a foreign country his military experience, knowledge and, if necessary, his head and life in addition ..."*

The hour of trials had come for the Motherland - even Khor, a stranger, understood this. A allegedly a patriot Kolchak at this hour decides to go to the mercenaries of a "foreign country".

Strange...

The "foreign country" was the United States.

How did it happen?

And why?

And was it true?

We already know something in order to speculate, but even more, dear reader, we have to find out ...

Now one can only guess about the POSSIBLE prehistory of Kolchak's pre-revolutionary ties with the emissaries of the Golden Elite of the world (although the patronage of Khor speaks for itself). The visible (that is, authentically known) "American" post-revolutionary line in the fate of Kolchak arose as follows ...

Almost all sources, in complete agreement with each other, report that on June 7, 1917, Kolchak met in Sevastopol with 60-year-old American Rear Admiral James Harold Glennon, who, with a group of naval officers, came to the Black Sea, allegedly in order to study under the leadership of Kolchak him the setting of minecraft and methods of combating underwater

boats.

I note that no more than a dozen German boats operated on the Black Sea at different times of the war (and in the 1916 campaign alone, the German fleet received 95 new boats, used mainly against the British). So did the overseas Anglo-Saxons have to go to the Black Sea for the experience of anti-submarine warfare?

One way or another, Glennon arrived in Sevastopol. However, Kolchak

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just gave up command of the fleet (more precisely, the fleet abandoned it). In fact, besides Kolchak, there were other officers in the Navy with considerable combat mine experience, but for some reason Glennon's mission immediately lost interest in the Black Sea Fleet without Kolchak. And, having not even really bathed in the Black Sea, the Yankees drove off that same evening back to St. Petersburg.

But not alone.

Kolchak rode in the same carriage with them.

When it was all over for Kolchak and he testified in Irkutsk

Extraordinary Commission of Inquiry, he claimed that, because of his frustrated feelings, he did not meet with Glennon in Sevastopol and went with him only "to one train..."

This lie of his (and this is a lie) is very eloquent! Well, what's the difference - when and how did the first contact of the admiral with the Americans take place, if the very fact of his subsequent close cooperation with them immediately upon arrival in St. Petersburg in 1917 was known in real time to many in Russian government and political circles?

And what would be terrible in admitting that, yes, he rode together and talked more than once? Why wouldn't two allied admirals pass the way from south to north in a pleasant conversation?

But no! Kolchak in this "little thing" for some reason squirmed and darkened. And, I repeat, I lied. Firstly, he was traveling with the Americans not just in the same train, but in the same carriage. And he didn't just ride, but also led conversations, which was witnessed by the translator - Lieutenant Dmitry Fedorov.

Secondly, if Kolchak had not had some kind of conversation with Glennon on June 7, then it is unlikely that the Americans would have left the Black Sea Fleet on the same day. After all, not only Kolchak could tell them about the mine business, and the summer Sevastopol is so uniquely good that it was possible to stay there for a couple of days.

Thankfully there was a reason.

Well, and thirdly, it simply could not be that in a few days of travel Glennon, not having reached Kolchak in Sevastopol, did not

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tried to get acquainted with Kolchak on the way, but Kolchak groundlessly refused him. That would be the height of impoliteness!

Nevertheless, Kolchak stubbornly denied acquaintance with Glennon before Peter. It turns out - why?

No, Glennon did not come for mine experience, but for Kolchak. And obviously, even before their joint arrival in the Russian capital, the two admirals met. However, why did Glennon need Kolchak so much? After all, Alexander Vasilievich, of course, was not so world famous that they knew about him in the States.

I will return to this issue. But let me remind you that if the admiral was not known overseas, then his political appearance was, on the other hand, well known in Petrograd. And he is known precisely to those Russian "tops" for whom the increasingly "red" course of the Russian revolution did not bode well. Yes, both the Entente and the Golden Elite did not have to expect pleasantness from the impending Bolshevik revolution, which was replacing the Cadet revolution that had taken place.

Russian bourgeois circles could not help but look with hope at the circles of the Entente... Let us recall the same member of the House of Commons, Samuel-Samuel Hoare. He had been in St. Petersburg for a long time and had business acquaintances not only in pre-, but also in post-February elite circles ... And there is little doubt that either Khor himself or his Russian acquaintances (perhaps at the suggestion of the same Kerensky or Minister of War Guchkov) brought the Americans to Kolchak.

And - for purposes not at all naval.

In his IRKUTSK testimonies, Kolchak stubbornly stood on the fact that he was always far from politics. But it was hardly true even in the days before the revolution ... But after the revolution it was absolutely not so! And for some reason, my dear reader, a lot of amusing facts have escaped *the analysis* of historians, having one or another connection with the future "Supreme Ruler". Bring them - brought. And here's to thinking...

Some of these - outwardly "absurd" - facts I have already cited.

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But there are other "absurdities" in the history of Kolchak. Well, here's one of them...

Looking ahead a little, I will report that the admiral, having arrived in St. Petersburg in early June 1917, almost immediately - after negotiations with Rear Admiral Glennon held there - agreed to go to America as a consultant. The essence of these "consultations", known only from his words, will be discussed separately. In the meantime, I'll just note that Kerensky agreed to the departure of the admiral ...

Kolchak informed Timirev.

So what was the matter?

Forward!

Kolchak, for some reason, is delayed and ... heads the military department of the anti-Bolshevik "Republican National Center", which from May 1917 gradually began to prepare a military coup.

The center was formed under the auspices of the powerful Siberian Bank not so much by the military as by counter-revolutionary ... engineers and businessmen. But after the commander of the Petrograd Military District, Lavr Kornilov, became the Supreme Commander, the leadership of this "engineering and business" center passed to him,

The question is, why, upon Kolchak's arrival in the capital, not to someone, but to him, the center committee offered the leadership of the military department of the RRC? Actually, the sources usually name as such Colonel Leon Dyusimitier. But Dyusimitier was the head of the military department and coordinator of the putsch already in the final stages of preparation, after Kolchak (I will say this, looking ahead again) left St. Petersburg. But when he arrived there from the Crimea, the "engineers" turned to the admiral. And Dyusimitier Kolchak only replaced.

General Denikin in his "Essays on Russian Troubles" devoted several pages to the "Republican Center". And he reported that the big bourgeoisie gave money to this center, while "personally representatives of this banking and commercial and industrial nobility

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stood outside the organization for fear of compromising themselves if they failed."

However, some people can be called by name. For example, the famous Pavel Ryabushinsky ... After the end of the Moscow State Conference on 8—

On August 10, 1917, where the transfer of power to General Kornilov was expected, but never took place, he declared to his inner circle: "What is postponed is not discarded."

Denikin writes: *"The absence of party intolerance (n-yes! - CK), the business program and, in particular, well-known means made it possible for the Rep. center" to unite many small, mainly military Petrograd organizations. They became part of the military section "Rep. center" in the person of their representatives, and not all of their members knew who led them. In this way, by the end of August, there were up to 4,000 active members of the military section. How many there were in reality, probably*

No one knew".

And these were not St. Petersburg janitors, but lieutenants and colonels with fresh front-line experience.

So, Kolchak is at the head of the military department of the Russian Scientific Center. Also weird! Why Kolchak? Why admiral? After all, in Petrograd there was no shortage of "ground" generals with combat experience dissatisfied with the course of events. Later, during interrogations, Kolchak modestly said that he "was at several meetings of the National Center," but modestly kept silent about who and how exactly.

However, it is clear that the tough personality of the anglicized admiral

attracted those who designed the coup precisely by its rigidity. And the very young forty-seven-year-old General Kornilov and the forty-three-year-old Admiral Kolchak looked like an excellent dictatorial "bunch"!

Again, Denikin testifies: *"The country was looking for a name ... Many organizations made certain proposals to Admiral Kolchak during his stay in Petrograd. In particular, the "Republican Center" was at that time in contact with the admiral, who did not fundamentally refuse*

possibilities

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be at the head of the movement. According to Novosiltsev, to whom the admiral personally spoke about this, confidential conversations on this subject were also held with him by the leader of the Cadet Party ... "

So, the "apolitical" Kolchak agrees to participate in the counter-revolution. And the circumstances of his involvement in the cunning "engineering-Ryabushin" affairs allow us to more confidently assume that Kolchak refused the fleet not out of the blue, but in order to be able to move to the capital without arousing anyone's suspicions.

Kolchak remains in the capital, although he seems to intend to go to America as a simple condottiere mercenary - ostensibly for the secret preparation of the Allied Dardanelles operation. So secret that the Yankees inform him (everything - from the words of Kolchak alone) that they will petition for him to be sent to the USA as a mining instructor, without saying anything about the Dardanelles.

Negotiating with someone, even with representatives of an ally, behind the back of his own government for a naval commander is not the most honest and patriotic line of conduct. But in all this "Dardanelles" the very involvement of the admiral in the alleged preparation of the operations of the American fleet in the Dardanelles zone looks strange. (Sometimes the biographers of the admiral drag in here some mythical Bosphorus operation, planned by the States. However, how can one get from the Mediterranean to the Bosphorus without conquering the Dardanelles, let these biographers explain.)

Yes, Kolchak looked very strange as an expert on the Dardanelles. The thing is, dear reader, that during 1915 the British and French were already developing frenzied activity there. Moreover, by capturing the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, they had in mind to deprive their allied Russia of the right to claim those straits, dreaming about which Russia was drawn into the world war. The bloody Dardanelles operation failed, but the Anglo-French gained experience there over the edge. Kolchak was not equal to them here!

And what was the value of the "Russian patriotism" of a Russian sailor who was ready to assist the Anglo-Saxons in counteracting the "torrential" aspirations of Russia?

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And what serious Dardanelles plans of the United States could be discussed if their fleet never reached the European theater of naval operations, and the Yankees were by no means eager to repeat the bloody fiasco of the Anglo-French, who lost 266 thousand people there!

And why the hell did these straits surrender to America in order to shed "100%" American blood for them and for the interests of the British?

And historians believe in such a "reason" for Kolchak's "invitation" by the Americans to this day, without taking the trouble to think about it at least a little. But strangely, very strangely, Admiral Kolchak explained his departure to the States!

All this looks even more strange in the light of the fact that in the military coup being prepared to establish the military dictatorship of Kornilov, Kolchak, who "broke with Russia", was assigned one of the main roles, which he, of course, knew well.

However, "military dictatorship" - that's just what they said. General Kornilov was supposed to be the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. However, the Kornilovites saw Kerensky as his deputy (and Kerensky himself saw his future place in the "Kornilov" political hierarchy as such). And the planned composition of ministers was civilian. Even the military and naval minister was to become a civilian - Boris Savinkov.

Already in exile, Zinaida Gippius, better known as a poetess and less - as an ambitious "politicess" she wrote: *"The famous K-S-K, i.e. "Kerensky, Savinkov and Kornilov" ... It was these letters that Kerensky drew on paper in the presence of Savinkov, dotting the sheet with them ... "*

Gippius and her husband Merezhkovsky were connected with Savinkov and Kerensky both personally and politically, so Zinaida Nikolaevna, then almost fifty years old, not from other people's words, but from Savinkov's own words, wrote down: "For me, these both (Kornilov and Kerensky . - S.K. .) merge into one. There is no first or second place. Inseparable ... I imagine that Kornilov is not
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even be with Kerensky, he will want to save Russia alone ... Of course, I will not stay with Kornilov. I don't believe in him without Kerensky...

Events were prepared jointly. And they reserved a place for Kolchak manager of the maritime ministry, and - no alternative.

And suddenly, from all these prospects, he intends to go overseas. And according to the old style, on July 27, 1917, he really leaves with the "Russian Naval Commission". And he officially leaves precisely as a specialist miner. And as he himself assures everyone - in the USA.

Denikin writes about this as follows: *"Soon, however, Admiral Kolchak, for **unknown reasons** (emphasis mine. - S.K.) , left Petrograd, went to America and temporarily retired from political activity."*

Surprisingly, all historians believed and still believe in this cheap fairy tale. they tell it with conviction to everyone that for a long time I believed in it too ...

Although we will think together, my dear reader!

JUST in the spring of 1917, on April 6, the United States entered the First World War on the side of the Entente. True, in fact, the United States entered the war on *its* side, because the world war was conceived for the rise of the United States.

The Europeans had already beaten each other to a pulp, and the hour of the Yankees was coming. However, the situation before America's entry into the war was not easy for her and the Entente...

The Germans offered stubborn resistance and could even win.

Tsarist Russia was on the verge of a separate peace.

Japan also threatened to make a separate peace with the Germans, and thereby further complicate the position of the United States.

In order to facilitate the military debut of the Yankees and shake up Russia, the "tops" of the Entente decided to replace the unsuccessful tsar-autocrat with a constitutional tsar or even with a bourgeois Russian republic.

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the public. And they found understanding in that among the bourgeois "tops" of Russia and part of the generals.

The "technique" of the case on the part of the Entente was taken over by the insidious Albion (Chorus, Buchanan, Milner, etc.).

Nicholas denied.

His brother Michael did not take the crown.

And the "Panama" of the Provisional Government began, declaring war

"until the end."

The United States officially declared war on Germany.

But then, on the course of the Russian revolution planned by the "tops", they began unplanned to influence the Russian masses and the Bolsheviks.

The masses are fed up with war - absolutely alien to them.

And the Bolsheviks called for peace.

Something had to be done... And in Russia, and in England, and in the USA, of course, they thought - by whose hands?

"Temporary" chatterboxes no longer represented themselves as strong authorities. And Russia time went "into the separation".

The idea of a tough dictatorship was in the air. Dictatorships of both red and white...

And I'm just sure that it was by no means accidental that at the beginning of May 1917, engineers began their "national" activities in St. Petersburg, and already in early June, Admiral Glennon was going to Sevastopol ... "Study" with master miner Kolchak was an obvious cover here. Yes, there is every reason to believe that this was the case!

Well, let's think, was Kolchak, with all his skill, really unique in comparison with the English sailors? For three years of the most active naval war, they ate, as they say, a dog both in mine productions and in submarine warfare. And they willingly shared their experience with their American colleagues.

The Black Sea under Kolchak had a number of successes - three German submarines were blown up by mines, and the British were less successful in anti-submarine warfare in the Dardanelles zone. But this became known for certain later - after the war! It turns out that from this point of view, Kolchak could not be seen by the Americans as an indisputable authority. Another thing is that Kolchak was one of the most successful

candida
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a tour to join the top of the pro-Entente and pro-American militarized counter-revolution.

The Americans - I personally have no doubts now - controlled both the "Kornilov" and "Keren" branches of it (Savinkov, for all his ambitions, was a second-class figure - a "militant"). However, the campaigner Kornilov and the Socialist-Revolutionary Kerensky were not among the bourgeois elite.

Kolchak or...

Well, I have already spoken about the inevitability of crossing the path of a popular polar explorer, a rank of the Main Naval Staff, an expert in the Duma, a developer of shipbuilding programs and the paths of wealthy bourgeois politicians. Kolchak was known to them, Milyukov, Guchkov...

What was this circle in psychological terms? Here, for example, the brother of the largest industrialist, chairman of the Moscow Military Industrial Committee, banker Pavel Pavlovich Ryabushinsky and the big industrialist Vladimir Pavlovich Ryabushinsky himself talks with the poet Valery Bryusov, about which the latter writes in his diary as follows: "I met Ryabushinsky . *Convinced "bourgeoisist". Everything will be done by the bourgeoisie. Proletarians -*

should be slaves. If anyone rebels, kill. Peasants burn estates? Shoot those who attack, and burn yourself, and not with the help of the Cossacks, ten villages around. And the men will understand that you have a right to the land. Guchkov for V.P. - a genius.

And who is this - Alexander Ivanovich Guchkov? But who: the son of an Old Believer merchant, graduated from the history and philology faculty of the university, a banker, leader of the party of right-wing liberals, the "Octobrists" (Ryabushinsky Sr. was a member of the Central Committee there). Since 1915 - Chairman of the Central Military

Industrial Committee, and in 1917 - War Minister at Kerensky.

Later, Guchkov would live in exile in Paris, apparently not connected with America (in Civil War, he more "supervised" the "French" Denikin and Wrangel). It seems that the Yankees were already disappointed in him then, but in 1917, among the post-February elite, he had to impress them with his non-Russian energy and adventurism. Thirty-eight years old this philologist

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he fought with the British on the side of the Boers, then with the Turks for the freedom of the Macedonians, then in the Russo-Japanese War, and in 1912 he participated in the 1st Balkan War, again against the Turks on the side of the southern Slavs.

The Yankees liked such "zhivchiki" ...

The first project of a "liberal" responsible ministry of people's trust "was drawn up in the summer of 1915 in the Petrograd apartment of Pavel Ryabushinsky. And it was, in fact, a sketch of the composition of the first Provisional Government of 1917, because already in the "Ryabushino" cabinet there were future "provisional" ministers Milyukov, Guchkov, Nekrasov with Konovalov, Lvov ...

Such was the circle to which Kolchak was also close. And this circle together with Guchkov, with both Ryabushinskys, he gradually prepared that speech of Kornilov, if successful, Kolchak would have risen high.

The fact that the author does not invent anything here is confirmed by General Denikin: *"How was the political physiognomy of the new government determined (after the Kornilov coup. - S.K.)? In the absence of a political program (n-yes. - S.K.) , we can only judge by indirect data: in the putative list of ministers compiled ... Kerensky, Savinkov, Argunov, Plekhanov ("the first Russian Marxist." - CK) were mentioned . ..General Alekseev, Admiral Kolchak, Takhtamyshev, Tretyakov, Pokrovsky, gr. Ignatiev (not a future Soviet general. - CK), Prince. Lvov ... By August 29, they were invited to the Stavka for a meeting on the question of the construction of power by Rodzianko, Prince. Lvov, Milyukov, V. Maklakov, Ryabushinsky, N. Lvov, Sirotkin, Tretyakov, Teslenko and others."*

They believed in Kornilov's success ... But, in fact, after that, Kornilov and Kerensky could have been wiped out (or even removed) and pushed forward by the admiral. As a screen for the Ryabushinskys, he would be closer, more understandable, and more reliable. And for the liberal masses - newer. And at the same time, it would suit the Entente (that is, America). And at the same time he was known as a tough person.

So Glennon was sent to Sevastopol, obviously to "bride".

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By whom? And I will tell this to the dear reader a little later ...

Maybe Glennon's arrival really coincided with Kolchak's resignation, or maybe he "coincided" with her in quotation marks, and the resignation was, I repeat, foreseen in advance. In the second case, it becomes clear why the admirals immediately left together.

The reader may object to me that Kolchak could have taken "self-resignation" even without the arrival of the Americans - was it worth it for them to sip jelly across Russia because of one day. But without showing public interest in Kolchak as a superminer, it would be difficult to clearly explain his subsequent "invitation to the United States." The sons of Uncle Sam were simple-minded only for the simple-minded and knew how to build a "cover". Because - I will say this, running ahead again - in my opinion, the "invitation to the USA" was just a smokescreen over the true role and mission of the admiral.

So, it would not be very bold to assume that Glennon drove Kolchak on "lookout". Soon, on the way to St. Petersburg, these "brides" took place.

Where?

In the Winter Palace.

But not with Kerensky.

After all, there, in Zimny, at that time was not only the Russian prime minister, but also the American mission of Elihu Root, in which Glennon was the head of the naval group.

For some reason, THIS MISSION is often called "military" for some reason, although the special mission to Russia included representatives not only of the military and naval departments, but also businessmen, and even a trade unionist, the renegade socialist Edward Russell.

The significance of the Root mission was emphasized by the fact that its head, while Francis was alive after the United States in Russia, had the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary, and eight members of the mission had the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary.

And ... And the figure of Elihu Root to us, dear reader, is already

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came across the pages of this book, and I asked you to remember his name ...

Yes, yes, it was the same Root who in 1908, as US Secretary of State, concluded the Root Agreement with Japan—

Takahira. I must say, he did not differ in love for Russia (which, in fact, was the norm for the US elite). In 1917, Root was 72 years old (he lived to be ninety-two), and it was he who was honored by the Golden Elite to inspect Russia for its readiness to continue the war. Root had enough experience, he ate his teeth on foreign policy and called himself a "hardened old campaigner."

About Root's mission, dear reader (as well as about the mission of Samuel Hoare, about the mission of Lord Milner), we know little. And surprisingly little attention has been paid to them by historians. But these missions are one of the "keys" to understanding both the history of the First World War and, in general, recent world history. Moreover, Root's mission was not just a meticulous inspection, but marked a new stage in the world war.

America has already directly assumed the supreme leadership of the war as a guarantee of its future supreme leadership of the world after the war. And Elihu Root came to assess the Russian situation, and also to inform in Petrograd - *who needs it* - that the role of Russia's main creditor is moving from England to the USA.

I think that not the last task of Root was also the preparation of such fallback options for the Russian government that would be convenient for the United States. It was necessary to find and discuss ways to establish it, to find and discuss candidacies of proxies of the Entente and the United States in this government.

American journalist Bessie Beatty saw a lot in the Russian Revolution during the Russian Revolution. And she wrote the famous book "The Red Heart of Russia" about what she saw. She also wrote there about Root's mission, which Beatty observed from the very first minutes of the mission's arrival (Bessie was among those who met the former royal train, on which he came to Peter Root and which the American saw

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la the last time when the royal family was taken into exile on this train).

The mission was received in a royal way, and settled in a royal way - in the Winter Palace, where every morning Beatty and other foreign correspondents saw Root at press conferences. These meetings were amazing, because at them Root and the reporters switched places: Root was silent, and the journalists told him what they managed to find out. But Root received the basic information, of course, not from them.

"From time to time," Beatty informs us, "special missions left Petrograd to find out on the spot some details of a difficult situation. Army specialists went to the front, marines studied the reasons for the disobedience of the Black Sea Fleet, bankers began to study the degree of exhaustion of the Russian treasury, and believers went to Moscow to get acquainted with the future state of the Russian church."

As you can see, Beatty knew about Glennon's trip. However, she did not write about Kolchak, and there is nothing strange here. She, who knows how to professionally inquire about what they usually try to hide, could well have deliberately palmed off that version of Glennon's trip, which she later announced to the whole world. In any case, the fact that Glennon studied all the "reasons for the disobedience of the Black Sea Fleet" in one day and left with Kolchak suggests that Beatty was deliberately slipped "disinformation" ...

Let us return, however, to the Ruth mission. She arrived in Vladivostok on June 3, 1917, and appeared in Petrograd on June 13. That is, after 10 days. She returned on July 9th. And already on July 21 (that is, twelve days later) she sailed from the same Vladivostok to the States.

And this route, as well as the duration of trips on it, I ask
remember the reader too.

Kolchak was shown to Ruta, and the "hardened old campaigner" liked the admiral. It was worse with the Russian army, which was inspected by the military group of Major General X. Scott. On July 1, the army launched its last and unsuccessful offensive.

However, this did not discourage the States. Drop Russia like an
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I didn't want to count Tigerman's strength. Not that I didn't want to! Russia's exit from the war threatened to disrupt all US plans! Both Francis and Ruth believed that Russia as "cannon fodder" was not yet lost to the West. Moreover, the "Kerenian" Russia was ready to serve the United States avidly.

And the States were already considering how to import military equipment into Russia and how to export from Russia what it would pay for this equipment. An American mission of railroad experts led by Stevens assessed the "carrying capacity" of the Siberian Railway, and the Provisional Government immediately gave Stevens the status of adviser to the Ministry of Railways.

In the United States, a special "railway corps" was formed to manage Russian roads (in 1918, with the beginning of the Siberian dictatorship of Kolchak, he took control of the Trans-Siberian Railway).

The result of Root's mission was the "Plan of American Activities to Preserve and Strengthen the Morale of the Army and Civilian Population of Russia." Its essence was simple: "If you want to have money, continue to fight."

"Mission Root," Bessie Beatty also confirms, "clearly stated that the main condition for providing assistance to Russia is the continued participation of Russia in the war."

Ruth was unanimously assured in St. Petersburg that this participation was not questioned and not put by anyone. At the same time, Ruth, of course, was well aware of the plans of the Russian "top" to establish a tough right-wing dictatorship. The chance for such a thing was by no means illusive, and Ruth oriented Washington in this spirit.

And on July 13 (again, for some reason, the 13th!) of the old style, the Ambassador of the Provisional Government to the USA Bakhmetev (namesake and successor of the tsarist ambassador) reported to the Foreign Ministry: "The American government immediately opens a loan of 75 million for us. " This was just the beginning. The loan was supposed to be \$325 million at low interest rates.

Kolchak was in the capital throughout July. It was the time of the execution of the July demonstrations, tense preparation time roots

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Lovsky coup (Kornilov spoke on August 26, old style). However, there are no documentary traces of the admiral's participation in the preparation of the coup that was supposed to make him one of the leaders of the country. Although in all draft lists of the future Kornilov-Keren government, he was invariably available. But - only in the lists, and not in operational documents.

And this is exactly the case when the absence of documents is more eloquent than their presence. The extreme stinginess of mentioning Kolchak by the Kornilovites once again confirms his special role in the plans of the Kerenets-Kornilovites. It seems that Kolchak was especially carefully covered up, and this is precisely what explains his meager presence on the written pages of the Kornilov adventure.

July is coming to an end, and Kolchak finally declares that he is leaving for the States. AND really leaves. But how does he leave?

Through Finland, Sweden and Norway to Bergen, driving part of the way under a false name and in civilian clothes! All this - allegedly in order "not to be captured by the Germans." They were traveling in civilian clothes and the officers accompanying him.

From Bergen, accompanied by destroyers (!) The steamer with Kolchak on board is heading to the English port of Aberdeen, and only on August 17 the Russians arrive in London. On the way from St. Petersburg to just London, twenty days were spent. And for another two weeks Kolchak is stuck in England.

Dear reader! Yes, this "in the USA" route alone (if you compare it with Root's route) is enough to say to yourself: "Uh-uh! .."

America is allegedly secretly preparing the Dardanelles operation and invites Kolchak to develop it. Time, of course, does not wait. And so, instead of going on an absolutely safe and then still short route through his native Russia and the Pacific Ocean to the Yankees, Kolchak chooses something that looks absolutely absurd, if ... Unless you make a natural assumption that Kolchak did not go to England in transit in the USA, but as a plenipotentiary

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emissary of the already close Kerensky-Kornilov coup. And I wasn't going to go to any States!

Well, in fact, gentlemen historians! How does it work out like this? At the end of *July*, Kolchak allegedly got out of the political arena of Russia, leaned almost into the free "condottieri". And already after the failure of the putsch, Kornilov admitted during interrogations in September 1917 that at the beginning of the putsch, on the evening of *August 26*, at the headquarters in Mogilev, the commissar of the Provisional Government Filonenko, Kornilov's "orderly officer" - Cadet Zavoyko and the adventurer Aladyin (who, however, had rank of Lieutenant in the British Army). Kornilov suggested that this far from holy trinity once again "outline the scheme of the organization of power and the composition of the government."

Further, the ex-Commander-in-Chief reported: "A draft of the People's Defense Council was sketched with the participation of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief (that is, Kornilov. — S.K.) as chairman, A.F. Kerensky - Deputy Minister, Mr. Savinkov, General Alekseev, Admiral Kolchak and Mr. Filonenko (candidate for the post of Minister of the Interior. - S.K.). This Council of Defense was supposed to create a collective dictatorship, since the establishment of a sole executive dictatorship was considered undesirable.

That is, absent (actually, according to historians, - deserted) Kolchak was supposed to enter, at the suggestion of Kornilov and his entourage, into the number of some Russian supreme "six-boys"!

And this despite the fact that he had been hanging out in London for almost two weeks - allegedly "idle" and waiting for an opportunity across the ocean ...

But how - without work ?! Not idle, but in anticipation of the "deed", in anticipation of the events, the course of which he was supposed to coordinate with the allies in London!

And all the "absurdities" and oddities of the early stages of Kolchak's "epopee" immediately cease to be such if we consider the admiral as a plenipotentiary emissary of Kornilov and the military dictatorship.

I think everything was thought like this ... Kornilov makes a coup in St. Petersburg, and in London a member of the People's Defense Council is already right there

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Kolchak, competent to decide all issues. It would be difficult to find a land general with such a "travel cover", and such intelligent generals were required in Russia itself. But Kolchak was a figure suitable in all respects.

And this is exactly what historians have not seen for almost a century that has passed since then, explaining everything by the admiral's highest demining qualifications. Even such a serious researcher of maritime history as the Soviet Admiral Ivan Stepanovich Isakov fell for this "explanation". Wanting to prove that the Russians were innovators in naval warfare, he passionately declared: "Back in the summer of 1917, when the revolutionary sailors threw Kolchak out of Sevastopol and to save him, Kerensky transported this admiral to the United States (another amusingly unexpected option explanation of departure! - S.K.), the American government offered him a choice of several (? - S.K.) responsible (?? - S.K.) positions.

Well, yes ... The Yankees did not offer him anything particularly responsible - except for the post of "Supreme Ruler of Russia."

There is another such detail in the Kolchak-Kornilov story that leads to the "American" trace quite transparently ... This detail is a strange (surprising contemporaries of events in real time and later) involvement in the affairs of Kornilov of such a figure as Vasily Stepanovich Zavoyko . In 1917, he was forty-two years old, but he is the son of an admiral who distinguished himself in the Far East in the Crimean War, a large landowner, in the past marshal of the nobility in the Gaysinsky district of the Podolsk province, managing director of the Lianozov brothers' society "Emba and the Caspian Sea", deputy chairman board of the Central Asian society "Santo", publisher of the magazine "Freedom and struggle" - in the summer of 1917 he volunteered for the Kabardian regiment and became Kornilov's orderly.

General Wrangel, recalling the prehistory of the Kornilov putsch, wrote about him as follows: "Zavoyko impressed me as a very lively, intelligent and capable person, at the same time, to a large extent, a dreamer."

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Those who knew Zavoyko often regarded him as both a dark personality and a political intriguer of the worst kind. Well, a dreamer is a dreamer, an intriguer is an intriguer, but in business acumen, and just of the American type, he could not be refused. Having acquired a decent fortune through real estate fraud in his native Podolia, he then went into the oil business and large-scale industrial financing, not neglecting ultra-right journalism.

After the February Revolution, Zavoyko, of course, was in the midst of events, the turbulence of which brought him to Kornilov. In fact, this adventurous and at the same time businesslike person was for the Commander-in-Chief a "gray eminence" and the closest political adviser. Arrested in the Kornilov case, he was released on October 20, 1917, went to London, then to the USA. IN

For some reason, the gallant freshly baked "Kabardian" and "convinced Kornilovite" did not participate in the Civil War. And his trace is lost until 1923, when he emerges as a representative of a number of American financial groups in negotiations with the Soviet Concession Committee. This fact, by the way, is not mentioned by those who write about Zavoyko, and it became known only recently.

So, in the 1920s, Vasily Stepanovich was a man of Americans. But when did he first meet them? After all, the oil business at that time was the favorite brainchild of the Golden Elite of the world, and could it be otherwise with a new kind of world gold - black? And didn't the "brisk" Vasily Stepanovich, besides Kolchak, attend audiences with Elihu Root in the Winter Palace? Was he in contact with the Choir, with the people of Milner and Buchanan?

"Eh, all this is speculation!" - I hear the skeptical voice of a sworn historian.

Oh, gentlemen, comrades "historians"! Of course, there are no documents confirming my version in nature. What kind of fool entrusts *such* matters to paper?!

But the Kornilov coup in the internal plan meant the bourgeois perspective of such a Russia, which after the war would become

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a semi-colony of the United States already by virtue of the debt to them and the entire Entente.

Externally, the Kornilov coup meant Russia's continuation of the war in the interests of the Entente and the United States.

The "technical" side of this "coup" is well characterized by the same Zinaida Nikolaevna Gippius-Merezhkovskaya: "As for the "rebellious" divisions marching on Petrograd, you don't need to be either a special psychologist or a politician, but it's enough to have a sound mind in order to , knowing in detail all the previous with all the actors, guess: these divisions, by all indications, went with the **knowledge** (Gippius allocation. - S.K.) Kerensky ... "

It only remains for me to clarify: with the knowledge of not only Kerensky.

America established control over Russia. Could its emissaries like Root bypass those military men who, without much hiding, were leading the cause of a coup? Or - to ignore the "temporary" Prime Minister Kerensky himself, Elihu Root's "neighbor" in the Winter Palace?

I think no.

Another thing is that the idea of Kerensky, Kornilov, Kolchak, the "Republican National Center" and their international friends failed. It was thwarted both by the mediocrity of the "temporary" "tops" and - in the final analysis - by the Russian masses, the St. Petersburg workers, the Kronstadt sailors and the Bolsheviks.

General Krymov shot himself, Kornilov, with the rest of the "rebellious" generals, went under arrest to Bykhov.

What about Kolchak, "stuck" in London?

Well, Kolchak, who really turned out to be out of work, was slowly sent by the British from the Scottish Glasgow to Canadian Halifax after the failure of the Kornilovshchina. He sailed aboard an auxiliary cruiser accompanying the transport of the wounded and crossed the Atlantic in 11 days. According to his "legend" cover, he was still going to the States to participate in the development of the landing operation, but the Allies were in no hurry to send him to the headquarters tables. For some reason, the need for a "super-specialist" has disappeared ... So hell

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miral Isakov was still mistaken, attributing the US military command to the desire to "use the Russian admiral as his adviser."

By the way, Kolchak moved from Petrograd on July 27, but only on August 16 did the Foreign Ministry

The Provisional Government telegraphed the Russian embassy in the USA to send him to America. As you can see, we were in no hurry and here ...

In the States, the admiral "stayed" for a couple of months, no longer caring about the Dardanelles. Later, he explained this by the fact that, they say, the United States refused the operation for a number of reasons. And he added: "Although the military circles said that the withdrawal of Turkey from the coalition would serve as the beginning of the end of the entire war." What the future "Supreme Ruler" said was utter rubbish. Africa, of course home of elephants. But Türkiye is the birthplace of the world? N-yes...

But God is with him!

For a person with an indefinite status, Kolchak was received in the United States at a high political level - there were meetings in the State Department, there was a meeting with President Wilson himself.

The October Revolution found Kolchak supposedly in Japan, in Yokohama, where he arrived from San Francisco. In any case, he himself claimed so, and there is no way to check where and when he actually was. One thing is certain: from October 1917 to October 1918, America withdraws Kolchak "to the reserve." At the same time, "oddities" that incriminate the admiral accompany his life as before.

So, having remained in the West and expressing (according to him) a desire to fight the Germans on the side of the Allies, he did not go to the fleet - English or American. But earlier he even wrote theoretical works on the mine case. Commanded the fleet. However, for some reason, the allies did not take him either as a miner or as a naval commander, and at one time they offered to go to ... the Mesopotamian land front, where sea minelaying was not required.

Soon Kolchak, however, will be reoriented to a different career and recommended to go to the Far East in order to "start my own

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activity". However, so far, no suitable "field of activity" for Kolchak has been planned directly in Russia. And maybe that's why...

The driving external and internal forces of the internal Russian war in different parts of Russia were different. The external (as well as internal) counter-revolutionary anti-Bolshevik forces had one thing in common - they were all hostile to Russia. Much has been said about this at different times, but I will refer to the latest, 2000, confirmation of Kolchak's biographer Valery Krasnov, who reports that any detachment of the White movement was characterized by a mandatory foreign orientation. Mentioning a more or less significant figure in this movement, they began with the fact that such and such an orientation ...

Valery Krasnov explains this feature of the white leaders by the "soft and trusting Russian character", but from such an "explanation" it gives, I will say frankly, a softening not of the character, but of the brain ... In fact, without "orientation" there would be no ammunition ...

By the summer of 1918, the Civil War in the Volga region, in Siberia and the Far East was "spun up" by the "white" rebellion of the Czechoslovak corps, subsidized by the USA (mainly), as well as by England and France.

In the industrial and grain-growing South of Russia, under the wing of the Anglo-French, the Volunteer Army of Kornilov and Denikin gathered.

In the Ukraine and South Russia, the Entente then relied primarily on the Austro-German occupation. Two birds with one stone were killed here: the German forces were diverted from the West to the East, and Soviet power was suppressed by the hands of the Germans.

The forest-rich North and the oil-rich Caucasus are English zones interventions.

In the North, Yudenich was planned to become a regional dictator, and in the Caucasus

there were enough local henchmen of the nationalists.

Therefore, in most places in Russia, the Entente did not need Kolchak in the first roles yet ... Except for two places - in Siberia and the Far East

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German East. And just this zone was "fixed" mainly to the United States. And also for Japan.

Only having dealt with Kolchak, I understood why he "surfaced" on public display only at the very end of 1918 ...

And why surfaced in Siberia.

And why, being and ruling in Siberia, on the Russian outskirts, in fact, which did not have serious domestic political influence and significance, he had the status of "Supreme Ruler of Russia and Supreme Commander of all Russian armies."

And why did General Denikin, who earlier thundered all over Russia before Kolchak, "rule", although without enthusiasm, but acknowledged.

Before that, for many years I had only vaguely languished with a misunderstanding: why almost the entire year of 1918, when European Russia was the scene of the most active battles, there were no particularly serious events in Siberia. White Czechs, General Boldyrev, troops of the emaciated "Ufa Directory" operated there, but all this was without a mortal threat to Soviet power. But then everything **suddenly** began to spin quickly with the advent of Kolchak.

And the thing, my dear reader, here, perhaps, is that in any place in Russia the activity of the internal counter-revolution directly depended on the activity of the interventionists in this place and on the scale of their support. In Siberia, the intervention was carried out in 1918 mainly by the Japanese (the British limited themselves to observation). But the Japanese did not go further than Transbaikalia. Why did they need the Urals? They should have kept Cupid. And if you can't hold it, then rip it off more ... What the practical Japanese successfully did.

Lenin said about all this later quite clearly: *"If we take Japan, which held almost the whole of Siberia in its hands and which, of course, could help Kolchak at any time, the main reason why she did not do this is that her interests are fundamentally at odds with the interests of America, that she did not want to pull chestnuts from the fire for American capital."*

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Clever Lenin placed the accents perfectly accurately. Kolchak was created by America. And he collaborated with the Japanese, although widely, but out of necessity, and also due to the fact that he had to reckon with a purely Japanese "creation" - ataman Semyonov. And the Japanese could not but reckon with Kolchak insofar as they could not but reckon with the Entente and the USA.

And even the historian Valery Krasnov, who is sympathetic to his "hero", does not deny that the Japanese considered Kolchak "a man of Washington", that is, a creature of Japan's main competitor.

In the spring and summer of 1918, the Japanese and Yankees became more and more politically involved in Russian affairs. Not busy with the World War, Japan sends large troops to Russia. America, for almost the whole of 1918, was not up to Siberia and not to the Russian Civil War.

First, she was busy in Europe.

Secondly, it is one thing to push Americans sensitive to the word "freedom" out of America into Europe - to "liberate" it from the tyrant-Kaiser, and another thing - to send them en masse to that Russia, the Soviet government of which President Wilson publicly congratulated on the freedom already gained.

Moreover, even in Europe, the Yankees are at the forefront if and

claimed, then by no means front-line. And in their Siberian interventionist "zone", the States had to fight with the hands of strangers, that is, Russians. And for this it was necessary to have in Siberia both one of your own, and the opportunity to help him seriously, on a large scale.

There was a man, but there was no opportunity in 1918.

Therefore, during this year, America, with the kind assistance of the British - while far from the arena of future events, he is trying on the role of the dictator of Siberia and the Far East of someone whom he already knows firsthand, that is, Kolchak.

In 1918, Kolchak's "training" and his "taming" are going on, I would say. From the States through Japan, he travels to Manchuria, to Harbin, and there he assumes the duties of a military member of the board of the CER and head of the guard of the CER under the head of the CER

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60-year-old engineer-general Horvat, a bribe-taker with pre-revolutionary rich (more precisely, enriching) experience.

For an admiral, a former commander of the fleet, taking the post of head of the land railway guards - given that the leadership of the Entente recommended that he move to the Far East - this is another strange absurdity. However, given what happened to him later, we must admit that this is not such an absurdity ... Horvath has already declared himself a "temporary Supreme Ruler." But he did not yet know that this "title" was not invented for him, but for Admiral Kolchak. And invented by the Golden Elite...

In the simple-hearted memoirs of Kolchak's common-law wife, Anna Timireva - there is a place where Timireva blurts out, without realizing it. 1918...

She is in Vladivostok.

He is in Harbin.

And then the word of Timireva herself: *"He wrote that **wherever I was**, I could always find out about him from the English consul and my letters would be delivered to him. And here we are in Vladivostok. The first thing I did was to write him a letter that I could come to Harbin. With this letter, I went to the English consulate and asked to deliver it to the address. A few days later a man I did not know came to me and handed me a letter of Alexander Vasilyevich , **rolled up in a cigarette, written in small and small pieces** .*

The emphasis here, dear reader, is mine everywhere... And how can one not highlight such and such lines!

First, how is it to be understood - "wherever I am"? Further ... Communication between Vladivostok and Harbin was then unhindered, Kolchak's letter was personal. And they transported it by reconnaissance methods!

And why would it?

But let's not be mistaken - the British (together with the French) patronized Kolchak only tactically, and the strategy of geopolitics passed into the hands of the United States.

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By the autumn of 1918, neither the interventionists, nor the Reds, nor the Whites had strong power over the vast territory from the Urals to Transbaikalia. But White did not yet have strong leaders. And the time has come for the West to change their Russian "horses" there ... In October 1918, together with the British military representative at the Ufa directory, General Knox, Kolchak arrived in Omsk.

On November 4, he becomes the military and naval minister of this ill-fated Directory, and on November 18 he makes his own, unlike Kornilov - a successful coup, liquidates the Directory and proclaims himself the Supreme Ruler of Russia and the Supreme Commander of all Russian armies.

A week and a half before, a revolution takes place in Germany.

The Kaiser's Reich and the war in Europe are coming to an end.

And for Kolchak, it's time for a debut.

That is, here's how amusingly "coincident": as soon as America had the opportunity to take the Russians seriously, so right there in Russia began what would soon be called "Kolchakism."

American newspapers wrote that Russia needed Cromwell. At the same time, it was implied between the lines that America needed Cromwell in Russia. She was looking for him and "run in", and when the time came, "Cromwell" "found" and was put into circulation.

Yes, the World War in Europe was over, and the United States was (without any publicity) becoming the true "Supreme Ruler" of the entire West. And the English Colonel Ward, who was under the admiral, admitted: "Admiral Kolchak would never have gone to Siberia, he would never have stood at the head of the Russian constitutional (? - S.K.) movement and government, if he had not been forced to do so by advice and instructions allies."

Is it any wonder, therefore, that the "supreme" authority of the "Siberian Cromwell", who had not fought on land for a single day (except for the short command of the fortress battery in Port Arthur), was quickly recognized by all the white rulers-generals with considerable experience of the just ended Great wars?

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Kolchak was given a year off by Russia. And at one time he showed off to his heart's content. Someone Anichkov, a landowner and financier, describes Kolchak in Yekaterinburg in the winter of 1919:

"The cortege consisted of several cars, of which the last one, in which Kolchak was sitting, was surrounded by a horse convoy. Particularly stood out was the handsome figure of Prince Kuli Mirza in a Circassian uniform, standing on the penultimate car with his back to the driver and glaring at the car of the Supreme. Kuli Mirza himself belonged to the Persian dynasty, was in the retinue of His Majesty the late Sovereign, and now accompanied the Supreme Ruler. Looking at this picturesque picture, I had no doubt that Kolchak would take the place of the Romanovs."

Of course, for the West, this would be a good turn of events. Once upon a time, Tsar Peter the Third, who saw happiness in the rank of Prussian lieutenant, was already at the head of Russia. And Uncle Sam would not refuse to get the officer of the English service Kolchak on the Russian throne ...

However, after the successes of the spring of 1919, the admiral began to suffer defeats on the way to Samara, or rather, his generals began to suffer defeats, because even with a big stretch the admiral did not pull on the commander. On November 11, 1919, he surrendered Omsk, and on January 4, 1920, the rights of the "Supreme Ruler", which had gone to General Denikin. Then the admiral went to the East, but on December 27 he was taken under guard by the White Czechs on the way, and on January 15, 1920, he was extradited by them in Irkutsk to representatives of the Socialist-Revolutionary Menshevik Political Center.

Even before that, the Czechs issued a memorandum where they denied Kolchak and stated that "under the protection of Czechoslovak bayonets, local Russian military bodies commit such actions that amaze the entire civilized world" ...

The White Czech rebellion was the same creation of Washington as Kolchak. So why did the Czechs finally undermine the "Supreme"? Yes, solely because US Secretary of State Lansing reported to President Wilson at the end of 1919: "The truth lies in the simple fact that the Kolchak government has suffered a complete defeat ..."

The Moor could not do his job, but he had to "leave" ... And Kolchak

"surrendered" ... And at first - to the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

The Siberian political mess manifested itself both in this and in the fact that there were no Bolsheviks in the commission of inquiry appointed by the Political Center. However, already on January 21, power in Irkutsk peacefully passed to the Soviet of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, that is, to the Bolsheviks. Interrogations continued, but the case could not be brought to trial.

The end of the admiral came on the night of February 6-7, 1920, when, by decision of the Irkutsk Revolutionary Committee, he and his Prime Minister Viktor Pepelyaev were shot on the banks of the Ushakovka River, and the bodies were lowered into the hole on the Angara ice. Near Irkutsk were the troops of General Voitsekhovskiy, in Irkutsk itself it was restless. The course of events left no time for either trial or burial. Only later, already in May 1920, was an open trial of the Kolchak ministers.

The admiral did not justify the certifications and hopes of the Golden Elite, but it was not his fault.

He tried.

He could not give Golden America what she expected from him, although he did give something. This "something" had a direct gold dimension, because it was pure gold from the gold reserves of Russia.

On August 6, 1918, the White Czechs seized in Kazan a gold reserve of 30,563 poods of gold (almost 490 tons) exported there in the amount of 651,532,117 rubles 86 kopecks (oh, those notorious banker "penny"!).

In the autumn of 1918, this stock passed to Kolchak.

In the world of physics, the phenomenon of superfluidity was discovered not so long ago. But in the world of people it has been known for thousands of years, since there is no more fluid thing in this world than money, gold ... Accordingly, it is more than difficult to take it into account. Here's an example for you...

The authors of the work "State Bank. 1860-1910", published in St. Petersburg in 1910 on the occasion of the half-century anniversary of the State Bank,

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reported: "To transport gold reserves (of the Russian treasury. - S.K.) it would take 1486 carts, counting 50 pounds for each. For transportation by rail, 100 wagons would be required, counting 750 pounds each. A simple multiplication in the first case gives a result of 1188.8 tons, and in the second - 1200 tons. As you can see, 11.2 tons of gold, even from the workers of the State Bank, leaked somewhere at a distance of just one printing point ...

So is it any wonder that the data on the fate of the "Kazan" gold reserves in different sources are very different? Some (what - the sources are silent, but considerable) part of it eventually ended up in Prague and formed the base of the "Legionbank" of the former legionnaires of the Czechoslovak corps. Companions of the good soldier Schweik proved to be vulgar thieves here. Some medicines they seized for three million gold rubles, one rubber -

forty million!

Some of the gold was "unofficially" stolen by the same white Czechs, as well as the Japanese, Kolchak's ministers, the Yankees, allies, Ataman Semyonov, smaller chieftains and just bandits without political overtones - when transporting gold through the ever-shrinking Kolchak "possessions".

Part was recaptured from Kolchak by Soviet troops in Irkutsk.

But part of it was officially transferred by Kolchak to the intervention countries on account of military supplies. And here the property of golden superfluidity is manifested with might and main ... Accurate data is leaking somewhere without a trace! Somewhere it says

that "the vast majority of the gold reserves (more than 30 thousand pounds. - S.K.) - about 10 thousand pounds the government of A.V. Kolchak was paid to his allies.

A third is, of course, a lot, but it is still not the overwhelming majority.

The First Great Soviet Encyclopedia gives us the following "disposition": from a reserve of 600 million gold rubles, England and France received 9,090 pounds of gold, Japan - 1,142 pounds. In total, this gives 10,232 pounds. That is, not "... about", but "more than ..."

The collective work "Anti-Soviet intervention and its collapse" contains

the figures are already different: the British received 2883 pounds, francs

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tsuzy - 1225 pounds (that is, in total - only 4,108 pounds), Japan - 2672 pounds. But the States - 2118 pounds. The total weight in "golden" pounds here is 8898 pounds.

Again, do not meet the ends!

Such, dear reader, is the "golden" inconsistency. And what is especially incomprehensible is the overly modest American share.

I don't know about the French, but the British and Japanese helped Kolchak seriously (the Japanese, however, supported Semenov first of all). From England, the admiral's troops received, for example, 100,000 rifles and more than 2,000 machine guns. But America gave about 400,000 rifles, 3,000 machine guns, plus hundreds of aircraft, locomotives, rails, steel, oil... On the whole, US deliveries were, of course, decisive - even if some of them were handed over to Kolchak only for paper, since Kolchak was defeated before he managed to get everything ordered.

I think that Kolchak's gold also flowed primarily to the United States. In those years, it generally only flowed there, including from England, and from France, and even from Japan ... It's just that part of the US share was not advertised. And if we start guessing, then I dare to assume that as a result, over the ocean settled from the Russian gold reserve of about six thousand pounds, or even more ... It was not without reason that the State Department repeatedly asked Kolchak whether he intended to transfer the gold "for storage in USA".

Of course, not only America, but the entire Interventionist International used Kolchak at the same time with might and main - just as Kolchak used the interventionists. Cashed in on this, of course, only the interventionists. Moreover, the riches of Siberia and the Far East, and the "admiral's" gold, were actually given to them for nothing, because by the end of 1918 rifles, machine guns, cartridges and uniforms were no longer in price ... This product was unprofitable by the end of World War II.

But here it is - it cost Russia not only the price of Russian sweat and blood, but also the *inaccurately* indicated price of Russian gold.

America has worked hard to ensure that such inaccuracies and white

stains in the history of her participation in the intervention in Russia

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there were as many as possible ... How historians describe that the French, they say, the imperialists sent General Janin to Kolchak, who was appointed "commander-in-chief of the allied forces operating in the Far East and Siberia east of Baikal" with "the right to control at the front and in the rear."

But General Zhanen knew little more about military leadership than Admiral Kolchak. During the First World War, he fought nothing at all, but basically represented the French command at the Russian Headquarters. That is, he was something like a hybrid of a scout, a diplomat and a politician. In the same capacity, he labored in Kolchak Siberia until the very end of Kolchakism. And - exactly until the very end, because on the orders of Janen, the Czechs gave the Admiral to the Political Center.

This figure was convenient for the United States - a Frenchman, he is not in touch with Washington, but with Paris. However, from January 18, 1919 (Kolchak was then mastering the chair of the "Supreme Ruler"), Paris became a branch of Washington for a whole year, because the Paris "peace" conference opened near Paris, in Versailles.

It was there, in Paris, that US President Wilson brought a map compiled by the State Department with "proposed borders in Russia", which left the Russians only the Central Russian Upland and which only by the beginning of the 21st century really became a map of the Russian Federation.

And it was from Paris that the Golden International, through the mouth of Wilson, issued directives to the Western world. And the conference turned out - among other things - also to be the General Headquarters of the intervention in Russia. Janin was just a representative of this "headquarters" under Kolchak and did not command, but coordinated ...

But in official correspondence, all the dots over the "i" were placed bluntly. Acting US Secretary of State Philipps reported to Wilson: *"When referring to the exchange of notes that took place between you and other heads of government who were in Paris, on the one hand, and Admiral Kolchak from Omsk, on the other, it means that the British supply clothing and everything the necessary weapons of Denikin, the French - the Czechs and*

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anti-Bolshevik forces in the western border countries, while Kolchak relies on receiving weapons from the United States.

Soviet newspapers wrote about Kolchak: "The uniform is English, the shoulder strap is French, tobacco - Japanese, ruler - Omsk.

The United States was not included in this ditty.

But they were firmly present in the fate of the "Omsk ruler."

Just as from the very beginning of the Russian revolution of 1917, they were present in general at any strategically important point in Russia. Even if often invisible.

And this also needs to be said at least a few words ...

ADMIRAL Kolchak turned out to be the last Yankee headquarters in the "Russian game", and the first (more precisely, the second, after Kornilov) was the ataman of the Don Cossacks, General Kaledin.

After the failure of Kornilov, the Entente (that is, the Golden Elite of the West) became seriously interested in the Cossacks. And those - the Entente.

Then in the South of Russia the military government of Kaledin was gaining political strength. And it seemed to be a force - after all, the Cossacks in collapsing Russia outwardly looked like a kind of monolith. On October 3, 1917, a conference of the most important Cossack troops (Don, Kuban, Terek, Orenburg, Ural and Astrakhan) and the mountain peoples of the Caucasus gathered in Yekaterinodar (future Krasnodar).

On October 22, 1917, members of the Council of the Union of Cossack Troops visited the American Ambassador Francis.

"The Cossacks extremely appreciate the high friendship with which the President of the United States and all of America treat Russia," its head, General Mikheev, said in a drilled voice.

- I am glad to hear this from the lips of the representatives of the Pacific Don, - with knowledge "local" conditions responded the ambassador.

"No," Mikheev clarified, "our gratitude is not expressed on behalf of some one Cossack army, but on behalf of the conference in Ekaterinodar!"

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— Conferences?

- Yes sir.

And Mikheev began to report ...

Francis listened attentively, and after listening, he said:

"I will immediately inform the President of everything you have said, gentlemen.

The Cossacks stirred with delight and fixed their mustaches, and Francis also encouraged them:

"America, gentlemen, highly appreciates the Russian Cossacks, so many put on the altar of freedom in the name of the well-being of Russia.

And the "apostles of Russian freedom" went home, patting on the tops of their sparkling boots with whips, which had worked so hard and often in the name of "the rights of man and citizen" ...

Is it any wonder after this that on November 3, 1917, the Cossack Congress opened in Kyiv! Greeted him, by the way, and the chairman of the Czechoslovak National Council Masaryk (another American creation, six months later realized the rebellion of the Czechoslovak corps).

Four days later, in Petrograd, the Bolsheviks deposed Kerensky, and "all the healthy forces of Russia" were drawn to the Quiet Don ... The second edition of Kornilovism - Kaledinism began.

On November 29, 1917, a "unified government of the South-Eastern Union" was created in Ekaterinodar, and ten days later the US Consul in Moscow sent a dispatch to Secretary of State Lansing with a report on negotiations with Kaledin's emissaries.

A day later, Lansing presents a memorandum to Wilson proposing "the overthrow of Bolshevik rule by a military dictatorship supported by loyal, disciplined troops." For an official document of a "free country" the dictionary here was somewhat, hmm ... *that*, but it was not written for newspapers. Therefore, everything was called by its proper name.

"The only real core of an organized movement strong enough to depose the Bolsheviks and establish a government is a group of senior officers led by the ataman of the Don Cossacks, Kaledin," Lansing said.

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Two days later, Lansing's memorandum received Wilson's official approval, but even before that, Francis in Petrograd authorized, at the request of Colonel Robins, the dispatch of an echelon with 80 trucks to Kaledin.

A week and a half later, US Ambassador to London Page was instructed to "secretly finance Kaledin in the required amount through the British and French government."

I will draw your attention, dear reader, to the fact that Page was instructed not to seek the consent of the "sovereign" British and French for such a covert combination, but simply to finance the Russian counter-revolution through them, and - period!

However, in reality, a comma came out here, because Kaledin turned out to be even more unfortunate than Kornilov, and in mid-February 1918 his idea failed, and he himself shot himself.

And the Golden Elite began to prepare the drawing of the already "Czechoslovak" card (which I mentioned in the book "Russia and Germany: the path to the pact"), not yet knowing that it would have to pull the card of the Russian admiral out of its sleeve as well.

Well, about this latter it was said above - it seems to me - quite enough.

MY STORY about the American line in the Russian counter-revolution, about its predominantly "Kolchak" color, is coming to an end. Both I and the reader now know a lot about what happened to Kolchak before he became

"Kolchak", about what escaped the attention of those zealous collectors of facts who also call themselves "historians". And I propose to return once again to the beginning of the "Kolchakiada" and trace once again the chain of events, its

made up...

Yes, outwardly Kolchak always gave the impression of a man of duty. But directly connected with the Kornilovites, he leaves on the eve of the putsch. Although the putschists were counting on him. It turns out that he is going as an emissary of Kornilov to wait in England his hour.

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However, Kornilovism breaks down. But he is already in London. What to do?

There are enough generals and admirals in Russia. Yes, and Kornilov - under arrest in Bykhov. The hopes of the Golden Elite are now connected with the Cossacks, with Kaledin. Nevertheless, it is too early to abandon Kolchak. Yes, and the cover of his contacts with the Entente is chosen well. And now he is going to the USA - as before, as an emissary of the counter-revolution.

October is coming...

Kornilov and his closest supporters are still in the Bykhov prison under the "guard" of the Tekinsky convoy, but on November 19, 1917, they are released by Colonel Kusonsky. And Kornilov and the Tekins went to Novochoerkassk to gather white forces, and after the collapse of Kaledin, he went on an "Ice" campaign against the Kuban. Kolchak does not yet need to return like this, from the bay-floundering. Moreover, other forces are coming to the fore in Russia - Kornilov dies in April 1918, and Denikin replaces him.

In addition, in the Far East, in China, in Northern Manchuria, many interests and opportunities are intertwined, since Prince Kudashev, who is currently sitting in Beijing as the Russian ambassador, has funds that China paid Russia on account of "boxing" reparations. Yes, and the CER is still in the hands of the local Russians, the Croatian ...

Croat claims to be "Sovereignty", but is old, greedy and in military circles has no authority and cannot have.

The spring of 1918 comes, and with it comes the rebellion of the White Czechs, who were greatly counted on. The Samara komuch and the Ufa directory appear. And everything seemed to turn out pretty well ... Kolchak is not really needed, especially since he is not present in the minds of the white masses. But he is more and more his own for the "top" of the interventionist forces.

Serious forces of the Japanese are advancing from the Far East to Transbaikalia, and together with the Czechs they do not allow the Siberian counter-revolution to die out. However, America needs its own people there, capable of providing their interests with Russian bayonets, because the Czechs are losing their enthusiasm more and more, and the Japanese for the Yankees try not to boo

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dut. To do this, it is necessary to create conditions - what the summer and autumn of 1918-th ... At the end of October, Kolchak was put into action through Knox: on November 4 they made the minister of the collapsing Directory, and on November 18, "under Kolchak" they made a coup. Kolchakism begins.

HOWEVER, America's plans were thwarted by a free Soviet Russia.

But since the beginning of 1919, America has been able to dictate its will to the West.

In Russia, America was betting on Kolchak. And if the "deal" with him "burned out", then the States would generally become the complete masters of the world. After all, then it would be possible to deal with the growing and impudent Japan. Not without reason, having created Kolchak and put on Kolchak, the States delegated to him after

the first successes of US Ambassador to Japan Morris. After a comprehensive inspection, Morris was to present "a comprehensive plan for the economic reconstruction of Siberia" and "an indicative plan for European Russia." And it is unlikely that in this regard there was a worthy place for Japan.

However, Kolchak fell.

And it is not accidental, of course, but once again revealing that, simultaneously with its fall, America's attitude towards intervention also changed. By January 1920, it became completely clear that Kolchak and his regime were "waste steam". And in early January of this year, the United States sent a note to Japan stating that the continued presence of foreign troops on Russian soil not only does not help, but prevents the Russian people from rationally arranging their lives.

Everything was explained, of course, not by love for the Russian people, but by the fact that in Russia the main card of America turned out to be beaten, and in the United States itself few people wanted to support the intervention. Back in November 1919, the unofficial representative of the RSFSR in the United States, Martens, informed People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Chicherin: *"The mood in government spheres is depressed, they feel*

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Vuyut that the intervention burst. And "society" is noticeably inclined to leave Russia alone.

"Nothing is as successful as success" -

this is how the average American summarizes his opinion about the turning point in relations with Soviet Russia.

That is, in the American note to Japan, America's desire to convince the Japanese that Russian, they say, "grapes" is green, was affected. Unable to eat it itself, America began to dissuade him and his Asian competitor.

However, Japan was a country of the East and "walked" on its own. The States could no longer fight in Siberia with the bayonets of Kolchak, and the Japanese did not refuse to fight there personally, if this was to their advantage.

And there was a benefit.

By the beginning of 1920, the interventionists from the European part of Russia left, and Soviet power was already firmly established there. The Russian Far East was still a real political ... How can I put it more precisely? It is impossible to say that it was a political "okroshka" ... It was precisely an indigestible mishmash of interventionist (mostly -

Japanese) troops, the fleeting "governments" of various adventurers, the remnants of the Kolchak, Semenov, muddy partisans and the centers of the Soviet authorities.

In Vladivostok, the Japanese, and the Yankees, and the Primorsky Provisional Government of the Bolshevik Sergei Lazo, and the White Guards somehow coexisted ... It ended on the second anniversary of the attack on the Isido office - on the night of April 4-5, 1920. The Japanese attacked the Soviet troops, captured Lazo and introduced martial law in Vladivostok. A few Soviet units retreated to the hills. The Japanese handed over Lazo to the White Guards, and they already burned it in a locomotive firebox.

The Japanese really did not want to leave such places rich in raw materials as Siberia and Primorye. In Khabarovsk, the commander of the Japanese troops, General Shirozu, published an article in the local newspaper on April 3, where he wrote: *"The long-awaited peace and order have been established in the country, for the preservation and maintenance of which the Japanese fought ...*

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It is a pity to leave the population of the Far East, with whom we got to know each other so closely, so intimately, having the warmest friendship for him. We wish you complete success in the construction and preservation of peace and order."

And a day later, Shirozu troops opened gunfire on state institutions and the headquarters of the revolutionary troops. Everything started over.

And the Japanese fought this fire for more than two years. Because it was profitable for them economically. Any atamans like Semyonov could not destroy Soviet power, but they could delay its arrival in Primorye. And all this time, the Japanese had the opportunity to rob our Far East with impunity.

As for the Europeans, on January 16, 1920, the Supreme Council of the Entente decided to lift the blockade of the RSFSR and withdraw his troops from Siberia.

On February 24, 1920, the Soviet government approached Japan with a proposal for peace talks. But the Japanese did not want to leave. The businessman Anichkov, already known to us, was at that time in Vladivostok and received a young Japanese general who had replaced another lodger with the same Anichkov - a Japanese general in advanced years.

At the housewarming dinner, the Japanese asked for permission to sing a song as a return toast in his honor and sang about the fact that cheerful geishas used to sing in Nikolsk-Ussuriysky, which once belonged to Japan, and now he himself sings a song about what is on in the light of a deep river with clear cold water, of which there is as much as there is a lot of fine wine on this table. And he, the general, is sure that the time will come when those sitting at the table will meet again in the beautiful city beyond Baikal, which stands on that river, and will drink its cold water.

The river was called the Angara, and the city on it was called Irkutsk. This is what the Japanese generals sang about in Vladivostok in the spring of 1920 (and "Russian patriots" like Anichkov declared that they would be happy to welcome the Japanese in Irkutsk after they drove the "damned Bolsheviks" out of there). Under such songs March 31, 1920

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Japan, in response to Moscow's peace proposals, refused under the pretext that ... it fears for the life and property of its subjects, as well as for peace in ... Manchuria and Korea ...

The latter looked especially ridiculous, but we did not have to laugh - as we know, in early April, the Japanese began a new stage of intervention with a coup in Vladivostok.

Moscow's answer came from Verkhneudinsk.

There, on April 6, 1920, at the congress of workers of Transbaikalia, the Far Eastern Republic was proclaimed - a "buffer" between the RSFSR and the zone of Japanese occupation. The more than two-year history of the FER began...

Semyonov, imprisoned by the Japanese, was sitting in Chita, but on July 25, 1920, the Japanese had to evacuate Chita and retreat to the Amur Region. Japan clung to its Far Eastern chance on Russian soil to the last. Unlike America, this policy within Japan itself was quite popular, and only the Red Army and Red Partisan bayonets pushed the Japanese more and more toward the ocean.

On August 26, 1921, in Japanese Dairen (the former Russian city of Far Dalian on the Chinese Liaodong Peninsula), negotiations began between representatives of Japan and the Far East. The Dairen Conference dragged on for a long time - until April 1922, when the Japanese thwarted it.

The fact is that in Washington from November 12, 1921 to February 6, 1922, a conference of nine powers was held on the limitation of naval weapons, the Pacific and Far Eastern issues (I will talk about it later). While the conference lasted, Japan should have been able to declare that it would solve the "Siberian" problems on its own, because it controls them independently.

The conference ended and the Japanese tried to end the "buffer" by force. However, on August 15, 1922, they had to announce the upcoming evacuation - the power in the Far East finally passed to the Reds. But even here the "little devils from across the sea" did not want to leave just like that - having boarded the ships, they

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they tried to bargain for something at the negotiations with the Far Eastern Republic and the RSFSR in Chinese Changchun in September 1922. The Japanese were now ready to consider a draft treaty with the Far East, which they themselves had rejected in Dairen and, given the impending realities, was extremely advantageous for the Japanese.

But now we were no longer inclined to bargain. And the Japanese reluctantly began to prepare the evacuation, willingly plundering the Far East in the end ... They had to hurry, because Spassk was taken by storm in early October, and on October 19 the People's Revolutionary Army of the Far Eastern Republic approached Vladivostok.

Now there was only one thing left - to urgently sign an agreement on the withdrawal of Japanese troops from Vladivostok on October 25 and urgently move to steamboats standing under steam.

On October 25, the People's Assembly of the FER declared the power of the Soviets in the entire Russian Far East, and on November 15, 1922, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee announced the entry of the FER into the RSFSR.

A month later, in December 1922, the formation of the USSR was proclaimed in Moscow.

The exceptional greed and tenacity of the Japanese prolonged the agony of the White Guard and intervention in Russia until 1922. However, now what would have ended without the Japanese by the summer of 1920 has finally happened.

And Japan was forced to think about how to build its own now peaceful relations with the new proletarian Russia.

And although there was no particular success here, the need to moderate appetites for Russia was also caused by new intra-Japanese difficulties ...

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Chapter 10

Years of the 20s and 30s: the "ball" is getting tangled ...

SOMETIMES, the expressiveness of a strict encyclopedic line surpasses any artistic technique, and therefore I will simply quote the first TSB: 1923, which destroyed a significant part of the Japanese national wealth. Tens of thousands of people died; approx. 4 million people.

That's right... And it's scary, tragic...

After the First World War, things in Japan, as already mentioned, went worse. The decline in demand for "war", and the crisis in world shipping, and the costs (albeit overlapped for the time being by income) for the intervention in Soviet Russia, and the temporarily unprofitable support for the militarist generals of the northern group in China, also affected.

And then there is the largest earthquake in the Tokyo-Yokohama area. Japan, typhoons and earthquakes are almost synonymous. Natural disasters were so familiar to the Japanese that - I have already said this - in no small measure

influenced the formation of the national character.

But for centuries, the elements have destroyed the "paper" Japanese houses. And here is the trouble first hit the new, industrial Japan.

The damage was determined by the amount of 5 billion yen. There were more than 150,000 dead alone. Japan is numb to

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several days under the glow of city fires. The government was also numb, and then, remembering that it would be accused of inaction, it spread rumors that the Koreans were setting fire to the houses. Korean pogroms began in Tokyo. Thousands of Koreans were killed.

At the end of December 1923, after an attempt on the life of a young anarchist Crown Prince Regent Hirohito resigned Yamamoto's government.

As a result of the earthquake in 1923, Japan's trade deficit reached 646 million yen, and taking into account trade with the colonies - 850 million yen. The foreign exchange reserve accumulated during the World War was almost completely squandered in the first decade of the war. The leakage of gold abroad was blocked only as a result of the embargo on gold.

Japan's foreign policy position was also not the best.

In June 1921, the Anglo-Japanese alliance treaty expired. Japan risked losing her only strong "well-wisher".

"Well-wisher" was, of course, in quotation marks - the British, like the Yankees, organically could not be sincerely loyal to anyone, although the British lion increasingly sincerely tucked his tail in front of the US "team" of the "democratic" donkey and the "republican" elephant.

But the British have so far supported Japan, based on their own interests. However, this was done without much enthusiasm.

The Land of the Rising Sun had to violate the "sacred" traditions that forbade the heir to the imperial throne to leave the borders of his homeland, and in May 1921 send Crown Prince Hirohito to England - far away.

The situation was up in the air...

And here the American President Harding turned to England, France, Italy, Japan, as well as to China, Holland, Belgium and Portugal with a formal proposal to convene in Washington

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conference. America, having assumed supremacy over Europe, wanted to establish new relations with the outside world and in Asia.

It was also necessary to sort out the world situation at sea... Such an arms race unfolded there that even those who started it began to be horrified by it. By 1919, the three most powerful maritime powers had the following navies:

England - 43 dreadnought battleships, 1 pre-dreadnought battleship, 11 armored cruisers, 99 light cruisers, 451 leaders and destroyers, 124 submarines.

USA - 22 dreadnought battleships, 20 pre-dreadnought battleships, 14 armored cruisers, 13 light cruisers, 424 leaders and destroyers, 102 submarines.

Japan - 13 dreadnought battleships, 9 pre-dreadnought battleships, 13 armored cruisers, 20 light cruisers, 84 leaders and destroyers, 53 submarines.

By 1921, Japan and the United States adopted new naval programs, according to which Japan intended to build a dozen and a half heavy ships alone, and the United States sixteen. By 1927, Japan's annual expenditures were to reach \$400 million, and the US had to spend an additional one and a half billion - more than Germany spent on all its naval preparations for the First World War, including the construction

deep water Kiel Canal.

In 1921, a book by Admiral Kojiro Sato was published in Japan, the title of which did not need comments: "If Japan and America fight ..." In the same year, American naval intelligence established that six battleships under construction in the States would not be the most powerful in the world : Japan was building eight even more powerful battleships, and England was laying four battleships that were not inferior to

Japanese.

The Americans began to proclaim on all corners that "the Anglo-Japanese alliance represents the most dangerous element in US relations with the Far East and the Pacific." Now, "after the fight," the Yankees no longer hesitated to openly declare that the Anglo-Japanese alliance was directed against Russia and Germany. And by

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Since the Russians and Germans are now weak, the union of Japan and England is no longer needed, they say.

N-yes.

At the Imperial Conference in London, the Prime Minister of Canada (formally Dominion) Meagan stated that if the Anglo-Japanese treaty was renewed, the Canadian Parliament would not ratify it. To which Lloyd George threw him: "Sir, you are acting as a citizen of the United States" - and he was not so far from the truth.

In general, a loud mess around the Pacific and other oceans was started up! And so America's proposal to discuss everything at a detailed conference was not in vain. On November 12, 1921, the Washington Conference began its work.

The official agenda included two items: 1) the limitation of naval weapons, as well as the rules for the use of new weapons of war; 2) the Pacific and Far Eastern question - China, Siberia and the Mandatory Islands.

The RSFSR was not invited to this conference. Well, it means that her decisions were not written to us either.

This conference did not bode well for Japan, because one of the unofficial points was precisely the search for ways to contain Japanese naval activity. And these ways were found in the form of three final documents of the conference.

The Treaty of the Four Powers (Quadruple Agreement) - the United States, Great Britain, France and Japan - on the "joint defense of the rights to island possessions" was signed on December 13, 1921. He - among other things - annulled the Anglo-Japanese alliance concluded in London on 13 (oh, how popular this figure is with the Golden Elite!) July 1911.

France was dragged into this agreement by the States, because they did not want to bind hands on a purely Anglo-Saxon-Japanese agreement in the Pacific.

At a secret meeting on the Far East question, the Japanese ambassador to United States Shidehara assured the audience that Japan will not

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will annex Siberia, but will conduct "peaceful trade construction" there.

Let's not forget that at that time the Vladivostok guest of the future white émigré Anichkov, a Japanese general, was still singing songs about the future Japanese Irkutsk.

Siberia and the islands were dealt with quickly in Washington, and then the most difficult disputes began over quotas for military fleets. Everyone agreed that they should be limited, because it had already become clear that with an unrestrained sea race, everyone could also drown in the financial abyss.

But here's who can afford what - a lot was broken on this, if not

spears and swords, then - clerk's quills and shorthand pencils.

The Japanese insisted on the ratio of forces of the battle fleets of England, the USA and Japan 10:10:7.

The states proposed 5:5:3 and insisted, in particular, on Japan's refusal to complete the construction of the newest battleship Mutsu, which had already been launched.

The Japanese resisted, but in the end, 60 percent of the Anglo-Saxon fleets agreed to the norm for their fleet. But at the same time, Japan was able to achieve a refusal to create such a network of Anglo-Saxon bases in the Pacific Ocean that would threaten Japan. Neither the States nor the Britons could have naval bases at a distance of less than 5 thousand kilometers from the Japanese coast.

France and Italy were added to the agreement for a round score, and the Treaty of the Five Powers signed on February 6 established the general ratio of fleets for them 5: 5: 3: 1.75: 1.75.

On the same February 6, the Nine-Power Treaty on China was signed. Japan had to return the Shandong province to China and abandon the "21st demand" ...

At the same time, the semi-colonial status of "sovereign" China was confirmed in Washington rather than challenged. Here, perhaps, it is enough to cite the opinion of US Secretary of State Hughes: "We believe that thanks to this treaty, "open doors" to China have finally become a reality."

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On the one hand, what was said was a blatant lie - because the "doors" to China had been open to the Yankees since, perhaps, the time of the Cushing mission, and even since the time of Hay, in any case. But, on the other hand, what was said was true, because it was in the Treaty of Nine Powers that the Yankees finally achieved for their policy of "open doors" the status not only de facto, but also de jure. However, these "doors" that were not opened by China were far from analogous to the Russian "window" that our Peter the Great cut through to Europe.

And soon after the conference, on April 14, 1923, the US-Japanese Lansing-Ishii agreement on Japan's "special interests" in China was declared invalid.

And AGAIN, dear reader, we need to get back to China...

The Chinese peasant, even now, at the beginning of the 21st century, is a creature, according to knowledgeable people, disenfranchised. This is probably what it is.

And why I think so, I will now explain ...

Apparently, not only millions, but tens and even hundreds of millions of Chinese have been falling into the sieve of Chinese "statistics" for centuries. And they are all peasants.

Here is a quote from the 32nd volume of the first TSB: "Individual estimates of its size (the population of China. - S.K.) differ greatly from each other. The official estimates of governmental bodies are quite high: the maritime customs department totals (1931) 439 million people; statistical office (1931) 453 million hours; postal administration (1928) 485 million. Chinese scholars agree with official estimates and believe that the population of China is much more than 400 million. Diao Ming-jian - 463 million people.

At the other extreme are the much lower estimates of American sinologists. Thus, Rokgil in 1904 determined the population of China proper at 275 million souls. Professor Wilcox of Cornell University considers (1930) the most acceptable figure of 323 million.

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The encyclopedia also cited the "last" (the volume was signed for publication on 13

December 1936) data of the Nanking government - 463,751,997 people.

This last seven, reader, especially touched me. She, presumably, was bred by the Nanjing "bookkeepers" in order to show how carefully everything was taken into account, but rather showed the opposite ...

But the "gap" between the highest and lowest estimates of the population by the customs and postal officials of China itself at the turn of the 20-30s was 46 million people!

Between the highest Chinese and American "scholarly" estimates—157 (!) million!!

That's how many Chinese fell into these "gaps" then ...

But who are they?

Mandarin officials?

These are taken into account.

Poets and artists?

These favorites of the imperial courts were always taken into account by the piece ...

The workers of factories and plants cannot be left out of account either.

But who will take into account the peasants?

It's easier and more accurate to say that there are "hundreds of millions" of them, and to establish yourself on that ...

So the real "superfluous people" in China have always turned out to be precisely

peasants.

At the same time, only in the troops of the provincial militarist generals in the 30s, not so much fought as drank and ate either two or three million people.

Approximately 80 million people lived in cities, and life there was far from sugary for many. In Shanghai, there were only 436 women per 1,000 men in 1934 (for all of China, statistics gave a ratio of 549 to 451).

And - here is the paradox - although there were not enough women in China, they were not appreciated there since childhood, and girls simply did not live up to the age of brides.

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GETTING ACQUAINTED (of course, through books) with China in the 1920s and 1930s, I simply marveled at the diversity and oddities that bulged out of every page of what I read.

Well, let's take railroads...

Unlike the Japanese, the Chinese did not close their country to the West, but the first Chinese railway was built ten years later than the first Japanese - in 1881.

And it was almost ten times shorter!

In Japan, on the eve of the First World War, there were already 11 thousand kilometers operated railway network, and in China - only 6 thousand.

And by the beginning of the thirties, China had not extended this network much. 8307 kilometers - that's what he had in 1932. And he transported on them 25-27 million tons of cargo and no more than 48 million passengers.

In 1929, Japan already had 19,613 kilometers, along which it transported 103.2 million tons of cargo and (hold on, reader!) - one billion two hundred and fourteen million passengers ... True, the average passenger had a "collision" of only 20 kilometers (that is, , as always, suburban trips contributed the most). But still, this is a figure that causes exceptional respect for the Japanese ...

Moreover, you can't tell from it alone that the Japanese of that time, "opened" to the outside world eighty years ago, remained homebodies (in England in those years, 18 million fewer Englishmen traveled by rail than Japanese in Japan, and in Germany Germans - only twice as many).

And what were the Chinese and Japanese railways like? With the permission of the reader, I will again simply quote volumes of the first TSB: 32nd (on

China) and 65th (about Japan).

1) "Extremely low technical building standard, the supply of rolling stock and technical equipment is overwhelmingly due to marriage and used foreign junk, an insignificant amount of new capital investments in the context of continuous militaristic wars and frequent natural disasters (in Japan, in fact, earthquakes also happened . —

S.K.) - all this

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catches the technical backwardness and ruin of the Chinese railway. transport".

2) "Y. has great achievements in the field of rolling stock. Carrying 3 times less cargo than England, and 5 times less than Germany, Japan has almost 10 times less freight wagons than either of these countries. We see the same thing in the use of passenger cars and steam locomotives ... High standards for the use of rolling stock on railways. d. Ya. associated with the excellent organization of their movement and repair. In this regard, Japan is ahead of all other countries ... "

Ahead of **all**, reader! And this was clearly the case, for further the TSB reported: "Therefore, when the problem of rationalizing the railway x-va of the USSR, I was taken as a sample.

Not Germany, not America, not England, not Sweden, but Japan, my dear reader!

After reviewing these figures, I once again realized how much the national character of its people means to the history of the country. Huge continental China was destroying itself, and narrow island Japan, accustomed over the centuries to the ideas of a single state, progressed so much that it was time for the Stalinist USSR with its five-year plans to envy not just industriousness, but the "Stakhanovite" pressure of the Japanese.

Japan used foreigners, but China fed and enriched them... In 1934, China and the Chinese (but by no means *China*) mined 28.5 million tons of coal. And here is a summary of the enterprises of his coal industry for 1934 year:

Mines owned exclusively by China, 9062 Mt
Kailan mines (English) 5460 million tons
Other British and Anglo-Chinese mines 1,637 Mt
Fushun mines (Japanese) 7106 Mt
Other Japanese and Japanese-Chinese mines 1,637 Mt
German-Chinese mines 0.879 million tons
Total with foreign capital participation 19,438 mmt

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And in the entire economy of China, the picture differed little from the one depicted above. At the same time, in terms of imports to China, America was in first place with 26.16 percent, Japan was in second place with 12.21 percent; England moved to third (from the first before the First World War) with 12 percent. Germany accounted for 9 Chinese imports.

China was ousted from the world tea market by British India and Ceylon, and from the raw silk market by Japan. China was forced out of the Japanese cotton market by the same India.

Yes, it's not easy...

However, since almost the beginning of the 20th century, China has been torn apart not only by the West, Japan, the States, but, above all, China itself.

This is how such an original researcher as Richard Sorge characterized the processes in the South-West of China.

In the German magazine "Zeitschrift für geopolitik" in 1938, concluding his

analytical article on Canton, Sorge wrote: *"This sketchy, covering almost all areas of provincial life, the changed situation of the Southwest ... contains to a large extent the answer to the so often asked question about how long cohesion and*

the unity of the Chinese provinces... One can perhaps assume that not all the contradictions that previously tore apart China, formally united under the control of the Nanjing government, have disappeared, and the Southwest will still pursue some of its own goals and intentions... Therefore, it would be risky already today to announce a new split or independent constitution of the southern province. It seems to the correspondent that the most serious test of the practical unity of the Southwest with the rest of China, forged in the struggle, will come only after the end of the struggle with *fully* *impossible...*
Japan. The Central Government ... will then be faced with two great factions and will have to deal with their leaders, new economic developments and political currents. This,

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on the one hand, the Communist-influenced Northwest of China, and on the other, the anti-communist, increasingly important Southwest."

And, of course, not only Sorge thought about what awaits China in the future ... And what awaited Japan? And what about Russia?

Smoky plumes from active volcanoes flew over Japan, its movements of the earth's crust and the tsunamis that were born in the open spaces of the ocean were shaking.

The world war is a thing of the past, which orphaned tens of millions of people in dozens of countries, and made Japan rich for a while.

The Russian Civil War and the Japanese anti-Soviet intervention in Russia, which did not contribute to the end of this war ...

The "buffer" Far Eastern Republic, which became part of the USSR, handed over its affairs to the archives.

Collapsed (and not only from the tremors of the earthquake of 1923), which turned out to be fragile, the well-being of the Japanese economy, which was not very rescued even by a temporary recovery in 1925 ...

But life went on...

In 1921, the property qualification for voters was significantly lowered in Japan, and in 1925 the right to vote became formally universal (though only for men, and even then not for all).

In the same year, 1925, a law on the "protection of public order" was adopted, which immediately received a second, unofficial name - the law on "dangerous thoughts" ... All doubts about the beneficence of private property were recognized as dangerous. For "creating or participating in a society that aims to change the constitution or government or rejects the system

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private property", the law provided for a ten-year sentence.

But life went on...

And in this life, Japan could not help but remember that it neighbors with Russia both by sea and by land - along the 50th parallel on the island with the double name of Karafuto-Sakhalin.

Nor could Soviet Russia forget about it.

Our trade relations were not particularly lively even before the First World War. In 1913, the total volume of Russian-Japanese trade amounted to 10.5 million yen, with an active balance for Japan of 7-8 million.

During the war, we also bought military goods from Japan (as we remember, the glorious

our gunsmith, General Fedorov, then went to Japan for Arisaka rifles) and food. They bought for quite decent amounts - in 1916 for 151

one million yen.

A little later, Japan made good use of our wealth during the intervention - from 45 to 171 million yen a year was then its Russian "booty".

But life went on...

In January 1923, the mayor of Tokyo, Viscount Goto, proposed starting negotiations between Japan and Russia to clarify the "misunderstandings" between them (later Goto became chairman of the Japanese-Soviet Society for Cultural Relations).

And two years later, on January 20, 1925, the first Soviet Japanese Treaty - Convention on Basic Principles of Relationships.

Under this Peking treaty, the Soviet Union recognized, by the way, the 1905 Portsmouth Treaty of 1905, which remained in force, but refused to share political responsibility for it with the former tsarist government.

It was decided to revise the fishing convention of 1907.

By May 1925, Japan withdrew its troops from Northern Sakhalin, but oil and coal concessions in accordance with the

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Under the Kin Treaty, Japan received up to 200,000 tons of oil and 130,000 tons of coal per year from the local concession fields.

Three years later, on January 23, 1928, a new Fishing Convention was concluded in Moscow. The negotiations were not easy, and the appetites of the Japanese - immodest.

Yes, and they behaved impudently - in 1928, our sales representative Anikeev received three bullets in Tokyo when leaving the house where he lived. The trade representative was only wounded, we signed the convention (for the Japanese - beneficial and preferential). However, these three bullets, as it were, symbolized those political "dots" that have become a fairly familiar "punctuation mark" for our mutual relations.

But not in everything and not always the Japanese were hostile to the USSR ... At the end of July of the same 1928, the famous kabuki theater headed by the outstanding actor Sadanji came to us on a monthly tour. The People's Commissar of Education Anatoly Vasilievich Lunacharsky published an article in No. 32 of the Krasnaya Panorama magazine, where he wrote:

"The arrival of the Japanese kabuki theater in Moscow and Leningrad is of exceptional interest. Firstly, a real Japanese theater, a traditional theater with a number of original features, has never, as far as I know, left the territory of Japan. Only now two theaters of the same type will go simultaneously: one to the USSR, the other to Germany ... "

The addresses of foreign kabuki tours were hardly accidental - they could even be regarded as symbolic ... After all, smart people in Japan understood that these three countries - Germany, Russia and Japan - could form a mutually complementary union unprecedented in its potential ...

Lunacharsky ended the article like this:

"We have no doubt that our public will show the most definite interest in such an original spectacle, which is the key to understanding a whole complex and high culture, until now; despite our proximity to the Japanese, which remains something distant and closed for us.

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Alas, other performances were played in the Far East, and they were also

the keys to understanding that only a strong Russia can be friends with the Japanese, able to calmly and convincingly say: "Everyone has his own" ...

After all, the Japanese kept trying to get at our expense something beyond "their own"... In 1930, in the conventional waters along the Soviet coast of the Sea of Japan, the Sea of Okhotsk and the Bering Sea, they caught fish for 60 million yen (and for 6 million yen they bought it from us that year).

The sea and its products have always fed the Japanese. And after the Meiji Revolution, industrial fishing also developed rapidly. Unsuccessful tsarist Russia was losing to Japan in this respect as well. And before the October Revolution, we caught little fish in our own Far Eastern waters. But Soviet fishing in the Far East by the beginning of the 30s was becoming a very real factor and every year more and more significant.

All this was very undesirable for Japan. We began to supply our own domestic market ourselves, entered foreign markets (Japanese included) and naturally pressed the Japanese in the fishing areas.

The waters, in the end, were ours, Russians, and we were forced to provide benefits to the Japanese. It was necessary to have a purely samurai self-confidence in order to count on the Soviet-Japanese fishing status quo to last forever.

In 1930, in the office of the manager of the Vladivostok branch of the Japanese Chosen Bank, people neatly dressed in civilian clothes, but not smart in civilian clothes, appeared.

"Lord Yomiura!" Your bank is making illegal transactions.

This is a brazen provocation!

- No, its true. You supply the Japanese fishermen with our chervonets at a reduced rate.

This is a brazen provocation!

- No, its true! But we won't let that happen again.

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Speculation in the Soviet currency we then cut down. But the anti-Soviet Japan's speculative politics, no.

But life went on...

In the same 1930, mutual export-import was divided approximately in half with a total turnover of more than forty million yen. Of course it wasn't God knows

What.

Japan received from us mainly timber and fish products. We bought forest products, metals and metal products, electrical products and textile products from Japan. Basically, our imports were carried out under the article "goods of a special kind" (four-fifths were ... networks).

The interesting thing is the economy. The Soviet trade representative, for his actions to protect our fishery, was forced to dodge bullets in the very country that supplied Russian fishermen with high-quality fishing gear.

A WORD, a little about the economy... In tsarist Russia, there was no need to talk about the special economy of the Far East.

But what about Soviet Russia?

So, volume 20 of the first TSB, published in 1930, in the article "Far Eastern Territory" reported:

"DVK is the largest unit of the regional division of the USSR after Yakutia and Kazakhstan, covering approx. 12% of its area is formed ... from the former lips. Transbaikal, Primorsky, Amur, Kamchatka and sowing. parts of Sakhalin ... Area 2.602.6 thousand km² ; us. 1,881.4 tons according to the 1926 census and 2,099.7 tons according to the calculation on January 1, 1929 (an increase of 10% over a few years says something! - S.K.). Center - Khabarovsk.

Not only the population, but also the entire economy of the region grew rapidly, although the plans for five-year plans were just being outlined at that time. During the same three years, from 1926 to 1929, the gross value of agricultural production increased from 184.3 million rubles to 261.5 million, industry - from 140.4 million to 235.9 million rubles.

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lei (including large - from 77.4 to 145.2, and the gold industry from 5.9 to 15.5 million) at the prices of 1926-1927.

At that time in the Far East we granted concessions to the Japanese. So, at the Sakhalin Okhinsky field, they produced up to 150 thousand tons of oil per year. But the Soviet trust "Sakhalinpet" already existed with a production plan of 370 thousand tons by 1933.

In 1913, the cargo turnover of the DVK ports was 1 million 530 thousand tons (out of 423 thousand of them are exports, 377 are imports, the rest is domestic cabotage).

By 1925, it fell to 1 million 185 thousand tons (980 thousand - export, 52 - import), but three years later it seriously exceeded the pre-revolutionary level - 2 million 591 thousand tons (2 million 005 thousand - export, 140 - import).

The balance of foreign trade in 1913 was passive at minus 23.6 percent, and in 1928 it was active at plus 3.9 percent, but the first TSB made a characteristic clarification: passive balance, which is offset by a surplus in exchange with the rest of the USSR.

However, by the beginning of the thirties, all this was becoming obsolete in the most pleasant way in the coming years. The TSB spoke about it this way: "The problem of the development of the productive forces of the DVK is in completely special conditions, different from any other region of the USSR. The Soviet Far East is the most remote from the main economic centers of the Union ...

A completely different situation will come at the beginning of the second five-year period. The Urals and Kuzbass will produce up to 6 million tons of ferrous metal processed into rails, tools, and machines. Transportable fertilizers will begin to come from the chemical plants of Kuzbass, Powerful cotton and linen factories will begin to operate in the Novosibirsk region ... A few more years later, an energy center of world importance will appear in the Baikal region ... "

All this gave a new chance to the Russian Far East. By 1933 it was supposed to deploy a coal mine

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industry with the extraction of up to 6 million tons of coal per year, the creation of a fishing fleet "from trawlers, drifters, floating crab-canning factories, whaling bases, etc.", and in addition - the creation of stationary factories, for which 42 million rubles were allocated. For those times - the money is not stunning, but decent.

The Far East was still nine thousand kilometers away from Moscow, but in this far Russian region a new psychology was already emerging. Chekhov did not see Russian self-consciousness here, and now the commonality of the East of Russia with the Center arose already on the basis of Soviet self-consciousness, that is -

collectivist, active, creative and optimistic...

And was it bad?

Even for Japan?

In HIS famous "Tsushima", Aleksey Silych Novikov-Priboy wrote about Japan of ordinary people (the other Tsushima sailor, in fact, could not see them) as follows: "*The Japanese surprised me. I have not seen sad and gloomy faces in either men or women. It seemed that they were always cheerful, as if all of them*

they live excellently and they are all satisfied with the state system, with themselves, and with their social position. In fact, the Japanese population lives in great poverty, but skillfully hides it. In the same way, it would be erroneous to assume, judging by their excessive politeness and courtesy developed over the centuries, that they represent the most peaceful people in the world.

light."

These were the results of the thoughtful Russian man's observation of the Japanese "bottom"...

The public physiognomy of the "top" is easier to study - both because you cannot hide many of their deeds from public view, and because many different papers remain from them ...

On July 25, 1927, the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan, General Tanaka, completed the secret memorandum "On the Foundations of Positive Policy in Manchuria and Mongolia" and presented it to the emperor. Japan's program in this memorandum

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was divided as follows: Manchuria, Mongolia, then - the rest of China, then - India, the Archipelago, Asia and, finally, "even Europe."

In fact, the Japanese tried to dispute the authenticity of the "Tanaka memorandum" (it was first published in the Chinese magazine "China Critic" in September 1931, in the atmosphere of the beginning of the occupation of Manchuria by Japanese troops).

But the "Neighbors of Japan" map hanging in Japanese schools with five concentric circles of promising expansion fully corresponded to this supposedly "fake".

Regarding America, Tanaka was not so decisive, but he believed that such a policy of the "Yamato race" puts her with the Yankees "face to face." Tanaka wrote: *"If we want to seize control of China in the future, we will have to crush the United States, that is, to deal with them as we did in the Russo-Japanese War."*

Of course, this was already unforgivable geopolitical and historical blindness. Japan did not defeat Russia, in any case, did not win convincingly, due to long-term factors. Russia was "beaten" with the help of Japan by those who needed Russia's anti-German activity in Europe and did not need Russia's reasonable activity in its own Far East.

Neither Mukden nor Tsushima could have taken place without Jacob Schiff's loans.

The Golden Elite, of course, was not averse to financing and encouraging Japan's new military preparations, however, no one, naturally, planned to allow Japan's military victory over the host country of the headquarters of this Elite. Japan's enduring, ultimate victory over the US was clearly a chimera.

And this was already the second (after the anti-Soviet) adventurous line in Japanese policy. Bowing before Prince Bismarck, the Japanese "viscounts" and "barons" from the "genro" did not want to assimilate Bismarck's general foreign policy thesis. Its essence could be formulated as follows: "Russia should not be loved, but Russia should not be neglected, which means that Russia should be friends."

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Not understanding this, Japan doomed itself to an external confrontation on two fronts at once.

But just as it would once be beneficial for the Germans to have an alliance with continental Russia against naval England, so it would be smart for the Japanese in their upcoming confrontation with oceanic America to secure an honest alliance with continental Russia ...

Did Japan understand this in the 1930s?

Unfortunately no!

Japan went to Manchuria and China and there supported those forces that they tore the country apart, and at the same time they also hated Russia.

So, again - Manchuria ...

On its territory, as was laid by Russia, so did the well-remembered "Wittew" CER. The Soviet Union considered the CER to be a commercial enterprise - although located in China, but built with Russian state funds and therefore owned by the USSR.

In the 1920s, however, the Chinese militarists, the Japanese, the Yankees, and even France (the latter on the "reason" that it bought out the shares of the Russo-Asiatic Bank) claimed the CER.

Nevertheless, on May 31, 1924, the Peking government signed the "Agreement on General Principles for the Settlement of Issues between the USSR and the Republic of China." He was not recognized by General Chang Tso-lin, head of the provincial Manchu government, but on September 24, 1924, we signed an agreement in Mukden on the CER and with him.

On the railways, Zhang Tso-lin eventually got burned, including literally. By 1928, his conflict with the central government had assumed an armed character. The general occupied Beijing, could not resist there, was forced to retreat, and thereby undermined his shares with the Japanese (they also suspected him of having connections with the Americans!).

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On June 4, 1928, Zhang Tso-lin went to Mukden, but when his train a viaduct guarded by Japanese troops was passing, an explosion was heard.

There was a lot of noise, it was clear that the Japanese themselves had removed the general, but the matter was hushed up. The general was succeeded by his 27-year-old son, General Zhang Hsu-eliang, who was nationalist and subjugated Manchuria to the Chiang Kai-shek Nanjing government of China. In December 1928, the Kuomintang flag was hoisted over Zhang Xu elian's capital, Mukden.

Against all this background, in mid-July 1929, Chang Hsu-eliang's troops captured the Chinese Eastern Railway, in which the Kuomintang Chiang Kai-shek did not even seem to hinder them. Actually, it was precisely at the meeting of Chiang Kai-shek and Chang Hsiu-elian in Peking at the beginning of July 1929 that the capture of the Chinese Eastern Railway was finally decided.

In the current "Rossiyanin", the "note" pens of the "debunkers" of the secrets of the Soviet special services reported, however, that "Marshal" Chang Tso-lin was removed by Moscow, and the Soviet intelligence officer Christopher Salnyn was the organizer of the act.

I can't believe it... And now they have learned how to fabricate "documents". Was it worth it for us to remove Chang Tso-lin in order to soon have a conflict on the CER? And if it weren't for Japanese hands, then the Japanese would have dug the earth with their noses after the explosion, and the Soviet "ends" would have been found. How great it would be to blame everything on the "agents of the Comintern"!

These agents in China acted actively, but here, it seems to me, they had nothing to do with it.

The Chinese went to the CER zone in the summer of 1929. But by the autumn of that year, the actions of the Special Far Eastern Army (ODVA), created by order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, quickly sobered up both the provincial Mukden and the central governments. The letter "K" (Red Banner) was added to the name of the ODVA, and the commander of the OKDVA, Vasily Blucher, received the newly established Order of the Red Star, number 1.

However, even after that, China Chiang Kai-shek behaved with us either flattering or - vile. But I have talked about this before.

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In fact, in China, we then broke a lot of firewood. China in the twenties

politically, it was even more of a "patchwork quilt" than Russia during the Civil War. The Blue Brotherhood was there, the Red Brotherhood was there, the Kuomintang was there, the Chinese workers' squads were there...

Shanghai mafia, Nanjing government of Chiang Kai-shek and Chang Xu-eliang, South Chinese troops and northern gangs of militarist generals, Soviet military adviser Galin-Blucher and Trotskyite political adviser Borodin-Gruzenberg, French consul and communist Canton Commune, communists and nationalists ...

There is no firm power, there is no stability of the situation.

Here is the detail...

Soviet emissary Borodin is Chiang Kai-shek's adviser. And his wife, Faina Borodina, and our diplomatic couriers are captured by the soldiers of Chang Tso-lin at the crossing from Shanghai on board the Soviet steamship Pamyat Lenina. Borodina is tried in Beijing, but for a bribe to the judge of 200 thousand dollars (sanctioned by Moscow), they are acquitted, released and immediately begin to search, announcing in Beijing a reward of 30 thousand dollars for her head, and 20 thousand in Mukden ...

Your head may spin!

We could not master the situation in China, and the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Chicherin, regarded the line of the Comintern in China as disastrous. And he was hardly wrong. Even if the proletarians of China were ready to unite with each other and with the proletarians of all countries, they, constituting an absolute minority in China, could not become a force uniting all of China.

And life went on...

Japan intervened in China's affairs to the extent possible, developed economically, raged politically, and gradually prepared to implement the Tanaka program.

In 1928, the "Dangerous Thought Law" was changed - instead of ten years prisons for its violation now relied on the death penalty.

The Japanese also stepped up in China. But rigidity is not always

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rosha, especially for the occupiers. Tanaka sent troops to China's Shandong, but China responded with a massive boycott of Japanese goods. There was also something more serious.

In March 1929, the Japanese were forced to withdraw their troops from Shandong, and on July 2, the Tanaka government fell. Tanaka himself soon died. On the same day, July 2, "genro" Sionlzi proposed to appoint the well-known politician, the leader of the minseito party Hamaguchi, as prime minister.

The Hamaguchi government had to disentangle that political naval "soup", which began to be brewed in 1927 already at the Geneva Naval Conference, England and the USA.

The Washington Conference only revealed the lines of future quarrels. Geneva continued them. And the British invited two other "first-class maritime powers" for consultations in London.

The 1930 London Naval Conference began in January and dealt primarily with the construction of those ships that the Washington Agreement did not restrict - cruisers, destroyers and submarines.

The Japanese insisted on a proportion of 7 Japanese cruisers and destroyers against 10 American and British and equality in boats. The states agreed with regard to heavy cruisers only at a ratio of 6:10.

The British wanted to have 70 cruisers of all types in their fleet, but the Yankees objected that then it would not be a reduction in armaments, but an increase in them.

The construction of a naval base in Singapore by England, clearly aimed against Japan's claims in Southeast Asia, did not calm the passions either.

As a result, by April, a fragile and apparently short-lived compromise was reached. But to many in Japan, compromise already seemed like a crime against the state. Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Kato Kanji, admirals Okada, Togo, Suetsugu stated that Hamaguchi did not ensure the country's maritime defense, and resigned in protest. And on November 14, 1930, Hamaguchi was the death

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but wounded by a member of a chauvinist organization and died in the spring of 1931.

His fellow minseito Watsuoki became prime minister.

By the end of the first third of the 20th century, Manchuria had become one of the largest economic regions in China. It accounted for 93 percent of oil production, about 41 percent of railways (thanks Witte!).

In China's foreign trade turnover, the share of Manchuria reached 37 percent.

In the summer of 1931, in the Manchurian city of Wanbaoshan, clashes began between Koreans settled here by Japan and the Chinese. They were organized, of course, by the Japanese, as were the retaliatory Chinese pogroms in Korea.

At the end of June, the Japanese agronomist Nakamura (who is also a captain in the Japanese army) "mysteriously disappears" in Manchuria. The Japanese military claims "an unheard of insult to the imperial army."

In July 1931, the Japanese press publishes a speech by General Koiso of the Ministry of War delivered at a cabinet meeting on July 7. Koiso declared: "The Russian threat has risen again. The fulfillment of the five-year plan poses a threat to Japan. China is also trying to belittle Japanese rights and interests in Manchuria. In view of this, the Mongol-Manchurian problem requires a quick and effective solution.

On September 15, 1931, the head of military intelligence of the Kwantung Army, Colonel Doihara, personally informs his and Captain Nakamura's "insulted" leadership in Tokyo about the current situation and receives instructions.

And on the night of September 18-19, an explosion thundered on the South Manchurian Railway (YuMZhD) near Mukden. Later, the Japanese blamed everything on supposedly Chinese soldiers, but what was there for them to deny!

History is silent about how far the place of the explosion was from the "via

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duka Chang Tso-lin," but politically the Japanese simply repeated the story of the general. However, this time nothing was hushed up. That's not what it was all about. On the same night, Japanese troops occupied Mukden, then Andong, Changchun and Nyuzhuang. The entire SUMZD zone was taken under control in 18 hours.

The occupation of Manchuria and China began. And she was to become permanent for many years. The "treaty of nine powers" on China was also archived.

The world economic crisis also pushed Japan to aggressive activity. The value of Japanese industrial output fell from 7.4 billion yen in 1929 to 5 billion yen in 1931. Half of the heavy and extractive industries were inactive. There were up to 3 million unemployed

Human.

The social typhoons then were not sweeping over Japan alone. In the summer of 1932, the governor (!) of Minnesota Olson publicly declared to the representative of Washington: "Tell them there, in the capital, that Olson no longer takes anyone who is not red into the national guard! Minnesota - left state".

So the war would be very *useful not* only for Japan.

But no other major capitalist country in the world could then

solve their internal problems through a major external war. .

None other than Japan.

For a big war in Europe, a serious basis was needed. And only the Soviet-German conflict could give it. But by the mid-1930s, Germany was just beginning to grow in steel and armor...

America could only fight far from its territory, but so far there could be no war in Europe ...

War in Asia? With whom? Perhaps only with Japan ... But this war also had to be seriously prepared. The Yankees prepared it in the manner already familiar to them - by indirect actions, as their military theorist Captain Liddell Garth taught the Anglo-Saxons.

Forty-eight hours before the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, US Secretary of State Henry Stimson was visited by Japanese Ambassador Katsui Debuchi. According to Stimson's memoirs, they

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They talked a lot about mutual friendly feelings, and nothing more ... After the interlocutors "expressed satisfaction to each other with the current state of affairs," Debuchi departed ...

And two days later, the Japanese invasion began ...

Stimson - like any high-ranking Yankee, self-confident to the point of revealing himself - let slip: "Manchuria was actually and legally part of China. But the Japanese showed such an interest in Manchuria, historical, political, such a feeling (n-yes. - S.K.) and in this they were backed up by such exclusive rights and claims that the conflict between these claims and the sovereignty of China practically became inevitable.

So, the US Secretary of State - the worthy heir of Quincy and Seward - was sincerely convinced that it is enough to want someone else's very strongly to have the right to take this someone else's ...

The logic and philosophy of a bandit, but who else were the Yankees in their foreign policy throughout their history? And they were far from always worried about whether their "claims" had at least some political or moral justification. And here Stimson and his boss, President Hoover, encouraged Japan insofar as in this way the United States itself was moving towards war ...

Yes, that serious war that the elite of the United States needed could only be started by Japan then. And only in China.

It was Japan that was the first to embark on this tempting for the elite, but very wrong way... Aggression in China expanded, and expanded successfully... Chiang Kai-shek wrote in his diary:

"The dwarf robbers took advantage of the unrest, the internal split and attacked our northeastern provinces..."

And the standard definitions for the Japanese for the Chinese were still "dwarfs", "dwarf devils" ... They talked about the "Kwantung army of dwarfs."

But not only the dexterous David defeated the giant Goliath. The Japanese also beat Chinese troops. And the effect of their victories was far from dwarfed.

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IN SEPTEMBER of the same crisis year of 1931, the Mitsubishi concern for the first time began the production of heavy bombers, moreover, already from the Japanese aluminum.

On February 29, 1932, the "All-Manchurian Conference" gathered in Mukden (however, more precisely, it was assembled by the Japanese), which on March 3 elected the former Emperor of China Pu Yi as the "regent" of the new Manchu state "-

puppet Manchukuo. Accordingly, the Japanese bayonet was already beginning to prop up not only the CER, but also - in a possible future - the Soviet "Amur Bulge" and Mongolia.

Even before the beginning of the events in Manchuria, in the spring of 1931, General Harada was returning through Moscow to Tokyo. In the Russian capital, he met with Ambassador Hirota and military attache Kasahara.

How is Europe? Will she support China against us? —
the ambassador asked the guest.

- No! Harada replied and in turn asked:

Will the Soviets support China?

"They would be happy," Hirota couldn't help smiling, "but the Chinese themselves don't see the need for such support, first of all..."

And immediately corrected:

Unless, of course, they are red...

"So what should I tell the Chief of the General Staff?"

- Tell him that we must pursue a decisive policy against Soviet Russia and be ready at any moment to start a war with the aim of seizing Eastern Siberia ...

Harada shifted his gaze to General Kasahara, who silently nodded his short-cropped head.

But it didn't really come to that... After all, the League of Nations gave Northern China to Japan, counting on the "Siberian" continuation, but the Japanese in the depths of their souls could not help but admit that they left Siberia not at all because they wanted to. But the Russians have become much stronger since then - they didn't have OKDVA then ...

Therefore, so far everything was limited to impudence within the CER - the Japanese and the troops of Pu Yi increasingly moved along the CER without paying fares. Traffic on the road was increasingly disrupted.

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In the spring of 1933, we offered to sell the CER to Japan for 250 million gold rubles. The price is more than similar, but the Japanese expected to get the road for free. Only two years later they paid us 140 million yen for the Chinese Eastern Railway, plus 30 million yen in compensation for dismissed Soviet employees.

It was a shame all this, but what to do... Witte's long-standing anti-Russian provocation was still echoing in our Far Eastern policy, and eliminating the occasion for new provocations was becoming not so small deed.

We are strong.

The Japanese were cautious.

Vladimir Kokkinaki made ultra-long flights, and the newspapers wrote: "If necessary, Kokkinaki will fly to Nagasaki and show everyone Araki, where crayfish spend the winter."

Araki was a Japanese general, minister of war, the idol of the "young officers" and did not hide his feelings towards us. They were, I must say, very far from love ...

In DECEMBER 1934, Japan abandoned the Washington Agreement and demanded the equalization of its fleet with the Anglo-Saxon ones. And at the beginning of 1936, she left the new London Conference, where she, in such an equation refused.

The Arakists became more and more active, although Araki himself retired in 1934. But the reason for it was not Japan's turn to a peaceful course, but a quarrel between the mighty "old" concerns and the arrogant "new" ones with which Araki was associated.

In the same 1934, 60 thousand girls from poor peasant families were sold to brothels.

General Hayashi took the place of Araki, but he soon had to leave. And - to leave about the tragicomic: on August 12, 1935, the Arakist Lieutenant Colonel Aizawa killed Hayashi's deputy for the personnel of General Nagata. "An unprecedented case of insubordination" (an officer kills a general, and not vice versa) and forced Hayashi to resign.

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He was replaced by the Arakist General Kawashima...

Increasingly, communists in Japan were executed, but the Minister of Justice lamented: "The government still cannot achieve the eradication of communism."

However, in general, the political face of Japan was steadily liberal. In the February 1936 elections, the anti-Arakist Minseito party increased its net seats in parliament from 146 to 205, and the militaristic seiyukai lost 132 out of 303 seats it previously had and went into opposition with 171 seats -

especially since the Shakai Taishuto Democratic Party also received an increase from 5 to 18 seats, further reducing the influence of the Arakists.

And on February 26, the coup of the "young officers" began. They brought one and a half thousand soldiers out into the street and occupied the parliament, the military ministry, and the main police department.

The putschists acted, not observing the chain of command at all. Former Prime Minister, Lord Privy Seal Admiral Saita, Finance Minister Takahashi, Chief Inspector of Military Training General Watanabe, Prime Minister Okada's son-in-law were killed in front of their family members.

The chief chamberlain of the emperor, Admiral Suzuki, was seriously wounded.

Premier Okada, "genro" Saioji and Makino managed to escape.

The three-day putsch was not suppressed, it simply dissipated, having received no support from either other military units or from the masses. The latter, although not actively, but clearly opposed the putschists.

As a result, 17 "switchmen" officers were executed (including Lieutenant Colonel Aizawa, who had previously been unpunished). Seven members of the supreme military council (the actual top of the coup) resigned, and four of them (Araki, Mazaki, Hayashi and Abe) left military service forever. The new prime minister was Hirota, the minister of foreign affairs in the fallen Okada government.

The putsch in Tokyo "dissolved" on February 29, and on March 1 of this leap "Olympic" year, Stalin gave an interview to the president of the American newspaper association "Scripps-Howard Newspapers" Roy Howard, where he said: "In case Japan decides to

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fall on the Mongolian People's Republic, encroaching on its independence, we will have to help the Mongolian People's Republic.

On March 12, 1936, an agreement was signed between the USSR and the MPR on mutual assistance.

And Hirota's government lasted a year. On February 2, 1937, he was replaced by the cabinet of one of the retired putschists, General Hayashi, but this prime minister did not last long either. Having dissolved parliament on March 31 and called new elections, the government was defeated and also resigned.

The new cabinet was headed by the 38-year-old "non-party" Prince Konoe - Chairman of the Chamber of Peers, an aristocrat, a lawyer by education, associated with both palace and financial circles. The Konoe regime was intended to ensure "internal harmony" and external warfare.

Even under Hirota, in November 1936, the Japanese raided our

territory near Lake Khanka. And on November 25, 1936, with the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany for 5 years, the Berlin-Tokyo axis took shape.

Formally, the Pact was directed not against the USSR, but against the Comintern (which Foreign Minister Arita emphasized in a conversation with the Soviet ambassador to Japan Yurenev). But the same Arita at a meeting of the secret council "genro" said: "From now on, Soviet Russia must understand that she has to stand face to face with Germany and Japan ..."

In what was said, the desired was much more than the real. Hitler was more inclined to cooperate extensively with us in the economic sphere than to seriously bloc with Japan. But as far as Japan was concerned, it was indeed—despite geography—that it intended to stand face to face with both America and Russia.

Russia, in response, refused to renew the Fishing Convention with Japan, which expired in 1936. However, the leaders of the "Yamato race", not embarrassed by this, were going to catch a different "fish" in the muddy waves of a very muddy

politicians.

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These waves washed Sakhalin-Karafuto, and the shores of the Pacific islands, and the banks of the muddy "Great Yellow River" of the Yangtze ...

They also washed the shores of the former Russian, and now the US Alaska ... By the mid-30s, there, in the Bristol Bay, the Japanese expanded their catch of fish - especially salmon, so that they became for the Yankees something like what the Yankees themselves were for us in the days of Russian America.

And in a memorandum dated November 21, 1937, US President Roosevelt stated: "It seems to me that a possible way out could be a presidential proclamation declaring the sea areas along the coast of Alaska closed to all types of fishing."

Well, the Yankees are like the Yankees ... They have been so - to the core selfish and hypocritical - since the days of the "Pilgrim Fathers" and "Founding Fathers", since the days of Washington and Jefferson, Adams and Monroe, Seward and Hay, Roosevelt -uncles and Taft, Wilson and Hoover.

So why would it be to change Roosevelt-nephew?

That's just - did the Japanese understand this? They - looking back at the United States over and over again - received tactical, momentary benefits from this. And they lost in the strategic, civilizational interest, going into confrontation with the Russians.

And this suited the Yankees quite well.

The year 1938 came...

The middle of July of this year was marked at first by a political conflict in the form of Japanese claims to the Zaozernaya hill in the area of Lake Khasan, and the last day of July already brought the beginning of a military conflict.

However, by August 11, everything was over. OKDVA - albeit not in the most brilliant way - approved the red banner on Zaozernaya. And the Japanese had to agree with the long-standing Russian demarcation of this section of the border.

Well, how was it in Europe?

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Well, the political autumn of 1938 in Europe, which ended with the Munich Agreement on the Sudetenland, was more like a hot summer.

And it was already 1939...

It brought the conflict to Khalkhin Gol to the USSR and Japan.

USSR and Germany in the midst of hostilities at Khalkhin Gol, he brought the Non-Aggression Pact of August 23 ...

Japan was shocked. The government of Hitler's ardent admirer, Prime Minister Hiranuma, has resigned. Much later, Japanese professor Hiromi Teratani said: "Never before or after

there was a case that the Japanese government resigned due to the conclusion of an agreement between two other states between themselves.

Baron Hiranuma, in response to a request to comment on the Pact, replied one thing: "Incomprehensible!"

Teratani believed that the demoralizing significance of this "incomprehensible" event not only hastened the surrender of the Japanese in Mongolia, but also kept them from wanting to spread their expansion towards Russia. That is, the shock of 1939 to some extent determined the choice of the southern direction, where Japan was in conflict with the Yankees.

In the autumn of 1939, pan-Poland fell victim to its own rottenness.

In the spring of 1940, France of "two hundred families" fell victim to its own rottenness, having forgotten about sanity and independence.

A truly incomprehensible situation for an inattentive observer was being created in the world... Although, on the whole, everything went approximately as it should have been for the Golden Elite of the world.

And it is a pity that events did not develop differently. How else?

Well, for example, at least like this...

Imagine the summer of 1940. And imagine that the following message arrives in the United States: "Japan has made peace with China,

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returned South Sakhalin to the USSR and concludes a direct military alliance with the USSR, and Germany joins this alliance ... "

That would have been a commotion! That would start a panic!

Alas, everything happened as the Golden Cosmopolitan

Elite. And the "tangle" of Far Eastern problems became more and more tangled...

And it was possible to unravel it ineptly, but it was possible - and smartly ...

And the year 1940 passed ...

And the year 1941 was already coming ...

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Afterword

ON THE EDUCATION OF 1941, which brought war to Russia and Germany, I am finishing this book ...

Japan, without getting involved in the senseless conflict of Russians and Germans provoked by the same West, nevertheless got its war with Russia in 1945 - already at the initiative of Russia ...

But in that situation, our declaration of war on Japan was not an act ingratitude - as the Japanese sometimes try to present it now.

Firstly, the Japanese would hardly have come out with anything worthwhile in the event of their aggression against us ... Especially since we had to keep very significant forces in the East throughout the entire period of the war with the Germans.

Secondly, competent leaders of peoples and states (and Stalin was highly competent) have no right to be guided primarily by certain ethical considerations. Actually, no one has ever been guided by them in real history (with the exception of a series of incompetent "Russian" monarchs and a number of post-Stalin Soviet unfortunate "leaders"). The not-wise Slavophiles (however, there were never any particularly wise among them) still cannot forgive, say, Prince Bismarck, that at the Berlin Congress he did not defend the interests of Russia with foam at the mouth and did not oppose the Anglo-Jewish politician Disraeli. But Bismarck was not a Russophile, but an intelligent German patriot, and as such he was guided solely by the interests **of his** Fatherland! And honor to him for this and praise!

Personally, I, the author of this book, am also not a Germanophile (although sometimes I am in Internet discussions and are taken for such

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th). I'm not a Japanophile either. I am a Russian Soviet patriot, and if I defend the ideas of the beneficial nature of Russia's partnership primarily with Germany and Japan, it is only because I am convinced that such an alliance is beneficial for Russia ...

For us!!!

By the way, while defending its national interests, Russia does not conflict with the national interests of other peoples. This is explained by the fact that Russia - as already mentioned - is the bearer of the global potential of Good. Preserving and strengthening itself, Russia preserves and strengthens the bright hopes (forgive me this, although successful, but very worn turn) of everything

humanity.

Let's go back to 1945...

The Soviet Union's declaration of war on Japan was not an act of ingratitude because, after the Great October Revolution, Japan took full advantage of the Russian crisis in its exclusively momentary interests.

A strict pedant may want to catch the author on the word "ungenerous", which has a clear ethical meaning... But the rational foreign policy of the powers does not have to be insidious at all. And even quite the opposite. Therefore, the generosity of Japan in relation first to the RSFSR, and then to the USSR would be a rational act in the long run.

However, Japan did not show just rationalism in the "Russian" policy ... We are with you, dear reader, we know about this ...

And instead of, say, peacefully returning South Sakhalin to the USSR and renouncing concession privileges in the Soviet North Sakhalin, Japan looked at Primorye ...

But even the Kuriles, Japan could cede to us peacefully! After all geopolitically, the Kuriles belong to Russia, not Japan ...

None of this was done, and our 1945 war with Japan became more of an act of restoring historical, geopolitical and civilizational justice...

But life went on continuously before, just as continuously goes on and does not

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it will continue discontinuously in the future.. And we can't get away from the future, just as we can't get away from the past that has already happened... So what can and should be said here?

RUSSIA and Japan...

Now for me these two concepts are more and more inseparable from the third concept - Germany ... It was not for nothing that the Anglo-Saxon Homer Lee (and not only him) already in the century before last was frightened by the triple alliance of Germany, Russia and ...

And Japan...

Japan!

By the way, General Kuropatkin, whose military fate was overshadowed precisely by defeats from the Japanese, wrote after that: *"Despite the war, which put a barrier between nations that seemed to be created for alliance and friendship, I still keep a feeling of sympathy for my friends in Tokyo."*

Such words from such lips are very serious "information for thought"...

And here are the impressions of the gunsmith general Fedorov: *"The closer we got to know the people of Japan, the more we became convinced that, despite the recent war, we Russians are treated very kindly. But only the people. Another thing*

- *the government. And in this sense, Japan turned out to be a two-faced Janus.*

Considering all this, our relations with Japan could have been built very, very differently in the 20th century.

As with Germany...

And with both powers - both Western and Eastern - Russia had to be friends and cooperate. However, in the 20th century, at the end of its history, tsarist Russia waged only two wars - first with Japan, then with Germany.

Soviet Russia was in serious conflict and also seriously fought only with Germany and Japan.

Why?

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Is it because they were pitted deliberately - mortally afraid of their alliance!

Although Germany in the West and Japan in the East were, and still are, Russia's most complementary potential partners. And we have a lot in common in our historical destinies...

Only three powers, three peoples in world history have been able to make rapid, by historical standards, instantaneous leaps towards political first-class!

This is Bismarck's Germany, and later Hitler's Reich.

This is the Russia of Peter the Great, and later the Soviet Russia of Lenin, Stalin's Soviet Union.

And this is Japan of the Meiji era, and later Japan of the Sony era...

Of course, Russia and Japan had to learn a lot and borrow a lot from the outside world... They were far behind this world before their civilizational breakthroughs. But at the same time they relied on the forces of their own national spirit and their own national intellect.

It's time, it's time for us to openly admit that the Russians not only harness for a long time, but fast - in the words of the great Bismarck - they drive.

Germany "harnessed" more than two years after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 century.

Japan, after "closing" its *leimitsu* Tokugawa in 1638, "harnessed" too more than two centuries.

And they went...

They went fast!

China is moving fast...

If only I could understand where... A person who knows modern China quite well, confirming my doubts, once told me: "Yes, what is brewed in this one and a half billion-dollar cauldron with the name "China", no one knows yet, including - and the Chinese themselves..."

Well said yes...

But it's brewing!

And brewed on the same planet with us.

Yes, and right next to us.

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And NOW I would like to acquaint the reader with some assessments of the Russian geopolitician of the General Staff, Major General Alexei Efimovich Vandam (Edrikhin), made at the beginning of the 20th century and concerning the subject of this book ... At the same time, the reader will learn some details of the visit of Commodore Matthew Colbright Perry to Japan about which the author has so far been silent.

Here is what Alexey Efimovich wrote in his work "Our Situation" in 1912:

"This discovery (discovery by Nevelsky in the late 40s of the XIX century

the insular position of Sakhalin and the navigation of the Amur. - CK), poorly understood in our country and almost entailed the demolition of Nevelsky himself to the rank and file, on the contrary, in England and America caused great alarm and a number of measures ...

As soon as the news of new Russian discoveries in the Pacific Ocean spread throughout the civilized world, American whalers working off Kamchatka and in the Sea of Okhotsk reached out to the Amur Estuary and the Tatar Strait to observe our actions there. In neighboring Manchuria, the best of political intelligence officers appeared - missionaries. In the States themselves, political thought has been occupied with clarifying the question of what significance the greatest of the basins of the globe, i.e., the Pacific Ocean, can have for mankind in general and for North Americans in particular ...

For its part, the executive branch did not sit idly by. Pondering over the map of the possible occupation of the Amur Basin by Russia in the near future, the leaders of American policy drew attention to the fact that the main Japanese islands of Pezo (Iyozo, Iesso - Hokkaido. - S.K.), Nippon (Honshu . - S.K.), and Kiu-Siu (Kyushu. - CK), stretching out in an arc from Sakhalin to the Korea Strait, represent, as it were, a giant bar (an alluvial shallow at the mouths of the rivers. - S.K), blocking the sea, to which Russia must not today or tomorrow was to go out along the Amur. This circumstance immediately suggested to the Anglo-Saxon mind, accustomed to complex combinations, one of the remarkable

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courage, foresight and depth of calculation of political moves, namely:

Without wasting time, undertake a sea voyage to Japan in order to establish the moral superiority of S.-A. over her with one blow. United States, to take her under his wing and, gradually directing her ambition to the Asian mainland, thus prepare a strong Anglo-Saxon vanguard against Russia from this island state.

And then Vandamme writes about Perry's mission, moreover, with such details that for some reason are omitted in domestic monographs. In the presentation of the chronology of events, he made some inaccuracies, but they are completely redeemed by the systemic accuracy of the estimates:

"For this purpose, by order of the President, a strong squadron of 10 warships was formed and sent to the Pacific Ocean in November 1852 under the command of Commodore Perry. Approaching the coast of Japan in the summer of 1853, Perry, after the Japanese refused to let him into Kurigama Bay, began to bombard the coastal cities. The "black ships" of the Americans, never seen in such numbers, energetic actions and the commanding tone of the squadron commander, instilled panic fear in the Japanese and inspired them with an idea of \u200b\u200bS.-A. the United States as the most powerful nation in the world..."

I note that the "black ships" of the Americans - this juicy detail of the effective psychological pressure of the Yankees - I met only at Vandam, although I was already aware of them from that Japanese engraving, which in

described in his place.

"Thus giving the Japanese a sense," Vandam finishes, "first by force, the Americans then declared themselves the spiritual fathers of this people, which they had led out of a closed state, and forced them to accept, in addition to diplomatic representatives, also special advisers on foreign affairs. The latter, closely following our every step in Asia and

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gradually instilling in the Japanese fear of Russia and hatred for everything Russian, they began to turn our neighbor, who is easily influenced by others, into a suspicious and dangerous enemy ... "

Not everything stated here is factually correct, having given some erroneous forecasts, Vandam surprisingly perspicaciously caught the essence of what was happening in the Pacific Ocean, in the Far East, and also, I will note additionally, and his connection with the hasty sale of the "kings" of Russian America, namely the Yankees ...

However, I wrote a separate book about the history of the natural foundation, contradictory development and the violent end of Russian America - "Russian America: to open and sell!".

THIS BOOK began as a study primarily of relations between Russia and Japan. Already in the course of work, the topic expanded due to the Chinese and Korean aspects, as well as the need to show the role of the United States and England in playing off two Pacific neighbors - the Russian and Japanese empires.

But ultimately this book is like all my previous books, and like me I hope future books are written about Russia and with Russia in mind...

At the "high banks of the Amur" there are still watchmen of the Motherland.

And they have something to protect!

Kremlev (Arzamas-16),

July 8, 2005

12 hours 21 minutes.

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About the author. SERGEY KREMLEV (Sergey Tarasovich Brezkun)

Ukrainian. Born October 7, 1951 in Dnepropetrovsk in the family of an engineer railwayman.

He graduated from secondary school named after A.S. Pushkin in Kerch and the engine building faculty of the Kharkov Order of Lenin Aviation Institute. NOT. Zhukovsky. By profession, he is a rocket engine engineer.

After serving in the coastal units of the Black Sea Fleet, from 1978 to the present, he has been an employee of the oldest Center for the Development of Soviet Nuclear Weapons in the city of Arzamas-16 (later - the city of Kremlev, now - the city of Sarov, Nizhny Novgorod Region).

He took part in the development and design of thermonuclear charges, in 1981, he participated in field tests at the Semipalatinsk test site.

In 2003 he was elected professor at the Academy of Military Sciences.

Author of numerous publications in periodicals on a wide range of socio-political and military-political topics, including the conceptual problems of nuclear weapons.

Co-author (with I.I. Nikitchuk) of two small books "START-2 at a glance" and "21st century. Will Russia have a nuclear weapons complex? (the latter was published as an official publication of the State Duma of the Russian Federation), as well as (with V.N. Mikhailov) the book Good or Evil? (Philosophy of a stable world).

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During 2003-2004, the ACT publishing house published three books by Sergei Kremlev (Brezkun) on Russian-German and Soviet-German relations in the Great Confrontation series: Russia and Germany: Play Off!, Russia and Germany: Together or Separate ? and "Russia and Germany: Path to a Pact".

In 2005, the Yauza publishing house published two more of his books: Russian America: Discover and Sell! and "Kremlin visit of the Fuhrer (Visit of fate)".

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